Ex Parte Charbonnier et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 23, 2017

13002852 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/002,852 03/08/2011 Emilien Charbonnier 1032326-000531 4746
21839 7590 02/27/2017
BUCHANAN, INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC
POST OFFICE BOX 1404
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22313-1404
EXAMINER
ZHU, ZHIMEI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2495
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ADIPDOCl@BIPC.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte EMILIEN CHARBONNIER, ANTOINE GALLAND, and
PATRICK GEORGE
Appeal 2015-000584
Application 13/002,852
Technology Center 2400
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.
THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—10, all the pending claims in the
present application. See Claim Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The present invention relates generally to managing an access from
remote device to data and/or at least one resource accessible from a local
device. See Abstract.
Appeal 2015-000584
Application 13/002,852
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for managing an access from a remote device
to data and/or at least one resource accessible from a local device,
wherein the local device includes a browser, and the
remote device hosts a server, as a remote server, the method
comprising:
- a remote server connecting step in which the browser
sends to the remote server a request for loading data,
- a local server interconnecting step in which the remote
server sends, through the browser, to a local server a request for
connecting to a local server, as a response to the request for loading
data; and
- a local server connecting step in which the local server
sends data to the remote server, the local server being connected from
the remote server to data storing means and/or at least one resource
accessible from the local device.
Appellants appeal the following rejections:
Rl. Claims 1, 3, 9, and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Fiducci (US 2006/0242273 Al, Oct. 26, 2006);
R2. Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fiducci and Rao (US 2006/0236325 Al, Oct. 19, 2006);
R3. Claims 4, 5, and 7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fiducci, Rao, and Kamath (US 6,754,696 Bl, June 22,
2004); and
R4. Claims 6 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fiducci, Rao, Kamath, and Hesselink (US 2005/0144186
Al, June 30, 2005).
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Application 13/002,852
ANALYSIS
Anticipation rejection of Claims 1, 3, 9, and 10
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding that Fiducci discloses the
remote server sends, through the browser, to a local server a request for
connecting to a local server, as set forth in claim 1?
Appellants contend that “it is not inherent that Fiducci’s remote server
sends a request to such a ‘file system program’ through a browser . . .
Fiducci does not explain how the remote server scans the account user
storage device” (App. Br. 6). Appellants further contend that “Fiducci’s
system computer could scan the files on the user computer by sending a
request over a different channel, separate from a browser connection,... for
example peer-to-peer client applications, file-sharing programs, or anti-virus
programs” {id. at 7).
The Examiner finds that in Fiducci “the browser is the only program
installed . . . the request from the remote server (system computer 12) to the
local server ... is necessarily sent through the browser on the user
computer” (Ans. 10—11; see also Final Act. 5).
Here, Fiducci discloses that the “[w]eb browser software is required
. . . Beyond a common browser, no specialized hardware or software need be
installed on account user computer 10 to fully utilize the features disclosed
herein” (| 43). We highlight that Fiducci does not state that “the browser is
the only program installed,” as proffered by the Examiner {see Ans. 10).
Instead, as noted supra, Fiducci merely states that no specialized software
“need be installed” in order to copy data between the account user computer
and the system computer. In other words, Fiducci notes that at a minimum
its method can function with just a common browser on the account user
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Application 13/002,852
computer 10. In this specific situation, we agree with the Examiner that
Fiducci’s request from the remote server to the local server would
necessarily be sent through the browser. Even if we agree with Appellants’
aforementioned contention that Fiducci’s system computer could scan the
files on the user computer by other means such as “peer-to-peer client
applications, file-sharing programs, or anti-virus programs” (see App. Br. 7),
we note that this contention fails to address the Examiner’s specific finding
regarding the situation whereby no specialized software is installed on the
account user computer other than a common browser.
Appellants further contend that “[t]he Answer contradicts the position
taken in the final rejection which alleges that it is inherent that Fiducci’s
computer 12 has a file system program in addition to a browser” (Reply Br.
2). For example, in the Final Action, “[t]he Examiner interpreted] the file
system program of a local device as a local server” (see Final Act. 2), and
emphasized that “there has to be a program running on the local device to
serve the request of the remote server for connecting the local device” {id. at
5). We agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that there has to be a program on the local device to achieve
connection between the remote server and local device (e.g., to access and
transmit data (local server)). However, no specialized hard ware/soft ware is
needed, beyond the common browser, to utilize Fiducci’s data backup
method, which would necessarily send the request through the browser. For
at least these reasons, we find Appellants’ contentions unavailing.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of
claim 1. Appellants’ arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 10 rely on the same arguments as for claim 1, and
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Application 13/002,852
Appellants do not argue separate patentability for dependent claims 3 and 9.
See App. Br. 5—8. We therefore also sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of claims 3, 9, and 10.
Obviousness rejection of Claim 2
Issue 2: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings
of Fiducci and Rao teach and/or suggest a local server, as set forth in claim
2?
Appellants contend that “Rao’s client device 107 is not a local server,
nor does it serve any requests on behalf of any local client” (App. Br. 9) and
“[i]t would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to
modify Fiducci’s ‘file system program’ which runs on computer 10 with
Rao’s client device 107 capable of authenticating a server” (id.).
In response, the Examiner finds that “the Office Action already
established that Fiducci teaches a local server” (see Ans. 11) and “[t]he only
necessary modification to Fiducci’s ‘file system program’ ... is the local
server performing an additional step of a remote server authentication, as
taught by Rao” (id. at 12). We agree with the Examiner.
Appellants’ argument against Rao separately from Fiducci does not
persuasively rebut the combination made by the Examiner. One cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually, where the
rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425-26
(CCPA 1981). Here, the Examiner finds that Fiducci discloses a local server
(see Ans. 11; see also Final Act 4—5). Furthermore, “[t]he test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
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Application 13/002,852
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference,” but rather
“what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested.”
See In re Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. We find that Appellants have not
demonstrated error in the Examiner’s combination of the references to form
the claimed invention.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2.
Obviousness rejection of Claims 4—8
Issue 3: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined cited art
teaches and/or suggests a local server and transmitting third credentials, as
set forth in claim 4?
Appellants contend that “Kamath’s client device 80 is not a local
server, nor is it a ‘file system program’” (App. Br. 11) and that “[a]t best,
Kamath teaches the use of first credentials” (id. at 12).
We point out that Appellants’ argument against Kamath separately
from Fiducci and Rao does not persuasively rebut the combination made by
the Examiner because one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually, where the rejections are based on combinations of
references (see Ans. 14). Here, the Examiner uses the combined teachings
of Fiducci, Rao, and Kamath to teach the local server and credentials.
Again, we find that Appellants have not demonstrated error in the
Examiner’s combination of the references to form the claimed invention.
Appellants further contend that “Kamath does not teach the temporal
aspect recited in claim 4 of authorizing a local server to continue while
transmitting third credentials to the local server” (App. Br. 12) and “claim 4
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Application 13/002,852
was filed in the original specification and is part of the disclosure” (Reply
Br. 7).
In response, the Examiner finds that “the claim limitation ‘while’ . . .
cannot be interpreted to indicate a temporal aspect in light of the
specification” because “in Fig. 7 of the specification, messages 710 and 712
are sent sequentially instead of simultaneously” (Ans. 15, citing Spec.
29:11—25), they “do not occur at the same time” {id. at 16), and “[t]he
Examiner interprets ‘while’ in claim 4 to mean ‘whereas’” {id.). We agree
with the Examiner.
“During examination, claims ... are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . . claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Amer. Acad, of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Here, the Examiner directed Appellants’ attention to page 29 of
their Specification, and highlighted that the relevant disclosure failed to
illustrate a simultaneous transmission of the comparison result and the third
credentials. Specifically, Appellants’ Specification merely discloses
“[w]hen the comparison between the received data and the user
authentication ticket is positive .... In such a latter case, the authentication
server 112 sends to the local server 48 a message 712 comprising an
operation authentication key . . .” (29:19-25). In other words, Appellants’
Specification does not support that the authentication key be sent
simultaneously with (i.e., “while”) authenticating/authorizing the local
server, as argued by Appellants.
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A claim meaning is reasonable if one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand the claim, read in light of the specification, to encompass the
meaning. See In reAmer. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364. Here,
we find the Examiner’s interpretation, i.e., “while” to mean “whereas,”
reasonable in light of Appellants’ Specification.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4—8.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 102(b) and § 103(a) rejections Rl—R4.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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