Ex Parte Chambliss et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 20, 201614158807 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/158,807 01/18/2014 David D. Chambliss TUC920130160US1 3183 78650 7590 12/22/2016 Nelson anH Nelson EXAMINER 775 High Ridge Drive Alpine, UT 84004 SNYDER, STEVEN G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2184 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/22/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): dan @ nnpatentlaw .com alexis @nnpatentlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DAVID D. CHAMBLISS, BRUCE MCNUTT, WILLIAM G. SHERMAN, and YAN XU Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 Technology Center 2100 Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, DEBRA K. STEPHENS, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION According to Appellants, the claims are directed to a feedback mechanism using queuing latency feedback to improve I/O performance Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 (Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for improving I/O performance using queuing latency feedback, the method comprising: generating, at a host system, an I/O for processing on a storage system, the I/O having a priority association therewith; receiving the I/O at the storage system; measuring, by the storage system, queuing latency experienced by the I/O as the I/O is processed by the storage system; returning, by the storage system, the queuing latency to the host system; and using, by the host system, the queuing latency to adjust the priority of subsequent I/Os transmitted to the storage system. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Field US 5,428,616 June 27, 1995 Lumb US 7,917,903 B2 Mar. 29, 2011 Brown US 2007/0174346 A1 July 26, 2007 Muppirala US 2011/0066770 A1 Mar. 17,2011 Oe US 2012/0265907 A1 Oct. 18, 2012 2 Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7—9, 11, 12, 14—16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muppirala, Oe, and Brown (Final Act. 2—9). Claims 3, 10, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muppirala, Oe, Brown, and Field (Final Act. 10-11). Claims 6, 13, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muppirala, Oe, Brown, and Lumb (Final Act. 11—12). We have only considered those arguments that Appellants actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2016). ISSUES 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7—9, 11, 12, 14—16, 18, and 19 Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7—9, 11, 12, 14—16, 18, and 19, is not obvious over Muppirala, Oe, and Brown (App. Br. 4—9). The issues presented by the arguments are: Issue 1: Does the combination of Muppirala, Oe, and Brown teach, suggest, or otherwise render obvious: [Measuring, by the storage system, queuing latency experienced by the I/O [Input/Output1] as the I/O is processed by the storage system; 1 Although Appellants do not provide an explanation in their Specification as to what I/O stands for, we determine an ordinarily skilled artisan, at the time of the invention, would have understood I/O (or IO) to refer to Input/Output (see e.g., Microsoft Computer Dictionary 287 (Fifth ed. 2002)). 3 Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 returning, by the storage system, the queuing latency to the host system; and using, by the host system, the queuing latency to adjust the priority of subsequent I/Os transmitted to the storage system, as recited in claim 1 ? Issue 2: Does the combination of Muppirala, Oe, and Brown teach, suggest, or otherwise render obvious “wherein returning the queuing latency to the host systems compris[es] returning the queuing latency with an I/O completion status to the host system,” as recited in claim 4? ANALYSIS We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken; and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Answer in response to the Appeal Brief. With respect to the claims argued by Appellants, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows. Appellants assert Brown fails to teach that a storage system returns queuing latency to a host system (App. Br. 5). According to Appellants, “Brown speaks broadly of ‘feedback’ without describing exactly what information is contained in the ‘feedback’ that is transmitted between components” (id. at 6). Appellants more specifically contend Brown’s first feedback loop appears to contain control signals that adjust assignment of system resources to workload groups and Brown’s second feedback loop appears to contain control signal that adjust the execution of requests (id. ). 4 Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 Thus, according to Appellants, neither feedback loop describes queuing latency information is contained in the feedback (id. ). Moreover, Appellants argue, Brown’s third feedback mechanism does not teach transmitting queuing latency from a storage system to a host system (id.). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. As explained by the Examiner, Appellants are arguing the references individually (Ans. 14—15). The Examiner relies on a combination of the teachings and suggestions of Muppirala, Oe, and Brown to teach the recited invention (Final Act. 3—5; Ans. 2—5, 13—15) whereas Appellants are arguing the references individually. We emphasize, the Examiner relies on Muppirala’s for measuring latency and Oe for teaching measuring queuing latency experienced by an I/O request in a storage system (Ans. 13). The Examiner further relies on Brown as teaching a feedback mechanism for adjusting and managing priorities to achieve goals of a closed-loop system (id. at 13—14). The Examiner determines “it would have been obvious to include a feedback mechanism for adjusting 10 priorities in the system of Muppirala and Oe” (id. at 14). Moreover, the Examiner cites Brown as teaching a feedback mechanism for adjusting and managing priorities in order to achieve goals of a closed loop system; Muppirala as teaching latencies associated with a storage s and a host system; and Oe as teaching queuing latency (id. at 14). Appellants’ arguments directed to Brown individually do not substantively address the combined teachings of the cited references and are therefore unpersuasive (see In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references”)). Each 5 Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole (see In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Here, the Appellants are arguing Brown must contain all the recited limitations without considering the Examiner’s findings and reasoning that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined the teaching and suggestions of the cited references. For these reasons, we find unavailing, Appellants’ arguments that the combination of Muppirala, Oe, and Brown fails to teach, suggest, or otherwise render obvious the invention as recited in independent claim 1, and as commensurately recited in independent claims 8 and 15. Appellants further argue Brown fails to teach “returning the queuing latency with an I/O completion status to the host system,” as recited in claim 4 (App. Br. 8). According to Appellants, Brown discloses “optimizer adaptive feedback” and a “feedback mechanism” but fails to disclose what is contained in the feedback or how the feedback is provided (id.). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. The Examiner relies on Muppirala and Oe as teaching returning an I/O completion status and teaching queuing latency (Final Act. 6—7; Ans. 16). The Examiner further combines the teachings and suggestions of Muppirala and Oe with Brown’s teaching of the feedback mechanism and using feedback data to adjust priority of I/Os taught by Brown (Ans. 16). Moreover, the Examiner finds an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine Brown’s feedback with Muppirala and Oe’s system including completion status, so the completion status includes the queuing latency data (id. at 16— 17). 6 Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 Appellants again are arguing the references individually. Indeed, Appellants’ arguments directed to Brown individually do not substantively address the combined teachings of the cited references. In the Reply Brief, Appellants, for the first time, present arguments that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 4. Appellants have not explained why, nor is it apparent that these arguments were necessitated by a new point in the Answer or any other circumstance constituting “good cause” for its belated presentation. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (2016). Therefore, we are not persuaded the combination of Muppirala, Oe, and Brown teaches, suggests, or renders obvious “returning the queuing latency with an I/O completion status to the host system,” as recited in claim 4. Accordingly, Appellants have not persuaded us the combination of Muppirala, Oe, and Brown fails to teach, suggest, or otherwise render obvious the limitations as recited in independent claims 1, 8, and 15 or in claim 4. Appellants have not separately argued dependent claims 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, and 19; therefore, these claims fall with their respective independent claims. It follows, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7—9, 11, 12, 14—16, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Muppirala, Oe, and Brown. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 3, 10, and 17 Appellants have not separately argued dependent claims 3,10, and 17 or claims 6, 13, and 20. Accordingly, these claims fall with their respective independent claims 1, 8, and 15. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 3,10, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Muppirala, Oe, Brown, and Field; and the rejection of claims 6, 13, and 20 7 Appeal 2016-004294 Application 14/158,807 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Muppirala, Oe, Brown, and Lumb. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7—9, 11, 12, 14—16, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muppirala, Oe, and Brown is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 10, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muppirala, Oe, Brown, and Field is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 13, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Muppirala, Oe, Brown, and Lumb is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation