Ex Parte Chaji et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 11, 201814291231 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 11, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/291,231 05/30/2014 Gholamreza' Chaji 058161-000082USP1 4043 01/16/201870001 7590 NIXON PEABODY LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 3500 CHICAGO, IL 60602 EXAMINER SATANOVSKY, ALEXANDER ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2857 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/16/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketingchicago @ nixonpeabody.com ipairlink @ nixonpeabody. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GHOLAMREZA CHAJI, JAIMAL SONI, JONATHAN JEKIR, and ALLYSON GIANNIKOURIS Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,2311 Technology Center 2800 Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, AVELYN M. ROSS, and SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134, Appellants appeal from the Examiner’s rejections adverse to the patentability of claims 1 and 4—9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. We affirm. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Ignis Innovation Inc. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 SUBJECT MATTER Sole independent claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and is copied below with key limitations relevant to this appeal italicized for emphasis: 1. A method of testing an active matrix organic light emitting device (AMOLED) display panel for defects during fabrication of the display panel, the method comprising detecting defects in entities forming the display panel at an intermediate stage in the fabrication of multiple types of entities forming the display panel, said entities including thin film transistors, organic light emitting devices (OLEDs), and signal conductors, wherein said defects are detected by measuring voltages or currents in at least one of said thin film transistors, organic light emitting devices (OLEDs), and signal conductors, and determining whether the measured voltages or currents exceed preselected thresholds for the types of entities in which said currents or voltages are measured, if the measured currents or voltages do not exceed said preselected thresholds, continuing the fabrication of the display panel, and if the measured currents or voltages exceed said preselected thresholds, identifying the types of defects detected, repairing the identified defects, and continuing the fabrication of the display panel. App. Br. 8 (emphasis added). 2 Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of unpatentability: Roach US 6,274,978 B1 Aug. 14, 2001 Tai US 2002/0014851 A1 Feb. 7,2002 Itoh US 2002/0176013 A1 Nov. 28,2002 Lee US 2007/0152672 A1 July 5,2007 Claims 1 and 5—9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lee in view of Tai and Roach. Final Act. 3—9. Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Lee in view of Tai, Roach, and Itoh. Final Act. 9-10. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Examiner finds that Lee teaches each of the limitations of claim 1, but does not disclose where measured voltages or currents exceed a plurality of preselected thresholds for the types of entities in which said currents are measured. Final Act. 3—5. The Examiner relies on Tai for this disclosure. Id. at 5—6. The Examiner also finds that Lee does not teach the claimed identifying, repairing, and continuing steps in the event that the measured currents or voltages exceed the preselected thresholds, and relies on Roach for this disclosure. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to have modified the teachings of Lee in view of Tai and Roach in order “to ensure an effective testing of an OLED array (pixel) panel,” and to make any necessary repairs while manufacturing the display so that defective components would not be used in a completely fabricated display panel, which would be wasteful and expensive. Id. at 6—7. 3 Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 OPINION We have considered Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 4—7; Reply Br. 1—5) and are unpersuaded that Appellants have identified any reversible error in the Examiner’s rejections. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365—66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring an Appellant to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection). Therefore, we sustain the obviousness rejections before us based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and rebuttals to arguments well- expressed by the Examiner in the Final Action and the Answer. We add the following comments for emphasis. Appellants’ arguments in the principle brief focus on the teachings of the Tai and Roach references individually. App. Br. 4—6. Such arguments, however, on their own, fail to identify reversible error. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references. . . . [The reference] must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Specifically, Appellants contend that “Tai contains no disclosure of any of the thresholds required by claim 1” because Tai “expressly teaches that a defective [circuit] is detected by comparing the current reading from each pixel circuit with the current readings from the other pixel circuits.” App. Br. 4—5. This argument fails to identify error, however, because it does not address the combination of Fee and Tai upon which the Examiner relies. Here, the Examiner finds that Fee discloses “determining whether the detected defects exceed [a] preselected threshold” (Final Act. 4) and relies on Tai to establish a plurality of such thresholds {id. at 5—6). Moreover, we 4 Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 note that Appellants do not explain with any specificity how Tai’s comparison of values does not meet the recited “threshold” limitation. We also find this argument unpersuasive because, in the Answer, the Examiner explains that Tai discloses the recited thresholds in two respects (Ans. 6, citing Tai Tflf 12, 13, 36, 37), and Appellants fail to challenge this finding. Reply Br. generally. Appellants also urge that the Examiner erred by citing to paragraphs 10 and 11 of Tai because these paragraphs relate to LCD panels and not OLED displays. App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 1—3.2 This argument is not persuasive because, as correctly explained by the Examiner (Ans. 9), paragraphs 10 and 11 of Tai were cited in the final rejection’s obviousness rationale because these paragraphs “relate [] to the plurality of types of entities (such as TFTs and OLED pixels that Tai discloses in paragraph [0011]) but not the particular kind of tested display.” Therefore, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 10) that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Tai “were raised in the rejection merely because they provided disclosure of a plurality of types of entities in [display] panels, including the components . . . such as the TFT 54 and OLED 56.” We discern no error in the Examiner’s reliance on such disclosure because it establishes that several of the recited entities 2 Appellants make several erroneous statements on page 3 of the Reply Brief. First, Appellants allege that “[t]he Examiner’s Answer cites, for the first time, paragraphs [0013] and [0037]-[0040] of Tai as relevant to the ‘determining’ step.” However, paragraphs 13, 37, and 40 were cited in the Final Rejection regarding the “determining” step. Final Act. 5—6. Further, Appellants state that paragraphs 10 and 11 “were the only paragraphs of Tai cited in the Final Rejection.” This is incorrect, as paragraphs 13, 14, 31, 33, 36, 37, and 40 of Tai were relied upon by the Examiner in the Final Rejection. Final Act. 5—6. 5 Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 (i.e., thin film transistors (TFTs) and organic light emitting devices (OLEDs)) were known in the art. Based on this disclosure, we agree with the Examiner that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan “to use specific thresholds for different types of entities” in order “to be able to identify . . . their corresponding potential defects based on measured currents or voltages” therein. Final Act. 6. Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in mapping the recited “entities” to Lee’s disclosure of a pixel circuit. Reply Br. 2. We decline to consider such argument, however, because Appellants have not shown good cause regarding why this argument could not have been raised in the Appeal Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(l)(iv) (“Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”). See also 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply brief which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument raised in the examiner’s answer, including any designated new ground of rejection, will not be considered by the Board for purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”). We emphasize here that the Examiner mapped the claimed entities to Lee’s “tested pixel circuit” in the Final Rejection. Final Act. 4. We also discern no persuasive merit in Appellants’ arguments regarding the Roach reference because they do not reflect the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1. App. Br. 4—5; Reply Br. 4—5. During examination, claims are given the broadest reasonable interpretation that is consistent with the specification. See In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Construing claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant. . . because the applicant has the 6 Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise claim coverage.” Id. Conditional steps need not be found in the prior art if, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, such steps need not be performed. See Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792 (PTAB April 28, 2016) (precedential). Here, the Examiner relies on the disclosure of Roach to establish that it was known to identify and repair defects and before continuing with the display panel’s progressive assembly. Final Act. 6. Claim 1, however, requires these steps to only be performed “if the measured currents or voltages exceed [] preselected threshold” values. Thus, based on the limitations as written, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1 encompasses instances wherein the condition precedent is not met (i.e., when the measured currents or voltages do not exceed preselected thresholds). Appellants’ arguments presume that the condition precedent is met, and are unpersuasive because they are not consistent with the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1. Moreover, even if Appellants’ arguments were commensurate in scope with the claim, such arguments would not be persuasive of reversible error because Appellants have not sufficiently explained why Roach’s testing and repair protocol, carried out prior to final assembly of the components (Roach 7:28— 33, 39-43), is any different than the claimed method which tests for defects during panel fabrication. Finally, we note that Appellants’ statement that “the Examiner’s Answer contains a new ground of rejection, although the Examiner’s 7 Appeal 2017-003491 Application 14/291,231 Answer does not designate it as such” (Reply Br. 3), is a petitionable matter. 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a).3 SUMMARY The Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1 and 4—9 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED 3 “Any request to seek review of the primary examiner’s failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an examiner’s answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under § 1.181 of this title filed within two months from the entry of the examiner’s answer and before the filing of any reply brief. Failure of appellant to timely file such a petition will constitute a waiver of any arguments that a rejection must be designated as a new ground of rejection.” 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation