Ex Parte Cavanaugh

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 18, 2014

11871293 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/871,293 10/12/2007 Craig Cavanaugh 070165 (BLL0513US) 6525
36192 7590 12/18/2014
AT&T Legal Department - CC
Attn: Patent Docketing
Room 2A-207
One AT&T Way
Bedminster, NJ 07921
EXAMINER
PEACH, POLINA G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2165
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/18/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

____________

Ex parte CRAIG CAVANAUGH
____________

Appeal 2012-005653
Application 11/871,293
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., and
JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges.

KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1–4, 7–11, and 14–18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to “automating distribution
of digital media” (Spec. ¶ 1).
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the
subject matter on appeal.
Appeal 2012-005653
Application 11/871,293

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1. A method for automating distribution of digital media,
the method including:
receiving a digital media content file over a network, the
digital media content file containing electronically captured
content;
associating the received digital media content file with a
destination identifier specifying a destination for the
electronically captured content and an output medium identifier
specifying an output medium for the electronically captured
content, the specifying a destination for the electronically
captured content and the output medium identifier specifying an
output medium is performed using a combination of: automatic
specifying by a media capturing device, automatic specifying
by an application server; and in response to user input received
at the application server;
storing a user profile associated with a user identifier,
wherein the user profile associates the user identifier with the
destination identifier and the output medium identifier, wherein
the digital media content file is associated with the destination
identifier and the output medium identifier by retrieving the
destination identifier and the output medium identifier from the
user profile;
producing an output medium that includes the
electronically captured content using the output medium
identifier, wherein the destination includes a physical address
identifying a physical location to which a physically tangible
medium that comprises the output medium is sent; and
sending the output medium to the destination specified
by the destination identifier.

REFERENCES and REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1–4, 7–11, and 14–18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) based upon the teachings of Lapstun (US 2006/0012814 A1, pub.
Jan. 19, 2006) and McIntyre (US 2003/0009527 A1, pub. Jan. 9, 2003).

Appeal 2012-005653
Application 11/871,293

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ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds Lapstun discloses all the claim limitations except
for explicitly disclosing the destination includes a physical address
identifying a physical location to which a physically tangible medium is sent
(Ans. 6). The Examiner then finds McIntyre explicitly discloses this
limitation (Ans. 7).
Appellant’s main contention is the Examiner is incorrect in finding the
recited “output medium identifier” to be the same as Lapstun’s “value”
(App. Br. 9). That is, Appellant asserts an image “cannot include an
identifier for the medium” and thus, is not an output medium identifier (id.).
We do not agree.
Upon consideration of the evidence on this record and each of
Appellant’s contentions, we find the preponderance of evidence supports the
Examiner’s conclusions that Appellant’s claims 1–4, 7–11, and 14–18 are
obvious over the combination of Lapstun and McIntyre. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejections of each of these claims for the reasons set
forth in the Answer (Ans. 14–22). For emphasis only, we provide the
following.
We agree with the Examiner, in light of Appellant’s Specification
“that ‘output medium identifier’ can be an email, telephone or instant
message” (Ans. 20). We also agree producing an attachment formatted for
email, MMS, printer, or fax (i.e., physical destinations) is analogous to
producing an output medium and sending it to a specified destination (Ans.
21).
Thus, we are not persuaded of Examiner error. We find the weight of
the evidence supports the Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion of
Appeal 2012-005653
Application 11/871,293

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obviousness, and therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4,
7–11, and 14–18.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 7–11, and 14–18 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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