Ex Parte Casati et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 7, 2013

11041653 (P.T.A.B. May. 7, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FABIO CASATI, MEHMET SAYAL, MARIA
GUADALUPE CASTELLANOS, YIFAN LI, and MING-
CHIEN SHAN
____________________

Appeal 2010-011848
Application 11/041,653
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before: JEAN R. HOMERE, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judges.

STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1-6, 8, 9 and 11-27. Claims 7 and 10 are objected to as being dependent
upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in
independent form. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

The claims are directed to a method and a system for process
discovery. Claims 1 and 4, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed
subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
extracting process data from a data source;
creating a trace using the extracted process data, wherein the
trace comprises a plurality of events; and
detecting a process model using the plurality of events.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein detecting the process model
comprises detecting a sequence process type if a number of
elements in the set comprising events that directly follow one
another is one (1) and a probability of Ys immediately
following Xe is greater than about 0.9.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Agrawal US 6,278,977 B1 Aug. 21, 2001

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REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112
second paragraph as being indefinite. Ans. 3.
Claims 1-3, 11-21 and 24-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being anticipated by Agrawal. Ans. 4.

We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of the
Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner has erred.
We agree with Appellants’ conclusions as to claims 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and
23. However, we disagree with the Appellants’ conclusions in connection
with claims 1-3, 11-21 and 24-27 and, in connection therewith, adopt as our
own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action
from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner
in the Examiner’s Answer in response to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief and
we concur with the conclusion reached by the Examiner. We highlight the
following arguments for emphasis.

REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2
Claims 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23
The Examiner finds that
[t]he term “about” is used in the claim but the specification
does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree
required by “about.” While the specification provides
antecedent basis for “about .90” or “about .05”, nothing in the
claim, specification or prosecution history suggests what range
of probability (e.g. is exactly .9 covered, just below, just above
etc) is covered by the claims as presented.
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Ans. 4.
Appellants contend that the term “about” is used in connection with
statistical probabilities. App. Br. 9. Appellants argue that, unlike the facts in
Amgen1 wherein the use of the term “about” was found to render the claim
indefinite, “Appellants are not relying on a specific range recitation to
differentiate the present claims from the reference cited by the Examiner.”
Id. Appellants further argue that “[t]he fact that the probabilities are
approximate does not make them indefinite.” Reply Br. 4. We agree with
Appellants.
The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is
whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the
claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted). Furthermore, the meaning of the word “about” is dependent on the
facts of a case, the nature of the invention, and the knowledge imparted by
the totality of the earlier disclosure to those skilled in the art. Eiselstein v.
Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1995). While sympathetic to the
Examiner’s position, we find that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
understand the meaning of “greater than about” (claims 4, 6, 9, and 22) and
“less than about” (claims 5, 8, and 23) when read in light of the
Specification. In particular, the Specification defines a “high probability” to
be greater than about 0.9 (Spec. [0022]) and a “low probability” to be less
than about 0.05 (Spec. [0023]). Thus, one skilled in the art would appreciate
that, for example, rounding errors might result in a probability calculation of

1 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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0.89 which would be understood to be “about 0.9” and within the “high
probability” context of the Specification. Therefore, on the record before us,
we find that Appellants have shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that the claim terms “probability ... great than about 0.9” and
“probability ... is less than about .05” in claim 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23 renders
the claims indefinite. Accordingly, we will not sustain the rejection of
claims 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.

REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
Claims 1, 14, 20 and 25
Appellants argue that while Agrawal discloses developing an audit
trail during a pattern collection step, it uses a current process model to
generate a next process model, omitting any detection of a process model.
App. Br. 11-12. The Examiner responds that Appellants’ argument
“presupposes a narrow definition of ‘detecting a process model’ [which is]
incongruent with the ‘Broadest reasonable interpretation’ of ‘detecting.’”
Ans. 28. Based on a dictionary definition of “detect” that includes both
“discover[ing] the existence of” and “find[ing] out the true character or
activity of” (id.), the Examiner finds that Agrawal’s teaching of data mining
algorithms 104 used to analyze audit trail 102 for execution pattern 105 so as
to generate a next process model 106 (Ans. 5, citing Agrawal col. 13, ll. 15-
20) discloses the disputed claim limitation of detecting a process model
using the plurality of events (Ans. 29). We agree with the Examiner.
During examination of a patent application pending claims are given
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In
re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969); In re Am. Acad. of Sci.
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Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, limitations
appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not read into
the claim. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without
importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily).
Thus, while Appellants argue that Agrawal does not disclose “detecting a
process model,” Appellants’ Specification does not provide an explicit
definition of what is meant by “detecting.” We instead find it reasonable
and agree with the Examiner that Agrawal’s analysis of audit trails
performed by data mining algorithms so as to generate a next process model
discloses detecting a process model using a plurality of events.
Furthermore, while Agrawal discloses using an “a posteriori”
approach that starts with “a rough approximation of a process model . . .
[and] improve[s] the process model” (Agrawal col. 4, ll. 23 – 28),
Appellants’ Specification discloses a similar starting point. In particular, log
files 104a-104e are disclosed by Appellants as storing events “related to one
or more business processes.” Spec. [0030]. It is from these process-related
events that process discovery engine 106 creates and reorganizes traces, and
detects process models within the traces. Spec. [0031]. Thus, Appellants’
method employs a starting point of processing data related to one or more
business processes. Similarly, Agrawal discloses a pattern collection step
using audit trail records wherein the “an audit trail record, encompasses a
process model instance identification of the process model instance within
said activity that is being executed.” Agrawal col. 3, ll. 59-62. Accordingly,
Appellants’ arguments that Agrawal is different because it generates a next
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model from an existing model ignores that both Agrawal and Appellants’
invention rely on data related to business processes.
Further, Appellants’ disclose that detecting a process model may
include the steps of claim 3:
3. The method of claim 1, wherein detecting the process
model comprises:
reorganizing the plurality of events within the trace to
create a reorganized plurality of events;
deriving a set comprising events that directly follow one
another for a task X and a task y from the reorganized plurality
of events;
deriving a set comprising events that indirectly follow
one another for the task X and the task Y from the reorganized
plurality of events;
and detecting a process using the set of events that
directly follow one another and the set of events that indirectly
follow one another.

That is, according to Appellants’ Specification, detecting a process
model includes reorganizing events, deriving sets of events that (i) directly
and (ii) indirectly follow one another, and detecting a process using the
derived sets. Thus, Appellants’ “detecting” step includes organizing events
into a representation of a process, steps that are also disclosed by Agrawal.
Therefore, based on Appellants’ own use of the term “detecting,” we again
find that Agrawal discloses “detecting a process model using the plurality of
events.”
For the reasons discussed supra, we find that Appellants have failed to
provide sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us that Agrawal fails to
disclose the disputed claim limitations. Therefore, we sustain the rejection
of claim 1 and for the same reason claims 14, 20 and 25 rejected under 35
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U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Agrawal together with the rejections
of claims 2, 3, 11-13, 15-19, 21, 24, 26 and 27 not separately argued.

CONCLUSION
Appellants have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s decision to
reject claims 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 second paragraph as
being indefinite. Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims
4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23. However, we sustain the rejection of claim 1-3, 11-21
and 24-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Agrawal.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 4-6, 8, 9, 22 and 23 is
reversed. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-3, 11-21 and 24-
27 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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