Ex Parte Carter

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 14, 2018

13479539 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 14, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/479,539 05/24/2012 Stephen R. Carter 4860P12814C2 1784
45217 7590 03/16/2018
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP/ APPLE INC.
Attn: IP Docketing
P.O. Box 7037
Atlanta, GA 30357-0037
EXAMINER
POPHAM, JEFFREY D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/16/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
FIP_Group @bstz. com
PTO.MAIL@BSTZPTO.COM
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEPHEN R. CARTER
Appeal 2016-002190
Application 13/479,5391
Technology Center 2400
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—20. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2
1 The Appeal Brief identifies Apple Inc. as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief, filed August 7, 2014
(“App. Br.”); Appellant’s Reply Brief, filed February 10, 2015 (“Reply
Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed December 24, 2014 (“Ans.”); the
Final Office Action, mailed January 17, 2014 (“Final Act.”); and the
Specification, filed May 24, 2012 (“Spec.”).
Appeal 2016-002190
Application 13/479,539
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims on Appeal
Claims 1,10, and 19 are independent claims. Claim 1 is reproduced
below:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing
executable instructions that when executed by a device cause a
method to be performed, the method comprising:
identifying, by the device, one or more time intervals or
dates that a principal is likely to be logged into a network;
determining that the principal is not logged into the
network during the one or more time intervals or dates; and
based on the determining, performing one or more actions
over the network pretending to be the principal and by using a
cloned identity for the principal, wherein the one or more actions
performed are related to one or more areas of interest that are
divergent from one or more areas of interest associated with a
true identity of the principal, and the one or more actions are
performed during the one or more time intervals or dates.
References
Chesko et al. US 2002/0038431 A1 Mar. 28, 2002
Hassett et al. US 6,807,558 B1 Oct. 19, 2004
Borders US 2007/0094725 Al Apr. 26,2007
Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1—3, 5, and 8—16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being unpatentable over Hassett. Final Act. 10—16.
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hassett and Borders. Final Act. 17.
Claims 6, 7, and 17—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Hassett and Chesko. Final Act. 17—22.
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Application 13/479,539
ANALYSIS
Rejection of claims 1—3, 5, and 8—16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
Appellant states that “[cjlaim 1 is a representative claim of group 1.
Claims of group 1 stand or fall together.” App. Br. 6. Based on Appellant’s
designation of claim 1 as representative of the claims in this ground of
rejection, we will decide the appeal as to this ground based on claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“For each ground of rejection applying to two
or more claims, the claims may be argued separately (claims are considered
by appellant as separately patentable), as a group (all claims subject to the
ground of rejection stand or fall together), or as a subgroup (a subset of the
claims subject to the ground of rejection stand or fall together). When
multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group
or subgroup by appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the
group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection
with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim
alone.”).
We have considered Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1, and, for the reasons explained below, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Hassett anticipated claim 1. Rather,
Appellant’s own arguments highlight the lack of clarity of the claim
language or, at least, the breadth of the claim language such that it
encompasses the disclosure of Hassett.
With respect to the limitation of claim 1 reciting “identifying, by the
device, one or more time intervals or dates that a principal is likely to be
logged into a network” (hereinafter, “the identifying limitation”), the
Examiner relies on Hassett’s disclosure of determining that a subscriber is
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likely to be logged in during the daytime. Final Act. 10 (citing Hassett,
9:57-10:15, 15:65-16:67); Ans. 3-8.
With respect to the limitation of claim 1 reciting “determining that the
principal is not logged into the network during the one or more time
intervals or dates” (hereinafter, “the determining limitation”), the Examiner
relies on Hassett’s disclosure of determining that the subscriber is away from
his or her computer during the daytime. Final Act. 10 (citing Hassett, 9:57—
10:15, 15:65-16:67); Ans. 8-11.
Claim 1 further recites:
based on the determining, performing one or more actions over
the network pretending to be the principal and by using a cloned
identity for the principal, wherein the one or more actions
performed are related to one or more areas of interest that are
divergent from one or more areas of interest associated with a
true identity of the principal, and the one or more actions are
performed during the one or more time intervals or dates
(hereinafter, “the performing limitation”). With respect to the performing
limitation, the Examiner relies on Hassett’s disclosure of the subscriber’s
computer connecting to the information server while the subscriber is away
from the computer to download information to the subscriber’s computer.
Final Act. 10—11 (citing Hassett, 6:22—30, 8:15—25, 8:51—58, 9:15—10:15,
11:5-30, 13:25—47, 15:65-16:67, 32:15-23); Ans. 11-23. The Examiner
finds that “acquiring data related to one category specified by the user that is
divergent from another category specified by the user” (Final Act. 11)
discloses actions that “are related to one or more areas of interest that are
divergent from one or more areas of interest associated with a true identity
of the principal,” as recited in claim 1.
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Appellant’s arguments attempt to differentiate the claimed subject
matter as a whole from that of Hassett by stating that, “in general, the claim
subject matter provides techniques to pollute electronic profiling, using a
cloned identity of a user.” App. Br. 10. Claim 1, however, does not recite
polluting, as the Examiner correctly noted in the Answer. Ans. 2. In the
Reply Brief, Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to electronic polluting
based on the recitation of performing actions “related to one or more areas of
interest that are divergent from one or more areas of interest associated with
a true identity of the principal.” Reply Br. 13. As noted above, the
Examiner finds that “acquiring data related to one category specified by the
user that is divergent from another category specified by the user” (Final
Act. 11) discloses actions that “are related to one or more areas of interest
that are divergent from one or more areas of interest associated with a true
identity of the principal,” as recited in claim 1. For example, Hassett
discloses various categories that may be selected and that are divergent from
each other, such as “Weather,” “Sports,” and “Health.” Hassett, 13:25—47
(cited at Final Act. 7), Figs. 8 and 9. Appellant does not present persuasive
arguments showing error in this finding of the Examiner. Therefore, even if
claim 1 is directed to electronic polluting based on the “divergent” language
of claim 1, Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us the Examiner erred in
finding Hassett discloses this subject matter.
Turning to the identifying and determining limitations of claim 1,
Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s interpretation of being “logged into
the network” as “using the network” or “being online” (Ans. 10). Reply
Br. 6. Appellant argues: “[Tjhere is no definition of Togged into the
network’ in the first group of claims 1—3, 5, and 8—16 or the specification-as-
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filed. Thus, there is no requirement that Togged into the network’ means
what the Answer claims it does.” Reply. Br. 6. Appellant then cites various
sources of extrinsic evidence and argues:
A reading of these definitions shows that the broadest
reasonable interpretation of the claimed “logged into the
network” refers to establishing communication and initiating
interaction with a network or gaining access to a network/web
server. Consequently, the claimed “not logged into the network”
refers to not communicating or interacting with a network or not
having access to a network/web server.
Reply Br. 6—7.
Appellant’s proposed definition of “logged into a network” does not
distinguish the identifying and determining limitations of claim 1 from the
disclosure of Hassett. In particular, Hassett discloses:
The profiler 206 can be used to specify a connection
schedule other than the default schedule. For instance, if the
subscriber’s computer is typically turned off at night, the
administrative update connection may be scheduled to occur (A)
during the subscriber’s typical lunch time, or (B) once per day
when the subscriber’s computer has not received any user input
for a specified minimum period of time (e.g., ten minutes) that
indicates the subscriber is away from his/her computer.
Hassett, 10:7—15. Thus, Hassett discloses that the subscriber (the claimed
“principal”) is likely to be logged in during the day (“one or more time
intervals”) so that the update should occur during the day. Hassett further
discloses determining that the subscriber is not logged in during that time
interval because “the subscriber’s computer has not received any user input
for a specified minimum period of time.” Hassett, 10:12—13. Because the
subscriber has not entered any input into the computer for a period of time,
Hassett discloses that the subscriber has been determined to be “away from
his/her computer,” and, thus, has been determined to be “not communicating
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or interacting with a network” under Appellant’s own definition of the
phrase “not logged into the network.”
Turning to the performing limitation, Appellant argues Hassett does
not disclose performing actions “pretending to be the principal and by using
a cloned identity for the principal.” App. Br. 14—19; Reply Br. 11—13. In
particular, Appellant argues the Examiner’s finding that the IP address of the
subscriber’s workstation discloses a cloned identity is incorrect because
“Hassett only discloses one identity performing its operations, regardless of
the user’s status on the workstation.” App. Br. 16—17 (citing Final Act. 4—
5). Appellant asserts that paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Specification
“provide^ a complete definition of the ‘clone,’” and Appellant argues that
“the broadest reasonable definition of a clone is another identity that is
associated with a principal and is a doppelganger or a dead ringer clone of
the principal that appears to be the principal to others that interact or monitor
the clone over the network.” Reply Br. 12. According to Appellant, “[i]n
view of the complete definition of a clone, a proper example would be that a
first IP address is the principal, while a similar (but not identical) second IP
address is a clone of the principal (the first IP address).” Reply Br. 12.
We are not persuaded. Appellant’s Specification states that “[a]
‘principal’ is a specific type of resource, such as an automated service or
user that acquires an identity.” Spec. 115 (emphasis added). The
Specification further states that “[a]n ‘identity’ is something that is
formulated from one or more identifiers and secrets that provide a statement
of roles and/or permissions that the identity has in relation to resources.”
Spec. 116. Hassett discloses that a subscriber (user) has a user profile with
various information, including “subscriber identifier 212” and “connection
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password] 213.” Hassett, 9:15—24 (cited at Final Act. 11). Therefore,
Hassett’s subscriber is a “principal” within the meaning of claim 1, as
viewed in light of the Specification.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the subscriber computer’s
address cannot be considered a “clone” of the subscriber. Applying
Appellant’s proposed definition, the subscriber computer’s address is
“another identity that is associated with a principal” in that it is not the
identity comprising the identifier and password discussed above. Rather, it
is another identity but is still associated with the principal in that it identifies
the principal’s computer. Furthermore, the activity originating from the
principal’s computer address “appears to be the principal to others that
interact or monitor the clone over the network.” Indeed, Hassett discloses
that the subscriber’s computer “initiate[s] a connection to the information
server” to receive updates. Hassett, 9:57—10:15. Thus, to any eavesdroppers
who monitor the network traffic originating at the address of the subscriber’s
computer, the automated updates will appear to be activity of the subscriber
because it is the subscriber’s computer when it is actually the automated
updating software acting in the subscriber’s absence.
Therefore, having considered Appellant’s arguments regarding the
rejection of claim 1, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Hassett discloses the limitations of claim 1 and, therefore, anticipated
claim 1. As such, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of
claim 1, as well as the anticipation rejection of claims 2, 3, 5, and 8—16,
which Appellant argues stand or fall with claim 1. See App. Br. 6.
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Rejection of claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant argues that Hassett is not analogous art to the claimed
subject matter and, therefore, that the rejection of claim 4 as obvious over
Hassett and Borders is improper. App. Br. 20-21. In particular, Appellant
argues that “the present application is related to electronic privacy and
techniques to pollute electronic profiling,” areas to which Hassett does not
relate. App. Br. 21. As noted above, however, claim 1, from which claim 4
depends, does not recite polluting, and claim 4 also does not recite polluting.
As also noted above, even if claim 1 is directed to electronic polluting based
on the “divergent” language of claim 1, the Examiner finds Hassett discloses
this subject matter. The Examiner finds Hassett is analogous to the claimed
subject matter because it discloses all of the limitations of claim 1. Ans. 23—
24. Having failed to persuade us claim 1 is not anticipated by Hassett,
Appellant’s arguments that Hassett is non-analogous for the same reasons
are not persuasive of Examiner error.
We, therefore, are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 4 and, therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 4 as obvious over
the combined teachings of Hassett and Borders under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection of claims 6, 7, and 17—20 under 35 U.S.C. f 103(a)
Appellant states that “[cjlaim 6 is a representative claim for claims in
group 3. Claims in group 3 stand or fall together.” App. Br. 6. Based on
Appellant’s designation of claim 1 as representative of the claims in this
ground of rejection, we will decide the appeal as to this ground based on
claim 6. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Claim 6 recites: “The non-transitory medium of claim 1, wherein
performing further includes selecting the one or more actions to pollute
information gathered by a potential eavesdropper to the network or to the
principal.” The Examiner relies on Chesko’s disclosure of performing
fictitious searches to teach polluting information gathered by a potential
eavesdropper. Final Act. 18 (citing Chesko, Abstract, || 26—31, 34—36, 40).
Chesko discloses “increas[ing] the personal privacy and security of the
networked client computer by generating random fictitious outputs
concurrently or remotely with actual outputs. The outputs can be Internet
searches and e-mail messages.” Chesko, Abstract. The Examiner finds a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to
to incorporate the Internet privacy techniques of Chesko into the
content download and display system of Hassett in order to
enhance privacy and security of users with respect to programs
which track, profile and target users based [on] their Internet
browsing history, and/or to allow users to set security and
privacy levels, such that each individual user can obtain the
amount of security and privacy they so desire.
Final Act. 18.
Appellant argues:
Chesko describes generating dummy searches that the user has
no interest in performing. Thus, the combination of Hassett and
Chesko would result in Hassett’s system creating areas of interest
that the user would have no interest in. Thus, the combination
would result in Hassett’s system pushing advertisements, news
updates, etc., on information for which the user would have no
desire or interest.
Thus, the combination would render Hassett
unsatisfactory for its intended purposes.
App. Br. 23.
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The Examiner responds that, in the asserted combination, “[t]he
system of Hassett still works in its intended fashion, since Hassett will still
download news and advertisements as described therein, and the
incorporation of Chesko merely adds in additional subject matter regarding
performing fictitious network actions that enhance privacy and security of
users.” Ans. 26. We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s reasoning.
Chesko’s functionality of performing additional operations, such as
fictitious searches, to generate additional network data to confuse a potential
eavesdropper does not render Hassett unsatisfactory for its intended purpose
of downloading information to a subscriber’s computer. The addition of
Chesko’s electronic pollution scheme to Hassett’s system gives the user
potentially more security and privacy, as disclosed in Chesko and pointed
out by the Examiner. Chesko | 11 (“providing a method and computer
program for enhanced security and privacy for individuals using the Internet
by allowing individual computer users the choice of the level of security and
privacy they require without having to rely on the voluntary compliance of
other persons.”); Final Act. 18; Ans. 25—26.
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claim 6, as well as the obviousness rejection of claims 7 and 17—20, which
Appellant argues stand or fall with claim 6. See App. Br. 22.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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