Ex Parte Carp et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Mar 22, 2007

10430883 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 22, 2007)

1
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written 2
for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board. 3
4
5
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 6
__________ 7
8
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND 9
INTERFERENCES 10
__________ 11
12
Ex parte TENLEY ANNE CARP, 13
MILTON B. FRIEDMAN and 14
NATALYA B. DAVIDOV 15
__________ 16
17
Appeal 2007-0768 18
Application 10/430,8831 19
Technology Center 3600 20
__________ 21
22
Decided: March 22, 2007 23
__________ 24
25
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, JENNIFER D. BAHR and LINDA E. 26
HORNER, Administrative Patent Judges. 27
28
LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge. 29
30
31
DECISION ON APPEAL 32
33
34
35
36
37

1 Filed 7 May 2003. The real party in interest is JurySignUp.com.

Appeal 2007-0768 Page 2
Application 10/430,883

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
2
The appeal is from a decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1, 4-7, 3
11-19 over the prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2002). We have jurisdiction 4
under 35 U.S.C. § 6 (b) (2002). 5
We AFFIRM. 6
Appellants, in the Brief2, argue the claims as a group with respect to 7
each ground of rejection. Pursuant to the rules, the Board selects 8
representative claims 1, 11 and 14 to decide the appeal with respect to each 9
ground of rejection, respectively. 37 CFR § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2005). 10
Claims 1, 11 and 14 read as follows: 11
1. A method for determining a trial type for which a proposed 12
juror is suitable, comprising: 13
a. forming a master database of names of citizens eligible to 14
serve as jurors from a set of all citizens residing within a trial court’s 15
jurisdiction; 16
b. forming a master jury wheel from the master database by 17
using a random selection procedure to select a smaller set of names of 18
citizens, said smaller set of names of citizens representative of a fair 19
demographic cross section of the set of all citizens residing within the 20
trial court’s jurisdiction; 21
c. randomly selecting a plurality of prospective jurors from the 22
plurality of names of citizens from the master jury wheel and storing 23
data in a database for a jury voir dire system comprising a name, a 24
social security number, a first juror identification number and a court 25
identification number for each one of the plurality of prospective 26
jurors; 27

2 Our decision will make reference to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Br.,” filed
6 June 2006) and to the Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed 29 August
2006) and to Appellants’ Reply Brief (“Reply,” filed 30 October 2006).

Appeal 2007-0768 Page 3
Application 10/430,883

d. providing access to a Juror Suitability Test form to each of 1
said plurality of prospective jurors over a general purpose computer 2
network, said Juror Suitability Test form including a plurality of 3
questions designed to determine at least one of a plurality of trial 4
types for which each of said prospective jurors is suitable to sit as a 5
juror; 6
e. accepting responses to each of said plurality of questions on 7
the Juror Suitability Test form over said general purpose computer 8
network; and 9
f. comparing the responses for each of said plurality of 10
questions on said Juror suitability Test form to a stored standard set of 11
responses for each of said plurality of questions and assigning a group 12
category to each of said plurality of prospective jurors, said assigned 13
group category indicative of at least one of a plurality of trial types for 14
which each of said plurality of prospective jurors is suitable to sit as a 15
juror. 16
17
11. An automated process for conducting jury voir dire for a trial 18
court comprising the steps of: 19
a. transmitting a Juror Suitability Test form to each of a 20
plurality of prospective jurors from a host server over a general 21
purpose computer network, said Juror Suitability Test form including 22
a plurality of questions designed to determine at least one of a 23
plurality of trial types for which each of said plurality of prospective 24
jurors is not suitable to sit as a juror; and 25
b. accepting responses to each of said plurality of questions to 26
said host server over said general purpose computer network to allow 27
comparison of the responses for each of said plurality of questions on 28
said Juror Suitability Test form to a stored standard set of responses 29
for each of said plurality of questions and to allow assignment of a 30
group category to each of said plurality of prospective jurors, said 31
assigned group category indicative of at least one of a plurality of trial 32
types for which each of said plurality of prospective jurors is not 33
suitable to sit as a juror. 34
35
14. The automated process for conducting jury voir dire for a trial 36
court of claim 11, further comprising transmitting a summons for jury 37
service to each one of said plurality of prospective jurors that is 38
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 4
Application 10/430,883

suitable, said summons including an assigned report date for said 1
qualified prospective juror to report to the trial court for jury service. 2
3
ISSUES 4
5
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not shown that the 6
following claimed limitations are taught or suggested in the cited prior art: 7
with respect to claim 1: 8
• categorizing responses to a Juror Suitability Test form from 9
prospective jurors and assigning them to a group indicative of a trial type for 10
which a prospective juror is suitable to sit as a juror (see FF 11 below); and, 11
• administering the claimed Juror Suitability Test prior to any 12
prospective juror panel being assembled at a trial (FF 12); 13
14
with respect to claim 11: 15
• administering the claimed Juror Suitability Test prior to any 16
prospective juror panel being assembled at a trial prior to a prospective juror 17
being summoned as a panel to court for a trial (FF 18); and, 18
• automating the process (FF 19); and, 19
20
with respect to claim 14: 21
• transmitting a summons only to those jurors who are suitable for the 22
trial, the suitability test having already been administered (FF Error! 23
Reference source not found.). 24
25
The issue is whether Appellants have established that the references 26
do not teach or suggest the claimed limitations and thus shown that the 27
Examiner erred in rejecting the claims as being unpatentable over the prior 28
art. 29
30
31
32
FINDINGS OF FACT 33
34
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 5
Application 10/430,883

The following findings of fact (FF) are believed to be supported by at 1
least a preponderance of the evidence. 2
1. The claims are drawn to an automated process for conducting jury voir 3
dire for a trial court involving the transmitting of a Juror Suitability 4
Test form to each of a plurality of prospective jurors over a general 5
purpose computer network. The Juror Suitability Test form includes a 6
plurality of questions designed to determine for what trial type(s) each 7
prospective juror is (claim 1) or is not (claim 11) suitable to sit as a 8
juror. A computer readable medium containing computer executable 9
instructions for conducting jury voir dire for a trial court comprising 10
instructions for transmitting the The Juror Suitability Test form is also 11
claimed (claim 15). 12
2. The Jury Research Institute (www.jri-inc.com) is a publication 13
modified on, at the latest, April 22, 1999 (page 2). Appellants do not 14
dispute that The Jury Research Institute (www.jri-inc.com) qualifies as 15
prior art. The Jury Research Institute discloses "The Prospective Juror 16
Questionnaire." Page 6. The Jury Research Institute describes a process 17
involving submitting the "Prospective Juror Questionnaire" to jurors in 18
court before voir dire begins. The answers are reviewed and given a 19
score (see page 9: "Develop a uniform scoring system.") and then the 20
prospective jurors are rated (page 10). 21
3. The Northern District of Texas Jury Plan 22
(www.txnd.uscourts.gov/rules/misc_rules.html) is a publication of a 23
plan to implement the policy of the United States as expressed in 24
section 1861, Title 28 of the U.S. Code. It was adopted and went into 25
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 6
Application 10/430,883

effect in 1998 (see page 27). Appellants do not dispute that the 1
Northern District of Texas Jury Plan qualifies as prior art. 2
4. The Examiner finally rejected claims 1, 4-7, and 15-19 as being 3
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the Northern District of 4
Texas Jury Plan in view of The Jury Research Institute. Answer 4. 5
5. The Examiner has made a limitation-by-limitation analysis of the 6
claims, finding that the Northern District of Texas Jury Plan discloses 7
steps a., b., and c. of claim 1. Answer 4-5. 8
6. The Examiner finds the differences between the subject matter sought 9
to be patented and the Northern District of Texas Jury Plan are (a) the 10
steps in the claim directed to using a Juror Suitability Test form, i.e., 11
steps d., e., and f. of claim 1, and (b) automating steps d. and e. over a 12
general purpose network. Answer 5-6. 13
7. As to steps d., e., and f. of claim 1, the Examiner finds them discussed 14
in The Jury Research Institute at page 4 (sections 1-2), page 6, page 8 15
(section 1), page 9 (section1) and page 10. Answer 5-6. 16
8. The Examiner finds "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary 17
skill in the art at the time of the invention to include the Juror 18
Suitability Test of the Jury Research Institute in the well known jury 19
selection process in order to expedite the jury selection process by 20
allowing a more focused and thus quicker voir dire process." Answer 6. 21
9. As to automating steps d. and e. over a general purpose network, the 22
Examiner appears to argue that doing so merely provides automatic 23
means for performing the manual activity necessary to conduct the 24
prior art jury plan and that this difference (automatic v. manual) cannot 25
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 7
Application 10/430,883

patentably distinguish the claimed process from the prior art-disclosed 1
process because it accomplishes the same result, i.e., jury selection, 2
relying on In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95, 120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 3
1958). Answer 6-7. 4
10. The Examiner finds "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary 5
skill in the art at the time of the invention to automate the providing 6
and accepting steps because this would speed up the process of 7
providing and receiving questionnaires, which is a purely known and 8
an expected result of automating a known manual process in the art." 9
Answer 7. 10
11. Appellants argue that the references do not teach categorizing 11
responses to a Juror Suitability Test form from prospective jurors and 12
assigning them to a group indicative of a trial type for which a 13
prospective juror is suitable to sit as a juror. 14
The novel features of the present invention in which prospective 15
jurors respond to a Juror Suitability Test and the responses are 16
categorized and assigned to a group indicative of at least one of a 17
plurality of trial types for which each of the plurality of prospective 18
jurors is suitable to sit as a juror is absent from the references, taken 19
either singly or in combination. 20
21
Br. 15. 22
23
12. Appellants also argue that, in contrast to the applied prior art, "the 24
claimed Juror Suitability Test is administered prior to any prospective 25
juror panel being assembled at a trial." Br. 14 (emphasis in original). 26
13. The examiner finally rejected claims 11-13 as being unpatentable 27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over The Jury Research Institute. Answer 10. 28
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 8
Application 10/430,883

14. The Examiner has made a limitation-by-limitation analysis of the 1
claims, finding that The Jury Research Institute discloses steps a. and 2
b. of claim 11. Answer 10-11. 3
15. The Examiner finds the difference between the subject matter sought to 4
be patented and The Jury Research Institute is in automating steps a. 5
and b. using a host server over a general purpose network. Answer 11. 6
16. As to automating steps a. and b. using a host server over a general 7
purpose network, the Examiner appears to argue that doing so merely 8
provides automatic means for performing the manual activity 9
necessary to conduct the prior art jury plan and that this difference 10
(automatic v. manual) cannot patentably distinguish the claimed 11
process from the prior art-disclosed process because it accomplishes 12
the same result, i.e., jury selection, relying on In re Venner, 262 F.2d 13
91, 95, 120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958). Answer 11-12. 14
17. The Examiner finds "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary 15
skill in the art at the time of the invention to automate the providing 16
and accepting steps because this would speed up the process of 17
providing and receiving questionnaires, which is a purely known and 18
an expected result of automating a known manual process in the art. 19
The Jury Research Institute discusses the want to expedite the jury 20
selection process by allowing a more focused and thus quicker voir 21
dire process. See page 6, section 2." Answer 12. 22
18. Appellants argue that "the Juror Suitability Test of the claimed 23
invention is administered prior to a prospective juror being summoned 24
as a panel to court for a trial." Br. 16 (emphasis in original). 25
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 9
Application 10/430,883

19. Appellants also argue that "automation of the process is not disclosed 1
in the applied references." Br. 16. 2
20. The examiner finally rejected claim 14 as being unpatentable under 35 3
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over The Jury Research Institute 4
in view of the Northern District of Texas Jury Plan. Answer 13. 5
21. Claim 14 depends on claim 11. 6
22. To address the features of claim 14, the Examiner cites the Northern 7
District of Texas Jury Plan, finding that it "teaches transmitting a 8
summons for jury service to each one of said plurality of prospective 9
jurors that is suitable, said summons including an assigned report date 10
for said qualified prospective juror to report to the trial court for jury 11
service," citing page 17. Answer 13. 12
23. Appellants do not discuss the Northern District of Texas Jury Plan and 13
therefore do not dispute the Examiner's finding of FF 22. 14
24. Appellants’ complete argument is: 15
It is respectfully submitted that the Examiner has 16
mischaracterized the content of claim 14. In particular, the Examiner 17
characterizes the claim as summoning the juror before performing 18
the suitability test, and therefore asserts that The Jury Research 19
Institute discloses this feature. 20
To the contrary, claim 14, as depending from claim 11, 21
transmits a summons only to those jurors who are suitable for the 22
trial, the suitability test having already been administered. 23
Accordingly, Appellants respectfully request that the Honorable 24
Board of Appeals and Interferences Reverse the rejection of claim 25
14 under 35 US.C. [sic U.S.C.] § 103. 26
27
Br. 16-17. 28
29
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 10
Application 10/430,883

25. Appellants do not dispute that, if the Examiner’s characterization of 1
claim 14 is correct, the prior art discloses the features of claim 14. 2
3
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 4
5
1. A prima facie case of obviousness is established by presenting 6
evidence that would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the 7
relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the claimed invention. See In 8
re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In 9
re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016, 173 USPQ 560, 562 (CCPA 1972). 10
2. “The prima facie case is a procedural tool of patent examination, 11
allocating the burdens of going forward as between examiner and applicant. 12
In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 707 n.3, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1657 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 13
1990). The term “prima facie case” refers only to the initial examination 14
step. In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 15
1984); In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 16
1976). As discussed in In re Piasecki, the examiner bears the initial burden, 17
on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie 18
case of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward 19
with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 20
1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 21
22
2. Claims are given the broadest reasonable construction consistent with 23
the specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 24
1997). 25
26
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 11
Application 10/430,883

3. “What the prior art teaches, whether it teaches away from the claimed 1
invention, and whether it motivates a combination of teachings from 2
different references are questions of fact.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 3
1199-1200, 73 USPQ2d 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 4
5
4. “[I]t is well settled that it is not “invention” to broadly provide a 6
mechanical or automatic means to replace manual activity which has 7
accomplished the same result. In re Rundell, 18 CCPA 1290, 48 F.2d 958, 9 8
USPQ 220[, 221] [“Appellant argues that his rejected claims rest upon an 9
automatic mechanism. The mere statement that a device is to be operated 10
automatically instead of by hand, without a claim specifying any particular 11
automatic mechanism, is not the statement of an invention. Marchand v. 12
Emken, 132 U. S. 195; In re Gill, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 700, 36 F. (2d) 13
128.”]” In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95, 120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958). 14
15
16
ANALYSIS 17
The rejection of claims 1, 4-7, 15-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the 18
Northern District of Texas Jury Plan in view of The Jury Research Institute. 19
20
The Examiner has presented evidence and a reasoned analysis in 21
support of her contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have 22
been led to combine the relevant teachings of the references to arrive at the 23
claimed invention and thus established a prima facie case of obviousness of 24
the claimed invention over that of the combined prior art. FF 4-10. The 25
burden now shifts to Appellant to come forward with evidence or argument 26
showing error in the Examiner’s determination. 27
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 12
Application 10/430,883

Appellants argue that the references do not teach or suggest 1
categorizing responses to a Juror Suitability Test form from prospective 2
jurors and assigning them to a group indicative of a trial type for which a 3
prospective juror is suitable to sit as a juror. FF 11. 4
Appellants' argument is directed to step f. of the claimed method. In 5
simple terms, step f. describes assigning group categories to prospective 6
jurors (and not the Test's responses, as Appellants have argued), indicative 7
of trial types for which they are suitable to sit as jurors, depending on 8
answers they give to a Juror Suitability Test form. The Juror Suitability Test 9
form is designed to determine whether a prospective juror is suitable for a 10
particular trial type (see step d.). It reads on the "The Prospective Juror 11
Questionnaire" The Jury Research Institute discloses. FF 2. 12
It is clear to one of ordinary skill in the art following the process The 13
Jury Research Institute describes (FF 2) that prospective jurors in the trial 14
may attain a rating that would cause counsel to either exercise or not 15
exercise a peremptory challenge to the juror's suitability as a juror in the 16
trial. In rating prospective jurors based on their responses to the 17
questionnaire, The Jury Research Institute process is in effect categorizing 18
prospective jurors based on their suitability for the trial, that is, whether the 19
prospective juror is suitable for the type of trial for which he or she has been 20
called to serve. While The Jury Research Institute does not explicitly state 21
that the prospective jurors are categorized by groups indicative of a trial type 22
for which a prospective juror is suitable to sit as a juror, that is in effect what 23
The Jury Research process accomplishes. In other words, the scores are in 24
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 13
Application 10/430,883

fact group categories indicative of a type of trial for which a prospective 1
juror is suitable to sit as a juror. 2
Appellants also argue that the references do not teach that the claimed 3
Juror Suitability Test is administered prior to any prospective juror panel 4
being assembled at a trial. FF 12. However, this argument is not 5
commensurate in scope with what is claimed. Its acceptance requires us to 6
read into the claims a step of administering the Test to a prospective juror 7
panel prior to being assembled at a trial. However, given their broadest 8
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, the claims on 9
appeal require no more than providing the Test to prospective jurors and 10
accepting their responses over a computer network, and that can be 11
accomplished while a prospective juror panel is assembled at a trial. In re 12
Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348, 213 USPQ 1, 5 (CCPA 1982) (“Many of 13
appellant’s arguments fail from the outset because, … they are not based on 14
limitations appearing in the claims ….”). 15
All of Appellants' arguments having been addressed and found 16
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection, the rejection is affirmed. 17
18
19
20
21
The rejection of claims 11-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) The Jury Research 22
Institute. 23
24
The Examiner has presented evidence and a reasoned analysis in 25
support of her contention that one of ordinary skill in the art would have 26
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 14
Application 10/430,883

been led to the relevant teachings of The Jury Research Institute to arrive at 1
the claimed invention and thus established a prima facie case of obviousness 2
of the claimed invention over that of The Jury Research Institute. FF 13-17. 3
The burden now shifts to Appellant to come forward with evidence or 4
argument showing error in Examiner’s determination. 5
Appellants argue that that the references do not teach that the claimed 6
Juror Suitability Test is administered prior to any prospective juror panel 7
being assembled at a trial. FF 18. However, as before, this argument is not 8
commensurate in scope with what is claimed. Its acceptance requires us to 9
read into the claims a step of administering the form to a prospective juror 10
panel prior to being assembled at a trial. However, given their broadest 11
reasonable interpretation, the claims on appeal require no more than 12
transmitting the form to prospective jurors and accepting their responses 13
using a host server over a computer network, and that can be accomplished 14
while a prospective juror panel is assembled at a trial. 15
Appellants also argue that "automation of the process is not disclosed 16
in the applied references." FF 19. That is the sum total of Appellants' 17
argument. A mere suggestion that appellants' process does automatically 18
what The Jury Research Institute process does by hand is not per se a strong 19
argument as the Examiner has suggested, where no difference in mechanism 20
is shown between conducting a process automatically and doing the same by 21
hand, a patentable distinction has not been made out by arguing that the 22
instant process involves "automation." FF 16. We do not find this argument, 23
without more, overcomes the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. 24
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 15
Application 10/430,883

All of Appellants' arguments having been addressed and found 1
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection, the rejection is affirmed. 2
3
The rejection of claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable 4
over The Jury Research Institute in view of the Northern District of Texas 5
Jury Plan. 6
7
Appellants contend that the Examiner’s rejection is based on a 8
mischaracterization of claim 14. FF 24. According to Appellants, the 9
Examiner characterized claim 14 as describing a step of transmitting a 10
summons to a juror before the suitability test is administered. Appellants 11
argue that claim 14 says otherwise; that is, the summons is transmitted after 12
the suitability test is administered. 13
However, claim 14 leaves open the possibility that the summons is 14
transmitted before the suitability test is administered. Claim 14 does not 15
place any limitation on the order in which the steps of transmitting the 16
summons and administering the suitability test are to be performed. Claim 17
14 states: “transmitting a summons for jury service to each one of said 18
plurality of prospective jurors that is suitable,” the suitability of the 19
prospective jurors being determined by the suitability test described in claim 20
11. Accordingly, claim 14 simply requires the summons to be administered 21
to jurors determined to be suitable. Claim 14 does not specify when the 22
jurors’ suitability must be determined and does not preclude transmitting the 23
summons to jurors determined not to be suitable. Claim 14 encompasses a 24
scenario whereby the summons is transmitted to all prospective jurors before 25
determining which of the summoned jurors are suitable to sit on the jury. 26
The result is consistent with what claim 14 recites, i.e., “transmitting a 27
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 16
Application 10/430,883

summons for jury service to each one of said plurality of prospective jurors 1
that is suitable.” 2
Accordingly, Appellants’ argument that the summons is transmitted 3
after the suitability test is administered is not commensurate in scope with 4
what is claimed. Its acceptance requires us to read into the claim a step of 5
transmitting the summons after administering the suitability test. However, 6
given the broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification 7
as interpreted by one of ordinary skill, claim 14 requires no more than 8
transmitting the summons to suitable jurors and that can be accomplished 9
before the suitability test is administered. 10
Appellants have not disputed that the prior art teaches the features of 11
claim 14 if the claim is given the characterization that Appellants allege the 12
examiner has given it, i.e., transmitting the summons before the suitability 13
test is administered. FF 25. Since we have found that the broadest reasonable 14
construction of claim 14 consistent with the specification as interpreted by 15
one of ordinary skill encompasses the Examiner’s alleged characterization, 16
Appellants have failed to show error in the rejection. 17
Accordingly, the rejection is affirmed. 18
19
20
CONCLUSION OF LAW 21
On the record before us, Appellants have failed to show that the 22
Examiner erred in rejecting the claims over the prior art. The Examiner’s 23
evidence and rationale is sufficient to make out a prima facie cases of 24
obviousness of the claims under 35 U.S.C. §103(a). 25
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 17
Application 10/430,883

Appellants have not sustained their burden of overcoming the prima 1
facie cases made out by the Examiner. 2
3
4
DECISION 5
The examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 4-7, 11-19 are affirmed. 6
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with 7
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. 8
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2006). 9
AFFIRMED 10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
JRG 18
Appeal 2007-0768 Page 18
Application 10/430,883

MH2 TECHNOLOGY LAW GROUP 1
1951 KIDWELL DRIVE 2
SUITE 550 3
TYSONS CORNER, VA 22182 4
5
6
7