Ex Parte Canney et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 30, 201714315963 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/315,963 06/26/2014 Jason Canney CAN-0008 5592 50437 7590 12/04/2017 DUFT BORNSEN & FETTIG, LLP 1526 SPRUCE STREET SUITE 302 BOULDER, CO 80302 EXAMINER LI, SUSAN X ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2423 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/04/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing @ dbflaw. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JASON CANNEY, JOEL HASSELL, SID GREGORY, CHRIS PIZZURRO, TOM HUBER, and STEVE MARKEL Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,9631 Technology Center 2400 Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, LARRY J. HUME, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final Rejection of claims 1—12, which are all claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Canoe Ventures, LLC. Br. 3. Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The Invention Appellants' disclosed embodiments and claimed invention "relate[] to the field of Content On Demand (COD) systems and more specifically to the modifying asset campaigns of asset managers to improve asset insertion into COD content selections." Spec. 12. Exemplary Claims Claims 1 and 2, reproduced below, are representative of the subject matter on appeal (emphases added to contested limitations): 1. A system, comprising: a Content On Demand (COD) asset insertion decision system operable to process information from a remote COD content distributer about COD content selections by Customer Premises Equipment (CPEs), and to identify assets for insertion in the COD content selections; and a campaign manager communicatively coupled to the COD asset insertion decision system and operable to provide asset campaigns to the COD asset insertion decision system, to collect information about the assets identified for insertion, to modify the asset campaigns based on the collected information, and to present the modified asset campaigns to asset managers through a communication portal. 2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed June 24, 2016); Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Nov. 30, 2016); Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed Jan. 26, 2016); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed June 26, 2014). We note Appellants did not file a Reply Brief in response to the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Examiner's Answer. 2 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 2. The system of claim 1, wherein: the campaign manager is further operable to process an acceptance by a first of the asset managers for a first of the modified asset campaigns, and to provide the first modified asset campaign to the COD asset insertion decision system; and the COD asset insertion decision system is further operable to process the first modified asset campaign, to further identify assets for insertion into the COD content selections based in part on the first modified asset campaign, and to direct the content distributer to insert the further identified assets. Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Hood US 2008/0046924 A1 Feb. 21,2008 Rejections on Appeal Rl. Claims 1—12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 4. R2: Claims 1—12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hood. Final Act. 11; see also Ans. 9. CFAIM GROUPING Based on Appellants' arguments (Br. 5—17), we decide the appeal of non-statutory subject matter Rejection Rl of claims 1—12 under § 101 on the basis of representative claim 1; we decide the appeal of anticipation Rejection R2 of claims 1 and 3—12 on the basis of representative claim 1; 3 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 and we decide the appeal of anticipation Rejection R2 of separately argued claim 2, infra? ISSUES AND ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Brief, and we deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). We disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1—12 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1 and 2 for emphasis as follows. 1. $ 101 Rejection R1 of Claims 1—12 Issue 1 Appellants argue (Br. 5—10) the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: 3 "Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). In addition, when appellants do not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 4 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 Did the Examiner err in concluding the claims on appeal are directed to the abstract idea of asset insertion into on-demand content, without significantly more, and thus are drawn to patent-ineligible subject matter? Analysis Step 1 —Abstract Idea Appellants generally contend "[t]he mere fact that a person may describe a claim in abstract terms does not render that claim unpatentable under §101." Br. 5. Appellants specifically contend: [Claim 1] describes a system able to actively identify assets to insert into Content On Demand (COD) content (e.g., videos) selected by pieces of Consumer Premises Equipment (CPE) (e.g., set top boxes). On a single day, the CPEs for a COD network may select millions of pieces of content to watch. Each of those pieces content may need to have tens of assets (e.g., commercials) inserted into it. The Appellant submits that this intensive task of identifying assets for insertion, and modifying asset campaigns based on which assets have been inserted, is not a lofty abstract concept, but rather involves a specific technique to improve the operations of the numerous servers, computers, and CPE that handle COD content on a daily basis. Br. 6-7. Appellants further allege, citing DDR Holdings,4 the claimed invention is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks where assets are dynamically inserted into COD content in a real-time and ongoing basis. Br. 7. Appellants further argue "[mjodifying an asset campaign based on information indicating which assets were identified for insertion is 4 DDR Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 5 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 an entirely new technique that differs from fundamental economic practices," and thus passes the first step of the Alice analysis. Id. Section 101 provides that anyone who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof' may obtain a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that patent protection should not extend to claims that monopolize "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLSBankInt'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patent-eligible subject matter. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. As alluded to above, the Supreme Court's two-part Mayo!Alice framework guides us in distinguishing between patent claims that impermissibly claim the "building blocks of human ingenuity" and those that "integrate the building blocks into something more." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. First, we "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept." Id. at 2355. If so, we "examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). While the two steps5 of the Alice framework are related, the "Supreme Court's formulation makes clear that 5 Applying this two-step process to claims challenged under the abstract idea exception, the courts typically refer to step one as the "abstract idea" step and step two as the "inventive concept" step. Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 6 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 the first-stage filter is a meaningful one, sometimes ending the § 101 inquiry." Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We note the Supreme Court "has not established a definitive rule to determine what constitutes an 'abstract idea'" for the purposes of step one. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357). However, our reviewing court has held claims ineligible as being directed to an abstract idea when they merely collect electronic information, display information, or embody mental processes that could be performed by humans. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353—54 (collecting cases). At the same time, "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. Under this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 ("[W]e tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law."). Under the "abstract idea" step we must evaluate "the 'focus of the claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's 'character as a whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1257. Turning to the claimed invention, system claim 1 recites: a Content On Demand (COD) asset insertion decision system operable to process information from a remote COD content distributer about COD content selections by Customer 7 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 Premises Equipment (CPEs), and to identify assets for insertion in the COD content selections; and a campaign manager communicatively coupled to the COD asset insertion decision system and operable to provide asset campaigns to the COD asset insertion decision system, to collect information about the assets identified for insertion, to modify the asset campaigns based on the collected information, and to present the modified asset campaigns to asset managers through a communication portal. Claim 1. In response, the Examiner concludes the recited steps of [claim 1 ] can be interpreted as an abstract idea, in other words, the claim describes modifying the asset campaigns, presenting the modified asset campaigns, and inserting assets can be performed mentally. The claim limitations does not mention about the quantity of the assets, so the cited steps can be done manually. For example, a campaign manager can modify the campaigns manually, and provide a modified asset campaigns to the asset managers verbally or written, and perform the steps of inserting assets into content based on a plurality of asset campaigns without a computer. Ans. 22 (emphasis added). Under step one, we agree with the Examiner that the invention claimed in independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, i.e., organizing human activities pertaining to advertising by modifying, presenting, and inserting assets into asset campaigns. See Final Act. 7—9; see Ans. 22. As the Specification itself observes, "[t]he invention relates to the field of Content On Demand (COD) systems and more specifically to the modifying asset campaigns of asset managers to improve asset insertion into 8 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 COD content selections." Spec. 12.6 We find this type of activity, i.e., managing advertising or asset campaigns, existed well before the advent of computers and the Internet, and could be carried out by a human with pen and paper, as well as other forms of manual actions. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.").1 Our reviewing court has previously held other patent claims ineligible for reciting similar abstract concepts. For example, while the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, they continue to "treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as 6 See also, Spec. 41 ("Abstract"): Systems and methods presented herein provide for Content On Demand (COD) asset insertion and to recommend changes to asset campaigns. One system includes a COD asset insertion decision system operable to process information from a remote COD content distributer about COD content selections by Customer Premises Equipment (CPEs) and to identify assets for insertion in the COD content selections. The system also includes a campaign manager communicatively coupled to COD asset insertion decision system and operable to provide asset campaigns to the COD asset insertion decision system. The campaign manager is also operable to collect information about the assets identified for insertion, to modify the asset campaigns based on the collected information, and to present the modified asset campaigns to asset managers through a communication portal. 1 CyberSource further guides that "a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under §101." 654 F.3d at 1373. 9 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category." Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354). In this regard, the claims are similar to claims our reviewing court has found patent ineligible in Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353—54 (explaining that collecting information and "analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, [are] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category"). Therefore, in agreement with the Examiner, we conclude claim 1 "describes modifying the asset campaigns, presenting the modified asset campaigns, and inserting assets, [which] can be performed mentally . . . [and t]he claim limitations do[] not mention about the quantity of the assets, so the cited steps can be done manually" — and is thus directed to an abstract idea. Ans. 22; see Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. Accordingly, on this record, and under step one of Alice, we agree with the Examiner’s conclusion the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Step 2 —Inventive Concept Appellants also allege the claims pass the second step of the Alice analysis because "claim 1 does not preempt the whole concept of auctioning asset placement opportunities and inserting assets," and the claim "does more than just take the concept of an 'asset auction' and apply it. Claim 1 transforms the generic concept of 'asset auctions,' because it dynamically modifies asset campaigns based on information about which assets are identified for insertion." Br. 8. Appellants additionally argue: 10 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 In prior systems, if an asset campaign was poorly defined or not competitive, the assets of that campaign would be underutilized. However, the system of claim 1 avoids this problem, by dynamically modifying asset campaigns, based on information indicating which assets are being identified for insertion into content. This is a new and useful application of the concept of "asset auctions" that alters the technological process of handling COD content and does significantly more than apply the concept of generic asset auctions. Br. 8-9. Finally, Appellants contend: Claim 1 does not encompass directing the actions of a human, because modem content delivery networks are well understood to service large amounts of content to large numbers (e.g., millions) of customers in real-time. It would be infeasible, impractical, and absurdly cost-prohibitive to attempt to use humans to perform these actions on a relevant scale. Br. 9. If the concept is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we conclude above, we proceed to the "inventive concept" step. For that step we must "look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to determine 'whether they identify an "inventive concept" in the application of the ineligible subject matter' to which the claim is directed." Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353). In applying step two of the Alice analysis, our reviewing court guides we must "determine whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe [the] abstract method" and thus transform the abstract idea into patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are any "additional features" in the claims that constitute an "inventive concept," thereby 11 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Those "additional features" must be more than "well-understood, routine, conventional activity." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. Evaluating representative claim 1 under step 2 of the Alice analysis, we agree with the Examiner that it lacks an "inventive concept" that transforms the abstract idea of managing and modifying asset campaigns into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. See Final Act. 9-10; see Ans. 22—23. We agree with the Examiner because, as in Alice, we find the recitation of a Content On Demand asset insertion system and a campaign manager is simply not enough to transform the patent-ineligible abstract idea here into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 ("[Cjlaims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform [an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."). Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's conclusion that the appealed claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's § 101 rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2—12 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. 2. $ 102(b) Rejection R2 of Claims 1 and 3—12 Issue 2 Appellants argue (Br. 10—16) the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hood is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: 12 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses a system that includes, inter alia, the limitations of "a campaign manager . . . operable to . . . collect information about the assets identified for insertion, to modify the asset campaigns based on the collected information, and to present the modified asset campaigns to asset managers through a communication portal," as recited in claim 1? Analysis Appellants proffer: [T]he term "asset", as used herein, includes any type of media for which an owner desires promotion. Examples of such include traditional television commercials, advertisements, streaming video commercials, promotional materials, marketing information, and the like. Thus, "content" and "asset" are not generic terms, but are specific terms that refer to specific aspects of COD systems. In a similar fashion, an "asset campaign" is shown in the Specification as filed at | [0044] as comprising a group of assets to be inserted into COD content. The Specification at | [0059] further describes asset campaigns as understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. Br. 12. In response to the Examiner's reliance upon Hood, Appellants contend, "Hood does not disclose a campaign manager that modifies asset campaigns based on collected information about assets identified for insertion, and presents the modified asset campaigns to asset managers through a communication portal." Br. 13. Appellants further allege: While Hood explains that a user may control when assets participate in auctions, Hood does not explain how to acquire information about assets that were actually selected for insertion into content, nor how to modify an asset campaign based on such information. Hood does not appear to make any 13 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 determinations about an asset campaign that relate to prior auctions. Nothing in Hood shows that the auction campaign manager 210 modifies an asset campaign based on information about assets that were identified for insertion into content. Rather, Hood simply discloses that advertisement owners may bid on placement of an advertisement into an avail. See e.g., 1 [0046] of Hood stating that the Ad Decision Service (ADS) determines "which advertisements can even bid for a given program asset." Br. 13—14. Appellants further allege, "[t]his missing feature in Hood is highly relevant. Since Hood does not describe its campaign manager as collecting information about assets identified for insertion, it further fails to describe what, if anything, its campaign manager could do with this information." Br. 14. In response to Appellants' contentions, the Examiner reads the recited "campaign manager" onto Hood's [Auction Campaign Manager] ACM 210 and Workstation 206 (see Hood Fig. 2, || 40, 42 46), which the Examiner finds work together to perform the functions of the recited campaign manager. See Ans. 24—25. We agree with and incorporate herein by reference the Examiner's findings, and further note Appellants do not rebut the Examiner's findings by filing a Reply Brief. Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the disputed limitations of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner's resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's anticipation rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 3—12 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. 14 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 3. $ 102(b) Rejection R2 of Claim 2 Issue 3 Appellants argue (Br. 16—18) the Examiner's rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Hood is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses the system of claim 1, in which, (1) "the campaign manager is further operable to process an acceptance by a first of the asset managers for a first of the modified asset campaigns, and to provide the first modified asset campaign to the COD asset insertion decision system," and (2) "the COD asset insertion decision system is further operable to process the first modified asset campaign, to further identify assets for insertion into the COD content selections based in part on the first modified asset campaign, and to direct the content distributer to insert the further identified assets," as recited in claim 2? Analysis In response to the Examiner's reliance upon Hood, Appellants contend, "the cited portion of Hood states that the ad decision service 502 and the ad management service 508 are performing this process — not the auction campaign manager 210/510 that the Examiner equates to the campaign manager of claim 1. Thus, the entity performing this operation in Hood has changed, while the entity performing this operation in claim 2 has not." Br. 16-17. 15 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 Appellants further allege: Second, the cited portion of Hood merely states that the ad management service 508 receives "real time placement messages for avails." This simply means that some entity in Hood updates the ad management service 508 to indicate how assets will be inserted into content. A discussion of how assets are inserted does not read on an acceptance by an asset manager for a modified asset campaign. As explicitly claimed, the campaign manager modifies asset campaigns from asset managers after assets have been inserted into COD content. Br. 17. Appellants also contend, "Hood's discussion at | [0054] does not explain how its ad campaigns would be modified, let alone how or why an asset manager would accept a proposed modification to an ad campaign." Id. "Third, as stated above, Hood's auction campaign manager 510 does not modify the asset campaigns of asset managers. Rather, Hood's 'users' generate asset campaigns through a workstation that feeds into the auction campaign manager 510." Id. In response to Appellants' contentions, the Examiner finds: Hood, Fig. 2 discloses the systems of conduction the advertising auction campaign. In Fig. 2, the Item 210 and 206 together will work like the campaign manager, and . . . campaign manager (ACM 210 +Ad Edition/Creation Workstation 206) will communicate with Ad Decision Service (ADS) 204 to do multiple steps as stated in the claim 2. The Ad/campaign can be created and edited by campaign manager, the edited Ad/campaign can be send [sic] to the ADS 204, and the Ad Meta data will be send [sic] to the ACM 210. Also, The Asset Management System 202 will work with ADS to perform the function of the Asset Manager in the instant application. For example, the modified Campaign can be accepted by the ADS 204. Also see para [0043] and [0058], Fig.6a-6g disclose 16 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 editing of the campaign to map the editing to the modifying whereby the editing of the campaign further defines the assets to be inserted).... [T]he the Ad campaign is created and edited by the campaign manager. The Ad/campaign or the edited ad/campaign is then sent to the ADS 204 as disclosed in para [0043] whereby the ADS accepts/receives the ad/campaign and editing ad/ campaign/information. Ans. 25—26. We agree with and incorporate herein by reference the Examiner's findings with respect to the rejection of dependent claim 2, and again note Appellants do not rebut the Examiner's findings by filing a Reply Brief. Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the disputed limitations of claim 2, nor do we find error in the Examiner's resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's anticipation rejection of dependent claim 2. CONCLUSIONS (1) The Examiner did not err with respect to non-statutory subject matter Rejection R1 of claims 1—12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we sustain the rejection. (2) The Examiner did not err with respect to anticipation Rejection R2 of claims 1—12 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over the cited prior art of record, and we sustain the rejection. 17 Appeal 2017-003637 Application 14/315,963 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1—12. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation