Ex Parte Cai et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 8, 2018

13060657 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 8, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/060,657 02/24/2011 Yigang Cai CAI 132-16 1901
50525 7590 03/12/2018
DUFT BORNSEN & FETTIG, LLP
1526 SPRUCE STREET
SUITE 302
BOULDER, CO 80302
EXAMINER
BORISSOV, IGORN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/12/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @ dbflaw. com
ipsnarocp @ nokia. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YIGANG CAI and XIANGYANG LI
Appeal 2016-006231
Application 13/060,657
Technology Center 3600
Before SCOTT C. MOORE, AMEE A. SHAH, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
The Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’
final decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20, which are
all of the pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Throughout this decision, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed Oct. 15, 2015), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed June 3,
2016), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Feb. 24, 2011), and to the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Apr. 7, 2016), and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed July 16, 2015).
2 According to the Appellants, the real party in interest is Alcatel-Lucent
USA Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-006231
Application 13/060,657
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants’ invention relates generally to “the field of
communication networks and, in particular, to correlating credit requests in
an Online Charging System (OCS) that are received from network elements
of an IMS network to provide more accurate charging for a session.”
Spec. 1,11. 6-8.
Claims 1, 9, and 17 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 9 is
exemplary of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below (with
bracketing added for sake of reference).
9. A method of providing online charging for an IP
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) session in an Online Charging
System (OCS), the method comprising:
[(a)] receiving a first charging request for a session in the
OCS from a first network element in an IMS network; rate;
[(b)] determining a charging rate for the session at the
OCS based on the first charging request;
[(c) granting, at the OCS, a credit quota to the first
network element based on the charging rate;
[(d)] transmitting a first charging response from the OCS
to the first network element indicating the credit quota;
[(e)] receiving a second charging request in the OCS
from a second network element in the IMS network that serves
the session in addition to the first network element;
[(f)] determining, at the OCS, that the second charging
request relates to the same session as the first charging request;
[(g)] correlating, at the OCS, the second charging request
with the first charging request to generate correlated charging
information for the session when the first and second charging
requests relate to the same session;
[(h)] determining an updated charging rate for the session
based on the correlated charging information;
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[(i)] transmitting a credit return request from the OCS to
the first network element requesting that the previously-granted
credit quota be returned;
[(j)] granting, at the OCS, credit quotas for the first and
second network elements based on the updated charging rate
that was determined based on the correlated charging
information; and
[(k)] providing the credit quotas from the OCS to the first
and second network elements.
Appeal Br. 24-25 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 2.
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over den Hartog
(US 2008/0062966 Al, pub. Mar. 13, 2008) and Zhu (US 2008/0205381 Al,
pub. Aug. 28, 2008). Final Act. 5.
Claims 7 and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over den Hartog, Zhu, and Koskinen (US 2004/0167834 Al,
pub. Aug. 26, 2004). Final Act. 9.
ANAFYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 —Non-statutory Subject Matter
The Appellants argue claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20 as a
group. See Appeal Br. 9, 15. We select claim 9 as representative of the
group with claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20 standing or falling
therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 7, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 588-89
(2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set
forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78-79 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79) (emphasis added). If so, the second step is to
consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’” to determine whether the additional elements “‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78).
In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We,
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therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method
that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea, and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery, i.e., “whether the focus of the claims is on [a] specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” See Enflsh, LLCv. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335-36
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the Examiner
determines that the claim is directed to “the concept of determining charging
rate for a session based upon various attributes” (Final Act. 2; Ans. 3) and
“adjusting credit quota on a generic computer” (Ans. 4). Conversely, the
Appellants contend that the claims are directed to “specific ways of
providing online charging for a session of an IMS network when multiple
NEs of the IMS network submit charging requests to the OCS” (Appeal
Br. 12) and, specifically, to a system that “correlates charging requests from
multiple NEs of the IMS network for the same session, determines an
updated charging rate for the session based on correlated charging
information, and grants credit quotas for the first and second network
elements based on the updated charging rate” (Reply Br. 4-53).
Before determining whether the claims at issue are directed to an
abstract idea, we must first determine what the claims are directed to.
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
3 We note that the pages of the Reply Brief are not numbered. We therefore
consider the page that contains the title “REPLY BRIEF” page 1, and each
page thereafter sequentially numbered.
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products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Internet Patents
Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., [818 F.3d
1369, 1375] (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inquiring into “the focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art”).
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335.
The step-one analysis requires us to consider the claims “in their
entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to
excluded subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1346. The
question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In this case, the preamble of claim 9 provides for a “method of
providing online charging for an IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) session in
an Online Charging System (OCS).” Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.). Claim 9
recites the limitations of receiving request data from a first element in the
IMS network, determining a charging rate, granting at the OCS a credit
quota, transmitting first charging data from the OCS to the first element,
receiving request data from a second element in the IMS network,
determining that the second request data relates to same session as the first
data, correlating the request data to generate correlated charging data,
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determining an updated charging rate based on the correlated data,
transmitting a credit request data, granting at the OCS credit quotas based on
the updated charge rate, and providing the credit quotas to the elements. See
id. at 24-25. Independent claim 1 recites a system comprising a server
configured to perform the functions of claim 9, and claim 17 similarly
recites a network and system configured to perform the function of claim 9.
See id. at 22, 26.
The Specification states that the invention relates particularly to
“correlating credit requests in an Online Charging System (OCS) that are
received from network elements of an IMS network to provide more
accurate charging for a session.” Spec. 1,11. 7-8. The Specification
discusses that problems with the prior art way of “performing online
charging” included “that the IMS subscriber may be overcharged or
undercharged for the session” {id. at 2,11. 28-30), and “[bjecause the rating
engine determines a charging rate for each individual online charging
request, the rating engine is not able to determine the correct charging rate
for the overall session” {id. at 3,11. 17-19). As such, the invention
“correlate[s] online charging requests that are received in the OCS so that a
correct charging rate may be determined for the overall session.” Id. at 3,
11. 21-22. The Specification states that the network elements can “comprise
any servers, systems, or functions operable to provide communication
services and to report charging events to OCS.” Id. at 6,11. 6-7. And,
similarly, the OCS is “any system, server, or function operable to perform
online charging, such as by receiving online charging requests from network
elements 112-113 that are serving a session, determining a charging rate for
the session, and granting credit quotas to the network elements 112-113 for
the session.” Id. at 6,11. 11-14. The Specification does not provide details
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as to how the first charging rate is determined, providing only that “[i]n
determining the charging rate, rating engine 126 may process a session
identifier, a service identifier, or any other desired charging information,
such as the calling party number, the called party number, a media
description, the time of day, an access network identifier, etc.” Id. at 7,
11. 27-31. “To ‘correlate’ the online charging requests, correlation
system 124 may group the online charging requests together, extract desired
charging information from the online charging requests, or otherwise link
the online charging requests or charging information together for
processing.” Id. at 9,11. 4-7. For example, to correlate, the system may
consolidate charging information from multiple requests in a message that
includes parameters for charging information for each of the requests. Id.
at 9,11. 7-10. The determination of an updated charge is based on the
correlated requests and stored rate rules by, for example, parsing each
request and rule to determine a defined charging rate. Id. at 9,11. 15-21.
The Specification does not provide details on how the granted credit quota is
determined, but states that the quota is “based on the new charging rate.” Id.
at 9,1. 22.
In that context, we determine that the claims are directed to
determining charging rates for a communication session by correlating
requests.4 The claims are similar to those found to be abstract ideas by our
reviewing court in Versata Develop. Grp., Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,
793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2105) (determining a price using
4 We note that “an abstract idea can generally be described at different levels
of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not
impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241.
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organizational and group hierarchies), Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (gathering and analyzing information
of a specified content and displaying the result), OIP Technologies, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“offer-based price
optimization”), and Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc.,
758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (combining and organizing
information through mathematical correlations to generate information and
not tied to a specific structure or machine). Here, the claim involves nothing
more than a building block of receiving, determining, transmitting,
correlating, and providing data and granting credit quotas in the
communications area, without any particular inventive technology — an
abstract idea. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354; Versata, 793 F.3d at
1333-34. As such, we find unpersuasive the Appellants’ arguments that the
claim is not directed to a building block and “would not hinder innovation in
the area of IMS networks more that promote it” (Appeal Br. 11; Reply
Br. 5), and that the Examiner mischaracterizes the claim {see Appeal Br. 12;
Reply Br. 4).
We also find unpersuasive the Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner’s rejection is in error because “[t]he Examiner has not set forth
any articles or other references that discuss a fundamental practice involving
an OCS as recited in claim 1.” Appeal Br. 12. As the Appellants note {id.),
the Examiner does provide support in citing to Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593 (2010) (Final Act. 3), Versata, and Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Ans. 4). Further, there is no such requirement
that Examiners must provide “articles or other references” in every case
before a conclusion can be made that a claim is directed to an abstract idea.
Evidence may be helpful in certain situations where, for instance, facts are in
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dispute. But it is not always necessary, and is not necessary here. See
Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,
1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[I]t is also possible, as numerous cases have
recognized, that a § 101 analysis may sometimes be undertaken without
resolving fact issues.”).
Under the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, we agree with
and find supported the Examiner’s determination that the elements of the
claims, individually or as an ordered combination, do not amount to
significantly more than that abstract idea. See Final Act. 3—4; Ans. 5-6. We
are not persuaded of Examiner error by the Appellants’ arguments that assert
the opposite. See Appeal Br. 13-15.
The Appellants state that the elements of the independent claims
“recite an inventive concept that transforms [it] into patent-eligible subject
matter” and recite the limitations of the claim. Appeal Br. 13-14. The
Appellants, however, do not provide further support or reasoning as to why
or how the limitations are not well-understood, routine, and conventional
functions of a generic computer. As discussed above, the Specification
states that the OCS that performs the functions is “any system, server, or
function operable to perform online charging” (Spec. 6,11. 11-12), i.e., a
generic computer. There is no indication in the Specification that any
technologically novel or inventive hardware is required. See Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLCv. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Enfish, 822 F.3d. at 1336 (focusing on whether the claim is “an
improvement to [the] computer functionality itself, not on economic or other
tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity”). Receiving,
determining, transmitting, correlating, and providing charging and credit
data are all routine, well-understood, and routine functions of a generic
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computer and merely require generic computer implementation. See
Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334.
The Appellants’ argument that the claims recite an inventive concept
because they “do not seek to pre-empt the use of charging in an IMS
network or any other type of network” (Appeal Br. 13; see also id. at 15) is
unpersuasive of error. Although the Supreme Court has described “the
concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract
ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption” (see Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2354), characterizing pre-emption as a driving concern for
patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing pre-emption as the sole
test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the
principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to
patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in
and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354).
Although “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
That the claims may not preempt all manners of charging in a network do
not make them any less abstract. OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1363.
We do not agree that the claim “improves the existing technology
with an OCS that correlates charging requests from different NEs when
determining a charging rate and generating a quota.” Appeal Br. 14.
Receiving, determining, transmitting, correlating, and providing charging
and credit data using a generic computer, i.e., the server or system of the
OCS, are not technical or technological improvements to the computer,
server, or system. Rather, the claim utilizes a generic processor in its normal
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capacity to simply implement the abstract idea. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2359.
We also do not agree with the Appellants’ contention that “[t]he
Office has not adequately addressed the elements of [the] claim [] to
determine whether or not it transforms a potentially abstract idea.” Appeal
Br. 14. The Examiner analyzes the claim under the two-part Mayo/Alice
framework and finds that the elements of the claims, considered separately
and as an ordered combination,
do not provide an improvement to another technology or
technical field; do not provide an improvement to the
functioning of the computer itself; do not apply the judicial
exception by use of a particular machine; do not effect a
transformation or reduce a particular article to a different state
or thing; and do not add a specific limitation other than what is
well-understood, routine and conventional in the operation of a
generic computer.
Final Act. 4 (emphases omitted); see also Ans. 5. Reply Br. 4; Thus, the
Examiner has set forth the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently
articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132
as to why the claims are patent-ineligible. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (Section 132 “is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that
it prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the
grounds for rejection”).
We find unpersuasive the Appellants’ argument that the claims are
analogous to those of DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), because they “solve a technical problem for charging
in an IMS network” (Appeal Br. 14), and because the OCS does not operate
“in its normal, expected manner [of] determining a charging rate based on a
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charging request received from an individual NE,” but rather “correlates
charging requests from multiple NEs, and determines a charging rate based
on the correlated charging information” {id. at 14-15).
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims
addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
transported instantly away from a host’s website after clicking on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257.
The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory
subject matter because they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer
technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks.” Id. The court cautioned that “not all claims
purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id.
at 1258. And the court contrasted the claims to those at issue in
Ultramercial Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) in that, in
DDR Holdings, the computer network was not operating in its “normal
expected manner” and the claims did not “recite an invention that is merely
the routine or conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1258-59.
In contrast, here, there is no indication here that the claimed invention
claims a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR Holdings, at 1257. The claims address the problem of charging the
correct rate for a session. See Spec. 3,11. 16-18, 21-22. Although the
session is network-centric, the problem of correctly charging for services is
one that existed prior to the Internet. The computers and computer network
still operate in their normal capacities to account for undesired/duplicate
data by receiving requests, determining rates and charges based on
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information, correlating requests by consolidating charging information (see
Spec. 9,11. 4-10), transmitting data, and granting and providing credits.
Thus, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in rejecting claim 9
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9
and of claims 1, 2, 5-8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20, which fall with claim 9.
35 U.S.C. § 103 - Obviousness
The Appellants contend that the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 9, and 17 is in error because, in relevant part, the prior art does not
teach correlating the requests received from a first element and a second
element in a network, and determining a rate for the session based on the
correlated information, as recited in limitations (e), (g), and (h) of claim 9
and similarly recited in claims 1 and 18. See Appeal Br. 16-18; Reply
Br. 7-8. We agree.
The Examiner finds that den Hartog teaches receiving first and second
charging requests from a network element, i.e., A-party with UE 1,
correlating the requests, and determining a rate for the session based on the
correlated requests. See Final Act. 5-6; Ans. 7. The Examiner
acknowledges that den Hartog does not specifically teach that the second
request is received from a second, different network element, i.e., den
Hartog’s B-party with UE 2. Final Act. 7. However, the Examiner finds
that den Hartog “teaches that said correlation can be conducted for more
than two communication sessions [0044], thereby suggesting
communicating with a second (new) node.” Id. at 8; see also Ans. 7-8. The
Examiner further determines that it would have been obvious to modify den
Hartog to have the functionality apply to a plurality of network elements
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“for the benefit of conducting a telephone or video conference between
participants situated in different locations.” Final Act. 8.
Den Hartog discloses an invention that performs a correlation check
of communication sessions in a combinatorial network and determines how
a subscriber is charged for that session. See den Hartog 15, 20. For
example, when a subscriber, such as A-party using its user equipment,
makes a voice call to another party, such as B-party, the system applies a
relevant charge. See id. 37. After establishing the call, A-party may
choose to set up an IMS session with B-party. See id. ^| 38. Upon the
system determining whether the voice call and IMS were part of the same
session, i.e., a combinational session, the charging rate is adapted to reflect
the combinational session. See id. 44, 45, 79. Thus, the invention
“makes it possible for an operator to apply charging a combination of a
simultaneous CS-call and a PS-session by the same subscriber and hence
provides extension on prior art charging solutions where the CS-call and the
PS-session, although being related to each other, were charged
independently.” Id. 80.
We agree with the Appellants that the Examiner has not adequately
shown, such that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand, how den
Hartog teaches or renders obvious receiving and correlating requests from
two different elements to determine charges/credits for the session. See
Reply Br. 7-8. One of ordinary skill in the art would not readily understand
how communicating with another element would modify den Hartog’s
invention that receives and correlates requests to determine charges for one
subscriber in a combination session (see den Hartog ^ 80) such that the
system receives and correlates requests from two subscribers in a session
and determines charges for each subscriber for that session, as required by
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the claims. In other words, the Examiner does not adequately establish that
correlating for one element in two sessions would be equally applicable to
correlating for two elements in one session. See Final Act. 8.
Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
independent claims 1, 9, and 17. We also do not sustain the obviousness
rejections of dependent claims 2, 5-8, 10, 13, 14, 19, and 20, which rely on
the same inadequately supported findings.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13, 14, 17, 19, and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are REVERSED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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