Ex Parte Bu¿uel Magdalena et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 16, 2017

12310954 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 16, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/310,954 03/12/2009 Miguel Angel Bu^uel Magdalena 2005P02610WOUS 4491
46726 7590 02/21/2017
RS»H Home. Annlianrp.s Pomoratinn
EXAMINER
100 Bosch Boulevard
NEW BERN, NC 28562
DUNIVER, DIALLO IGWE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3742
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/21/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MBX-NBN-IntelProp@bshg.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MIGUEL ANGEL BUNUEL MAGDALENA,
JESUS CEAMANOS GAYA, JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA HERRER,
JOSE-RAMON GARCIA JIMENEZ, and ALFONSO LORENTE PEREZ
Appeal 2014-0079531
Application 12/310,9542
Technology Center 3700
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final decision rejecting claims 11, 13-20, and 22-32. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed Oct. 16, 2012), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed July 14,
2014), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Mar. 12, 2009), and to the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 5, 2014) and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed July 19, 2012).
2 According to the Appellants, “[t]he real party in interest is BSH Bosch und
Siemens Hausgerate GmbH.” Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants’ invention is directed to a cooking device and method
of using the cooking device, and “in particular for induction cookers.”
Spec. 1.
Claims 11 and 20 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 11,
which we reproduce below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal
(bracketing added for reference):
11. A cooking device, in particular a cooking device for
induction hobs, the cooking device comprising:
[(a)] a computation unit, the computation unit having at
least one standby mode that is activated as a function of a
removal of cookware from a cooking zone at a time Tl; and
[(b)] a warning signal output unit, the warning signal
output unit outputting, during a period in which the standby
mode has been activated, a warning signal in the event that
cookware is placed within the cooking zone at a time T2 that is
at least a predetermined time after Tl,
[(c)] wherein a warning signal is not output if cookware is
placed within the cooking zone after time Tl but before the
predetermined time after Tl.
Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS
Claims 11, 13-20, and 22-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement. Final Act. 2.
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Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
Claims 11, 13-20, and 22-32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Hazan (US 5,243,172, iss. Sept. 7, 1993) and
Gama (US 2005/0235983 Al, pub. Oct. 27, 2005).3 Id.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The findings of fact in the Analysis section below are supported at
least by a preponderance of the evidence.
ANALYSIS
§112— Written Description
The Examiner finds that claims 11, 13-20, and 22-32 do not
reasonably convey to one of skilled in the relevant art that the inventors, at
the time the application was filed, had possession of “wherein a warning
signal is not output if cookware is placed within the cooking zone after time
T1 but before the predetermined time after Tl,” as recited in limitation (c) of
claim 11 as amended after the previous office action. Final Act. 2.
The Appellants contend the rejection is in error and direct attention to
page 1, lines 19-21, and page 2, lines 8-13, of the Specification for
providing adequate support. Appeal Br. 7.
We agree with the Appellants that the Specification provides adequate
support to reasonably convey to one of ordinary skill in the art that the
3 Although the rejection states only claims 11 and 22 are rejected over
Hazan and Gama (Final Act. 2), the remaining claims are discussed under
this heading. The Appellants also understand all of the claims to be included
in this rejection. Appeal Br. 8. We therefore consider all of the claims to be
included in the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Hazan and Gama,
and the Examiner’s omission to be inadvertent error.
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Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
Appellants had possession of not outputting a signal if cookware is within
the time period cited. The Specification provides that a warning signal
output unit gives off a warning signal “after the cookware has been put back
on the cooking zone when the standby mode is activated.” Spec. 1,11. 19-
21. The Specification further provides that the warning signal output unit
also
give[s] off a warning signal after cookware has been put back
following a first time interval of the standby mode, as a result of
which an unwanted warning signal output can be prevented by
the warning signal output unit during a cooking process. In this
way, a warning signal output can in particular be prevented in the
case of a cooking process-specific, brief removal of cookware
from a cooking zone.
Id. at 2,11. 8-13. Thus, the Specification provides that the warning signal
output unit does not give off a warning signal within the first time period for
a “brief removal of [the] cookware” {id.) and provides a reason to exclude
the signal from outputting during that time, i.e., that it is not wanted. See
Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc., 805 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In
particular, ‘[njegative claim limitations are adequately supported when the
specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation.’”) (citing
Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2012).
Therefore, we find there is adequate support for the limitation at issue.
Based on the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
§103 — Obviousness
Claims 11, 13—20, and 22—28
The Appellants argue independent claims 11, 13-20, and 22-28 as a
group. See Appeal Br. 8. We select claim 11 as representative of the group;
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Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
claims 13-20 and 22-28 stand or fall with claim 11. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Appellants contend the rejection of claim 11 is in error because
“Hazan does not disclose the claimed predetermined time interval before
outputting an alarm,” as required by claim 11, limitation (c). Appeal Br. 9.
Specifically, the Appellants argue that in Hazan, “every time cookware is
placed back in the cooking zone during the office action defined standby
mode (At) the alarm is activated, regardless of how quickly the cookware is
replaced in the cooking zone” and thus does not disclose “using an alarm but
delaying the alarm in certain cases.” Id.
After careful review of the Appellants’ arguments presented in the
Appeal and Reply Briefs, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred.
The Examiner does not find that Hazan discloses, i.e., anticipates, the
limitation but rather that Hazan teaches, i.e., renders obvious, the limitation.
See Final Act. 3. The Examiner finds Hazan discloses a warning signal
output but that Hazan does not explicitly state that the warning signal output
is silent when the cookware is placed back on the hob after the standby
mode At {id.), and cites to Hazan’s Figure 4B as showing an interval
between t6 and t7 that teaches “replacing a cookware within a cooking zone
within the standby mode where the alarm would not be produced no matter
how quickly the user replaces the cookware” (Ans. 5-6). The Examiner
determines “it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan that the alarm is
silent when the cookware is absen[t] longer than time (At) because the
cooking section is turned off and there is no danger with a powered off
stove.” Final Act. 3.
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Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
Hazan discloses a cook-top with heating elements, function controls,
and automatic control devices to apply the function commands activated by
the user to the heating elements. Hazan, Abstract, Fig. 1, col. 3,11. 23-64.
The control devices comprise, for each heating element, a timing means, a
presence detector, and a power device, whereby the timing means operates
under the control of the presence detector, and the power device influences
the heating element. Id. col. 3,1. 66-col. 4,1. 5. The presence detector
detects and determines the weight of a utensil, i.e., cookware. Id. col. 2,
1. 64-col. 3,1. 2. When cookware is removed and put back, the heating
element in the cooking section is reactivated if the variation of the weight
between the removal and return of the cookware is below a predetermined
limit. Id. col. 3,11. 2-13. The cook-top can operate on reduced power
during reactivation to allow the user to respond, during which an audible
alarm, such as a beep, or an optical alarm, such as a flash, can be output. Id.
col. 3,11. 13-17. For example, when the cookware is removed from the
cooking section, the weight is zero, the power is deactivated, and the timing
means uses a time constant At, the difference in time within which the
timing means allows the power to be restored automatically. Id. Fig. 4B,
col. 4,11. 19-23, col. 6,11. 14-18 (instant te), 11. 27-28 (instant tio). When
the cookware is returned within a time period shorter than At, if the
temperature is below the temperature threshold, the power remains
deactivated. Id. Fig, 4B, col. 6,11. 18-22 (instant t?). Because there is no
reactivation, an alarm would not be output. In contrast, if the temperature is
above the threshold, the power device is reactivated. Id. Fig 4B, col. 6,11.
29-31 (instant tn). Because there is a reactivation, an alarm could be output.
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Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
We are not persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that in Hazan,
“every time cookware is placed back in the cooking zone during the office
action defined standby mode (At) the alarm is activated, regardless of how
quickly the cookware is replaced in the cooking zone.” Appeal Br. 9.
Rather, we agree with the Examiner that Hazan renders obvious an alarm,
i.e., warning signal, being output during a period in which standby has been
activated (At) in the event the cookware is placed within a predetermined
time (T2) after removal (Tl), i.e., during reactivation, for example at instant
tn, and not being output if the cookware is placed within the cooking zone
during a predetermined time period during standby (At) after removal of the
cookware (Tl), i.e., when the power remains deactivated, for example at
instant ti. See Final Act. 3—4; Ans. 5-6.
The Appellants’ argument that Hazan does not teach “using the alarm
but delaying the alarm in certain cases” (Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 4),
is also unpersuasive because it is not commensurate with the scope of the
claim. Claim 11 does not require a delay of an alarm, but that an alarm is
not output in the recited situation. As discussed above, Hazan teaches using
an alarm when the cookware is returned during the recited period during
reactivation, at least in situations with reduced power during reactivation,
and not using an alarm when the cookware is returned during the recited
period when the power is not reactivated, i.e., remains deactivated.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
the rejection of independent claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and we
sustain the rejection. For the same reasons, we also sustain the rejection of
claims 13-20 and 22-28, which fall with claim 11.
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Appeal 2014-007953
Application 12/310,954
Claims 29—32
The Appellants argue claims 29-32 as a group. See Appeal Br. 10.
We select claim 29 as representative; claims 30-32 stand or fall with claim
29. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Appellants contend the Examiner’s rejection of claim 29 is in
error because “Hazan does not state any upper limit on the claimed
predetermined time interval,” and thus, “it would not have been obvious
from Hazan to set the upper limit at either 5 seconds or 10 seconds,” as
recited by claims 29. Appeal Br. 10.
The Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive because it is against Hazan
individually when the Examiner relies on the combination of Hazan and
Gama for disclosing the limitation. The test for obviousness is not what any
one reference would have suggested, but rather what the combined teachings
of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.
See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
The Examiner relies on Hazan for teaching that a standby mode
having a given time period, At, is activated by the removal of the cookware
and that the change in time, At, has an upper and a lower time limit, the
maximum allowable difference and zero, respectively. See Final Act. 5, 6;
Ans. 8. The Examiner relies on Gama for teaching a time delay between 1
and 10 seconds (the range encompassing an upper limit of 5 seconds). See
Final Act. 6; Ans. 8. The Examiner determines it would have been obvious
to combine the art to “enable the user to operate the cooking stove easily”
(Final Act. 6, 7) and because to “enable[] the user to operate the cooking
stove heating device while alerting the user of cooking misshapen within a
short time period while operating the stove top” (Ans. 8). Thus, the
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Application 12/310,954
Examiner provides articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to
support the rejection based on obviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (citation omitted).
The Appellants do not provide sufficient evidence or technical
reasoning to rebut either the Examiner’s findings regarding Hazan and Gama
or the Examiner’s reasoning for combining them.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
the rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), and we sustain the
rejection. For the same reasons, we also sustain the rejection of claims
30-32, which fall with claim 29.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 11, 13-20, and 22-32 under
35 U.S.C. § 112 is REVERSED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 11, 13-20, and 22-32 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is AFFIRMED.
No time period of taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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