Ex Parte Bujak

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Mar 27, 2008

10249132 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 27, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte CHRISTOPHER RICHARD BUJAK
____________

Appeal 2007-4343
Application 10/249,132
Technology Center 3600
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Decided: March 27, 2008
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Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, ANTON W. FETTING, and STEVEN D.A.
McCARTHY, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Christopher Richard Bujak (Appellant) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-3 and 5-20, the only claims
pending in the application. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6 (2002).
Appeal 2007-4343
Application 10/249,132

The Invention
Appellant’s claimed invention is directed to a restraint system for
automotive vehicles that uses two sensors to determine a crash event
(Specification, ¶ 1). Claims 1 and 2 are illustrative of the invention and read
as follows:
1. A system for an automotive vehicle having a
door comprising:
a first sensor generating a first signal
corresponding to a first crash characteristic
comprising a door cavity pressure;
a second sensor generating a second signal
corresponding to a second crash characteristic
different than the first characteristic;
a restraint device; and
a controller coupled to said first sensor, said
second sensor and said restraint device, said
controller when either the first signal is above a
first threshold or the second signal is above a
second threshold, comparing the first signal and
second signal to each other and deploying the
restraint device in response to comparing.
2. A system as recited in claim 1 wherein said
controller categorizes an event mode in response to
the first signal and the second signal and deploys
the restraint device in response to the controller
comparing the first signal and second signal and
the controller categorizing the event mode.

The Rejection
Appellant seeks review of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3 and
5-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter
which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably
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convey to one skilled in the relevant art that Appellant, at the time the
application was filed, had possession of the invention.
We make reference in our decision to the Examiner’s Answer (mailed
May 3, 2006) and Appellant’s Appeal Brief (filed February 10, 2006) for the
respective positions of the Examiner and Appellant.

THE ISSUE
At issue in this appeal is whether Appellant’s application, as
originally filed, adequately describes the comparison of the cavity pressure
and acceleration sensor signals and the event mode determination carried out
in steps 114 and 116, respectively, of Appellant’s Figure 9 to convey to a
person of ordinary skill in the art that Appellant was in possession of the
invention as now recited in claims 1-3 and 5-20 as of the filing date of the
application.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The description requirement found in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 is separate from the enablement requirement of that provision. See
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) and In
re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 591 (CCPA 1977).
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, requires a
“written description of the invention” which is
separate and distinct from the enablement
requirement. The purpose of the “written
description” requirement is broader than to merely
explain how to “make and use”; the applicant must
also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled
in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she
was in possession of the invention. The invention
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Application 10/249,132

is, for purposes of the “written description”
inquiry, whatever is now claimed.
. . . drawings alone may be sufficient to provide the
"written description of the invention" required by §
112, first paragraph.
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64 (emphasis original). “The written
description requirement does not require the applicant ‘to describe exactly
the subject matter claimed, [instead] the description must clearly allow
persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented
what is claimed.’” Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989,
997 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Compliance with the written description requirement is a question of
fact. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).

FINDINGS OF FACT (FF)
Appellant’s original Specification and drawings describe the invention
as follows:
1. The system “uses two sensors to measure different crash
characteristics and uses a comparison of the sensor signals to safe
each other and to provide a particular type or series of deployments
corresponding to a particular event mode in response to the measured
sensor signals” (Specification ¶ 4).
2. The Specification repeatedly refers to comparing the first (door cavity
pressure) and second (accelerometer) signals, when either the first
signal or the second signal is above a threshold (Specification, ¶¶ 5, 6,
7).
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3. The Specification, in Paragraphs 31 and 32, describes the flow
diagram of Figure 9 as follows:
In step 100 the crash event is started. In step 102 a
crash deceleration pulse is applied to the vehicle
10. Door cavity pressure sensors 28 and
accelerometers 30 generate respective signals
which start a crash event algorithm 104. A change
in door pressure in step 106 and a change in
acceleration in step 108 are parallel paths through
the crash event algorithm. When the door pressure
sensor indicates a pressure greater than a first or
pressure threshold in step 110, or the
accelerometer 30 indicates an acceleration in
excess of a second or acceleration threshold in step
112, the acceleration and pressure are compared in
step 114. In step 114, by comparing the
acceleration and pressure from the door cavity
pressure signals 28 and the accelerometer 30, a
safing mode is entered. That is, if a high level of
pressure change is detected, some deceleration of
the vehicle in the lateral direction may also be
detected. If some change in acceleration is
detected, some change in door pressure indicating
a crash may also be detected. Thus, erroneous
signals may be removed from consideration. Of
course, these considerations are based on the
vehicle and the number of sensors employed.
Each different type of vehicle may include a
different set of threshold, acceleration, and
pressure parameters.
In step 116, the characteristics of pressure and
sensor may be used to determine an event mode.
Various types of event modes including but not
limited to those illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 may
be formed. That is, when the vehicle hits a pole
sideways, one set of deployment criteria may be
employed. When a vehicle is hitting the front
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quarter and/or front door of the vehicle or the rear
quarter of the vehicle, another two types of event
modes may be entered. Again, the various types of
event modes and the sequence of deployment and
the timing of the deployment varies based upon the
vehicle model. Such values may be easily
determined in pre-production testing. Step 116
may also perform the safing function described
above with respect to step 114. In step 118 if
during the safing function the event mode is not a
qualified event, step 104 is executed. In step 118
if the event mode indicates a qualified event,
various restraints such as those described above
may be deployed in step 120. Of course, the
timing and sequence of the deployments may be
varied. Also, the number of restraint devices may
also be varied. In step 122 the event is complete.

ANALYSIS
The Examiner makes it clear that the rejection is not based on lack of
enablement (Answer 4). The Examiner's position is that the comparing
(claims 1, 9, and 18) and determining (“categorizing” of claims 2, 10, and
19) carried out in steps 114 and 116 of Figure 9 are not adequately described
(Answer 3). The Examiner also appears to be concerned that the
relationship between the pressure and acceleration sensor signals is not
adequately described (Answer 3) and that no comparative relationship of
those signals to each other is disclosed (Answer 4).
The Examiner implies that the specification must show reduction to
practice in order to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (Answer 4). That
an invention can be ready for patenting prior to reduction to practice is made
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clear in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66 (1998), wherein it is
stated:
The word “invention” must refer to a
concept that is complete, rather than merely one
that is “substantially complete.” It is true that
reduction to practice ordinarily provides the best
evidence that an invention is complete. But just
because reduction to practice is sufficient evidence
of completion, it does not follow that proof of
reduction to practice is necessary in every case.
Indeed, both the facts of The Telephone Cases and
the facts of this case demonstrate that one can
prove that an invention is complete and ready for
patenting before it has actually been reduced to
practice.
Therefore, to the extent that the Examiner requires Appellant’s application to
show the invention was reduced to practice at the time the application was
filed, the Examiner applies an incorrect standard.
Based on our findings, enumerated supra, we conclude that
Appellant’s application, as originally filed, reasonably conveys to a person
of ordinary skill in the art that the door cavity pressure sensor signal and the
accelerometer signal are compared to one another. We reach this conclusion
from the repeated reference throughout the Specification to comparing the
door cavity pressure sensor signal and the accelerometer signal, without
identification of any other signal or reference value to which they are
compared (FF1, FF2, and FF3). This conclusion also follows logically from
the description of Figure 9 (FF3: Specification, ¶ 31), which explains that:
when either the door cavity pressure sensor signal or the accelerometer
signal exceeds its threshold, the acceleration and pressure are compared in
step 114; if a high level is sensed by one of the sensors, some change in the
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other signal “may also be detected”; thus, erroneous signals may be removed
from consideration. While Paragraph 31 of Appellant’s Specification does
not explicitly state that the door cavity pressure sensor signal and
accelerometer signal are compared to each other, one of ordinary skill in the
art would understand from the disclosure therein that in the event of an
actual crash, a change in both pressure and acceleration signals would be
expected. If a change is detected in only one of the two, this is deemed to be
an erroneous signal. In such a situation, the event is not categorized as a
crash event, and no restraint is deployed. We thus conclude that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would understand from Appellant’s Specification
that the pressure and acceleration signals are compared to each other in the
event that either one of them exceeds its threshold.
We further conclude that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand from the description in Appellant’s Specification (FF3) that an
event is categorized as either a crash event (both signals changed) or a non-
crash event (only one signal changed), and categorized as to location (front,
rear, side, etc.) based on which sensor signals changed (front, rear, front
passenger door, front driver door, etc.) to determine which restraint to
deploy.
For the above reasons, the Examiner fails to persuade us that
Appellant’s application, as originally filed, lacks an adequate description of
the invention to convey to a person of ordinary skill in the art that at the time
the application was filed, Appellant was in possession of the invention as
now recited in claims 1-3 and 5-20 in compliance with the description
requirement of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. The rejection cannot
be sustained.
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CONCLUSION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-3 and 5-12 under the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is reversed.
REVERSED

JRG

Dickinson Wright, PLLC
38525 Woodward Avenue
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