Ex Parte Buford

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 28, 2017

13418024 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/418,024 03/12/2012 Keith D. BUFORD P015835-GMVE-CD 6642
80748 7590 08/30/2017
Cantor Colburn LLP-General Motors
20 Church Street, 22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
TORRES RUIZ, JOHALI ALEJANDRA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolbum.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KEITH D. BUFORD
Appeal 2016-006520
Application 13/418,024
Technology Center 2800
Before BRADLEY R. GARRIS, WHITNEY N. WILSON, and
JANE E. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges.
INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 requests our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a non-
final rejection of claims 1, 6—8, 12, 13, and 16. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant claims a programmable cabin conditioner for an electric
vehicle and a method of conditioning a cabin of an electric vehicle. App. Br.
6-7.
1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as GM Global Technology
Operations LLC. Appeal Brief filed December 14, 2015 (“App. Br.”), 2.
Appeal 2016-006520
Application 13/418,024
Claim 1 illustrates the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced
below:
1. A programmable cabin conditioner for an electric vehicle
comprising:
a power charging system for providing power to a battery
of the electric vehicle; and
a cabin conditioning system for receiving input from a
user from a remote device to provide a desired cabin
conditioning environment prior to a departure time, the desired
cabin conditioning environment comprising a target
temperature,
wherein the cabin conditioning system selectively
determines an initiation time to achieve the target
temperature prior to the departure time,
provides the target temperature for a plurality of
departure times over a plurality of days, and
is operated during operation of the power charging
system and subsequent to a fully charged state of the
battery,
wherein the plurality of departure times selectively
vary from each other and are programmed during a single
programming session.
App. Br. 14 (Claims Appendix) (indentations and spacing added).
The Examiner sets forth the following rejections in the Office Action
entered July 20, 2015 (“Office Act.”), and maintains the rejections in the
Answer entered April 21, 2016 (“Ans.”):
I. Claims 1, 8, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Chander et al. (US 2011/0046828 Al, published February 24, 2011) in
view of Umebayashi et al. (US 2004/0194479 Al, published October 7,
2004) and Jennings et al. (US 2010/0107112 Al, published April 29, 2010);
and
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Application 13/418,024
II. Claims 6, 7, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grander in view of Umebayashi, Jennings, and Gale et al.
(US 2008/0203973 Al, published August 28, 2008).
DISCUSSION
Upon consideration of the evidence relied upon in this appeal and
each of Appellant’s contentions, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of
claims 1, 6—8, 12, 13, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the reasons set
forth in the Office Action, the Answer, and below.
Rejection I
Appellant argues claims 1, 8, and 16 as a group. App. Br. 9-12.
Therefore, we select claim 1 as representative, and decide the appeal as to
claims 1, 8, and 16 based on claim 1 alone. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Grander discloses a system for distributing power provided to an
electric vehicle from an external power source to one or more predetermined
internal components of the vehicle, such as an air conditioning system and a
charger for a storage battery. || 10, 20, 22, 37. Grander discloses that a
user of the vehicle can program a preferred temperature value and departure
time into the system, and the system will distribute power appropriately to
pre-heat or pre-cool the passenger compartment to the desired temperature in
advance of the departure time, while maintaining or increasing the state of
charge of the storage battery. 131, 37, 38. Grander discloses that the
programmed departure time indicates to the system when it should command
the air conditioning system to heat or cool the passenger compartment so as
to reach the preferred temperature before departure. 138.
The Examiner finds that Grander does not disclose inputting the
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Application 13/418,024
preferred temperature value and departure time into the system from a
remote device, and the Examiner relies on Umebayashi’s disclosure of
remotely controlling an air conditioning apparatus in an electric vehicle
using a mobile device that sends an instruction to the air conditioning
apparatus indicating a desired air temperature and anticipated boarding time.
Office Act. 3; Umebayashi || 8, 23, 28, 32—33. The Examiner finds that one
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s invention would have
been led to modify Chander’s system to enable a remote control device as
disclosed in Umebayashi to program Chander’s system in order to provide
the convenience of remotely changing a preferred temperature or departure
time. Office Act. 3.
The Examiner finds that Chander also does not disclose programming
a plurality of departure times over a plurality of days into the system a single
session, and the Examiner relies on Jennings for suggesting this feature.
Office Act. 3^4; Ans. 3. The “Background” section of Jennings discloses
the conventionality of using climate control systems to regulate vehicle
temperature. 13. Jennings further discloses a climate control system having
a graphical interface that allows a user to program a seven day schedule of
temperature set points for up to four time periods each day. Tflf 98, 99, 153;
Fig. 9A. The Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of Appellant’s invention would have been led to modify Chander’s system to
allow a user to automatically control the vehicle passenger compartment
temperature based on a weekly schedule, as disclosed in Jennings. Office
Act. 4; Ans. 3.
Appellant argues that Chander and Umebayashi both fail to disclose a
system that allows a user to program a plurality of departure times over a
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Application 13/418,024
plurality of days in a single session. App. Br. 9—10. However, as discussed
above, the Examiner acknowledges that Chander lacks this disclosure, and
relies on Jennings for suggesting these features. As also discussed above,
the Examiner relies on Umebayashi’s disclosure of using a mobile device to
remotely control an air conditioning apparatus in an electric vehicle based on
a desired air temperature and anticipated boarding time. Because
Appellant’s arguments do not address the basis for the Examiner’s reliance
on Chander and Umebayashi, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive of
reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection.
Appellant further argues that Jennings is non-analogous art because
Jennings does not teach or suggest using the climate control system
described in the reference in a vehicle, particularly in the manner recited in
claim 1. App. Br. 11. Appellant contends that although Jennings discloses a
customizable programming schedule for HVAC systems, the detailed
description of Jennings is “completely silent” regarding use of the
programming schedule in a vehicle. App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 2. Appellant
asserts that one skill in the art therefore would not have combined “the non-
vehicular application disclosed by Jennings with the vehicle systems of
Chander and/or Umebayashi,” and Appellant argues that the Examiner’s
rejection is thus based on improper hindsight bias. App. Br. 11, Reply Br.
2-3.
For a prior art reference to be analogous art, the reference must either
be in the field of the inventor’s (Appellant’s) endeavor, or it must be
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor
(Appellant) was concerned, from the viewpoint of one of ordinary skill in
the art. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986—87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating
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Application 13/418,024
that the analogous art test requires that “a reference is either in the field of
the applicant’s endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the problem with
which the inventor was concerned . . . based on the judgment of a person
having ordinary skill in the art.”); In re Antle, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171—1172
(CCPA 1971) (indicating that section 103 requires a presumption of full
knowledge by the inventor of the prior art in the field of his endeavor, but
does not require a presumption of full knowledge by the inventor of prior art
outside the field of his endeavor, i.e., of non-analogous art. “In that respect,
it only requires us to presume that the inventor would have that ability to
select and utilize knowledge from other arts reasonably pertinent to his
particular problem which would be expected of a man of ordinary skill in the
art to which the subject matter pertains.”)
In the present case, Jennings’ disclosure of the conventionality of
using climate control systems for vehicles reasonably would have suggested
to one of ordinary skill in the art that the programmable climate control
system described in the reference would be suitable for use in a vehicle.
Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably would have understood
that Jennings and Appellant are both within the same field of programmable
temperature control systems for vehicles. However, even if Jennings is not
within the field of Appellant’s endeavor, one of ordinary skill in the art
seeking to develop a programmable temperature control system for electric
vehicles reasonably would have looked to Jennings’ disclosure of a
graphical interface that can be used to program a weekly schedule into a
climate control system. Accordingly, one of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood Jennings to be reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which Appellant was concerned—development of a
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Application 13/418,024
temperature control system for electric vehicles that can be programmed to
provide a preferred temperature according to a multiple day schedule of
departure times.
Therefore, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the preponderance of
the evidence on this record supports the Examiner’s finding that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Chander’s system for
pre-heating or pre-cooling the passenger compartment of an electric vehicle
as suggested by Jennings to enable a user to conveniently program a seven
day schedule of temperature set points based on particular departure times
each day. Therefore, the Examiner’s rejection is not grounded on
impermissible hindsight as Appellant contends. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,
988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”) (cited
with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
Consequently, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive of reversible
error, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 8, and 16 under
35U.S.C. § 103(a).
Rejection II
In addressing this rejection, Appellant relies on the arguments
discussed above that Appellant provides for the independent claims, and
contends that the additional reference cited by the Examiner fails to remedy
the deficiencies of Chander, Umebayashi, and Jennings. App. Br. 12.
Because we are unpersuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 1 as discussed above, Appellant’s position as to this ground of
rejection is therefore also without merit. Accordingly, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 7, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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DECISION
In view of the reasons set forth above and in the Office Action and the
Answer, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 6—8, 12, 13, and
16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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