Ex Parte Buchmann et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesMar 5, 201010977329 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 5, 2010) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________________ Ex parte DANIEL BUCHMANN, WOLFGANG KALTHOFF, GERD MOSER, RALF PHILIPP, and WOLFGANG WIESE ____________________ Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Decided: March 5, 2010 ____________________ Before JAMES D. THOMAS, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and THU A. DANG, Administrative Patent Judges. DANG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 I. STATEMENT OF CASE Appellants appeal the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. A. INVENTION According to Appellants, the invention relates to “a master data framework” that “allows the user to create a definition of a business object type by associating two or more definitions of other business object types” (Spec. 24, ll. 2-8). B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM Claim 1 is exemplary and reproduced below: 1. A machine-readable storage medium comprising instructions, which when implemented by one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform the following operations: receiving information describing a business object type; and in response to user input, creating a definition of the business object type, the definition being in accordance with a data model usable to define different business object types, the data model being a standard data model used in an enterprise system. C. REJECTION The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: 2 Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 Aigner US 2004/0187140 Sep. 23, 2004 (filed on Sep. 8, 2003) Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Aigner. II. ISSUE Have Appellants shown the Examiner erred in finding that Aigner teaches “creating a definition of the business object type” (claim 1)? III. FINDINGS OF FACT The following Findings of Fact (FF) are shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Aigner 1) Aigner discloses a business object modeler that provides a user interface for constructing business objects (¶ [0009]); and a business object generator that creates executable versions of a business object (¶¶ [0009] and [0016]). 2) The business object modeler, its user interface, and the business object generator are design-time components (¶ [0066] and [0070]) that generate “the classes and the coding” (¶ [0096]). 3) The user interface allows a user to specify the attributes and relations of a business object (¶ [0016]). 4) The user interface provides a first attribute specification section displaying “available attributes” (e.g., “customer,” “employee,” “product,” “address,” and “country”), which can be selectively added to the business 3 Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 object’s current attributes by drag and drop techniques (¶ [0121]; Figs. 5C- D). IV. PRINCIPLES OF LAW Claim Interpretation The claims measure the invention. See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). “[T]he PTO gives claims their ‘broadest reasonable interpretation.’” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “Moreover, limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 35 U.S.C. § 102 In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “[a] single prior art reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a claim invalidates that claim by anticipation.” Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference.” Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed Cir. 1999). “In other words, if granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art, then that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it also covers subject matter not in the prior art.” Id. (citations omitted). V. ANALYSIS As to independent claim 1, Appellants argue that “creating a ‘business 4 Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 obiect’ is not ‘creating a definition of a business object type,’ as recited in claim 1” and, thus, Aigner’s system does not create a definition of a “business object type” (App. Br. 11). However, the Examiner finds that “Aigner teaches a user interface demonstrat[ing] the creation of a business object for a composite application” (Ans. 11). The Examiner further finds that, when creating a business object, Aigner’s system creates a definition equivalent to the recited “definition of the business object type” (id.). Thus, an issue we address on appeal is whether the Examiner erred in finding that Aigner teaches “creating a definition of the business object type” (claim 1). We begin our analysis by giving the claims their broadest reasonable interpretation. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1324. Furthermore, our analysis will not read limitations into the claims from the specification. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d at 1184. Claim 1 does not place any limitation on what “definition” and “business object type” mean, include, or represent, other than that the “definition of the business object type” accords with a “data model usable to define different business object types.” However, Appellants’ disclosure states that “[t]ypically, a programmer will predefine standard object classes, referred to in the present specification as object types” (Spec. 1, ll. 5-7; emphasis added). Appellants’ disclosure further states that “[o]bject types are blueprints for describing individual objects using a defined set of class attributes (or properties)” (Spec. 1, ll. 7-8). The disclosure explains that the invention’s “object type definitions” adhere to a data model (Spec. 8, ll. 3-4), whereby 5 Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 each definition includes: a “data set component” describing the business object type’s attributes, e.g., “geographic location” (Spec. 9, ll. 3-14); and a “relations component” specifying relationships between the defined and other business object types (Spec. 9, ll. 15-21). With respect to business object types (i.e., classes) and their instantiated business objects, Appellants’ disclosure also states that “design time [is] a period in which business object types are defined” (Spec. 4, ll. 20- 22); and that “run time [is] a period in which applications … instantiate data objects” (Spec. 4, ll. 26-28). In view of Appellants’ disclosure, we broadly and reasonably interpret the recited “object type” as meaning an “object class” of an object-oriented program. Aigner discloses a business object modeler for constructing business objects (FF 1); and a business object generator for creating executable versions of business objects (FF 1). The business object modeler, its user interface, and the business object generator are design-time components (FF 2) that generate object “classes” and “coding” (FF 2). The user interface specifies the attributes and relations of a business object (FF 3) by displaying “available attributes” (e.g., “address” and “country”) that can be selectively added to a business object’s current attributes (FF 4). Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, Aigner’s system “constructs” and “generates” business object “classes” during “design time” (FF 1-2), which Appellants acknowledge as a period for defining business object types/classes as opposed to business object instances (Spec. 4, ll. 20-22 and 26-28). Furthermore, Aigner’s system constructs business objects by specifying their attributes (e.g., “address” and “country”) and relations (FF 6 Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 3), which equate to the “data set component” (e.g., “geographic location”) and “relations component” forming Aigner’s business object type definitions (Spec. 9, ll. 3-21). For each of these reasons, a skilled artisan would have understood Aigner’s system as “creating a definition of the business object type” (claim 1). Appellants further argue that “Aigner discusses reception of ‘requests’ and ‘information [to fulfill] requests,’ but fails to discuss a ‘business object type,’ as recited in claim 1,” and thus “does not describe ‘receiving information describing a business object type,’ as recited in claim 1” (App. Br. 9). Like the above-addressed argument, this argument merely asserts that Aigner is silent as to business object types/classes. In view of our findings, this argument is not persuasive. Accordingly, Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1. We therefore affirm the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). As Appellants do not provide separate arguments for claims 2-20, those claims fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). We therefore also affirm the rejection of claims 2-16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). VI. CONCLUSION Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in finding that claims 1-20 are anticipated by Aigner. 7 Appeal 2009-007260 Application 10/977,329 VII. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED peb SCHWEGMAN, LUNDBERG & WOESSNER/SAP P.O. BOX 2938 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation