Ex Parte Brundridge et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 12, 2016

13627569 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 12, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/627,569 09/26/2012 Michael A. Brundridge
34456 7590 07114/2016
LARSON NEWMAN, LLP
8200 N. MOP AC EXPY.
SUITE 280
AUSTIN, TX 78759
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
DC-19797 4169
EXAMINER
MCCOY, RICHARD ANTHONY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2431
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/14/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@larsonnewman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL A. BRUNDRIDGE and GANG LIU1
Appeal2015-003438
Application 13/627,569
Technology Center 2400
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, BRUCE R. WINSOR, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
Technology
The application relates to a unified license manager. Spec. i-f 1. Claim
1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the key limitation emphasized:
1. A computing device comprising:
a component;
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Dell Products, LP,
with additional security interests to Bank of New York Mellon Trust
Company and Bank of America. App. Br. 3.
Appeal2015-003438
Application 13/627,569
a device detector to detect when the component is
connected to the computing device; and
a license manager subsystem in communication with the
device detector to determine that the component requires a
license in order to be activated and to communicate with the
component pursuant to a uniform protocol for communicating
with devices for licensing purposes, the communicating with the
component comprising issuing commands to the component
pursuant to the uniform protocol, the commands including a
command to the component for identification of the component
and a command to the component to activate itself pursuant to
the license.
Rejections
Claims 6, 7, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph as indefinite. Final Act. 3.
Claims 1, 3, 4, and 8-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Yellai et al. (US 2006/0106728 Al; May 18, 2006) and
Pichetti et al. (US 2009/0276856 Al; Nov. 5, 2009). Final Act. 6.
Claims 2, 5, 15-18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Yellai, Pichetti, and Mittapalli et al. (US 8,108,667 B2; Jan.
31, 2012). Final Act. 16.
Claims 6, 7, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Y ellai, Pichetti, Mittapalli, and the Management Component
Transport Protocol (MCTP) Overview White Paper (July 2007) ("MCTP
Paper"). Final Act. 20.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding claims 6, 7, and 19 indefinite
based on the use of the terms "Management Component Transport
Protocol," "Network Controller Sideband Interface," "Inter-Integrated
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Application 13/627,569
Circuit," "Peripheral Component Interconnect-Express," and "Reduced
Media Independent Interface"?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding Yellai teaches or suggests the
"identification of the component," as recited in claims 1, 11, and 15?
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness: Claims 6, 7, and 19
The Examiner rejects claims 6, 7, and 19 as indefinite for using the
terms "Management Component Transport Protocol," "Network Controller
Sideband Interface," "Inter-Integrated Circuit," "Peripheral Component
Interconnect-Express," and "Reduced Media Independent Interface" because
the Examiner finds these terms have "a meaning which may change over
time." Final Act. 3. The Examiner further finds "the trademark/trade names
I2C, PCie, and RMII" render claims 7 and 19 indefinite because "[a]
trademark or trade name is used to identify a source of goods, and not the
goods themselves." Ans. 3.
However, we agree with Appellants that these particular terms
"describe standards" that had "very specific meanings" at the time of the
invention based on "very detailed" specifications "ranging to the hundreds
of pages." App. Br. 8. Although technical standards may change over time,
such as when new versions of a standard are introduced, this is no different
than the meaning of any other claim term changing over time. The Federal
Circuit has "made clear ... that the ordinary and customary meaning of a
claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary
skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective
filing date of the patent application." Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
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Application 13/627,569
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) (emphasis added). Thus, the meaning of a
claim reciting a standard is tied to the version or versions of the standard in
existence at the time of the invention, specifically the version or versions
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the claims to
refer to at the time of the invention. See also Kopykake Enters., Inc. v.
Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("when a claim term
understood to have a narrow meaning when the application is filed later
acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of the term is limited to what
it was understood to mean at the time of filing"). That some of the claim
terms may also be trademarks or trade names does not change that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood the terms to refer to the
industry standards' versions at the time of the invention. Thus, we find the
claims inform those of ordinary skill in the art with reasonable certainty
about the scope of the invention.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 6,
7, and 19 for indefiniteness.
Obviousness: Claims 1-20
Both the present application and the prior art, Y ellai, relate to a
computing device (such as a server) that includes one or more components,
such as modules or cards that provide a service or functionality. Spec.
i-fi-f 12, 14; Yellai i122. For example, Figure 6 ofYellai shows an electronic
device 600 having a chassis with 32 different slots and a service module 620
plugged into slot 1. Y ellai i1 66. Y ellai' s service modules offer services
such as the forwarding of packets or providing voice/video services. Id.
i122. The present application similarly describes a server that has multiple
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Application 13/627,569
components providing services such as systems management or PCle
functionality. Spec. i-f 14. The Examiner relies upon Y ellai' s service
module as teaching the present application's claimed component. Ans. 4.
All three independent claims ( 1, 11, and 15) recite a command "for
identification of the component." For this limitation, the Examiner relies
upon Y ellai' s disclosure of license manager 710 (on controller 700)
receiving an authorization key with a command containing a "node
identifier." Ans. 4. The node identifier contained in the authorization key is
compared to an official node identifier for the electronic device, and
installation only happens ifthere is a match. Id. at 4--5 (citing Yellai i-fi-175-
77). Appellants contend the node identifier refers to the "device to which
the service module is attached" (e.g., electronic device 600), not the service
module itself (e.g., service module 620). App. Br. 10-11. The Examiner
agrees with Appellants, including that "the node does not identify a service
module." Ans. 4. Nevertheless, the Examiner finds the identification of the
electronic device sufficient "according to the broadest reasonable
interpretation" because "the claim does not include any language that would
limit the interpretation of the claim to 'a command to the component for
uniquely identifying the component'." Id. at 5.
We agree with Appellants that "the node identifier is not an
identification of the component." Reply Br. 4. While we apply the broadest
reasonable interpretation during examination, "[a]bove all, the broadest
reasonable interpretation must be reasonable in light of the claims and
specification." PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc 'ns RF,
LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, in the context of the claims
and the Specification, we conclude an ordinarily skilled artisan would not
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Application 13/627,569
have found it reasonable that the identification of a server discloses the
identification of a component within that server. For example, Yellai
teaches that "[t]he license manager 710 manages a pool of licenses 750
available to an associated electronic device (e.g., device 600 of FIG. 6)" and
"[t]he allocated licenses enable corresponding service features on any
service module installed." Y ellai i-f 71 (emphasis added). Thus, in Y ellai,
licenses are tied to the electronic device or chassis, not the service modules
within a chassis. Id. i-f 84. The Examiner is correct that there may be
instances when the identification of the component is not unique (e.g., two
components that share the same number, just as two people may share the
same name). However, the Examiner does not establish that an identifier of
a device containing components is encompassed within an identifier,
whether unique or non-unique, of a component of the device. To the
contrary, even the Examiner finds that "the node does not identify a service
module." Ans. 4.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1,
11, and 15 for obviousness. Dependent claims 2-10, 12-14, and 16-20
stand with their respective independent claims.
DECISION
For the reasons above, we reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-2 0.
REVERSED
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