Ex Parte Brumback et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 24, 201714029763 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/029,763 09/17/2013 Christine Boomer Brumback FTBTP003 9779 119042 7590 07/26/2017 Weaver Austin Villeneuve & Sampson LLP; FITBIT ATTN: FITBIT, INC P.O. BOX 70250 Oakland, CA 94612-0250 EXAMINER ULRICH, NICHOLAS S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2173 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/26/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@wavsip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHRISTINE BOOMER BRUMBACK, DAVID WAYNE KNIGHT, JAMES PARK, ANDREW COLE AXLEY, and SHELTEN GEE JAO YUEN Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 Technology Center 2100 Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1—30, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Fitbit, Incorporated. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Invention According to the Specification, the invention relates to a “biometric monitoring device with a display.” Abstract; see Spec. ]Hf 5—66.2 The Specification explains that the “display may, in response to receiving page advance requests from a user, advance through a plurality of different data display pages, at least some of which show aspects of biometric data recorded by the device.” Id. The Specification further explains that the “biometric monitoring device may also, based on the biometric data, modify the sequential display order of the data display pages.” Id. Exemplary Claims Independent claims 1 and 21 exemplify the subject matter of the claims under consideration and read as follows: 1. A biometric monitoring device comprising: one or more biometric sensors; a display; and one or more processors and a memory communicatively connected with the one or more biometric sensors and the display, wherein the memory stores instructions to cause the one or more processors to: receive data from the one or more biometric sensors, 2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the Specification, filed September 17, 2013; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action, mailed July 8, 2015; “App. Br.” for the Appeal Brief, filed July 20, 2016; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed November 3, 2016; and “Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed December 20, 2016. 2 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 determine a device state for the biometric monitoring device based on the data from the one or more biometric sensors, and select a screen associated with the device state for display on the display in response to receipt of a user input. 21. A storage device comprising computer-executable instructions that, when executed, cause one or more processors to: receive data from one or more biometric sensors of a biometric monitoring device; determine a device state for the biometric monitoring device based on the data from the one or more biometric sensors; and select a screen associated with the device state for display on a display of the biometric monitoring device in response to receipt of a user input by the biometric monitoring device. App. Br. 16, 21 (Claims App.). The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal As evidence of unpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following prior art: Lakovic et al. (“Lakovic”) Yuen et al. (“Yuen”) Prykari et al. (“Prykari”) Low et al. (“Low”) Bernini et al. (“Bernini”) US 2010/0331145 Al US 2012/0084053 Al US 2012/0112908 Al US 2013/0080811 Al US 2013/0198685 Al Dec. 30, 2010 Apr. 5, 2012 May 10, 2012 Mar. 28, 2013 (filed Sept .23,2011) Aug. 1,2013 (filed July 27, 2012) The Rejections on Appeal Claims 21—30 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Pinal Act. 13. 3 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 Claims 1—3, 5, 9, 11—13, 15, 19, 21—23, 25, and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lakovic and Yuen. Final Act. 14—17. Claims 4, 14, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lakovic, Yuen, and Prykari. Final Act. 17—18. Claims 6, 7, 10, 16, 17, 20, 26, 27, and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lakovic, Yuen, and Bernini. Final Act. 18-21. Claims 8, 18, and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Lakovic, Yuen, and Low. Final Act. 21—22. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1—30 in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we disagree with Appellants’ assertions regarding error by the Examiner. We adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office Action (Final Act. 13—22) and Answer (Ans. 2—7). We add the following to address and emphasize specific findings and arguments. The § 101 Rejection of Claims 21—30 Appellants note that the Examiner relies on the Board’s precedential decision Ex parte Mewherter, 107 USPQ2d 1857, 1861—63 (PTAB 2013), to support the § 101 rejection of claims 21—30 and that Mewherter addressed claims reciting a “machine-readable storage medium.” App. Br. 7. Appellants argue error in the § 101 rejection because a “storage device” as recited in claims 21—30 is narrower than a “storage medium” and “due to this narrowness, avoids encompassing non-transitory storage media such as 4 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 carrier waves.” Id. at 8; see Reply Br. 3—5. Based on a dictionary definition of “device,” Appellants argue that a “device” is a “thing,” and “things” are “by their very nature, not ‘transitory.’” App. Br. 7—8; Reply Br. 5. Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because the Examiner determines that the Specification fails to define “storage device” to exclude a transitory storage medium and the broadest reasonable interpretation of “storage device” includes a transitory storage medium. Ans. 3. Although not binding on this panel, we note that other Board panels have sustained § 101 rejections of claims reciting a “computer-readable storage device,” a “program storage device,” and a “storage device” based on reasoning similar to the Examiner’s reasoning here. See, e.g., Ex Parte Hunt, Appeal 2016-006675, 2017 WL 1279529, at *3 (PTAB Mar. 22, 2017); Ex Parte Bernelas, Appeal 2015-006381, 2016 WL 6125122, at *3 (PTAB Sept. 20, 2016); Ex Parte Brodeur, Appeal 2012-011945, 2015 WL 907468, at *2 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2015); see also Ex Parte Katsikas, Appeal 2015-002172, 2016 WL 4446787, at *4 n.6 (PTAB Aug. 19, 2016); Ex Parte Dayka, Appeal 2013-002073, 2015 WL 1941106, at *4 n.l (PTAB Apr. 20, 2015); Ex Parte Hamilton, Appeal 2012-006024, 2014 WL 4631433, at *5 (PTAB Sept. 10, 2014) (entering new ground of rejection under § 101); and Ex Parte Mcdonough, Appeal 2011-013619, 2014 WL 1274030, at *4 n.l (PTAB Mar. 27, 2014). Thus, we sustain the § 101 rejection of claims 21—30 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. 5 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 The § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1—3, 5, 9, 11-13, 15, 19, 21-23, 25, and 29 Motivation to Combine: Advantages Achieved by the Combination Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 because the proposed modification of “Lakovic to allow for automatic determination of a workout state based on biometric sensor data as taught by Yuen” rests on an invalid or insufficient foundation. App. Br. 10 (quoting Final Act. 15). More specifically, Appellants assert that the “Examiner does not explain how, precisely, this modification would be implemented in a way that makes sense” to achieve the advantages identified by the Examiner, e.g., reducing manual inputs and saving user time. Id. at 10-11. Appellants also assert that it “does not make sense to trigger the ‘start’ of the athletic performance data recording in Lakovic’s device based on an automatically determined mode” because “this robs the user of the ability to precisely control when the workout starts and stops” and makes “it difficult or impossible for the user to be able to compare data from the start or end of the workout with data elsewhere in the workout. . . .” Id. at 11-12. In addition, Appellants contend that the proposed modification requires the user to “first engage in behavior . . . that produces biometric sensor data,” “stop engaging in the behavior long enough to [manually] link to the external sensors,” and “[a]fter linking the sensor(s), the user would then need to start the workout behavior again.” App. Br. 11. Appellants also contend that it is: (1) “unclear what connection having ‘more accurate automated calculations of device state’ has to the claimed subject matter”; (2) “unclear how tying the selection of screens to an automated 6 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 determination of device state . . . would make such an automated determination ‘more accurate’”; and (3) “unclear how an automated determination of device state . . . could be ‘more accurate’ than an athlete’s manual indication that they are engaging in a workout or are stopping their workout.” Id. at 12—13; see Reply Br. 13. Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. The Examiner explains that “modifying Lakovic with Yuen provides for automatically invoking” the Run mode and “then further receiving user input to begin recording an athletic performance.” Ans. 4—5; see Final Act. 15; see also Reply Br. 15. During normal operation of Lakovic’s device, a user manually scrolls through several options, e.g., by pushing a button, before reaching the Run option. Lakovic Figs. 86b, 86c; see id. H 89, 91—92; see also id. Figs. 86d, 86e, 127, 129. After the user reaches the Run option and manually selects it, e.g., by pushing another button, the device enters the Run mode. Id. 1104, Fig. 86b. The device then prompts the user to link with sensors by displaying the Walk to Connect screen. Id. H 105, 109, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. As the user walks, the device (1) detects and automatically links with a first sensor, (2) displays the Sensor Found screen, (3) detects and automatically links with a second sensor, and (4) displays the Ready screen after sensor linking. Id. H 105-09, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. The Ready screen includes a Start or Go option. Id. H 105, 109, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. If the user manually selects that option, the device begins recording athletic performance data and displays the Run Layout screen, which may include the pace per mile, total workout time, and total distance. Id. 105-09, 115, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e, 88c, 88d; see Ans. 5. 7 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 The proposed modification replaces manual scrolling to reach the Run option and manual selection of the Run option with entering the Run mode automatically based on biometric sensor data. Ans. 4—5; see Final Act. 15. Thus, the modification automates the manual process of switching to the Run mode. Ans. 6. Accordingly, the modification reduces manual inputs and saves user time by entering the Run mode automatically rather than requiring the user to (1) manually scroll through several options to reach the Run option and (2) manually select the Run option to enter the Run mode. Ans. 4—5; see Final Act. 15. But after entering the Run mode automatically, the user controls when data recording commences by manually selecting the Start or Go option. Ans. 5; see Final Act. 15; see also Reply Br. 15. Thus, the modification does not rob the user of the ability to precisely control when the workout starts and stops. Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the Examiner has explained how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have implemented the proposed modification in a way that makes sense. Ans. 4—5; see Final Act. 15. Consequently, the Examiner has provided “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Appellants assert that entering the Run mode automatically may “actually be slower or more cumbersome” because “it may take several seconds or several minutes of data collected during an activity before a device could ‘automatically’ determine what the activity was and place the device into a corresponding mode.” Reply Br. 8—9. Appellants do not direct us to evidence supporting that assertion and instead rely on attorney 8 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 argument. Attorney argument “cannot take the place of evidence.” See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Appellants assert that Lakovic discloses a shortcut option for a user to enter the Run mode with a single button press. Reply Br. 9. But the existence of that shortcut option does not undermine the desirability of the proposed modification with respect to normal operation of Lakovic’s device. As for Appellants’ contention that the modification requires the user to discontinue activity “long enough to [manually] link to the external sensors,” the Examiner finds that “[t]here is nothing taught by Lakovic that indicates that a user must stop to link sensors” and Lakovic instead teaches “that a user is instructed to move in order to link a shoe-based sensor.” Ans. 4 (citing Lakovic ^fl[ 105-06). Appellants argue that “the link process for sensors . . . needs to be interactive to allow the user to confirm that the sensor in question has been properly linked.” Reply Br. 10. We disagree. Lakovic discloses that, as the user walks in response to the Walk to Connect screen, the device (1) detects and automatically links with a first sensor, (2) displays the Sensor Found screen, (3) detects and automatically links with a second sensor, and (4) displays the Ready screen after sensor linking. Lakovic ^fl[ 105-09, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. For example, the user interfaces in Figures 86a, 86d, and 86e do not include an option between the Walk to Connect screen and the Ready screen that allows a user to manually confirm sensor connection. Id. Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. Appellants assert that “Lakovic allows the user to complete the link process before actually starting the workout in question by selecting the ‘start’ option” to “ensure[] that the desired sensors are linked.” Reply Br. 10 9 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 (citing Lakovic 1105). That assertion rests on a misunderstanding of Lakovic. Lakovic’s device displays the Ready screen after sensor linking. Lakovic H 104—09, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. The Ready screen includes a Start or Go option. Id. H 105, 109, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e. If the user manually selects that option, the device begins recording athletic performance data and displays the Run Layout screen. Id. H 105-09, 115, Figs. 86a, 86d, 86e, 88c, 88d. Thus, selecting the Start or Go option does not cause the device to link with the desired sensors. In addition, Appellants’ contentions that it is unclear how the proposed modification affects accuracy do not identify Examiner error. See Ans. 5—6. The Federal Circuit has recognized “the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections . . . .” In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Ex parte Frye, Appeal No. 2009-006013, 2010 WL 889747 (BPAI Feb. 26, 2010) (precedential)). Further, the applicable rules require that the arguments in an appeal brief “explain why the examiner erred as to each ground of rejection contested by appellant.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants’ contentions that it is unclear how the proposed modification affects accuracy also overlook Yuen’s disclosure. In particular, Yuen explains that “data from one or more physiological sensors may . . . enhance the accuracy of identifying the user state and/or improve the confidence of the correctness/accuracy of the identified user state.” Yuen 1126. And even if, contrary to Yuen’s disclosure, the proposed modification does not enhance accuracy, reducing manual inputs and saving user time provide a sufficient basis for the modification. “[A]ny need or problem 10 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining” references. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). “[T]he desire to enhance commercial opportunities by improving a product or process is universal . . . DyStar Textilfarben GmbHv. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[A]n implicit motivation to combine” may result from a desire to make a product or process “stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient.” DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1368. Motivation to Combine: Combination of Known Methods That Yields a Predictable Result Appellants note that the Examiner finds that the proposed modification “is a combination of known methods that yields a predictable result.” App. Br. 13; see Final Act. 15. Appellants respond by arguing that the resulting device would “be less appealing to the intended market” because the modification would (1) “interfere with the user experience,” (2) “render the user experience . . . more convoluted,” and (3) “offer a degraded user experience as compared with the ‘stock’ version of Lakovic’s device . . . .” App. Br. 13; see Reply Br. 15. Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because the Examiner explains that the proposed modification automates the manual process of switching to the Run mode. Ans. 6. Appellants’ arguments do not direct us to evidence that automating the manual process of switching would negatively affect the user experience. App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 15. Moreover, Yuen discloses automatic mode switching along with optional manual mode switching. See, e.g., Yuen || 175, 251. Because the user may 11 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 still switch modes manually, the proposed modification would not affect the user experience as urged by Appellants. Further, the Examiner finds that “the known method of utilizing sensor data to invoke a mode or state change of a device would be a predictable method to change the mode or state of a device.” Ans. 6; see Yuen || 15, 20, 175, 251. We are persuaded the claimed subject matter exemplifies the principle that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Summary for Independent Claim 1 For the reasons discussed above, Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 for obviousness based on Lakovic and Yuen. Hence, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Independent claims 11 and 21 and Dependent Claims 2, 3, 5,9,12,13,15,19,22,23,25, and 29 Appellants do not make any separate patentability arguments for independent claims 11 and 21 or dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 22, 23, 25, and 29. App. Br. 13—14; Reply Br. 5—16. Because Appellants do not argue the claims separately, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 2, 3, 5, 9, 11—13, 15, 19, 21—23, 25, and 29 for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The § 103(a) Rejections of Claims 4, 6—8, 10, 14, 16—18, 20, 24, 26—28, and 30 Claims 4, 6—8, and 10 depend from claim 1; claims 14, 16—18, and 20 depend from claim 11; and claims 24, 26—28, and 30 depend from claim 21. App. Br. 17—23 (Claims App.). Appellants assert that these dependent claims “stand or fall with independent claim 1 ” and do not make any 12 Appeal 2017-003373 Application 14/029,763 separate patentability arguments for them. App. Br. 14—15. Because Appellants do not argue the claims separately, we sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 4, 6—8, 10, 14, 16—18, 20, 24, 26—28, and 30 for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—30. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 13 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation