Ex Parte Bruckert et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 29, 2012

10953242 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte WILLIAM F. BRUCKERT, JAMES S. KLECKA,
and JAMES R. SMULLEN
____________________

Appeal 2010-005945
Application 10/953,242
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ALLEN R MACDONALD, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, and
BRYAN F. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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Application 10/953,242

2
STATEMENT OF CASE
1

The Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a final
rejection of claims 1 and 3-27, the only claims pending in the application on
appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

The Appellants invented:
[C]omputing system, a plurality of redundant, loosely-
coupled processor elements are operational as a logical
processor. A logic detects a halt condition of the logical
processor and, in response to the halt condition, reintegrates and
commences operation in less than all of the processor elements
leaving at least one processor element nonoperational.

Specification ¶ 0006.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below:
1. A method for performing a diagnostic memory dump
comprising:
detecting a halt condition of at least one processor
element of multiple redundant processor elements, the
processor elements loosely synchronized;
maintaining one processor element in a state existing at
the halt condition;
reloading others of the processor elements whereby the
others commence execution;

1
Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed Dec. 3, 2009) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Mar. 15, 2010),
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Feb. 8, 2012), and Final
Rejection (“Final Rej.,” mailed Sep. 10, 2008).
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copying the state of the maintained one processor
element to a storage while the others continue executing, the
copying by at least one of the others of the processors; and
reintegrating the one processor element when the halt
condition copying is complete whereby the one processor
element commences execution.

REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Hughes
Jewett
Inaho
Gulick
US 4,481,578
US 5,295,258
US 5,884,019
US 6,314,501 B1
Nov. 6, 1984
Mar. 15, 1994
Mar. 16, 1999
Nov. 6, 2001
Smullen US 2003/0145157 A1 Jul. 31, 2003

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 4-5, 9, 11, and 25-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§103(a) as being unpatentable over Smullen, Jewett, and Inaho.
Claims 3 and 23-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, and Hughes.
Claims 6 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, and Gulick.
Claims 7-8 and 13-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, Gulick, and Hughes.
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ISSUE
The issue of whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 3-
27 turns on whether the combination of Smullen, Jewett, and Inaho teaches
or suggests “copying the state of the maintained one processor element to a
storage while the others continue executing, the copying by at least one of
the others of the processors,” and the limitations of claims 3 and 19.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of the
Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner has erred.
We disagree with the Appellants’ conclusions. We adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from
which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We
concur with the conclusion reached by the Examiner. We highlight the
following arguments for emphasis.

Claims 1, 4-5, 9, 11, and 25-27 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Smullen, Jewett, and Inaho
The Appellants contend that the combination of Smullen, Jewett, and
Inaho fails to teach or suggest “copying the state of the maintained one
processor element to a storage while the others continue executing, the
copying by at least one of the others of the processors,” as required by claim
1. App. Br. 11-16 and Reply Br. 1-4.
We disagree with the Appellants. The Examine relied on Smullen to
describe “copying the state of the maintained one processor element to a
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storage while the others continue executing, the copying by at least one of
the others of the processors.” Ans. 4-5 (citing Smullen ¶ 0044). The
Appellants do not set forth any rationale or evidence to rebut this finding by
the Examiner. The Appellants’ arguments point out the deficiencies in
Smullen, Jewett, and Inaho regarding features the Examiner has not relied
upon these references to describe. App. Br. 11-17 and Reply Br. 2-5. We
do not find these arguments to be persuasive because these arguments are
tantamount to the Appellants attacking the references individually when the
rejection is based on the combination of the cited references.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
disclosures. See In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
The Appellants further contend that Smullen and Inaho describe that
processor elements not involved in the parallel processing or loose
synchronization are responsible for copying of the data dump from the failed
processor element and the incorporation of a feature of a processor element
involved in loose synchronization is responsible for copying the data dump
would change the principle of operation. App. Br. 13. We disagree with the
Appellants. Both Smullen and Inaho describe the use of another processor
for copying the data dump of the halted or failed processor. Smullen ¶ 0044
and Inaho 3:30-35. As such, Smullen contemplates the use of multiple
processors that are either networked or local and does not discourage or
discredit the use of the well-known technique of loose synchronization, as
described by Jewett. Inaho similarly describes the use of multiple
processors in parallel processing and does not explicitly discourage or
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discredit having a processor involved in the parallel processing to be
responsible for copying the data dump. In other words, a person with
ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to modify Smullen and
Inaho to include the loose synchronization, as described by Jewett, and such
a modification of the cited references would yield nothing more than
predictable results. As such, the Appellants’ arguments are not found to be
persuasive.

Claims 3 and 23-24 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable
over Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, and Hughes
The Appellants contend that Inaho fails to describe “the state being
copied to a storage while the others continue execution,” as per claim 23.
App. Br. 17. The Appellants specifically argue that Inaho describes that
processors 12-13 and 15 are halted when they copy data to failed processor
14 and only after they copy dump data to processor 14 are processors 12-13
and 15 restarted. App. Br. 16-17 (citing Inaho 4:19-23). We disagree with
the Appellants. Inaho describes that processors 12-13 and 15 are restarted
and executing when the data dump from processor 14 is copied. Inaho 4:19-
28. That is, the state of processor 14 is copied while processors 12-13 and
15 continue execution. As such, Inaho describes this feature of claim 23.
The Examiner has relied on Hughes to describe Direct Memory Access
(DMA) operation. Ans. 15-16 (citing Hughes 1:63-67). As such, the
combination of Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, and Hughes teaches or suggests the
limitations of claim 23.

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Claims 6 and 12 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable
over Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, and Gulick
The Appellants contend that claims 6 and 12 are allowable for the
same reasons asserted in support of claim 1. App. Br. 17. We disagree with
the Appellants. The Appellants’ arguments in support of claim 1 were not
found to be persuasive and are not found to be persuasive here for the same
reasons.

Claims 7-8 and 13-22 rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Smullen, Jewett, Inaho, Gulick, and Hughes
The Appellants first contend that claims 7-8 and 13-18 are allowable
for the same reasons asserted in support of claim 1. App. Br. 17. We
disagree with the Appellants. The Appellants’ arguments in support of
claim 1 were not found to be persuasive and are not found to be persuasive
here for the same reasons.
The Appellants further contend that Inaho fails to describe “the
program causes the first processor element to. . . [transfer] data from one
non-executing source processor element of the processor element plurality to
buffers in at least one executing target processor element of others in the
plurality of processor elements” or “a first processor element of the loosely-
coupled processor elements executes the data transfer program,” as recited in
claim 19. App. Br. 18. We disagree with the Appellants. The Examiner
has relied on the combination of Smullen, Inaho, and Hughes to teach or
suggest “the program causes the first processor element to [transfer] data
from one non-executing source processor element of the processor element
plurality to buffers in at least one executing target processor element of
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others in the plurality of processor elements.” Ans. 25-26 and 31. The
Examiner further relied on the combination of Smullen, Jewett, and Inaho to
teach or suggest “a first processor element of the loosely-coupled processor
elements executes the data transfer program.” Ans. 25-26 and 31. As such,
the Appellants arguments are not found to be persuasive because the
Appellants are attacking the references individually when the rejection is
based on the combination of the cited references. Nonobviousness cannot be
established by attacking the references individually when the rejection is
predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. Id.

CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1 and 3-27.

DECISION
To summarize, our decision is as follows.
 The rejection of claims 1 and 3-27 is sustained.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED

ELD