Ex Parte Broyles et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 16, 2013

11618822 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

____________

Ex parte PAUL J. BROYLES, LOUIS B. HOBSON,
and MARK A. PIWONKA
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Appeal 2011-004547
Application 11/618,822
Technology Center 2100
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Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, JOHN A. EVANS, and PETER P. CHEN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 15-19, and 21-24, which are all the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

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Application 11/618,822

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ invention relates to methods of and a system for
controlling access to a non-volatile memory region (see Abstract).
Exemplary independent claim 1 reads as follows (emphasis added as to the
disputed features):
1. A method of controlling access to a memory region in a
first memory that stores parameters associated with components
of a computer system, wherein the first memory further stores
one or more access rights relating to access of the parameters,
the method comprising:

driving an unlock signal to an input line based on an
unlocked value in a lock state memory;

restarting the computer system after writing the
unlocked value to the lock state memory;

reading, by a controller in response to restarting of the
computer system, the unlocked value from the input line; and

enabling access to the memory region of the first memory
based on the read unlocked value without reading the one or
more access rights.

The Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 15-19, 21, 23, and 24 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Piwonka (U.S. 2004/0215954
A1, Oct. 28, 2004) and Brown (U.S. 5,749,088, May 5, 1998).
Claims 6, 8, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown, Piwonka, and Dalvi (U.S. 6,073,243, Jun. 6,
2000).
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Application 11/618,822

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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
assertions.
In response to each of the arguments raised by Appellants, the
Examiner presents sufficient findings and responses (Ans. 13-20). We agree
with these findings and conclusions and adopt them as our own.
In particular, Appellants argue that Piwonka and Brown do not
disclose controlling of access to a memory region where the controller
functions “in response to” a restart or startup of a computer system, as
recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 8-13; Reply Br. 2-5). We agree with the
Examiner (Ans. 15-16) that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
recited step of “reading, by a controller in response to restarting of the
computer system, the unlocked value from the input line” is met by the
proposed combination. As further explained by the Examiner (Ans. 16),
reading the unlocked value during the normal execution after a restart
effectively takes place “in response to restarting the computer system.”
Contrary to Appellants’ assertion that the system operation after
restarting the computer is not in response to restarting the computer (Reply
Br. 3), the claims are not so limited. We also observe that the Examiner’s
interpretation is consistent with how Appellants have defined the restart of a
computer system as the start, or boot, or reboot, of the system, Spec. para.
13. The PTO gives a disputed claim term its broadest reasonable
interpretation during patent prosecution. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2000). The “broadest reasonable interpretation” rule recognizes
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Application 11/618,822

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that “before a patent is granted the claims are readily amended as part of the
examination process.” Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1581, 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1987). Thus, a patent applicant has the opportunity and
responsibility to remove any ambiguity in claim term meaning by amending
the application. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969).
Additionally, the broadest reasonable interpretation rule “serves the public
interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given
broader scope than is justified.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, we agree with the Examiner’s position that “any action taken by
a computer system could be interpreted as being ‘in response to’ the
computer system being started or restarted,” Ans. 15 (emphasis omitted).
The broadest reasonable interpretation of “in response to” and the other
claim language do not preclude the Examiner’s claim interpretation. We
agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusion that the combination of
Piwonka and Brown teaches or suggests the claimed limitations.
We further disagree with Appellants’ challenge to the propriety of the
proposed combination (App. Br. 9). The Examiner has clearly mapped the
claimed features to the teachings in each reference and has articulated (see
Ans. 16-17) how the claimed features are met by the references’ teachings
with some rational underpinning to combine the teachings of Piwonka with
Brown. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). The
Examiner further articulates the rationale for combining the known prior art
elements of Brown and Piwonka to yield an obvious, predictable
improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
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Application 11/618,822

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We also agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in
response to Appellants’ contentions regarding claims 5, 10, and 23 (see
Ans. 17-19),

CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude that, because the references
teach or suggest all the claim limitations, the Examiner has not erred in
rejecting claims 1, 5, 10, and 23, as well as claims 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15-19, 21,
22, and 24, which were not argued separately (see App. Br. 10-14).

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 15-19,
and 21-24 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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