Ex Parte Brown et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 11, 2013

11264717 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 11, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte WILLIAM A. BROWN, RICHARD W. MUIRHEAD and
FRANCIS X. REDDINGTON
____________

Appeal 2010-009736
Application 11/264,717
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before KRISTEN L. DROESCH, KALYAN K. DESHPANDE and
HUNG H. BUI, Administrative Patent Judges.

DROESCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a final
rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
The Appellants’ disclosed invention is related to methods, systems,
and products for workflow decision management. Embodiments include
maintaining a device state history; identifying a plurality of device usage
patterns in dependence upon the device state history; identifying a plurality
of workflow scenarios in dependence upon the device usage patterns;
determining a workflow administration capacity in dependence upon the
plurality of workflow scenarios; identifying a plurality of workflows in
dependence upon the workflow scenario; executing the plurality of
workflows in dependence upon the workflow administration capacity.
Spec. 2; Abs.
Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below (disputed limitation in
italics):
1. A computer-implemented method for workflow decision
management, the method comprising:
maintaining a device state history, wherein the device state
history is a data structure containing the history of the values of
one or more attributes of one or more devices in a network;
identifying a plurality of device usage patterns in dependence
upon the device state history;
identifying a plurality of workflow scenarios in dependence
upon the device usage patterns;

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determining a workflow administration capacity in dependence
upon the plurality of workflow scenarios, wherein the workflow
administration capacity implements rules governing the
concurrent execution of a plurality of workflows;
identifying a plurality of workflows in dependence upon the
workflow scenario, wherein each workflow is implemented as
software for carrying out a device controlling action by
changing the values of one or more attributes of one or more
devices in the network; and
executing the plurality of workflows in dependence upon the
workflow administration capacity including changing the
values of one or more attributes of one or more devices in the
network.
Rejections
Claims 1-3, 7, 9-11 and 15-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Shum (U.S. 2003/0009507) and Brown (U.S.
2004/0015242).
Claims 4-6, 12-14 and 18-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Shum, Brown and Koclanes (U.S.
2004/0243699).
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Shum, Brown and Subbloie (U.S. 2003/0154123).
ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in finding that Brown teaches or suggests “the
workflow administration capacity implements rules governing the
concurrent execution of a plurality of workflows,” as recited in claim 1, and
similarly recited in independent claims 9 and 15?

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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of the Appellants’
arguments in the Appeal Brief presented in response to the Final Office
Action. We disagree with the Appellants’ conclusions. We highlight and
address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.
The Appellants argue that Brown does not disclose that any logic or
rules govern the concurrent execution of a plurality of workflows. Br. 7.
Specifically, the Appellants argue that Brown’s description of managing and
initiating sets of instructions that will be performed by devices teaches the
disputed limitations is incorrect because managing “a set of instructions”
refers to a single workflow routine. Br. 8. In support of their argument, the
Appellants direct attention to Brown’s disclosure that “[e]ach set of
instructions is known as a ‘workflow routine.’” Br. 8 (citing Brown ¶ 19).
The Appellants’ arguments are misplaced because the Examiner directs
attention to Brown’s description of managing and initiating sets of
instructions (i.e., plural sets of instructions); not a singular set of
instructions. Therefore, by the Appellants’ logic, if “a set of instructions”
refers to a single workflow routine, the management and initiation of sets of
instructions (i.e., plural sets of instructions) refers to plural workflows.
The Appellants also argue that the terms “concurrent”, “rule”, “rules”
or “logic” do not appear in the Brown reference. Br. 8. The Appellants’
arguments are unpersuasive. We are unaware of a requirement for the prior
art references to use the exact same terminology as the Appellants’ claims.
Instead, claim terms are given the broadest reasonable interpretation during
prosecution. The Appellants do not direct us to explicit definitions in their

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Specification for the terms “concurrent” and “rule.” We broadly construe
“concurrent” in light of the Appellants’ Specification to include
simultaneously, in series, in close temporal proximity, and in overlapping
time periods. See Spec. 50-51. We further decline Appellants’ invitation to
narrowly construe “rule” and “rules” such that it is equivalent to “logic.”
Rather, in accordance with the dictionary definition, “rule” or “rules”
encompass a prescribed guide for conduct or action.1 We adopt as our own
the Examiner’s additional findings that Brown teaches the disputed
limitations. Ans. 6, 13 (citing Brown ¶¶ 19, 31, 38, 39). In particular, we
note the Examiner’s citation to Brown’s teachings in paragraph 38 of 1) a
home alarm system when activated can trigger a workflow routine that
causes lights to come on; 2) a Workflow Session 29 that manages the
existence of an executing workflow(s) (i.e., a singular workflow or plural
workflows); and 3) the workflow session describes which if any workflows
(i.e., plural workflows) are currently in progress. Accordingly, we agree
with the Examiner that Brown teaches or suggests a workflow
administration that implements prescribed guides for action governing the
execution in close temporal proximity of a plurality of workflows (e.g., the
activation of a home alarm system triggers a workflow routine that causes
activation of lights).
For all these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-3, 7, 9-11
and 15-17 as obvious over Shum and Brown. The Appellants do not
separately argue the limitations of dependent claims 4-6, 8, 12-14 and 18-20,

1 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/rule (last visited May 31, 2013).

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but instead argue that Koclanes and Subbloie do not teach the disputed
limitations of claim 1. Br. 9-11. For the same reasons as claims 1-3, 7, 9-11
and 15-17, we sustain the rejection of claims 4-6, 12-14 and 18-20 as
obvious over Shum, Brown, and Koclanes and the rejection of claim 8 as
obvious over Shum, Brown and Subbloie.
In the Event of Further Prosecution
We have decided the Appeal before us. We direct the Examiner’s
attention to independent claim 15 which recites: “[a] computer program
product.” In the event of further prosecution, we leave it to the Examiner to
determine whether claim 15, and those claims dependent therefrom,
encompass statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions for Evaluating
Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, Aug. 2009, at 2, available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-08-25_interim_
101_instructions.pdf (providing a computer program per se as an example of
a claim not directed to one of the four patent-eligible subject matter
categories).
DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejections of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over the applied prior art.
TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

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AFFIRMED

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