Ex Parte Brezina et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 6, 201612180471 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 6, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/180,471 07/25/2008 76058 7590 09/08/2016 YAHOO! INC. C/O GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP MET LIFE BUILDING 200 PARK A VENUE NEW YORK, NY 10166 Matthew Brezina UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 085804-620760/US 1109 EXAMINER LO,WEILUN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2179 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/08/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): mendozae@GTLA W.COM cordesp@gtlaw.com njdocket@gtlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MATTHEW BREZINA, ADAM SMITH, and GREGORY DUFFY Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN P. PINKERTON, NATHAN A. ENGELS and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge. Per Curiam DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 file this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-20, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify Yahoo, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants' described and claimed invention is generally directed to collecting and presenting historical communication data and personal data. Spec. ,-r 4. 2 Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows: 1. A computer-implemented method, comprising: receiving, by an application, a trigger identifying a first person referenced in a communication, the first person being different than a sender or recipient of the communication, the communication having been transmitted by a communication client separate from the application; generating a plurality of person profiles based on communications sent or received by the communication client, each profile including a list of contacts associated with the profile; retrieving, by the application, information relating to the first person, the information being a first person profile of the plurality of person profiles, and the first person profile including a list of contacts associated with the first person, wherein the retrieving comprises obtaining the list of contacts from one or more social networks; and providing, by the application, the information to the communication client in accordance with an application programming interface, the information to be displayed to a user of the communication client. 2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed Oct. 2, 2013 ("Final Act."), Appellants' Appeal Brief filed Mar. 31, 2014 ("App. Br.") and Reply Brief filed Nov. 3, 2014 ("Reply Br."), the Examiner's Answer mailed Sept. 4, 2014 ("Ans."), and the original Specification filed July 25, 2008 ("Spec."). 2 Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 Hale Le Vasseur et al. Daigle Dolin et al. References US 2006/0282303 Al Dec. 14, 2006 US 2007/005715 Al Jan. 4, 2007 US 2007/0143414 Al June 21, 2007 US 2008/0316925 Al Dec. 25, 2008 Rejection on Appeal Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dolin, Hale, Daigle, and Le Vasseur. Appellants ' Contentions 1. Appellants contend the Examiner did not provide the required analysis to support the rejections under§ 103(a) because the rejections are conclusory without specific findings regarding the scope of the prior art, the level of ordinary skill in the art, or the rationale to support the legal conclusions of obviousness. App. Br. 5-7. 2. Appellants contend the Examiner fails to consider the claims as a whole by impermissibly parsing the features of the claims into fragments to selectively combine the references by hindsight and that the references do not teach the "receiving" limitation of claim 1, as well as the corresponding limitation of claims 10 and 15. App. Br. 7-13; Reply Br. 2--4. 3. Appellants contend the cited art teaches away from the modifications and combinations proposed by the Examiner because Dolin, Daigle, Hale, and Le Vasseur are four disparate and incompatible systems, and combining Daigle, Hale, and 3 Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 Le Vasseur with Dolin would significantly change Dolin's principle of operation. App. Br. 13-17; Reply Br. 5-9. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants' arguments in the Briefs that the Examiner has erred. See App. Br. 5-17; Reply Br. 2-10. We have also reviewed the Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments and the evidence of record. We disagree with Appellants' contention that the Examiner has erred. The Examiner has provided a detailed and comprehensive response, supported by evidence based on the combined teachings and suggestions of the cited references, to each of Appellants' contentions and arguments. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2-14) and in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' Appeal Brief (Ans. 14--43). We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis, we consider and highlight specific arguments as presented in the Briefs. Regarding Appellants' contention 1, we disagree with Appellants' arguments that the Examiner's rejections are conclusory and without specific findings regarding the scope and content of the prior art or the rationale to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. As set forth in the Final Action and the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner made specific findings regarding the teachings of each of the cited references and how the reference teaches or suggests, or differs from, the claim limitations at issue. See Final Act. 2- 14; Ans. 17-23, 26-28, 32. As required by KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Co., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007), the Examiner also provided "some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of 4 Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 obviousness." See Ans. 23-26, 28-31, 32-34. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument the Examiner errs by failing to identify the level of ordinary skill in the art because the cited references reflect the level of skill in the art, and Appellants do not explain how the level of skill was necessary to resolve any of Appellants' arguments. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown"). Regarding Appellants' contention 2, we disagree with Appellants' arguments that the Examiner fails to consider the claims as a whole by parsing or fragmenting the claim limitations to selectively combine the references using impermissible hindsight. As reflected in the Final Action and the Examiner's Answer, the Examiner finds all of the elements of claim 1, including the "receiving" element, are known in the art as they are taught by the primary reference Dolan or the combination of Dolan with one or more of Daigle, Hale or La Vasseur. Final Act. 3-8; Ans. 35-39. These findings show that the combination proposed by the Examiner involves familiar elements and known methods that yield predictable results. As the Supreme Court stated, "[ t ]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence or argument to rebut the Examiner's findings or establish that the combination of these known elements would yield more than predictable results. Furthermore, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based 5 Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 upon hindsight reasoning. However, so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the Appellants' disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Here, we conclude the Examiner did not use impermissible hindsight because the rejection is based on the references and what they would have taught or suggested to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Regarding Appellants' contention 3, based on the Examiner's findings concerning the cited references, we do not agree with Appellants that the cited art are disparate and incompatible systems that teach away from combining Dolin, Daigle, Hale, and Le Vasseur or that combining Daigle, Hale, and Le Vasseur with Dolin would significantly change Dolin's principle of operation. See Ans. 18-34, 40-42. We note "the test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCP A 1981 ). Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence or argument to show that modifying Dolin as proposed by the Examiner was "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art." See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007)). Absent such evidence or argument, we "take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ" and agree that the Examiner's proposed modifications and combinations were 6 Appeal2015-002974 Application 12/180,471 within the level of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also id. at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."). CONCLUSION Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 10, and 15, as well as claims 2-9, 11-14, and 16-20, which depend from claims 1, 10, and 15, respectively, and are not argued separately. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation