Ex Parte Brei et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 7, 2007

10142248 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 7, 2007)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today is not binding
precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte JAMES BREI, MARK HOLT, KEN OLSON,
and SRI POTHARAJU
____________________

Appeal 2007-1863
Application 10/142,2481
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Decided: September 7, 2007
____________________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, and
SCOTT R. BOALICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOALICK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1-20, all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.

1 Application filed May 9, 2002. The real party in interest is Proquest
Company.

Appeal 2007-1863
Application 10/142,248

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention relates to a method for creating durable web-
enabled Uniform Resource Locator (URL) links. In the words of the
Appellants:
The present invention relates generally to web-
based browsing and searching capabilities. More
particularly, the present invention relates to a
method of performing multiple user function
requests, such as searching, browsing, printing,
and retrieving documents, in a web-enabled
environment that requires user authentication and
authorization for user access which further
provides process distribution. Specifically, the
invention relates to the creation of durable
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) link results
incorporating search results derived from user-
performed functions and user authentication
information. The link can be placed in a table that
would map links with logical locations of the place
to which it refers. As the location changes, the
links would remain persistent.

(Specification 1:6-18.)

In addition, according to Appellants:
The present invention provides a method of
performing Internet and/or Intranet user functions
in a web-enabled information system. The present
invention allows authentication and retrieval of
authorized information while not making
additional graphic user interfaces (GUI) necessary.
The method is as follows: the user begins by
authenticating himself within the web-enabled user
interface. After authentication, the user will be
able to perform a first user function request; this
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first user function, typically a search for document,
search for publication, or search by keyword, will
create durable URL link results incorporating the
user's initial authentication information and the
linking information for the searched for
documents; the user can then perform successive
user function requests either independent of or
based on the first user function results. However,
such successive user function requests will not
require the user to re-authenticate nor will they
alter or destroy the original URL link results
created from the first user function. Furthermore,
since the user's authentication information is stored
within all URL links, it is unnecessary for the user
to re-enter any authentication information when
performing successive user functions, such as
document retrieval requests, search by keywords
and the like, since the system simply obtains this
information from the previous link.

(Specification 9:1-23.)

Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method of performing authenticated web-
enabled functions, comprising the steps of:

authenticating a user on a web-enabled
service with a user authentication;

receiving a first user function request on
said web-enabled service;

returning a first user function request result;

creating a first Uniform Resource Locator
link derived from said first user function request,
and incorporating said user authentication and said
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Application 10/142,248

first user function request result within said first
Uniform Resource Locator link;

preserving said first Uniform Resource
Locator link.

The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Levergood US 5,708,780 Jan. 13, 1998

Claims 1-5 and 7-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Levergood.
Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious
over Levergood.
Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellants or the Examiner, we
make reference to the Briefs and the Answer for their respective details.
Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in
this decision. Arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not
to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2004).2

2 Except as will be noted in this opinion, Appellants have not presented any
substantive arguments directed separately to the patentability of the
dependent claims or related claims in each group. In the absence of a
separate argument with respect to those claims, they stand or fall with the
representative independent claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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ISSUES
1. Whether Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1-5 and 7-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The issue turns on
whether Levergood discloses each and every limitation of claims 1-5 and
7-20.
2. Whether Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). That is, given the teachings of
the prior art, have Appellants shown that the differences between claim 6
and the prior art are sufficient to render the claimed subject matter
unobvious to a person skilled in the art at the time the invention was made?

FINDINGS OF FACT
The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by a
preponderance of the evidence.

1. Levergood describes techniques for controlling and monitoring access
to network servers. (Abstract.) These techniques may be used in
processing service requests from a client to a server through the
Internet. (Col. 3, ll. 7-8.) Levergood teaches forwarding a service
request from a client to the server and appending a session
identification [SID] to that request and to subsequent service requests
within the same session. (Col. 3, ll. 12-16.) A client request typically
is made with a URL from a Web browser. (Col. 3, ll. 21-22.) "When
the user selects a link that is directed to an access-controlled file, the
server subjects the request to a secondary server which determines
whether the client has an authorization or valid account." (Abstract.)
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After verifying that the user has authorization, "the user is provided
with a session identification which allows the user to access to the
requested file as well as any other files within the present protection
domain." (Abstract.) The SID includes an authorization identifier to
enable the user to access the controlled file. (Col. 3, ll. 18-20.) The
SID may have an expiration time associated with it. (Col. 3,
ll. 33-37.)

2. Levergood teaches that "a valid SID allows the client to access all
controlled files within a protection domain without requiring further
authorization. A protection domain is . . . a collection of controlled
files of common protection within one or more servers." (Col. 3, ll.
50-55.) Levergood also teaches that "[w]hen a client accesses a
controlled Web page with a valid SID, the user viewing the page may
want to traverse a link to view another Web page." (Col. 3, ll. 56-58.)
Levergood teaches the use of either a "relative link" or an "absolute
link" to traverse the link to view another Web page. (Col. 3, l. 59 to
col. 4, l. 23.)

3. Levergood teaches that a link to another Web page in the same path is
called a "relative link." (Col. 3, ll. 59-60.) Levergood instructs that:
The browser on the client computer executes a
relative link by rewriting the current URL to
replace the old controlled page name with a new
one. The new URL retains all portions of the old,
including the SID, except for the new page name.
If the relative link points to a page in the same
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protection domain, the SID remains valid, and the
request is honored.

(Col. 3, ll. 62-67.)

4. Levergood teaches that a link to another Web page in a different path
is called an "absolute link." (Col. 4, ll. 7-8.) Levergood instructs that:
In generating a new absolute link, the SID is
overwritten by the browser. In the preferred
embodiment, the content server, in each serving of
a controlled Web page within the domain, filters
the page to include the current SID in each
absolute URL on the page. Hence, when the user
elects to traverse an absolute link, the browser is
facilitated with an authenticated URL which is
directed with its SID to a page in a different path.

(Col. 4, ll. 8-16.)

5. Levergood also teaches monitoring the frequency and duration of
access to Web pages. (Col. 4, ll. 32-34.) "Such records provide
important marketing feedback including user demand, access pattern,
and relationships between customer demographics and accessed pages
and access patterns." (Col. 4, ll. 39-42.)

6. Referring to Figure 2A, Levergood teaches that when a user clicks on
a link corresponding to a URL for a controlled page, the browser
forwards the request to a content server which determines whether the
URL contains an SID. (Col. 5, ll. 31-42.) If no SID is present, the
content server instructs the browser to redirect the request to an
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authentication server to obtain a valid SID. (Col. 5, ll. 45-48.) After
completing the authentication process, a SID is provided from the
authentication server to the client. (Col. 5, ll. 48-51.) When a URL is
appended with a SID, the SID may be encrypted. (Col. 5, ll. 53-65.)
If the URL contains a SID, the content server determines whether the
request is directed to a page in the current domain and, if so, validates
the SID. (Col. 5, l. 66 to col. 6, l. 8.) Levergood teaches that:
If the validation passes, the content server searches
the page to be forwarded for any absolute URL
links contained therein 112, that is, any links
directed to controlled documents in different
content servers. The content server augments each
absolute URL with the current SID to facilitate
authenticated accesses across multiple content
servers. The requested page as processed is then
transmitted to the client browser for display 117.
The user viewing the requested Web page may
elect to traverse any link on that page to trigger the
entire sequence again 100.

(Col. 6, ll. 17-26.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
On appeal, all timely filed evidence and properly presented argument
are considered by the Board. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223
USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In the examination of a patent application, the Examiner bears the
initial burden of showing a prima facie case of unpatentability. Id. at 1472,
223 USPQ at 788. When that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
applicant to rebut. Id.; see also In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343-44, 74
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USPQ2d 1951, 1954-55 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding rebuttal evidence
unpersuasive). If the applicant produces rebuttal evidence of adequate
weight, the prima facie case of unpatentability is dissipated. In re Piasecki,
745 F.2d at 1472, 223 USPQ at 788. Thereafter, patentability is determined
in view of the entire record. Id. However, on appeal to the Board it is an
appellant's burden to establish that the Examiner did not sustain the
necessary burden and to show that the Examiner erred -- on appeal we will
not start with a presumption that the Examiner is wrong.
Anticipation is established when a single prior art reference discloses
expressly or under the principles of inherency each and every limitation of
the claimed invention. Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342,
1347, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1478-79, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
"Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.'" KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,
1734, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1391 (2007). The question of obviousness is
resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the
scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed
subject matter and the prior art, and (3) the level of skill in the art. Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966). See also
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734, 82 USPQ2d at 1391 ("While the sequence of these
questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors
continue to define the inquiry that controls."). The Court in Graham further
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noted that evidence of secondary considerations, such as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., "might be
utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented." 383 U.S. at 18, 148 USPQ at 467. "If
a court, or patent examiner, conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed
subject matter was obvious, the claim is invalid under § 103." KSR,
127 S. Ct. at 1734, 82 USPQ2d at 1391.
In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized "the need for caution in
granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior
art," id. at 1739, 82 USPQ2d at 1395, and discussed circumstances in which
a patent might be determined to be obvious. In particular, the Supreme
Court emphasized that "the principles laid down in Graham reaffirmed the
'functional approach' of Hotchkiss, 11 How. 248 [(1850)]." KSR, 127 S. Ct.
at 1739, 82 USPQ2d at 1395 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
12, 148 USPQ 459, 464 (1966) (emphasis added)), and reaffirmed principles
based on its precedent that "[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results." Id. The Court explained:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor,
design incentives and other market forces can
prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a
different one. If a person of ordinary skill can
implement a predictable variation, §103 likely bars
its patentability. For the same reason, if a
technique has been used to improve one device,
and a person of ordinary skill in the art would
recognize that it would improve similar devices in
the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her
skill.
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Id. at 1740, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. The operative question in this "functional
approach" is thus "whether the improvement is more than the predictable use
of prior art elements according to their established functions." Id. at 1740,
82 USPQ2d at 1396.
The Court explained that:
[o]ften, it will be necessary . . . to look to . . . the
effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person
having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to
determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue.

Id. at 1740-41, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. The Court noted that "[t]o facilitate
review, this analysis should be made explicit." Id. at 1741, 82 USPQ2d at
1396 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by
mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness")). However, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ." Id. The Court cautioned that "[a]
factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight
bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning." Id.
at 1742, 82 USPQ2d at 1397.
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The Court noted that "[i]n many fields it may be that there is little
discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the
case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design
trends." KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. "Under the correct
analysis, any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining
the elements in the manner claimed." Id. at 1741, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. The
Court also noted that "[c]ommon sense teaches . . . that familiar items may
have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a
person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents
together like pieces of a puzzle." Id. at 1742, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. "A
person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton." Id.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that "[w]hen there is a
design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite
number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has
good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp."
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. "If this leads to the
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary
skill and common sense," id. and, in such an instance "the fact that a
combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103"
id.
During examination of patent application, a claim is given its broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In re Prater, 415
F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969). "[T]he words of
a claim 'are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.'"
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Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). The "ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have
to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,
i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application." Id. at 1313, 75
USPQ2d at 1326.

ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-20.
Reviewing the findings of facts cited above, we do not agree that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-8, 11-14, and 20. In particular, we find
that the Appellants have not shown that the Examiner failed to make a prima
facie showing of anticipation with respect to claims 1-5, 7-8, 11-14, and 20
and a prima facie showing of obviousness with respect to claim 6.
Appellants failed to meet the burden of overcoming these prima facie
showings. However, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 9-10 and 15-19 as being anticipated by Levergood.
Regarding claims 1-5, 7-8, 11-14, and 20, Appellants argue that
Levergood does not teach or suggest each and every limitation of the claims.
(Br. 8-17; Reply Br. 1-4.) Appellants assert that Levergood does not
perform a user function request, return function request results, and does not
create and preserve links, as claimed. (Br. 9.) Appellants contend that the
Examiner's interpretation of the claim language is overbroad and erroneous,
and further contend that the Examiner's interpretation would result in a
nonsensical hyperlink. (Reply Br. 2-3.) In particular, Appellants argue that
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a request for a Web page as taught by Levergood does not meet the claimed
"user function request" limitation. (Br. 9; Reply Br. 2-3.) We do not agree.
We conclude that the Examiner correctly interpreted the claim term
"user function request" as a request for a Web page. (Answer 9.)
Appellants admit that a user function request includes browsing. (Br. 2.)
Further, the Specification explicitly states that "the present invention relates
to a method of performing multiple user function requests, such as . . .
browsing . . . in a web-enabled environment." (Specification 1:7-10.) Thus,
we find no error in the Examiner's interpretation that a user function request
can be a request for a Web page. Based on this interpretation, the Examiner
correctly found that Levergood teaches receiving a user function request and
returning a user function request result by teaching the requesting of a Web
page and the returning of the requested Web page. (Answer 3, 9; FF 1-2, 6.)
In addition, the Examiner correctly found that Levergood teaches
creating a URL link derived from the user function request and incorporating
the user authentication and the user function request result within the URL.
(Answer 3, 9.) Appellants argue that the Examiner's interpretation would
"result in a nonsensical hyperlink containing the webpage URL, the user
authentication, and the webpage URL again." (Reply Br. 3.) We do not
agree.
Levergood teaches creating a URL link by appending an
authentication in the form of a SID to a URL. (FF 1-4, 6.) The plain
meaning of "derive" is "to get or receive (something) from a source."
Webster's New World Dictionary Third College Edition 371 (1994).
Therefore, the claim limitation "creating a first Uniform Resource Locator
link derived from said first user function request" merely requires that the
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created URL link get or receive something from a source (i.e., the request
for the Web page). The URL link created by Levergood gets the URL from
the request for the Web page and incorporates both that URL and the SID
authentication into the URL link. (FF 1-4, 6.) Thus, Levergood teaches the
limitation of creating a URL as claimed.
Further, the Examiner correctly found that Levergood teaches
preserving the URL link by teaching an absolute link. (Answer 9; FF 4.)
The plain meaning of "preserve" is "to . . . protect; save." Webster's New
World Dictionary Third College Edition 1065 (1994). As the Examiner
found, the absolute link of Levergood is valid from differing paths and
provides direct access to a Web page without requiring further
authentication. (Answer 9.) Thus, under a reasonable interpretation, an
absolute link meets the claimed limitation of preserving the URL link by
protecting or saving access to the URL link from different paths.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that Levergood teaches the
other limitations of claims 1-5, 7-8, 11-14, and 20. (Answer 3-7, 9-12; FF 1-
6.)
Appellants also argue that Levergood does not perform the method
steps in the same order as claimed. (Br. 3.) However, we do not find any
requirement that the claimed method steps be performed in a particular
order. Although the claimed method steps are recited in the same order as
described in the preferred embodiment of the Specification, and the
"specification describes only the preferred embodiment of the invention as
shown," (Specification 16:14-15), the Specification further explains that
"[o]ther embodiments besides the above may be articulated as well. The
terms and expressions therefore serve only to describe the invention by
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examples only and not to limit the invention" (Specification 16:15-18).
Thus, there is no requirement to limit the order in which the claimed method
steps are performed and we decline to import such a limitation into the
claims.
Regarding claim 6, Appellants argue that Levergood does not render
the claimed subject matter obvious because Levergood does not teach or
suggest performing a user function request. As discussed above, we do not
agree. Further, Appellants argue that there is no suggestion that the user
function request is a search request for documents. We do not agree.
The Examiner took official notice that searching for documents on the
Web was well known to those of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention. (Answer 8.) The Examiner also found that Levergood provided
motivation to search for a document in its disclosure of monitoring the
frequency and duration of access to Web pages for feedback purposes.
(Answer 8; FF 5.) Appellants have failed to show error in these findings.
We have considered Appellants' remaining arguments with respect to
claims 1-8, 11-14, and 20 and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-5, 7-8, 11-14,
and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
However, with respect to claims 9-10 and 15-19, we agree with
Appellants that the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims as being
anticipated by Levergood. In particular, we conclude that Levergood does
not teach: (1) the limitation "wherein said successive user function request
does not alter said first Uniform Resource Locator link" as recited by
claim 9; (2) the limitation "wherein said multiple subsequent successive user
function requests do not alter previously created Uniform Resource Locator
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link"3 as recited in claim 10; and (3) the limitation of performing at least one
subsequent user function request "without affecting access to said first
Uniform Resource Locator link" as recited by claim 15 and claims 16-19,
which depend from claim 15.
With respect to claims 9 and 10, the Examiner found that the quoted
limitations of these claims were met by Levergood's teaching of an absolute
link. (Br. 11.) However, Levergood's teaching of an absolute link is silent
with respect to the effect of successive user function requests on previously
created URLs. In other words, Levergood does not include a teaching that
the absolute link is unaltered by successive user function requests.4 Rather,
Levergood teaches that portions of absolute links are overwritten by
subsequent browsing in the same domain. (FF 4.)
The Examiner does not appear to have addressed the quoted limitation
of claim 15. In the Answer, the Examiner states that "[c]laims 15-19 list all
the same elements of claims 1-5, 7-14." (Answer 6.) However, the
limitation "without affecting access to said first Uniform Resource Locator
link" recited by claim 15 is not found in claims 1-5 or 7-14. The Examiner
may have interpreted the quoted limitation of claim 15 to be the same as the
limitation "preserving said first Uniform Resource Locator link" recited by
claim 1. However, these two limitations are not the same and have differing

3 We note that there does not appear to be an antecedent basis for the claim
term "previously created Uniform Resource Locator link." For the purpose
of this appeal, we will treat claim 10 as if it had recited a proper antecedent
basis for that term.
4 For example, there is no teaching in Levergood of a browser saving a URL
in a "favorites" list or opening a subsequent URL in a new browser window.
The issue of whether claims 9 and 10 would have been obvious in view of
such a teaching is not before us.
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claim scope. As discussed above, we agree that Levergood teaches
"preserving said first Uniform Resource Locator link," as recited by claim 1.
However, we do not find that Levergood teaches performing a subsequent
user function request "without affecting access to said first Uniform
Resource Locator link."5 In addition, Levergood teaches that URLs are
overwritten by subsequent browsing in the same domain. (FF 3-4.)
Therefore, we conclude that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
9-10 and 15-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because Levergood does not teach
each and every limitation of the claims.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the findings of facts and analysis above, we conclude that:
(1) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-5, 7-8, 11-14, and 20 for
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
(2) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 6 for obviousness under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
(3) The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 9-10 and 15-19 for anticipation
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-5, 7-8, 11-14, and 20 for anticipation under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is affirmed.

5 Again, there is no teaching in Levergood of, for example, a browser saving
a URL in a "favorites" list or opening a subsequent URL in a new browser
window. The issue of whether claims 15-19 would have been obvious in
view of such a teaching is not before us.
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The rejection of claim 6 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
affirmed.
The rejection of claims 9-10 and 15-19 for anticipation under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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