Ex Parte Boyd

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 26, 2018

14574218 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2018)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/574,218 12/17/2014 Ian Boyd 1432.00008 5818
109504 7590 01/26/2018
Thomas Carulli
7 Orly Court
Princeton Junction, NJ 08550
EXAMINER
BLOOMQUIST, KEITH D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2178
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/26/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte IAN BOYD
____________

Appeal 2018-001343
Application 14/574,218
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before SCOTT B. HOWARD, JOHN D. HAMANN, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1–41, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the “invention relates to a software
application development system and method for producing, delivering and
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displaying” applications that provide “consistency, operability and
compatibility” on different digital devices. Spec. ¶¶ 7, 26, 30, Abstract.1
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as
follows (with formatting added for clarity):
1. A software application development system comprising:
a microprocessor;
a storage device;
a display; and,
a memory in communication with the microprocessor,
the memory including a generator component comprising
program code executable on the microprocessor to:
generate at least one master architectural blueprint which
utilizes descriptors to identify and generate the software
architectural components, code and content required to create
one or more separate software applications,
wherein each separate application is comprised of code
and content that is
universally compatible and
maintains a consistent scaled display, consistent
functionality and consistent operability across net-
capable or web-capable devices having a web browser
installed and having a minimum display screen size
which accommodates the legible display and navigation
of net or web pages, regardless of the device hardware or
operating system,

1 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the
Specification, filed December 17, 2014; “Final Act.” for the Final Office
Action, mailed January 26, 2017; “Adv. Act.” for the Advisory Action,
mailed March 30, 2017; “App. Br.” for the Appeal Brief, filed June 15,
2017; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed September 21, 2017; and
“Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed November 19, 2017.
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which operability includes legibility and, for
applicable devices, distinct touchability, irrespective of
the physical size, aspect ratio or pixel resolution of said
net-capable or web-capable devices having at least said
minimum display screen size; and
wherein the blueprints generates [sic] the code for the
applications and
wherein the generated applications populate the display
with the code and content.
App. Br. 39 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following
prior art:
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–13 and 16–41 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Gunjal, Bain, Sheth, and Catallo. Final Act. 2–14.
Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gunjal, Bain, Sheth, Catallo, and Kirsch. Final
Act. 15–16.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1–41 in light of
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained
below, we disagree with Appellant’s assertions regarding Examiner error.
Kirsch et al. (“Kirsch”) US 2003/0110296 A1 June 12, 2003
Gunjal et al. (“Gunjal”) US 2003/0221184 A1 Nov. 27, 2003
Bain et al. (“Bain”) US 6,978,418 B1 Dec. 20, 2005
Catallo et al. (“Catallo”) US 2008/0137922 A1 June 12, 2008
Sheth et al. (“Sheth”) US 2012/0017172 A1 Jan. 19, 2012
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We adopt the Examiner’s findings and reasoning in the Final Office Action
(Final Act. 2–16), Advisory Action (Adv. Act. 2), and Answer (Ans. 2–20).
We add the following to address and emphasize specific findings and
arguments.
The § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1–13 and 16–41
I. “MASTER ARCHITECTURAL
BLUEPRINT WHICH UTILIZES DESCRIPTORS”
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because
“Gunjal teach[es] nothing about a ‘master architectural blueprint’ that
‘utilizes descriptors’ which ‘identify and generate the software architectural
components, code and content required to create one or more separate
software applications,’” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 24. In particular,
Appellant contends that: (1) “the Examiner confuses the very limited
‘templates’ taught only in the Gunjal reference” with the claimed “master
architectural blueprint”; and (2) “the Gunjal templates do not ‘identify and
generate the software architectural components, code and content required to
create one or more separate software applications’ as claimed” by Appellant.
App. Br. 22–24; see Reply Br. 5–7. Appellant also contends that the
Examiner wrongly treats “the term ‘template’ as used by Gunjal and
‘blueprint’ as taught by Applicant as synonyms.” App. Br. 22–23; see Reply
Br. 3.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because
the Examiner finds that: (1) Gunjal discloses templates that “ensure in part
that specific types of code appear at predefined locations in the code, and
that this specification is used while assembling the code”; (2) Gunjal’s
purpose “is to allow inexperienced developers to create programs using the
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templates”; and (3) Gunjal’s “purpose and function . . . to generate code for
an application according to a predefined template using code specifications
therein . . . is directly analogous to one or more blueprints which generate
code using descriptors, as claimed.” Ans. 16–17; see Final Act. 2–3; Adv.
Act. 2.
For example, Gunjal describes an application-development system
with templates for assembling code that ensure “specific types of code
appear at . . . predefined locations in the code.” Gunjal ¶ 13, Abstract; see
Ans. 16–17. The system includes a template-assigner utility that “allows a
user to define a new template or link an existing template with a building
block (session bean, presentation bean, etc.) and then assemble the code for
the building block.” Gunjal ¶ 50. A “bean” constitutes “a reusable software
component” that “can be as simple as a button element for a graphical
interface or as complex as a fully functional database viewer.” Id. ¶ 51.
With the template-assigner utility, a user may select a template format,
customize the selection by specifying certain information, and assemble the
code for a bean. Id. ¶¶ 52–55, Abstract, Figs. 4A–4B. The user may save
the bean as a new template. Id. ¶¶ 54–55, Abstract, Figs. 4A–4B. Thus,
Gunjal discloses templates and beans employed to create increasingly larger
and more complex building blocks for use by the application-development
system, including “fully functional” applications that may cooperate with
one another.
Gunjal’s templates and beans teach or suggest the claimed “master
architectural blueprint which utilizes descriptors” for creating software
applications. See, e.g., Gunjal ¶¶ 13, 50–55, Abstract, Figs. 4A–4B.
Consistent with this, the Specification describes a “blueprint” as a
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“template” that “defines the structure of certain operational components.”
Spec. ¶ 182. In addition, the Specification discusses “using pre-defined
templates that provide for some modification by the developer as desired.”
Id. ¶ 211.
Appellant contends that a bean “is but a small component of what a
developer would use in building an application.” Reply Br. 7. But that
contention conflicts with Gunjal’s disclosure that a bean may constitute a
“fully functional” application. Gunjal ¶ 51.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Gunjal by asserting that “Gunjal
teaches that it is the user – not the template – who assembles the code.”
App. Br. 23 (citing Gunjal ¶¶ 21, 50–51); see Reply Br. 6–7. But claim 1
does not preclude user input. See App. Br. 39 (Claims App.). As the
Examiner reasons, the claim does not specify “that the blueprint generates
code for an application absent any human interaction whatsoever.” Ans. 16.
Consistent with this, the Specification contemplates user input with an
application-development system. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 190, 192–194, 197,
209–210, 212, 214, 218–220, 226–227, 236–237, 245–248. For example,
the Specification discusses user-entered data, user selection of various items,
and user navigation through various parts of the system. Spec. ¶¶ 192–193,
197, 219, 226–227, 236–237, 245–246. Further, as noted above, the
Specification discusses “using pre-defined templates that provide for some
modification by the developer [user] as desired.” Id. ¶ 211.
Appellant also attempts to distinguish Gunjal by asserting that
Gunjal’s “templates do not generate the code and content for the entire
Gunjal software application.” App. Br. 23. Appellant argues that claim 1
“is clear – the blueprint generates the architectural components, the code
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and the content required to create the software application – not less that all
the code.” Reply Br. 4. Appellant also argues that “[t]he word ‘the’ in the
English language is a definite article,” and therefore “the blueprint generates
‘all of the code that will make up a complete application.’” Id.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. As
discussed above, claim 1 does not preclude user input. Also, Gunjal’s
application-development system includes a code generator. Gunjal
¶¶ 19, 49. After appropriate user input, the system may generate a “fully
functional” application. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13, 20, 50–55, Abstract, Figs. 4A–
4B. Thus, Gunjal teaches or suggests that the templates generate all the code
for a complete application.
Appellant argues that: (1) “Bain does not teach anything about
developing software applications”; (2) “Catallo teaches nothing at all about
developing software applications”; and (3) “Sheth teaches nothing at all
about the application it purports to scale, in terms of the application code or
content or the application architecture.” App. Br. 26, 29, 33. But those
arguments do not respond to the rejection because the Examiner relies on
Gunjal for teaching or suggesting the claimed “master architectural blueprint
which utilizes descriptors” for creating software applications. Final Act.
2–3; Ans. 16–17, 19.
Appellant asserts that: (1) “Bain has no disclosure respecting
generating the code that comprises the images being displayed”; and
(2) “Bain does not teach or suggest anything about creating code for the
images themselves, much less for a software application.” Reply Br. 10
(emphasis omitted). Those assertions do not respond to the rejection. See
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Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 16–17, 19. Appellant’s similar assertions concerning
Catallo and Sheth fail for similar reasons. See Reply Br. 12–13, 17–18.
II. UNIVERSAL COMPATIBILITY AND A “CONSISTENT”
SCALED DISPLAY, FUNCTIONALITY, AND OPERABILITY
A. GUNJAL
Appellant asserts that Gunjal differs from claim 1 and “teaches the
exact opposite” because: (1) “Gunjal relies upon compilers to compile the
code for any user-created application”; and (2) the compiled code “is
specific to the target machine and operating system.” App. Br. 20–22
(citation omitted); see Reply Br. 8. According to Appellant, an application
that “is compiled for each specific platform . . . is comprised of different
code for different platforms.” Reply Br. 9; see App. Br. 27. Appellant
contends that “a Gunjal application compiled for a IPhone 8 using the
IOS 11 Operating System will . . . have different code from that same
program as compiled for a Dell XPS Desktop computer using Windows 10,”
in contrast to claim 1. Reply Br. 9.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because
claim 1 does not specify how the “program code” achieves universal
compatibility for an application or maintains a “consistent” scaled display,
functionality, and operability on different devices and systems. App. Br. 39
(Claims App.). Claim 1 employs functional language to specify objectives
and lacks detail regarding how to achieve them.2 Claim 1 does not require a

2 In the event of continued prosecution, the Examiner should consider (1) the
applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 to the claimed “generator component”
and (2) whether under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 the Specification discloses
adequate corresponding structure, e.g., a suitable algorithm, for
accomplishing the functions assigned to that “component.” See, e.g.,
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particular code language and does not exclude a code language translated by
a compiler into machine language. As the Examiner reasons, “the claim
language does not mention anything about applications not being compiled
or assembled.” Adv. Act. 2.
Further, the Specification explains that the “program code” for the
application-development system “can be written in any combination of one
or more suitable programming languages,” such as “PERL, Visual Basic,
AS3, JavaScript, Flex, ActionScript, HTML, C++, and the like.” Spec.
¶ 257; see id. ¶ 180 (discussing “HTML, CSS, JavaScript” and “other code
languages in other formats”). The Specification also explains that the
system’s production tools “may be in the form of functional code in Visual
Basic, C++, Python, HTML, CSS, and JavaScript, and in any of their
versions or other code languages in other formats.” Id. ¶ 212; see id. Fig. 1.
Hence, the Specification describes carrying out the invention with a code
language translated by a compiler into machine language, e.g., C++. See
Spec. ¶ 257; App. Br. 21.
Appellant asserts that “Gunjal expressly teaches a system that
inherently will result in a software application that will have a different

Advanced Ground Info. Sys., Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1349–50
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–54
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part); EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 624 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Where a means-
plus-function limitation recites two or more functions, the specification
“must disclose adequate corresponding structure to perform all of the
claimed functions.” Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
800 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52;
see also Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (means-plus-function limitation specifying two functions).
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scaled display . . . and different functionality and different operability
on each different platform because it has platform-specific versions in
different code.” Reply Br. 9; see App. Br. 27. Appellant’s assertion
constitutes attorney argument. Attorney argument “cannot take the place of
evidence.” In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). Moreover,
Appellant’s assertion does not distinguish claim 1 from the prior art.
“[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re Hyatt,
211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Claim 1 does not require the
“identical” scaled display, functionality, and operability on different devices
and systems. App. Br. 39 (Claims App.). Instead, claim 1 requires a
“consistent” scaled display, functionality, and operability, and therefore
encompasses some differences.
Appellant argues that Gunjal “teaches nothing at all about any Gunjal
application maintaining ‘a consistent scaled display, consistent functionality
and consistent operability’ regardless of the device or operating system.”
App. Br. 25. That argument does not respond to the rejection because the
Examiner does not rely on Gunjal for that teaching or suggestion. Final
Act. 2–4; see Ans. 18–20.
B. BAIN, CATALLO, AND SHETH
“[T]he test for combining references is not what the individual
references themselves suggest but rather what the combination of disclosures
taken as a whole would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re
McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971); see In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 425 (CCPA 1981); see also Adv. Act. 2 (citing Keller). Here, the
combination of disclosures in Bain, Catallo, and Sheth taken as a whole
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teaches or suggests universal compatibility for an application and a
“consistent” scaled display, functionality, and operability on different
devices and systems. Final Act. 3–4; Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 18–20. For the
reasons explained below, we consider Appellant’s contentions to the
contrary unpersuasive. See App. Br. 25–34; Reply Br. 10–22.
For instance, Catallo teaches or suggests universal compatibility and
“consistent” functionality and operability for different devices and systems.
See, e.g., Catallo ¶¶ 12–13, 38, Figs. 4–6; see also Final Act. 4; Ans. 18–19.
In particular, Catallo discloses a “platform-independent” interface
application that allows a user to view image data from a variety of sources.
Catallo ¶¶ 12–13. Catallo explains that “one embodiment of the invention
can be used in any computing environment equipped with a web browser,
regardless of the computing platform (e.g., PC, Macintosh®, Unix®).” Id.
¶ 13. Hence, Catallo’s interface application provides consistent access to
and viewability of the same image data across different computing
environments. See Adv. Act. 2. As the Examiner determines, “Catallo does
teach generating an application . . . compatible with any web browser” that
provides the “functionality of various playback options, image viewing
options, and HTML report generation.” Ans. 18 (citing Catallo Figs. 4–6).
Sheth teaches or suggests a “consistent” scaled display for different
devices and systems. See, e.g., Sheth ¶¶ 4, 25, Abstract, Figs. 1–3; see also
Final Act. 4; Ans. 19–20. In particular, Sheth discloses “application user
interfaces . . . displayed on different sizes and types of displays without
having to modify the application for each different display” and
“automatically scaled for specific displays, especially smaller size displays
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such as mobile device displays.” Sheth ¶ 4, Abstract, Fig. 2; see Final
Act. 4; Ans. 19–20.
Bain teaches or suggests a “consistent” scaled display with
“consistent” functionality and operability. See, e.g., Bain 2:55–3:45; see
also Final Act. 4; Ans. 20. More specifically, Bain describes “active
regions” in a display that produce actions when prompted by a user, e.g., by
clicking on the active region. Bain 1:43–52; see id. at 5:1–25. Bain
discloses “associating active regions with positions within displayed
images” in a device-independent and display-independent manner to
maintain the correspondence between the active regions and the associated
image portions. Id. at 2:55–3:2, 7:49–55, Abstract. When a user alters an
image by zooming in or zooming out, the user’s image viewer maintains
defined relationships between the active regions and the associated image
portions. Id. at 4:25–32, Abstract, Figs. 4–5. Consequently, the altered
image portions associated with the active regions maintain their functionality
and operate to produce the same actions when prompted by a user. Id.
at 4:25–35, Abstract, Figs. 4–5. As the Examiner determines, Bain teaches
“the ability to scale active click zones on a displayed markup language
element along with the scaled image.” Ans. 20.
Appellant argues that: (1) “Catallo teaches nothing at all about
maintaining consistent functionality and consistent operability, utilizing the
same software code in all environments” and nothing “about maintaining a
consistent scaled display”; (2) Sheth does not suggest “an application that is
universally compatible as claimed by Applicant”; and (3) “Bain does not
teach or suggest that the code and content for any software application will
be ‘universally compatible and maintains a consistent scaled display,
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consistent functionality and consistent operability’ across all devices and
operating systems.” App. Br. 27, 32, 33. As the Examiner points out,
however, Appellant presents a “piecemeal analysis” of the references.
Ans. 17–18. Where a rejection rests on a combination of references, an
appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking the references
individually. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellant attempts to distinguish Catallo by contending that “Catallo
relies upon preexisting code resident on each computer to navigate and
present the images – code inherently different from one operating system
and device to another.” App. Br. 30; see Reply Br. 13–16. Appellant’s
contention constitutes attorney argument. Attorney argument “cannot take
the place of evidence.” Pearson, 494 F.2d at 1405. In addition, claim 1 uses
the transitional term “comprising” and, therefore, “does not exclude
unrecited elements,” such as “preexisting code resident on each computer.”
See Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111.03).
Moreover, Appellant’s attempt to distinguish Sheth on similar grounds
(Reply Br. 20–22) fails for similar reasons.
Appellant asserts that Sheth combined with Gunjal does not yield the
claimed invention due to “different code for different devices and
environments” resulting from compiling an application. App. Br. 32–34; see
Reply Br. 22–23. As explained above, however, claim 1 does not exclude a
code language translated by a compiler into machine language.
Appellant contends that “Bain does not teach or suggest resizing the
images or scaling the images.” Reply Br. 10. We disagree. Bain discloses
“user-initiated image display alterations,” such as zoom operations that
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resize images. Bain 4:25–32, 6:33–39, 7:11–15, 10:50–53, Fig. 7. Further,
Figures 4 and 5 depict an image before and after “a zoom operation that
expands the scale at which the image is displayed,” i.e., “to approximately
twice its original display size.” Id. at 3:55–60, 7:11–15, Figs. 4–5.
Appellant alleges incompatibilities between and among the references
and existing computing environments, for example, due to an alleged need
for different code. See, e.g., Reply Br. 11, 15–16, 18, 20–22. But
combining the teachings of references “does not require an actual, physical
substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
III. “DISTINCT TOUCHABILITY”
Appellant contends that “Bain cannot maintain the ‘distinct
touchability’ . . . of Applicant’s claimed invention” because:
if the user pans out, such that the image component is no longer
legible or distinct, or pans in or scrolls such that an image
component with an associated active region is not visible on the
screen at all, Bain’s resizing of that invisibly active region for
that component is for naught – because if the component is too
small to touch on an IPhone screen, or not visible at all on the
screen to be able to touch it, Bain cannot maintain the “distinct
touchability” . . . of Applicant’s claimed invention.
Reply Br. 11.
Appellant’s contention does not persuade us of Examiner error
because claim 1 does not specify what happens when a user resizes or moves
a displayed image. Instead, claim 1 specifies what happens with an
application provided to different devices or systems by requiring consistency
across different devices and systems. The “problem” Appellant describes
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could occur with any device or system, depending on how a user interacts
with a displayed image.
IV. “OPERABILITY INCLUDES LEGIBILITY”
Appellant asserts that Sheth does not teach or suggest “operability
includes legibility” because “[m]erely adjusting font heights – based upon a
default display size, and based solely upon ‘dots’ per inch - simply cannot
result in” legibility according to claim 1. Reply Br. 20. More specifically,
Appellant asserts that “Sheth’s limited ‘scaling’ of font heights based on a
default display size ignores the fact that true font scaling, other than just by
font height, implicates a myriad of processes and data about which Sheth
teaches nothing.” Id.
Appellant’s assertions do not persuade us of Examiner error. Claim 1
does not specify how the system functions to maintain “consistent”
operability including legibility. App. Br. 39 (Claims App.). As discussed
above, Sheth discloses “application user interfaces . . . displayed on different
sizes and types of displays without having to modify the application for each
different display” and “automatically scaled for specific displays, especially
smaller size displays such as mobile device displays.” Sheth ¶ 4, Abstract,
Fig. 2; see Final Act. 4; Ans. 19–20. Sheth also discloses “vertical scaling”
and “horizontal scaling” as well as “font scaling” for consistent legibility.
Sheth ¶¶ 7, 20–29, 31, 35, Fig. 2 (device 208 with display 210, device 212
with display 214, device 216 with display 218), Fig. 3 (vertical scaling 336,
horizontal scaling 338, and font scaling 340).
Appellant’s assertions address Sheth’s font scaling and disregard
Sheth’s vertical scaling and horizontal scaling. See Reply Br. 18, 20–21.
Sheth’s combined scaling produces legible displays in devices with different
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display areas. See, e.g., Sheth ¶ 24 (referring to “Minimum Row Height in
mm for legibility”), Fig. 2. Appellant’s contention (Reply Br. 21) that
“Sheth’s crude scaling is incapable of presenting the ‘consistent scaled
display’ or the ‘legibility’ of Applicant’s claims” constitutes unsupported
attorney argument.
V. MOTIVATION TO COMBINE THE REFERENCES
Appellant asserts that a “person of skill in the art simply has no reason
to combine” Bain, Sheth, and Catallo with Gunjal because “Applicant’s
claims are directed to an architectural blueprint that generates software
applications with compatible code” and “Gunjal at it[s] essence relies upon
and requires different code for different environments.” App. Br. 36.
Appellant also asserts that “the Examiner provides no analysis of what
specific elements of Applicant’s claim are taught by specific reference to
either piece of art or, more importantly, why one skilled in the art would
pluck those concepts – as actually taught by the references – from those
disparate references.” Id. at 37.
Appellant’s assertions do not persuade us of Examiner error because
the Examiner finds that: (1) “each reference contains beneficial teachings in
the specific realm of application interface development”; and (2) “each
reference has specific benefits which can be used in the course of developing
an application to provide advantages in the creation and display of the
application.” Ans. 20; see Final Act. 4–5. The Examiner identifies benefits
in each secondary reference that improve the primary reference’s
application-development system. See, e.g., Final Act. 4; Ans. 4, 18–20. The
Examiner reasons that “this provides clear motivation to combine the
teachings of the references, as incorporating the teachings of each provides
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the specific beneficial behavior described therein to a final application.”
Ans. 20.
Thus, the Examiner provides “articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “[A]ny need or problem known
in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent
can provide a reason for combining” references. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). “[T]he desire to enhance commercial
opportunities by improving a product or process is universal . . . .” DyStar
Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2006); see In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[A]n
implicit motivation to combine” may result from a desire to make a product
or process “stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable,
or more efficient.” DyStar, 464 F.3d at 1368.
Further, the Examiner finds that “Sheth and Bain, as well as Catallo,
all deal with applications, which must be generated somehow as they do not
simply appear by themselves,” and thus constitute analogous art. Adv.
Act. 2. Appellant presents no persuasive arguments to the contrary.
VI. SUMMARY FOR INDEPENDENT CLAIM 1
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s arguments have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 for obviousness
based on Gunjal, Bain, Sheth, and Catallo. Hence, we sustain the § 103(a)
rejection of claim 1.
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VII. INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 20, 28, AND 37 AND
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 3–13, 16–19, 21–27, 29–36, AND 38–41
Appellant does not argue patentability separately for independent
claims 20, 28, and 37 or dependent claims 3–13, 16–19, 21–27, 29–36, and
38–41. App. Br. 19–38; Reply Br. 3–24. Because Appellant does not argue
the claims separately, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claims 3–13 and
16–41 for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
VIII. DEPENDENT CLAIM 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1 and requires that “the descriptors relate
to one or more of the structure, design layout, hyper display location or
navigation aspects of the content.” App. Br. 39 (Claims App.). Appellant
argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2 because Gunjal
paragraph 51 “does not use the word ‘descriptions’ at all.” App. Br. 35.
Appellant also argues that “the Gunjal templates are not and do not
comprise” the claimed “descriptors.” Id. at 35–36.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. As
explained above for claim 1, Gunjal’s templates and beans teach or suggest
the claimed “master architectural blueprint which utilizes descriptors” for
creating software applications. The beans constitute building blocks for
constructing an application. See, e.g., Gunjal ¶¶ 4, 10, 50–52, Figs. 4A–4B;
see also Final Act. 5. Gunjal satisfies claim 2’s requirements by disclosing
beans for “a button element for a graphical interface” and “a fully functional
database viewer.” See Gunjal ¶ 51. As the Examiner determines, “Gunjal
clearly teaches the functional elements of descriptors present in the claims
. . . even though it may do so using different terms.” Ans. 19.
Consequently, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 2.
Appeal 2018-001343
Application 14/574,218

19
The § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 14 and 15
Claims 14 and 15 depend from claim 1. App. Br. 42 (Claims App.).
For claims 14 and 15, Appellant contends that: (1) “Bain/Gunjal/Sheth/
Catallo, alone or in combination, do not render Claim 1 obvious”; and
(2) Kirsch “adds nothing to the other 4 references that would result in the
invention set forth in any of Applicant’s claims.” App. Br. 34–35.
Appellant’s contentions do not constitute separate arguments distinguishing
claims 14 and 15 from the prior art. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that the applicable rules “require more
substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim
elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not
found in the prior art”). As the Examiner notes, “Claims 14 and 15 are
argued on the same grounds as Claim 1.” Ans. 19. Because Appellant does
not argue the claims separately, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of
claims 14 and 15 for the same reasons as claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Insofar as the Reply Brief contains substantive arguments
distinguishing claims 14 and 15 from the prior art, those arguments do not
respond to an argument in the Answer. See Ans. 19. Appellant presents
those arguments for the first time in the Reply Brief. Such arguments “will
not be considered by the Board” absent good cause. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2); see also Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1475 (BPAI
2010) (informative) (discussing procedural difficulties with belated
arguments). Here, Appellant has not shown good cause, and we decline to
consider Appellant’s new arguments.

Appeal 2018-001343
Application 14/574,218

20
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–41.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED