Ex Parte BournandDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 24, 201813515020 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 24, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/515,020 06/11/2012 13897 7590 09/26/2018 Abel Law Group, LLP 8911 N. Capital of Texas Hwy Bldg 4, Suite 4200 Austin, TX 78759 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Yves Bournand UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. BOV-49536USO 6727 EXAMINER SCHWARTZ, CHRISTOPHER P ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3657 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/26/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mail@Abel-IP.com hmuensterer@abel-ip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte YVES BOURNAND Appeal2017-011724 1 Application 13/515,0202 Technology Center 3600 Before, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, GEORGE R. HOSKINS , and TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant's claimed invention "relates to the technical field of damping relative movement between elements of a structure, and in 1 Our Decision references Appellant's Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed Apr. 26, 2016) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Sept. 18, 2017), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed July 18, 2017), and Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed Nov. 30, 2015). 2 Appellant identifies VSL International AG as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2017-011724 Application 13/515,020 particular to the damping of vibration in structural stay cables." Spec. 1, 11. 2--4. Claims 1, 15, and 22 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A damper device for damping relative motion between a first structural member and a second structural member in a construction, the damper device comprising a first friction element mechanically associated with the first structural member, the first friction element including a first friction surface made of a first friction material, a second friction element mechanically associated with the second structural member, the second friction element including a second friction surface made of a second friction material, the first and second friction surfaces being in mutual frictional engagement such that relative motion between the first and second friction surfaces is damped by the frictional engagement between the first and second friction surfaces, the damper device being characterized in that at least one of the first and second friction materials is a low-friction polymer material. REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4--17, and 19--26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Kovacs (EP 1035350 Al, pub. Sept. 13, 2000), Rudmann (US 4,219,171, iss. Aug. 26, 1980), and Beyene (US 6,443,437 Bl, iss. Sept. 3, 2002). Claims 3 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Kovacs, Rudmann, Beyene, and Okuda (US 5,858,521, iss. Jan. 12, 1999). 2 Appeal 2017-011724 Application 13/515,020 Claims 3 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Kovacs, Rudmann, Beyene, and Fujita (US 2002/0089105 Al, pub. July 11, 2002). ANALYSIS Independent Claim 1, and Dependent Claims 2, 4-14, 16, 17, 19, and 26 In rejecting independent claim 1 under§ I03(a), the Examiner cites Kovac' s method and device for damping oscillations and vibrations of cables as comprising substantially all of the limitations of claim 1, except "the specific compositions of the friction materials." Final Act. 2-3. The Examiner cites Rudmann as describing that "it is known to use a 'low friction polymer material' for damping purposes." Id. (citing Rudmann, col. 4, 11. 45-50). And the Examiner relies on Beyene "to show a friction damper and that it is well known to adjust the damping properties by selecting specific materials." Id. at 3 (citing Beyene at col. 6-col. 7). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant's invention "to have made the first and second friction materials of [Kovacs] from 'low friction polymer materials,['] as the choice of one well known low friction material for increased durability and wear ability of the friction materials possibly due to the lower heat generated by such materials." Id. Appellant argues (see Reply Br. 3; see also App. Br. 8-17), and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had no reason to modify Kovacs' damper device for cables to make the first and second materials low-friction polymer materials, as the Examiner proposes, because Kovacs' disclosed friction brake damper "was designed to dampen only relatively high forces and would not have been modified to dampen lower 3 Appeal 2017-011724 Application 13/515,020 energy oscillations." Appeal Br. 8. Kovacs supports Appellant's assertions. For example, at paragraph 4 Kovacs describes "serious drawbacks" that accompany known vibration dampers because the "damping forces begin with very low values, near to zero," making them more susceptible to wear. To address this problem, at paragraph 39 Kovacs discloses that the damping device acts only after the cable vibrations exceed a specified level. Kovacs' damper provides no relative movement until an applied force reaches the limit of static friction, and then, as the applied force further increases, the frictional parts move relative to one another with a significant reaction. Id. ,r,r 6, 29. The effect is called "stick-slip," and it arises as a result of a significant difference between static and dynamic friction coefficients. See Spec. 2 ( discussing Kovacs). Kovacs at paragraph 34 describes ways in which overall frictional forces can be modified. The Examiner indicates that one of ordinary skill in the art would modify Kovacs' material to a low friction material for increased durability. Final Act. 3. Yet, Kovacs describes using a material with a high static coefficient force to provide no movement for vibrations below a threshold, thereby eliminating wear due to damping at low frequencies. And it is unclear why one of ordinary skill in the art would seek a low friction material for use in Kovacs. Rudmann relates to a coupling device for coupling orbiting space craft. Rudmann, col. 3, 11. 13-15. An orbiting space shuttle has a remote manipulator system that is capable of removing or returning objects to the payload bay of the shuttle. Id. at col. 3, 11. 15-18. Rudmann's coupling device at one end is connected with the remote manipulator system and at the other end is coupled to an orbiting space craft, such as a satellite. Id. at 4 Appeal 2017-011724 Application 13/515,020 col. 3, 11. 18-22. The coupling device includes, in part, a bumper arm that moves into contact with the payload. Id. at col. 4, 11. 32--40. The bumper arm has a low friction polymer material to provide damping during coupling. Id. at col. 4, 11. 45--48. Although Rudmann describes the use of a low friction polymer in the use of its coupling device, it is unclear how or why one of ordinary skill in the art would modify Kovacs in light of Rudmann to result in the claimed invention. Beyene relates to suspension struts having damping. See Beyene, col. 1, 11. 4--5. Suspension struts may be used to join a vehicle body with vehicle wheels. Id. at col. 1, 11. 9-11. Frictional resistance provides compression and rebound damping for the suspension strut, thereby reducing bouncing or oscillation. Id. at col. 6, 11. 30-36. Beyene describes that "[t]he damping rate of the strut may be more easily and effectively tuned by adjusting one or more of several parameters," including frictional properties of engagement surfaces. Id. at col. 7, 11. 4--6, 15-22. Yet, it is unclear why one of ordinary skill in the art would modify Kovacs such that at least one of the first and second friction materials is a low-friction polymer material, as required by claim 1, in light of Beyene' s disclosure that materials with different frictional properties could be chosen to manipulate damping. The Examiner has not established, on this record, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an apparent reason, to replace the friction materials of Kovacs' damper device such that at least one of the first and second friction materials is a low-friction polymer material. As such, the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness. See KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007) (holding that a prima facie case of obviousness requires showing that one of ordinary skill 5 Appeal 2017-011724 Application 13/515,020 in the art would have had both an apparent reason to modify the prior art and predictability or a reasonable expectation of success in doing so). Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 4--14, 16, 17, 19, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Independent Claims 15 and 22, and Dependent Claims 20, 21, and 23-25 Independent claims 15 and 22 include language substantially similar to the language of claim 1, and the Examiner relies on the same reasoning set forth above with respect to claim 1 to reject claims 15 and 22. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 15 and 22, and dependent claims 20, 21, and 23-25 for the same reasons described above with reference to claim 1. Dependent Claims 3 and 18 The rejections of claims 3 and 18 do not cure the deficiency in the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of dependent claims 3 and 18 for the same reasons described above with reference to claim 1. DECISION The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed. REVERSED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation