Ex Parte Bossemeyer

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 18, 2004

08863462 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 18, 2004)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written
for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 27
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte ROBERT WESLEY BOSSEMEYER JR.
____________
Appeal No. 2002-1982
Application No. 08/863,462
____________
ON BRIEF
____________
Before JERRY SMITH, BARRETT and SAADAT, Administrative Patent
Judges.
SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-19, which are all of the claims pending in
this application.
We affirm-in-part.
BACKGROUND
Appellant’s invention is generally directed to a dial-up
service, and more specifically, to a method of accessing a dial-
up service which allows access to a verified user. As depicted
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Application No. 08/863,462
2
in Figure 6 and described in page 12 of the specification, a user
dials a service number and is prompted to speak a plurality of
digits. Using speaker independent voice recognition of step 176,
the uttered digits are compared to a stored utterance. Access is
allowed if the user is verified otherwise; the user is prompted
to input a personal identification number (PIN) which provides
access upon verification.
Representative independent claims 1 and 10 are reproduced
below:
1. A method of accessing a dial-up service,
comprising the steps of:
(a) dialing a service number;
(b) speaking a plurality of digits to form a first
utterance;
(c) recognizing the plurality of digits using speaker
independent speaker recognition;
(d) when a user has used the dial-up service
previously, verifying the user based on the first utterance
using a speaker verification system that has only two
possible decisions verified and not verified;
(e) when the user is not verified, requesting the
user to enter a personal identification number; and
(f) when the personal identification number is valid,
providing access to the dial-up service.
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10. A method of allowing access to a communication
service, comprising the steps of:
(a) entering a communication service address by a
user;
(b) speaking an access code to form a plurality of
utterances;
(c) determining if the user has previously used a
communication server;
(d) when the user has previously utilized the
communication service, verifying an identity of the user
utilizing a speaker verification system;
(e) when the identity of the user is not verified,
requesting the user to enter a personal identification
number; and
(f) when the personal identification number is valid,
providing access to the communication service.
The Examiner relies on the following references in rejecting
the claims:
Uchiyama et al. (Uchiyama) 5,121,428 Jun. 9, 1992
Hunt et al. (Hunt) 5,297,194 Mar. 22, 1994
Cameron 5,384,833 Jan. 24, 1995
Claims 1-3, 10-12 and 15-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Hunt.
Claims 4-9 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Hunt and Cameron.
Appeal No. 2002-1982
Application No. 08/863,462
1 The answer refers to the final rejection (Paper No. 19, mailed March
16, 2000) for the complete text of the rejections.
4
Claims 14, 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Hunt and Cameron and further in view
of Uchiyama.
We make reference to the answer (Paper No. 22, mailed
September 12, 2000)1 for the Examiner’s reasoning and to the
appeal brief (Paper No. 21, filed June 27, 2000) and the reply
brief (Paper No. 24, filed October 12, 2000) for Appellant’s
arguments thereagainst.
OPINION
At the outset, we note that Appellant indicates that the
claims do not stand or fall together (brief, page 7). While,
Appellant provides arguments, which appear to be separate and
related to each claim individually (brief, pages 8-46), identical
arguments centered around Hunt and the recited features of claim
1 are repeated. Therefore, as directed by 37 CFR § 1.192(c)(7)
(July 1, 1999), we will consider Appellant’s claims as standing
or falling together as far as they related to the same ground of
rejection.
With regard to the 35 U.S.C. § 102 rejection of claims 1, 10
and 15, Appellant’s main point of argument is that Hunt provides
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5
for three possibilities after the first utterance and requires
the termination of the call if the voice does not match (brief,
pages 8, 28 & 37). Appellant points out that the claims, in
contrast, allow access to the dial-up system even if no voice
recognition and verification is accomplished (brief, pages 9, 29
& 38). Appellant further argues that the claimed system does not
require the use of the voice recognition, but makes it available
only as an option for the caller to gain access (brief, pages 10,
30 & 39).
In response to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner asserts
that although Hunt discloses a system with three options, it
still anticipates a two-option system (answer, page 4). The
Examiner apparently relies on Hunt (col. 3, lines 22-29) to show
that if an utterance is not accepted, the user is required to
input additional information which results in two possible
decisions: verified or not verified (answer, page 5).
Additionally, the Examiner argues that the system of Hunt,
similar to the claimed step (f), allows access to the service
after the user personal information is entered and verified
(answer, page 6).
A rejection for anticipation under section 102 requires that
the four corners of a single prior art document describe every
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element of the claimed invention, either expressly or inherently,
such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice
the invention without undue experimentation. See Atlas Powder
Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1947
(Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-79, 31 USPQ2d
1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
A review of Hunt reveals that the reference describes a
system and method for enabling a caller to obtain access to
services via a telephone network (abstract). After a first
utterance is stored in the voice verification reference database
(col. 6, lines 2-14), the system performs the step of voice
verification to determine if the utterance is spoken by a voice
previously enrolled (col. 6, lines 20-24). Hunt further
discloses that if a “match” is established, access to the service
is allowed, but the call is terminated if voice cannot be
substantially matched (col. 6, lines 27-30). However, Hunt
provides for another option which prompts the caller to input
additional personal information if the entered voice
substantially matches a stored voice, but not within a
predetermined criterion (col. 6, lines 30-37). It is after the
caller fails to provide such information that the call is
terminated (col. 6, lines 37-39).
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Therefore, Hunt’s initial inquiry is whether a “match”
within a predetermined criterion is established before access is
allowed. If a “match” is not established, the system makes a
second inquiry to determine whether the voice “substantially”
matches a stored sample, which results in the termination of the
call if the entered voice cannot be “substantially” matched.
However, if the second inquiry determines that the voice is
substantially matched, but not within the predetermined criteria,
the user is requested to enter additional personal information
before access is authorized. It is this “not matched,” but
“substantially matched” state that reads on the claimed “not
verified” state.
“The starting point for any claim construction must be the
claims themselves,” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see
also Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp.,
859 F.2d 878, 882, 8 USPQ2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (claim
interpretation must begin with the language of the claim itself).
Here, Appellant’s claim 1 requires “using a speaker verification
system that has only two possible decisions verified and not
verified,” which either allows access when the user is verified
or requests additional information when the user is not verified,
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without any other inquiries. On the other hand, claims 10 and 15
do not limit the outcome to only two possible decisions and
therefore, do not preclude the possibility that the personal
identification number may not be entered in the “not verified”
state when a “substantial match” is not established. However,
limiting the determination of a valid user to only two
conditions, as recited in claim 1, precludes that possibility and
the additional inquiry for determining a “substantial” match,
which prompts the entry of the personal information only when a
substantial match is established.
With respect to Appellant’s argument that the claimed system
allows access to the dial-up services even if the user has not
enrolled in the system (brief, pages 10 and 30), we note that the
claims actually require prior use. Step (d), in claim 1 for
example, recites “when the user has used the dial-up service
previously” as a condition for using the dial-up service.
In view of the analysis made above, we find that the
Examiner has established a prima facie case of anticipation with
respect to claims 10 and 15, but not with respect to claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain 35 U.S.C. § 102 rejection of claims 10-12
and 15-17 over Hunt, whereas the rejection of claims 1-3 cannot
be sustained.
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Turning now to the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 4-9
and 13 over Hunt and Cameron, Appellant points out that neither
reference describes the “enrollment on the fly” feature (brief,
page 15). Appellant further argues that Cameron merely compares
each received word of a first utterance against a set of
templates (col. 1, lines 18-33) without showing any comparison
between the utterances (brief, page 16). The examiner responds
by referring to the fact that the saved templates are in fact
digits uttered by the user (col. 2, lines 20-23) and stored as
voice samples to which a second utterance is compared (answer,
page 9).
We agree with the Examiner that the voice templates are
actually formed by storing training utterances as uttered digits
or any other word by the user and are compared with any received
or second utterance for verification and generating scores as
“weighted decisions” (col. 2, lines 16-26). Therefore, the
Examiner’s reliance on Cameron for teaching a comparison between
separate utterances for establishing a password and the
corresponding codes and scores as the recited weighted decisions
and verification decision supports a prima facie case of
obviousness with respect to claim 13. However, regarding claims
4-9, we find that the Examiner has not pointed to any teachings
Appeal No. 2002-1982
Application No. 08/863,462
2 It should be noted that our decision to reverse the anticipation
rejection of claim 1 does not preclude reliance on Hunt for a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103. However, such rejection neither is before us nor can be
implied based on the reasoning addressed in the rejection of claims 4-9 as no
reasoning and/or discussion that may be extended to the subject matter of
claim 1 was presented by the examiner.
3 Although not noted by the Examiner, we observe that the first
occurrence of the term “utterance” in the last line of claim 4 should probably
be “first utterance” in order to provide proper antecedent basis for the term.
10
in Cameron, nor do we find any, that would have overcome the
deficiencies of Hunt with respect to their base claim 1, as
discussed above.2 Thus, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection
of claim 13 over Hunt and Cameron, but not with respect to claims
4-9.3
Regarding the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 14, 18 and
19 over Hunt, Cameron and Uchiyama, Appellant merely repeats the
arguments pointing to the alleged failure of the prior art to
teach a system having voice verification as an option to access
the system, brief, pages 36, 44 & 46). However, contrary to
Appellant’s position and as discussed above, the claimed optional
voice verification of base claims 10 and 15 are taught by the
prior art and therefore, the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims
14, 18 and 19, dependant thereon, are sustained.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Examiner
rejecting claims 1-3 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and claims 4-9 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is reversed, but is affirmed with respect to the
35 U.S.C. § 102 rejection of claims 10-12 and 15-17 and the
35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 13, 14, 18 and 19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
JERRY SMITH )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
LEE E. BARRETT ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
MAHSHID D. SAADAT )
Administrative Patent Judge )
MDS/ki
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