Ex Parte Bollineni

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 31, 2017

13931159 (P.T.A.B. May. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/931,159 06/28/2013 Vijay Bollineni 678-4773 (P20035) 4738
66547 7590 06/02/2017
THE FARRELL LAW FIRM, P.C.
290 Broadhollow Road
Suite 210E
Melville, NY 11747
EXAMINER
KHAN, IBRAHIM A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pto @ farrelliplaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte VIJAY BOLLINENI
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,1591
Technology Center 2600
Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, AMBER L. HAGY, and
SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.
FENICK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—10. (Appeal Br. 9.) We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1).
We AFFIRM.
Invention
Appellant’s invention relates a touchscreen device and stylus pen,
where the stylus pen is used for event invocation at the touchscreen. When
event invocation is performed using a distal end of the stylus pen, a
1 Appellant identifies Samsung Electronics as the real party in interest.
(Appeal Br. 1.)
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,159
predefined action is retrieved and performed. (Spec. 8:16—9:22, Fig. 6,
Abstract.)
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below with italicization added for emphasis, is
exemplary:
1. A method of handling event invocation in a device using
a stylus pen, the method comprising:
identifying the event invocation at a touchscreen of the
device;
determining if the event invocation is performed using a
distal end of the stylus pen;
retrieving a predefined action with respect to the event
invocation using the distal end of the stylus pen;
and
performing the predefined action for the event invocation
by the distal end of the stylus pen,
wherein the predefined action is assigned as a different
action to at least one application.
Rejection
The Examiner rejects claims 1—6, 8, and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Brown et al. (US 2011/0304577 Al; pub. Dec. 15, 2011)
(hereinafter “Brown”) and Nguyen (US 2003/0107607 Al; pub. June 12,
2003). (Final Action 2—8.)
The Examiner rejects claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Brown, Nguyen, and Rimon et al. (US 2008/0012835 Al;
pub. Jan. 17, 2008) (hereinafter “Rimon”). (Final Action 8.)
2
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,159
The Examiner rejects claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Brown, Nguyen, and Atkins et al. (US 2008/0278455 Al;
pub. Nov. 13, 2008) (hereinafter “Atkins”). (Final Action 9.)
Issues
A. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Brown
and Nguyen teaches or suggests “retrieving a predefined action with respect
to the event invocation using the distal end of the stylus pen,” as recited in
claim 1?
B. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Brown and
Nguyen teaches or suggests “the predefined action is assigned as a different
action to at least one application,” as recited in claim 1?
C. Did the Examiner err in combining Brown and Nguyen in
rejecting claim 1?
ANALYSIS
A. “retrieving a predefined action with respect to the event
invocation using the distal end of the stylus pen ”
The Examiner finds Brown teaches or suggests identifying event
invocation, determining if the event invocation is performed using a distal
end of a stylus pen, and retrieving a predefined action with respect to the
event invocation using the distal end of the stylus pen. (Final Action 3.)
Brown relates to a stylus with two tips (tip 102(1) and tip 102(2)) that are
used to interact with a touch screen through a determination of contact with
or force exerted by the stylus. (Brown 199; Fig. 8.) The Examiner maps
Brown’s teaching that the first tip of the stylus writes on the touch screen
and the second tip is used for erasing to the claimed retrieval of a predefined
3
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,159
action with respect to event invocation using the distal end of the stylus pen.
(Final Action 3 (citing Brown H 99, 101, 105, Figs. 8, 9).)
Appellant argues that, according to the Specification, the predefined
action that may be retrieved for an event invocation may vary — for example,
it may be the attachment of an image to an email in an e-mail application, or
the retrieval of a text box in a text messaging application. (Appeal Br. 5.)
Appellant then argues that “Brown, on the other hand, fails to retrieve a
predefined action, and, rather, always provides the write or erase function
(depending on the tip used), regardless of an event invocation.” (Id.)
With this argument, Appellant appears to read a requirement into the
“retrieving” claim limitation that different predefined actions must be
retrieved. However, this claim limitation does not affirmatively set forth any
method step or otherwise require different predefined actions be retrieved,
and Appellant does not explain why a narrower interpretation of the
“retrieving” limitation requiring the retrieval of different predefined actions
would be warranted. The requirement in the claim that different actions are
retrieved when event invocation occurs in different applications is instead
encompassed only in the “wherein” claim limitation (viz. “wherein the
predefined action is assigned as a different action to at least one
application.”) The Examiner relies on a combination of Nguyen with Brown
to teach the “wherein” limitation. (Final Action 4.) As such, Appellant’s
argument focusing only on Brown’s teaching or suggestion that the same
action occurs regardless of application is unavailing.
The Examiner finds that, in Brown, in the case where only one
function is assigned to each tip, the stylus sends signals to a processor,
which would be used to retrieve the predefined function to be implemented
4
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,159
in application software. (Answer 2—3.) Appellant argues that Brown does
not teach or suggest a predefined action “with respect to the event
invocation,” arguing that “in Brown, the event which invokes the action of
writing or erasing is always strokes made to the screen” by one of the tips of
the stylus. (Reply Br. 2.) Appellant contends that “in Brown, which action is
triggered is determined based on which end of the stylus is being used and
not with respect to the event invocation.” {Id. at 3.) Appellant provides an
example of event invocation — that such event invocation may be “whether
an input is received to an input or to a text box.” {Id.)
However, the Specification defines “event invocation” as “input
event” and notes that “event invocation is performed at the touchscreen” and
“is done using the proximal end ... or the distal end ... of the stylus pen.”
(Spec. 5:11—17.) Thus, where, in Brown, one of the two tips of the stylus is
being used to provide input to the touchscreen, we are not convinced of error
in the Examiner’s finding that a stroke made to the screen in Brown is an
input event (event invocation) using a tip of the stylus, which causes a
predefined action to be retrieved (and then performed.)
Thus, with respect to the claim limitation regarding “retrieving a
predefined action with respect to the event invocation” we are not persuaded
of error in the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
B. “the predefined action is assigned as a different action to at
least one application ”
The Examiner finds Nguyen, in combination with Brown, teaches or
suggests that “the predefined action is assigned as a different action to at
least one application” because it teaches enabling different functions to
occur based on which program is running. (Final Action 4.) Nguyen’s
background section discusses computer mice as input devices, and describes
5
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,159
that “[m]ice contain at least one button and sometimes as many as three,
which have different functions depending on what program is running.”
(Nguyen 13.)
Appellant argues that Nguyen teaches only the one action is assigned
to each mouse button. (Appeal Br. 6—7; Reply Br. 3—4.) Specifically,
Appellant argues that Nguyen’s examples show only a left mouse button
actuation as actuating a selection of underlying component of UI and a right
mouse button actuation as actuating a menu display. (Appeal Br. 6—7.)
However, regardless of the extent of the examples given in Nguyen,
Nguyen’s express teaching that mouse buttons “have different functions
depending on what program is running” is enough to teach or suggest, as the
Examiner finds, that a different predefined action with respect to an input
event may be retrieved based on which program is running. We are not
convinced of error in the Examiner’s finding that that this teaching or
suggestion from Nguyen, in combination with Brown, teaches or suggests
“the predefined action is assigned as a different action to at least one
application.”
C. The Combination of Brown and Nguyen
Appellant argues that it would not have been obvious to combine the
teachings of Nguyen with those of Brown as in the rejection of claim 1:
This is evidenced by the fact [that] Nguyen attempts to achieve
such mouse button functionality for stylus-based input through
the use of a selectable helper icon button displayed in a user
interface, rather than through the use of a second end of the
stylus. That is, if the use of a distal end of the stylus to perform
a predefined action which differs based on the application were
obvious, Nguyen would have employed such a method to
achieve such functionality.
6
Appeal 2017-001706
Application 13/931,159
(Appeal Br. 7, see also Reply Br. 4.) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s
contention, which does not address what the combined teachings and
suggestions of Nguyen and Brown would have suggested to an artisan.
Appellant’s argument blurs the distinction between anticipation and
obviousness. The fact that Nguyen does not provide a teaching or
suggestion of the use of a distal end of a stylus for input is not dispositive of
the issue of the non-obviousness of the claimed system. The issue is what
the prior art, taken as a whole, would have suggested to an artisan. In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in combining teachings from Brown and
Nguyen in the rejection.
To summarize, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments
of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the
obviousness rejection of claim 1, as well as the rejection of independent
claim 8 and dependent claims 2—7, 9, and 10, argued on the same basis.
(Appeal Br. 3, 8—9.)
DECISION
The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1—10 is
affirmed.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv), no time period for taking any
subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended.
AFFIRMED
7