Ex Parte Boismier et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesMar 3, 200910410896 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 3, 2009) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE __________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES __________ Ex parte DENNIS A. BOISMIER and STEFAN PALLAZZA __________ Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 Technology Center 3700 __________ Decided:1 March 3, 2009 __________ Before ERIC GRIMES, RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, and STEPHEN WALSH, Administrative Patent Judges. WALSH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims to an embolic protection filter for temporary use in a blood vessel. The Examiner 1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery). Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 rejected the claims as obvious. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part and enter a new ground of rejection. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to embolic protection devices. (Spec. 1.) Appellants describe an embolic protection filter made of two materials, one of which is radiopaque. (Id.) The claimed filter comprises a support structure made of composite material having an inner core of radiopaque material, and an outer layer that can be a shape-memory or superelastic material. Claims 1, 2, 5-7, 9-10, 13-18, 21-23, 25, 26 and 29-34 are on appeal.2 The Examiner rejected the claims as follows: • claims 1, 2, 5-7, 9, 10, 14-18, 21-23, 25, 26 and 30-34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Heath3 in view of Khosravi;4 and • claims 13 and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Heath and Khosravi and further in view of Bagaoisan.5 Appellants argue the claims in four groups: • claims 1, 2, 5-7, 9-10 and 14-16; • claims 17, 18, 21-23, 25, 26 and 30-33; • claims 13 and 29; and 2 Claims 3, 4, 8, 11, 12, 19, 20, 27 and 28 are also pending but have been withdrawn from consideration by the Examiner. (App. Br. 3). 3 Int’l Application WO 93/19803 by Heath et al., published Oct. 14, 1993. 4 U.S. Patent No. 6,129,739, issued to Farhad Khosravi, Oct. 10, 2000. 5 U.S. Patent No. 6,270,477 B1, issued to Bagaoisan et al., Aug. 7, 2001. 2 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 • claim 34. Claims 2, 5-7, 9-10 and 14-16 will stand or fall with claim 1; claims 18, 21- 23, 25, 26 and 30-33 will stand or fall with claim 17; and claim 29 will stand or fall with claim 13. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). The four representative claims read as follows: 1. An embolic protection filter attachable to a guidewire for temporary placement within a blood vessel to collect embolic debris during a medical procedure, said embolic protection filter comprising: a support structure including a composite material having an outer layer formed of a first material, and an inner core layer disposed within the outer layer and formed of a second material different than the first material, the second material having a radiographic density greater than the first material to enhance the visibility of the embolic protection filter; and a filter membrane operatively coupled to the support structure. 13. The embolic protection filter of claim 1, wherein said support structure includes an anti-thrombogenic coating. 17. An embolic protection filter attachable to a guidewire for temporary placement within a blood vessel to collect embolic debris during a medical procedure, said embolic protection filter comprising: a support structure forming a proximal mouth of the embolic protection filter, said support structure including a composite material having an outer layer formed of a first material, and an inner core layer disposed within the outer layer and formed of a second material different than the first material, the second material having a radiographic density greater than the first material to enhance the visibility of the embolic protection filter; and a filter membrane operatively coupled to the support structure. 3 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 34. An embolic protection filter attachable to a guidewire for temporary placement within a blood vessel to collect embolic debris during a medical procedure, said embolic protection filter comprising: a composite wire loop forming a proximal mouth of the embolic protection filter, said composite wire loop comprising at least one outer layer formed of a first material, and an inner layer formed of a second material different than the first material, the first material formed of a superelastic alloy having shape-memory characteristics at body temperature, the second material having a radiographic density greater than the first material to enhance the visibility of the embolic protection filter; and a filter membrane operatively coupled to the support structure. OBVIOUSNESS The Issue The Examiner rejected most of the claims as obvious over the combined teachings of the Heath and Khosravi references. The Examiner found that Heath’s embolic filter disclosed all the elements of claims 1, 17 and 34, except for comprising a membrane. (Ans. 4.) Khosravi disclosed an embolic filter membrane that enhanced filtration. (Id.) The Examiner concluded that one of skill in the art at the time of the invention would have found it obvious to add Khosravi’s membrane to Heath’s filter for “enhanced filtration ability.” (Id.) Claim 13 requires the filter support structure to include an anti- thrombogenic coating that Heath and Khosravi did not teach. Bagaoisan taught that a variety of anti-thrombogenic coatings were available for use on catheters used for embolic containment. (Ans. 4.) The Examiner concluded it would have been obvious at the time for one of ordinary skill in the art to add a thrombogenic coating to the combined filter suggested by Heath and 4 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 Khosravi, “thereby preventing the body from forming clots and rejecting the device.” (Ans. 4-5.) Appellants contend that “modifying the vena cava filter disclosed in Heath to include a filter membrane as taught in Khosravi would present detrimental consequences which may result in impairment or death of the patient in which the vena cava filter is placed.” (App. Br. 7-8). According to Appellants, Heath’s filter is “permanent,” in contrast to the claimed filter “for temporary placement,” and Heath’s filter was configured to allow smaller clots to pass through rather than capture them. (Id. at 9.) Appellants thus argue that Heath teaches away from the claimed invention. (Id. at 11.) Appellants further argue that Heath’s filter had a distal opening, not the “proximal mouth” of claim 17 (id. at 12), and that Heath does not teach the composite wire loop recited in claim 34 (id. at 13). Regarding claim 13, Appellants contend that “Bagaoisan fails to overcome the insufficiencies of the teachings of Heath and Khosravi.” (Id. at 13.) The issues are: • does the claim phrase “for temporary placement” distinguish Heath; • did Heath teach away from the claimed invention; • if Heath’s filter had a distal opening, must the rejection of claim 17 be reversed; • did Heath disclose a composite wire loop; and • did Bagaoisan overcome the alleged insufficiencies of the teachings of Heath and Khosravi? 5 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 Findings of Fact 1. Heath’s invention related to metal medical components to be used inside the body, such as medical wires used in guidewires, filters, and other medical devices. (1:3-7.) 2. Heath disclosed that “[t]ypically, X-ray fluoroscopy is used to view the medical device within the body cavity to monitor placement and operation. . . . the medical device must include some radiopaque material . . . to provide sufficient contrast on an X-ray image.” (1:22- 32.) 3. Heath taught that “optimum properties” could be achieved with medical wires having a multiple material coaxial construction, which “allows increased radiopacity of a metal medical device without adversely affecting and in some cases improving other important properties such as the biocompatibility, size or other performance characteristics.” (2:7-9; 3:15-20.) 4. Heath taught that “it would be preferable to put the dense radiopaque material (e.g., tantalum) on the inside (core) since dense materials are generally less elastic and the elastic material (e.g., titanium or nickel- titanium alloy) on the outside (clad).” (2:14-18.) 5. Heath’s elastic material included “superelastic alloys, precursor alloys of superelastic alloys, stainless steel, and titanium and its alloys. The superelastic alloy is nitinol.” (4:21-24.) 6. Heath taught that the core metal, relatively dense to enhance radiopacity, would preferably be formed from tantalum, tungsten, rhenium, bismuth, silver, gold, platinum or iridium. (11:9-17.) 6 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 7. Heath’s Example 3 referred to Fig. 5 and explained “a wire of the invention may also be used in a blood clot filtration device of the type positioned within a blood vessel.” (16:3-22.) 8. Heath did not disclose a filter membrane coupled to the filtration device. (Ans. 4.) 9. Khosravi taught “a vascular filter or thrombectomy/embolectomy device that comprises a blood permeable sac affixed at its perimeter to a support hoop . . . [that] supports a proximally-oriented mouth of the sac when the device is deployed in a vessel.” (Col. 2, l. 67 – col. 3, l. 6.) 10. Khosravi’s support hoop is formed of a super-elastic material, such as a nickel-titanium alloy (nitinol) or other super-elastic material. (Col. 5, l. 59 – col. 6, l. 2.) 11. Khosravi Fig. 6 disclosed a device comprising a filter frame 53 and 54 (support hoops), with a filter membrane 58 (permeable sac), attached to guide wire 52. (Col. 8, ll. 15-42.) 12. Khosravi’s support hoops 53 and 54 could include “radiopaque features, such as gold or platinum bands 65.” (Col. 8, ll. 35-38.) 13. Khosravi’s openings or pores 60 in sac 58 “permit red blood cells to easily pass through the sac.” (Col. 8, ll. 27-28.) 14. Khosravi’s membrane or sac openings could be made in a preferred embodiment to filter particles of about 20 to 400 microns. (Col. 5, ll. 41-58.) 7 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 15. Khosravi taught that radiopaque features could be bands attached to, or radiopaque wire wrapped around, the frame at the mouth of the device. (Col. 9, ll. 53-60; and Fig. 10.) 16. Khosravi did not disclose an inner core of radiopaque material. 17. Bagaoisan taught that “a variety of antithrombogenic coatings” could be applied to catheters being used for embolic containment. (Col. 9, ll. 35-39.) Principles of Law A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Obviousness is a question of law based on fact findings. The scope and content of the prior art are determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are ascertained; and the level of skill in the art is resolved. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Against that background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Id.; In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The proper question to ask is whether a person of ordinary skill in the art, “facing the wide range of needs created by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a benefit to” combining the prior art teachings. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, ___, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1744 (2007). “[T]he question is whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to 8 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination, not whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest that the combination is the most desirable combination available.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A prior art reference is said to teach away from an Applicant’s invention “when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from . . . alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed.” Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. “The preamble of a claim does not limit the scope of the claim when it merely states a purpose or intended use of the invention. . . . [R]eview of a patent in its entirety should be made to determine whether the inventors intended such language to represent an additional structural limitation or mere introductory language.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The claims are given their “broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” Id. Analysis Claim 1 1. The Examiner determined that it would have been obvious to add Khosravi’s permeable emboli filter membrane to Heath’s blood clot 9 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 filtration device. Appellants dispute that one of skill in the art would have been inclined to add Khosravi’s filter membrane to Heath’s filter because it “would present detrimental consequences,” rendering Heath’s filter “unsatisfactory for its intended purpose,” and would change the principle of operation of Heath’s filter. (App. Br. 8.) The principle of operation that Heath identified was “achiev[ing] optimum properties by creating a multiple material coaxial construction.” (FF3.) Optimal properties meant that medical devices being used within the body could be better visualized from outside the body with X-ray equipment if they were made with Heath’s composite wires. Heath put the principle into operation by using dense radiopaque material as the core of a wire, and elastic material such as nickel-titanium alloy as the cladding on the outside. (FF4.) Heath taught that wire embodying the principle of operation could be used in filters. (FF1.) Adding Khosravi’s membrane to Heath’s filter would not have changed the principle of operation of Heath’s invention. Appellants assume as their premise that the principle of operation for all of Heath’s filter embodiments must be limited to exacting filtration details they read into Heath’s Example 3. But the principle of filtration even for Example 3 would not have been changed by combining Khosravi’s teachings with Heath’s. Both Heath’s Example 3 and Khosravi’s devices operated by the same filtration principle--capturing some clots and passing smaller ones. The suggested combination would have given users of embolic filters the option to filter at Khosravi’s finer level of discrimination, allowing blood cells to pass but capturing embolic debris less than 3 mm in diameter. (Ans. 4.) Adding Khosravi’s membrane would have been 10 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 expected to enhance filtration ability because the improved filter would have caught “more medium sized particles,” but that is not a change in the principle of operation. (Ans. 5.) The desirability of the combination would have been appreciated by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time Appellants’ invention was made. See Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“the nature of the problem supplies a motivation to combine these prior art references.”) Appellants argue that Heath’s Example 3 is limited to a vena cava filter of the type described in patents to Herms et al.6 and El-Nounou et al.,7 because Heath incorporated those patents by reference. (App. Br. 8.) Herms mentioned filters that retained large emboli and allowed clots smaller than 3 millimeters to pass, and Appellants infer that Heath’s disclosure was limited by Herms. (App. Br. 9.) Appellants conclude that the combination of the Heath and Khosravi teachings would be unsatisfactory for Herms’ purpose. (App. Br. 10-11.) First, Appellants’ claims are not limited by the size of particle filtered. The arguments about size therefore carry little weight. Second, we are not persuaded that a person of skill in the art would have read Heath so narrowly. Heath taught that its improved medical wires “can be used for a variety of purposes such as tracking, stenting, filtering” etc. (FF1.) Nothing in Heath limits filtration to a particular size. Neither Heath nor Herms taught specific particle diameters that should be filtered, or others that should not be filtered. Although Appellants find a command in 6 U.S. Patent No. 4,817,600, issued to Herms et al., Apr.4, 1989. 7 U.S. Patent No. 5,059,205, issued to El-Nounou et al., Oct. 22, 1991. 11 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 Herms to filter at no lower than 3 millimeters, we do not. Herms reported, in a “Background of the Invention” section, that “[f]ilters of this type are typically formed of fine wire legs and . . . . The filter may trap clots of approximately three millimeters or larger. The clot, depending on its age and nature, may stay permanently in the filter or be resorbed by the body.” (Herms, col. 1, ll. 13-21.) Herms was simply reporting what was typical in the pre-existing art. After that one mention of particle size in the “Background” section, Herms did not return to the topic. Khosravi evidences that there was a recognized need in the prior art for embolic filters to filter particles smaller than 3 millimeters. (FF13-14.) There is nothing in Heath or Herms that “taught away” from the combination of Heath with Khosravi. Third, Appellants’ claims are directed to devices, not methods of using devices. “Under section 103 we must look to the person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains, not those who may use the invention.” In re Grout, 377 F.2d 1019, 1021 (CCPA 1967) (for the beehive device claimed, persons of ordinary skill in the art were persons who built beehives, not beekeepers who used them). Khosravi is evidence that filtering small particles was desirable at the time of the invention. Persons of skill in the art of making such devices would have been motivated by that need to make such devices for use by doctors. Appellants’ arguments about “injurious implications or death of a patient” (App. Br. 11), although not based on statements in the references, might have been pertinent to precautions a doctor using such a device might have taken, but they would not have discouraged persons of skill in the art from providing devices to 12 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 meet the need Khosravi identified. See Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1200 (“case law does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation for the current invention.”). Appellants’ argument for limiting Heath by implications they perceive in Herms is also unpersuasive because it does not give due weight to Khosravi’s disclosure. When a combination of prior art teachings is relied on to show obviousness, attacking only one reference is often unpersuasive. Each reference “must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.”). 2. After several Office actions rejecting the claims over Heath and Khosravi, Appellants amended the claims by adding the phrase “for temporary placement.” (Amend. filed Oct. 13, 2006.) The Specification and original claims did not use the term “temporary.” Appellants argue that “temporary” distinguishes Heath’s filter shown in Fig. 5, which they describe as “for permanent implantation.” (App. Br. 8-9.) The ordinary meaning of temporary is “lasting for a limited time.”8 Notwithstanding their own argument, Appellants acknowledge that filters described in Heath were “maintained in situ for extended periods (of at least 8-10 years).” (Id. at 9.) Heath’s filters were not permanent because a filter maintained in situ for a period of 8-10 years is “lasting for a limited time,” 8 Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Ed. 1993. 13 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 not permanent. An implantation for a period, whether extended or not, is temporary, not permanent. Appellants did not assign a special meaning to “temporary,” and there are no structural features in the body of the claim that define Appellants’ filter in a way that is different from the filter suggested by the combination of Heath and Khosravi. Using the ordinary meaning of temporary, for a period of time, we conclude that “for temporary placement” does not distinguish the claimed filter from that suggested by the combination of Heath and Khosravi. Claim 13 Claim 13 further limits the filter of claim 1 by reciting that the “support structure includes an anti-thrombogenic coating.” Bagaoisan taught using anti-thrombogenic coatings on catheters being used for embolic containment. (FF17.) Appellants rely on their arguments concerning claim 1, and add only a general comment that Bagaoisan “fails to overcome the insufficiencies of the teachings of Heath and Khosravi.” (App. Br. 13.) Appellants do not identify any specific error in the Examiner’s reliance on Bagaoisan for suggesting that the effectiveness of the support structure would be enhanced by “providing a therapeutic agent.” (Ans. 4.) We conclude that the Examiner established the prima facie obviousness of claim 13, and that Appellants have not rebutted it. Claim 17 14 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 Appellants argue that the “support structure forming a proximal mouth” recited in claim 17 is different from Heath’s filter having a distal opening rather than a proximal mouth. (App. Br. 11-12.) Heath itself is silent on this point, but Appellants read El-Nounou’s disclosure into Heath as support for their argument. (App. Br. 12.) The ordinary dictionary meaning for proximal is near, which requires a reference point for meaning. We conclude that until Appellants’ filter is attached to a guidewire, the term “proximal” as used in Appellants’ claims is not a meaningful distinction of “mouth” from prior art filter mouths. (See Ans. 5.) Claim 17 is directed to “a filter attachable to a guidewire,” i.e., the filter by itself, not attached to a guidewire. Claim 17 does not recite defining structural limitations for “proximal mouth” by which one end of the unattached filter can be distinguished from the other. While Appellants might intend the term “proximal” to imply structural features on the attachable filter by itself, they have not identified any. We must therefore determine if the term itself has a structural meaning for the mouth of a filter before the filter is oriented by attachment to a guidewire. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1479 (review the entire disclosure to make the determination). The written description in the Specification uses the term “proximal” once, in the “Background of the Invention.” (Spec. 2:6-9.) Those lines in the “Background” describe a prior art technique of attaching a radiopaque coil at the frame that forms the proximal mouth, but they do not indicate there would necessarily be a difference in the unattached structure if the mouth were oriented in the proximal or distal direction after attachment. That description of prior art is consistent with Khosravi, which shows the 15 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 mouth on a guidewire in proximal orientation. (FF9; FF11.) According to its placement on the guidewire with the mouth facing away from the distal end of the guidewire, Khosravi’s “sac 58 is coupled to support hoop 53 at its proximal end so that the support hoop forms an opening for the sac.” See Col. 8, ll. 15-42. Put another way, Khosravi applies the term proximal to the mouth of the filter because it faces away from the distal end of the guidewire. Similarly, Heath refers to the proximal end of the guidewire remaining outside the body. See Heath at 1:9-21. In Appellants’ claim for an “attachable” filter, there is no structure by which a proximal end can be distinguished from a distal end while the filter is unattached. Following Paulsen, we also review the Specification’s drawings. See also Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 479 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (for the meaning of “balloon angioplasty catheter,” look “to the specification and drawings to determine whether those sources convey a clear structural meaning for the phrase”). There is no drawing indicating a feature by which a proximal or distal mouth can be identified before the filter is attached to a guidewire. Specification Figure 1, which is only “an exemplary embodiment,” shows the filter after it was attached. (Spec. 4:3-4.) In Figure 1, “ends 18, 20 of the wire loop 16 may be attached to a tubular member 22 configured to slide along a guidewire,” or “can be fixedly secured directly to the guidewire 24, in which case the guidewire 24 can be used to advance the embolic protection filter 10 within the body.” (Spec. 4:11-16.) The claim does not recite the features shown in the example, and an example is not imported as a limitation into the claims. An artisan may attach the filter to the guidewire with the mouth facing proximally or distally as desired. Although one 16 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 embodiment of the filter on the guidewire after attachment is illustrated, Figure 1 does not convey that “proximal” has a clear structural meaning as applied to the mouth of the “attachable” filter as claimed before attachment. In the absence of a necessary structural meaning in Appellants’ Specification and claims, we conclude that whether the mouth is proximal or distal depends on how the filter is attached to the guidewire. The filter mouth’s orientation toward the proximal or distal end of the guidewire cannot be determined until the filter is attached. In the claims presented, “proximal” is only nominal, not structural, and would apply to any filter mouth before attachment to a guidewire because it names but doesn’t define by structure. We agree with the Examiner’s reasoning that “proximal” does not distinguish the claimed “attachable” filter over the applied combination of references. In contrast to the Specification’s lack of definition, El-Nounou defines proximal and distal by reference to certain parts of the filter itself, not by reference to the guidewire. Unlike Appellants’ claims, El-Nounou’s distal end is expressly identified with respect to another part of the filter itself: “each leg having securement means on its distal end with respect to the head, the improvement being that the securement means on the distal end of each leg being of multiple curvilinear configuration to define a pad which permits hook engagement of a vessel wall.” (Col. 1, l. 64 – col. 2, l. 6, emphasis added.) The head is similarly identified with respect to parts of the filter itself: “a head with a plurality of legs extending distally therefrom, the head and legs having a centrally disposed longitude axis. The legs have proximal portions which are secured to the head . . . .” (Col. 2, ll. 7-15, 17 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 emphasis added.) In Appellants’ view, not only should El-Nounou’s definitions be read into Heath, the opposite meanings should be read into their own Specification and claims. Even if we were to read El-Nounou’s definitions into Heath, we do not read limitations into Appellants’ claims because Appellants’ claims are given their “broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1479. The Examiner’s explanation that “proximal” does not have a necessary structural meaning until the filter is attached is reasonable. (Ans. 5-6.) Khosravi and Heath evidence that the Examiner’s explanation of usage in the art is correct. “Absent an express definition in their specification, the fact that appellants can point to definitions or usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO's definition unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its interpretation.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appellants had the opportunity to define their invention over the art by writing structural limitations into the claims. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (during examination, an Applicant “may amend [the] claims to obtain protection commensurate with [the] actual contribution to the art.”) Claim 34 Claim 34 recites “a composite wire loop forming a proximal mouth of the embolic protection filter.” Appellants’ first argument is that Heath does not teach a “proximal mouth” because “Heath appears to disclose a distal opening of the vena cava filter.” (App. Br. 13.) For the reasons already explained in our analysis of 18 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 claim 17, the term “proximal mouth” has no structural meaning for a filter defined as “attachable.” We are not persuaded of Examiner error on that score. Appellants next argue that Heath does not teach a “loop” because “the divergent struts of the vena cava filter taught in Heath are not a loop.” (App. Br. 13.) The Examiner found that “[Heath’s] composite wires form a round loop cross-section near reference number 54.” (Ans. 5.) Ordinary meanings for the word “loop”9 are: 1 : a curving or doubling of a line so as to form a closed or partly open curve within itself through which another line can be passed 2 a : something (as an anatomical part) shaped like a loop -- see LOOP OF HENLE; LIPPES LOOP b : a surgical electrode in the form of a loop 3 : a fingerprint in which some of the papillary ridges make a single backward turn without any twist 4 : a wire usually of platinum bent at one end into a small loop (usually four millimeters in inside diameter) and used in transferring microorganisms The ordinary meanings for “loop” refer to a continuous thing, not a cross- section. We agree with Appellants that a cross-section through radial struts is not “a composite wire loop.” We reverse the rejection of claim 34 and enter a new ground of rejection. 9 From Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary, online at http://medical.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/medical, last accessed Jan. 16, 2009. 19 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Claim 34 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combined teachings of Khosravi and Heath. Khosravi disclosed an embolic filter used during thrombectomy or embolectomy. (FF9.) Khosravi’s filter comprised a blood permeable sac, i.e., a filter membrane, affixed to a support hoop, i.e., a wire loop, that formed a proximal mouth when deployed in a blood vessel. (FF9.) Khosravi’s filter was attached to a guidewire when deployed. (FF11.) Khosravi formed the support hoop of a superelastic material such as a nickel-titanium alloy. (FF10.) Khosravi attached radiopaque bands or wire, such as gold or platinum, to the frame at the mouth of the device. (FF12; FF15.) Khosravi did not disclose a composite support hoop comprising a radiographically denser material within the superelastic material. Heath disclosed metal medical components to be used inside the body, such as wires used in guidewires and filters. (FF1.) Heath taught that to view medical devices within the body, the device must include radiopaque material to be viewed by X-ray fluoroscopy. (FF2.) Heath taught that optimum properties and increased radiopacity could be achieved with multiple material coaxial construction. (FF3.) Heath’s coaxial material was made with a dense radiopaque material in the core and elastic material such as nickel-titanium alloy, nitinol, which has shape-memory characteristics, on the outside. (FF4-6.) To achieve the optimum properties Heath taught, a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellants’ invention would have found it obvious to have made Khosravi’s support hoop with Heath’s coaxial construction wire. 20 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW • Heath did not teach away from the claimed invention; • “proximal” as used in the claims does not have structural meaning that distinguishes the claimed attachable filter from the filter suggested by Heath and Khosravi; • the combination of teachings in Heath, Khosravi and Bagaoisan rendered claim 13 obvious; • Heath did not teach a composite wire loop; and • claim 34’s filter comprising a composite wire loop would have been obvious over the combined teachings of Khosravi and Heath as explained in the new ground of rejection. SUMMARY We affirm the rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-7, 9, 10, 14-18, 21-23, 25, 26 and 30-33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Heath in view of Khosravi; we affirm the rejection of claims 13 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Heath and Khosravi and further in view of Bagaoisan; we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 34; and we enter a new ground of rejection for claim 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combined teachings of Khosravi and Heath. Regarding the affirmed rejection(s), 37 CFR § 41.52(a)(1) provides "[a]ppellant may file a single request for rehearing within two months from 21 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 the date of the original decision of the Board." In addition to affirming the Examiner's rejection(s) of one or more claims, this opinion contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 CFR § 41.50(b) (effective September 13, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 49960 (August 12, 2004), 1286 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 21 (September 7, 2004)). 37 CFR § 41.50(b) provides "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." 37 CFR § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . . Should Appellants elect to prosecute further before the Examiner pursuant to 37 CFR § 41.50(b)(1), in order to preserve the right to seek review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 141 or 145 with respect to the affirmed rejection, the effective date of the affirmance is deferred until conclusion of the prosecution before the Examiner unless, as a mere incident to the limited prosecution, the affirmed rejection is overcome. If Appellants elect prosecution before the Examiner and this does not result in allowance of the application, abandonment or a second appeal, this 22 Appeal 2009-0085 Application 10/410,896 case should be returned to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences for final action on the affirmed rejection, including any timely request for rehearing thereof. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED § 41.50(b) dm CROMPTON, SEAGER & TUFTE, LLC 1221 NICOLLET AVENUE SUITE 800 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55403-2420 23 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation