Ex Parte Block

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 25, 2011

09875454 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 25, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte DAVID BLOCK
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Appeal 2010-005658
Application 09/875,454
Technology Center 3600
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Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
MICHAEL W. KIM, Administrative Patent Judges.

KIM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
Appeal 2010-005658
Application 09/875,454

2

Appellant filed a Request for Reconsideration (hereinafter “Req.”) of
the Board’s Decision on Appeal of August 4, 2011, asking that we
reconsider and reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-19.
Appellant argues that we were mistaken in construing the term
“websites” to encompass individual webpages described in Iyengar, et al.
(US Pat. 6,360,205 B1, iss. Mar. 19, 2002) (hereinafter “Iyengar”). To that
end, Appellant sets forth two arguments. However, the interrelated
difficulties when applying those two arguments show that Appellant has not
set forth a persuasive argument that a proper construction of “websites”
excludes Iyengar’s webpages.
Appellant asserts that the Specification contextually delineates
between websites and webpages (Req. 2-3). The first example given is that
the Specification includes a “home page” and a “web parking page” that are
presumably portions of and distinct from a website. However, Appellant
later asserts that different domain names constitute different websites (Req.
3). The “home page” and “web parking page” are respectively set forth on
seemingly unrelated pages 8 and 32 of the Specification, and thus Appellant
has not given any indication that the “home page” and “web parking page”
share the same domain name.
The second example given is that the Specification provides an
express definition of websites because they are “‘AA owned and controlled
domains’” (Req. 2-3). However, the cited portion of the Specification then
asserts that
AA owns at least one and usually several of the
most common domain names of the fifty or more
busiest airports in the world, each of which is
Appeal 2010-005658
Application 09/875,454
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cross-linked so that reference to any portion of an
airport name by an AA member will lead to the
web site and to an AA portal through metatags.
(Spec. 33). So, for a particular airport, multiple domain name permutations
will redirect to a single “main” portal for that particular airport.
Accordingly, as those multiple domain names are for the same airport portal,
this conflicts with Appellant’s later assertion that different domain names
constitute different websites.
Appellant asserts that one of ordinary skill would understand the
difference between website and webpage (Req. 3-5). As an example,
Appellant asserts that different domain names constitute different websites.
However, we have addressed above how such a definition conflicts with
examples in the Specification.
Appellant also cites a claim construction opinion concerning
“websites” (Req. 4-5). Initially, we note that all opinions are fact specific,
and that the claim interpretation that is used by courts in litigation is not the
same claim interpretation that is applicable during prosecution of a pending
application before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). See In re Zletz,
893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Moreover, even under the court’s
definition, all that is required for a website is “[a] collection of interlinked
Web pages, including a host page, residing at the same network location.”
Applied to Iyengar, Figure 10 could be considered a host page, with the
hyperlinks “interlinking” to other pages at the same network location.
Under this scenario, each separate search in Iyengar resulting in a host page,
like that on Figure 10, would constitute a separate website, even if hosted
under the same domain name, thus corresponding to the “plurality of
standardized websites,” as recited in independent claim 1.
Appeal 2010-005658
Application 09/875,454
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The Request for Rehearing has been granted in that we have
reconsidered our opinion. However, we decline to make any changes to that
decision.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

DENIED

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