Ex Parte BLIGHT et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 25, 2018

11739706 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 25, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
11/739,706 04/25/2007 JEFFREY BLIGHT
73109 7590 09/27/2018
Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC
20283 State Road 7
Ste. 300
Boca Raton, FL 33498
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.
GB920050112US 1
8152-0125
CONFIRMATION NO.
9811
EXAMINER
PRASAD, NANCY N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/27/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ibmptomail@iplawpro.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEFFREY BLIGHT, AMANDA ELIZABETH CRESSELL,
MARTIN J. GALE, and CHRISTOPHER EDWARD SHARP
Appeal2017-006004 1
Application 11/739,706
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.
KIM, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final rejection of claims 1-19. We have
jurisdiction to review the case under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 6.
The invention relates generally to managing a data processing process.
Spec. ,r 1.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A computer-implemented method for managing a
workflow process of a plurality of activities, comprising:
1 The Appellants identify IBM Corporation as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 1.
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creating a workflow definition that defines a sequence of
activities which comprise a workflow process;
identifying a first activity implementation for providing
services to one or more of said activities;
assigning said first activity implementation to a first said
activity;
associating, with a processor, a set of one or more
performance criteria for the performance of said first activity
implementation when providing services to said first activity;
monitoring, using the processor, the performance of said
first activity implementation against said set of performance
criteria;
identifying a second activity implementation for providing
services to said first activity; and
upon said first activity implementation failing to meet one
or more of said performance criteria, assigning, using the
processor, said second activity implementation to said first
activity in place of said first activity implementation.
The Examiner rejected claims 10-12 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as indefinite.
The Examiner rejected claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to ineligible subject matter in the form of abstract ideas.
The Examiner rejected claims 13-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
reciting propagating signals.
The Examiner rejected claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Willcox et al. (US 2002/0156664 Al, pub. Oct. 24, 2002)
(hereinafter "Willcox") and Casati et al. (US 2002/0174093 Al, pub.
Nov. 21, 2002).
We AFFIRM.
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ANALYSIS
Re;ection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph
The Examiner construes claims 10-12 as invoking 35 U.S.C. § 112,
sixth paragraph, and finds "the written description fails to (1) disclose the
corresponding structure, material, or acts for the claimed function" of
claims 10-12, and "[n]owhere in the [A]pplicants['] originally presented
[S]pecification and claims is the performance monitor or any type of logic
shown to be hardware." Final Act. 5.
The Appellants argue "the term 'logic' in computer science refers to
the logic gates (and digital circuits constructed from the logic gates),"
thereby providing "sufficient definite structure" to avoid construction under
the sixth paragraph. Appeal Br. 11. The Appellants also assert claim 10 is
not a means-plus function claim, because the term "logic" was not
recognized by the Federal Circuit as one of the "nonce words that reflect
nothing more than verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that
is tantamount to using the word 'means."' Id.; see also Reply Br. 2
( asserting the same).
Claim 10 recites several instances of "logic that" defines, identifies,
associates, and assigns various elements of data. We determine the scope of
the claims in patent applications "not solely on the basis of the claim
language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction 'in
light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art."' Phillips v. AWHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
bane) (quoting In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
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In support of claim 10, the Appellants direct us to paragraphs 7, 11,
and 12 of the Specification. Appeal Br. 3--4. Paragraph 7 describes
components in Figure 1, which include computer system 101, storage
device 105, application program 119, performance management module 111,
data 113, and policies 117. Spec. ,r 7. Paragraph 11 describes Figure 4,
which is a flow chart for performance management module 111, describing
the high-level functions of steps 401, 403, 405, 407, and 409. Id. f 11.
Paragraph 12 describes the high-level functions of steps 411, 413, and 415.
Id. ,r 12. The term "logic" does not appear in these cited paragraphs, or any
other in the Specification. The Specification describes that "the apparatus
that embodies a part or all of the present invention may be a general purpose
device having software arranged to provide a part or all of an embodiment of
the invention." Id. ,r 18. However, taking "logic" that identifies a first
"activity implementation" as an example, the Specification describes only
that "the relevant activity implementation 119 [is] identified." Id. ,II I.
Construing the term "logic" in light of the Specification, because no
description is presented of the specific logic that performs the functions, and
because the Specification comprises only description of software modules
that are programmed to perform various functions, we construe the "logic"
of claim 10 to be software logic that performs the recited functions. In other
words we, thus, construe "logic" as a nonce word under Williamson v. Citrix
Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015), because there is no sufficient
structure in the claims to define what the logic represents, other than the
functions recited. Williamson states that when a claim uses a term other than
"means," a presumption is created that the claim term does not invoke
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35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. Id. at 1348. That presumption, however,
may be rebutted if "the claim term fails to 'recite sufficiently definite
structure' or else recites 'function without reciting sufficient structure for
performing that function."' Id. at 1349 ( citing Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232
F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). In determining whether the claim term
"module" recited sufficient structure, the Williamson court evaluated
"module" in light of the surrounding claim language, the understanding of
the claim term in the relevant art, and the written description. Id. at 13 50-
51. Accordingly, the Appellants must set forth sufficient facts and analysis
to rebut the presumption that "logic" recites sufficiently definite structure.
However, based on the claims and Specification, the Appellants have failed
to do so. The Examiner's construction of claims 10-12 as means-plus-
functions claims is, therefore, correct.
Because we construe the claimed logic as software, in order for a
disclosure of the logic to be complete, the Specification must describe an
algorithm for each logic component. For computer-implemented means-
plus-function claims where the disclosed structure is a computer
programmed to implement an algorithm, "the disclosed structure is not the
general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer
programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm." WMS Gaming, Inc. v.
Int'! Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Thus, the
Specification must disclose, at least to the satisfaction of one of ordinary
skill in the art, enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure
under§ 112, paragraph 6. The court permits a patentee to express that
algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula,
in prose (see In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245--46 (CCPA 1978)), or as a
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flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure. Finisar
Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Simply reciting software "components," without providing some detail about
the means to accomplish the function, is not enough. See Aristocrat Techs.
Aust!. Pty Ltd. v. Int'! Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("For a patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and
then to disclose only a general purpose computer as the structure designed to
perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Because general
purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in
very different ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated
to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to 'the
corresponding structure, material, or acts' that perform the function, as
required by section 112 paragraph 6.").
When a Specification discloses no algorithm corresponding to a
computer-enabled means-plus-function limitation in a claim, an applicant
has necessarily failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention as required by the second paragraph of Section 112. See also
Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417
F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[T]he corresponding structure for a§ 112
,r 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in
the specification."); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A] means-plus-function claim element for which
the only disclosed structure is a general purpose computer is invalid if the
specification fails to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed
function."); see also Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding Blackboard's means-plus-function claims
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indefinite because the patent describes an undefined component, i.e., a black
box, that performs the recited function but does not disclose how the
component performs the function); see further Ex parte Catlin, 90 USPQ2d
1603, 1605 (BP AI 2009) (precedential) ( during prosecution, computer-
enabled means-plus-function claims will be held unpatentable under 3 5
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite if a Specification fails to
disclose any algorithm corresponding to the recited function in the claims).
Because the Specification fails to disclose an algorithm for identifying
activity implementations, the Examiner is correct in rejecting claims 10-12
as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. For this reason we
sustain this rejection.
Reiection of Claims 1~12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Even though claims 10-12 essentially recite only software that
performs functions, software itself being fundamentally abstract, because
claims 10-12 are indefinite, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 must fall
because it is necessarily based on a speculative assumption as to the scope of
those claims. In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862---63 (CCPA 1962). Therefore,
on this basis alone, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 10-12 as
directed to abstract ideas under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Reiection of Claims 1~12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Where claims do not particularly point out and distinctly claim the
invention as required by the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, a§ 103
rejection of the claims must be reversed as impermissibly involving
speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims. Steele, 305 F.2d at
862---63. If no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms
in the claim, "the subject matter does not become obvious-the claim
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becomes indefinite." In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970).
Because we sustain the rejection of claims 10-12 as indefinite, we cannot
sustain the rejection of those claims under§ 103(a).
Reiection of Claims 1-9 and 13-19 under 35 U.S. C. § 1 OJ
Principles Of Law
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are
not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct.
2347, 2354 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within the excluded category of
abstract ideas, we are guided in our analysis by the Supreme Court's two-
step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-78 (2012)).
In accordance with that framework, we first determine whether the claim is
"directed to" a patent-ineligible abstract idea. See id. at 2356 ("On their
face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated
settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); Bilski v.
Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners'
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk."); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) ("Analyzing
respondents' claims according to the above statements from our cases, we
think that a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic
rubber products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter."); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)
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("Respondent's application simply provides a new and presumably better
method for calculating alarm limit values."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 64 (1972) ("They claimed a method for converting binary-coded decimal
(BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.").
The following method is then used to determine whether what the
claim is "directed to" is an abstract idea:
[T]he decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine
earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can
be seen-what prior cases were about, and which way they were
decided. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54. That
is the classic common law methodology for creating law when a
single governing definitional context is not available. See
generally Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:
Deciding Appeals (1960). This more flexible approach is also
the approach employed by the Supreme Court. See Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355-57. We shall follow that approach here.
Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
The patent-ineligible end of the spectrum includes fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Flook, 437 U.S. at 594--95); and basic tools of
scientific and technological work (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69). On the patent-
eligible side of the spectrum are physical and chemical processes, such as
curing rubber (Diamond, 450 U.S. at 184 n.7), "tanning, dyeing, making
waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores," and a process for
manufacturing flour (Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69).
If the claim is "directed to" a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we then
consider the elements of the claim-both individually and as an ordered
combination-to assess whether the additional elements transform the nature
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of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. Alice, 134
S. Ct. at 2355. This is a search for an "inventive concept"-an element or
combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to
"significantly more" than the abstract idea itself. Id.
Analysis
The Appellants argue claims 1-9 and 13-19 together as a group.
Appeal Br. 12. We select independent claim 1 as representative. See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner finds claim 1 is directed to "'managing a workflow
process of a plurality of activities.'" Final Act. 7.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument that the Examiner
errs by oversimplifying the claim language and fails to consider it as a
whole. Reply Br. 3; see also Appeal Br. 15. Indeed, the Appellants do not
identify, and we are unable to discern, any step in claim 1 that does not fall
within the scope of managing a workflow process of a plurality of activities.
The Examiner, for example, articulates that:
Managing workflow for a plurality of entities is an abstract
idea that falls under certain method of organizing human
activities. It should be noted that managing workflow has been
in place in the pre-industrial age as a human activity that requires
breaking down a job into tasks, which are then organized and
prioritized to meet deadlines.
Answer 6. Claim 1 recites steps that identify a job ("creating a workflow
definition that defines a sequence of activities"), break the job down into
tasks ("identifying a first [ and second] activity implementation"), and
organize and prioritize tasks ("assigning," "associating ... performance
criteria," and "monitoring"). As nothing in claim 1 falls outside the scope of
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the idea to which the Examiner finds the claim is directed, we, therefore, are
unpersuaded that the Examiner has failed to considered the claim as a whole.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument that the claim is not
abstract because "[ m ]anaging a workflow process is an action performed
using a computer," and that an "activity implementation" is, essentially, a
software routine. Appeal Br. 15; see also id. at 19; Reply Br. 4--5 ("services
are implemented using 'activity implementations,' which are in the form of
sub-process software (see paragraph [0008] of Appellants'
[S ]pecification )").
The Specification describes "storage device 105 also contains a set of
policies 117 and activity implementations 119 in the form of local code, web
service access data and sub-process software." Spec. ,r 7. The Specification
also describes that "[i]n the example of Figure 2, activities 201, 205, 209
each use an activity implementation in the form of sub-process software 213,
215 from the set of activity implementations 119 to provide function such as
data retrieval or delivery." Id. ,r 8. We are unpersuaded, however, that
either of these examples rise to the level of a lexicological definition of the
claim term "activity implementation," because the Specification indicates
the code or software is merely an activity implementation "in the form of'
code or software, indicating that "activity implementation" is broader than
both.
The claim, thus, does not require that "activity implementation" is
software and, therefore, the claim is directed to managing workflow
generally. We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that, other than the
claimed "processor" and preamble indication that the method is "computer-
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implemented," "[m]anaging a workflow process can be performed in the
human mind as well as using pen and paper." Answer 6.
We also are not persuaded by the Appellants' argument that the claim
does not "tie-up" or pre-empt the abstract idea. Appeal Br. 15-16. "While
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The Appellants have, thus, failed to persuade us that claim 1 is not an
abstract idea, as asserted by the Examiner. We, therefore, tum to the second
step and look to the claim for "significantly more," or an "inventive
concept."
Here, the Appellants first assert the Examiner has only considered
whether the claimed "processor" is "significantly more," and has not
identified "additional elements" in the claim that transform the abstract idea
into eligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 17. However, the Appellants do not
indicate, and we are unable to discern, any step of the process which offers
"significantly more," because every step we've considered so far is merely
part of managing a workflow process, as asserted by the Examiner.
The closest is the final recited limitation of claim 1, which is "upon
said first activity implementation failing to meet one or more of said
performance criteria, assigning, using the processor, said second activity
implementation to said first activity in place of said first activity
implementation." This limitation, however, is performed only upon a
"failing" condition, and, therefore, is a conditional step. Conditional steps
employed in a method claim need not be found in the prior art if, under the
broadest reasonable construction, the method need not invoke the steps. Ex
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parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792, at *3-6 (PTAB
April 28, 2016) ( concluding the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim
encompassed situations in which conditional method steps "need not be
reached") (precedential). This step, therefore, is, in the broadest
construction of the claim, not a required step, and we are unpersuaded that a
non-required step transforms the abstract idea into eligible subject matter.
The Appellants further argue the claims "improve the operation of a
computer." Appeal Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 5 ("the operation of the data
processing system in performing a workflow process is improved by
ensuring that certain performance criteria is being met").
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' arguments, because the claim,
though perhaps intended to be directed to improving computer operations, is
broadly construed as encompassing the purely manual management of
workflow processes, which need not be implemented on a computer. In
addition, a computer operating the claimed method, does not improve its
computer operations by performing these tasks, because the computer
remains a general purpose computer. See Spec. ,r 18.
For these reasons, the Appellants have failed to persuade us of error in
the Examiner's finding that the claims are directed to abstract ideas.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-9 and 13-19 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to ineligible subject matter.
Reiection of Claims 13-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 1 OJ
The Examiner rejected the medium claims under § 101 because "the
[S]pecification does not disavow a signal or carrier wave as a possible
interpretation of a computer readable medium." Final Act. 8-9; see also
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Answer 22-23 ("the [claim] amendments are insufficient to overcome the
previously made rejection").
The Appellants argue that, based on the amendments to independent
medium claims 13 and 19, which recite that "'the computer usable storage
device is not a transitory, propagating signal per se, '" the result is that "a
transitory, propagating signal per se is expressly excluded from the scope"
of the claims. Appeal Br. 23.
Because the Examiner has failed to explain why this unambiguous
claim language is "insufficient to overcome the previously made rejection,"
and because the claim cannot encompass transitory signals, we do not
sustain the rejection of claims 13-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on the basis of
signals.
Re;ection of Claims 1-9 and 13-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
The Appellants argue claims 1-9 and 13-19 together as a group.
Appeal Br. 24. We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claim 1 recites "creating a workflow definition that defines a
sequence of activities which comprise a workflow process," and "identifying
a first activity implementation for providing services to one or more of said
activities." Thus, services are provided to activities that in a sequence make
up a workflow process that is defined in a workflow definition.
The Appellants assert "the Examiner is alleging that the claimed
'workflow process' is identically disclosed by the 'service request' of
Willcox," then argue "the Examiner's analysis fails to specifically identify,
within Willcox, (i) the alleged 'workflow definition." Appeal Br. 24--25.
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We are not persuaded by the Appellants' argument. The Examiner
finds "the 'service request' in Willcox read[s] on the 'workflow process' in
the claim." Final Act. 12. The Examiner further finds "Willcox shows a
service request is a distributed thread that can spawn several threads and
transaction legs." Id. Willcox discloses:
A thread is the name given to a path taken by a command
as it traverses the system, and a distributed thread is formed when
the command sender is on a different node in a network than a
command receiver. A service request is a distributed thread that
can spawn several threads and transaction legs. A "transaction
leg" is a command issued from the business rules to an adapter
via the workflow engine in order to execute a component of a
service request.
Willcox ,r 41. Therefore, the service request corresponds with the claimed
workflow process, the distributed thread corresponds to the claimed
activities, and the transaction legs correspond to the claimed activity
implementations.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument that the Examiner
fails to identify where in Willcox the workflow definition is created. Appeal
Br. 24--25. We are persuaded that the ordinary artisan would have
recognized that Willcox's business rules are established by the business to
define the steps required to perform various service requests to establish
service for customers. For example, Willcox discloses "the business rule
manager 101 runs on a separate virtual machine from that on which the
workflow engine 100 runs. This separation permits the business rules to be
changed dynamically, i.e., without shutting down the workflow engine."
Willcox ,r 3 6. Therefore, the rules are defined by the people operating the
system.
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We are further unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument that the
Examiner fails to identify in Willcox "how this workflow definition defines
the transaction legs (i.e., the alleged sequence of activities)." Appeal
Br. 24--26. Willcox discloses "[a] service request is a distributed thread that
can spawn several threads and transaction legs. A 'transaction leg' is a
command issued from the business rules to an adapter via the workflow
engine in order to execute a component of a service request." Willcox ,r 41.
The "threads" in Willcox, thus, correspond to the series of activities that are
performed as part of handling a service request.
Claim 1 recites "identifying a first activity implementation for
providing services to one or more of said activities." The Appellants argue
the Examiner has failed to identify "the feature within Wilcox that allegedly
corresponds to the claimed 'services"' that are provided to the claimed
activities. Appeal Br. 27. The services are the transaction legs in Willcox
that perform services as part of the threads. See Willcox ,r 41.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellants' argument that the positive and
negative "votes" in Willcox fail to teach the claimed performance criteria.
Appeal Br. 29-30. The Examiner instead relies on "the association of
'normal' and 'exception' returns from the adapter are the results of applying
performance criteria for the performance of said first activity
implementation." Final Act. 14--15. We agree with the Examiner that
whether a task completes normally, or with an exception, is a type of
performance criteria against which the task is compared, as claimed.
The Appellants argue "the Examiner's analysis fails to tie the asserted
'second activity implementation' allegedly described in paragraph [0066]
with the teachings of paragraph [0078]." Appeal Br. 39. We interpret this
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argument to assert that the Examiner has not identified the "second activity
implementation." The Examiner identified the second activity
implementation as a second command that is executed. Final Act. 15-16
( citing Willcox ,r,r 14, 66). Willcox explains that the second command is
executed as part of recovery from an error. Willcox ,r 65.
We have considered the remainder of the Appellants' arguments
throughout pages 24--40 of the Appeal Brief, and pages 9-14 of the Reply
Brief, but determine that they are unpersuasive based on the analysis set
forth above.
For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-9 and 13-19 as
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 10-12 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite.
We REVERSE proforma the rejection of claims 10-12 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We REVERSE proforma the rejection of claims 10-12 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1-9 and 13-19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to abstract ideas.
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 13-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to transitory signals.
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1-9 and 13-19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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