Ex Parte Blanchflower et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 28, 2019

14782743 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 28, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/782,743 10/06/2015
146568 7590
ENTIT SOFTWARE LLC
500 Westover Drive
#12603
Sanford, NC 27330
07/02/2019
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Sean Blanchflower
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90063361 7090
EXAMINER
KIM, JONATHAN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2659
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
software.ip.mail@microfocus.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SEAN BLANCHFLOWER and DANIEL TIMMS
Appeal2018-008294
Application 14/782,743
Technology Center 2600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY HUME, and
PHILLIP BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16-18, and 21-25, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 6, 8, 11, 15, 19,
and 20 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is EntIT Software LLC.
App. Br. 1.
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Application 14/782,743
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Disclosed embodiments of Appellants' invention relate to "improving
the accuracy of rules-based sentiment analysis systems by providing for
useful and detailed feedback about the sentiment results." Spec. ,r 10.
Illustrative Claim
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
determining, by a system comprising a physical
processor, a ruleset comprising a set of rules that are applied to
a document,
generating, by the system, a proposed sentiment result
associated with the document based on the ruleset, the proposed
sentiment result generated using a triggered first rule of the
ruleset;
causing, by the system, display of the proposed sentiment
result and the triggered first rule of the ruleset;
receiving, by the system, feedback about the proposed
sentiment result based on the displayed proposed sentiment
result and the displayed triggered first rule, the feedback
including an actual sentiment associated with the document and
a feature of the document that is indicative of the actual
sentiment, the feature included in the feedback being from a
first section of a plurality of sections of the document;
identifying, by the system, a proposed modification to the
triggered first rule of the ruleset based on the feedback;
2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Dec. 14, 2017 ("Final
Act."); Appeal Brief, filed May 3, 2018 ("App. Br."); Examiner's Answer,
mailed June 29, 2018 ("Ans."); and the Reply Brief, filed Aug. 22, 2018
("Reply Br.").
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modifying, by the system, the ruleset according to the
proposed modification, wherein modifying the ruleset
comprises applying a greater weight to terms in the first section
than terms in another section of the plurality of sections in
response to the feature included in the feedback;
and
generating, by the system, a sentiment result for a further
document using the modified ruleset, and updating metadata of
the further document to indicate the sentiment result for the
further document.
App. Br. Claims Appendix.
Rejection
Claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16-18, and 21-25 are rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception, without
significantly more. Final Act. 6.
Issue on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16-18,
and 21-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception,
without significantly more?
ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellants' arguments and any evidence
presented. To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
We have reviewed Appellants' arguments in the Briefs, the
Examiner's rejections, and the Examiner's responses to Appellants'
arguments. For at least the reasons discussed below, we are not persuaded
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the Examiner erred. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific
findings and arguments for emphasis.
Principles of Law-35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[L Jaws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk." (emphasis omitted)); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 );
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
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determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding of rubber products" (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193); "tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores"
(id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267---68
(1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane
v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We
view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
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ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id.
Subject Matter Eligibility- 2019 Revised Guidance
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
35 U.S.C. § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 Revised Guidance"). This
new guidance is applied in this opinion. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance,
we first look to whether the claim recites:
( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes,
or certain methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure ("MPEP") §§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). 3
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52, 55.
A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application
applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so
3 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 08-201 7
(rev. Jan. 2018).
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integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent
eligible under § 101. Id.
Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. See 2019 Revised
Guidance at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18.
For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional"
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Because there is no single definition of an "abstract idea" under Alice
step 1, the PTO has recently synthesized, for purposes of clarity,
predictability, and consistency, key concepts identified by the courts as
abstract ideas to explain that the "abstract idea" exception includes the
following three groupings:
1. Mathematical concepts-mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical
calculations;
2. Mental processes-concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion);
and
3. Certain methods of organizing human activity-fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior
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or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
According to the 2019 Revised Guidance, "[ c ]laims that do not recite
[subject] matter that falls within these enumerated groupings of abstract
ideas should not be treated as reciting abstract ideas," except in rare
circumstances. Even if the claims recite any one of these three groupings of
abstract ideas, these claims are still not "directed to" a judicial exception
( abstract idea), and thus are patent eligible, if "the claim as a whole
integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that
exception." See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
For example, limitations that are indicative of "integration into a
practical application" include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any
other technology or technical field - see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a
particular machine - see MPEP § 2106.05(b );
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular
article to a different state or thing - see MPEP
§ 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological
environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception-
see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of "integration into a
practical application" include:
1. Adding the words "apply it" ( or an equivalent) with the
judicial exception, or merely include instructions to
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implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses
a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea - see
MPEP § 2106.05(±);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception - see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use - see
MPEP 2106.05(h).
See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55 ("Prong Two").
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One 4
The Judicial Exception
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, we begin our analysis by first
considering whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas, in particular: (a) mathematical concepts,
(b) mental steps, and ( c) certain methods of organizing human activities.
Turning to independent claim 1, we observe the claim recites:
"determining ... a ruleset comprising a set of rules that are applied to a
document; ... identifying ... a proposed modification to the triggered first
rule of the ruleset based on the feedback; [and] modifying . .. the ruleset
according to the proposed modification .... " ( emphasis added).
Thus, we conclude these limitations of claim 1 recite an abstract idea,
i.e., mental processes, which could be performed alternatively in the human
4 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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mind, or with the aid of pen and paper. 5 See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52.
Moreover, we conclude the "determining," "identifying," and
"modifying," steps of claim 1 recite modifying rules for document
classification according to user-sentiment feedback. Claim 1. We note the
"sentiment" recited in claim 1 is also an abstract idea because sentiment
refers to a mental state." 6
Thus, we conclude the recited steps of "determining" a rule set,
"identifying" a proposed modification of a triggered rule, and "modifying"
the rule set are steps that can be performed in the human mind. Claim 1.
The intended purpose appears to be a tool for organizations that desire to
understand how individuals or groups regard the organization or its
offerings. See e.g., Spec. ,r 2.
5 If a method can be performed by human thought alone, or by a human
using pen and paper, it is merely an abstract idea and is not patent eligible
under§ 101. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011); "That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson." Cy her Source, 654
F.3d at 1375. See also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d
1138, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6 Merely combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination
any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea
... does not render the claim non-abstract."); see also FairWarning IP, LLC
v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining
the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
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Thus, we conclude the aforementioned limitations of claim 1 recite an
abstract idea-mental processes, i.e., concepts performed in the human
mind. Claim 1.
We note the exceptions are the additional limitations of generic
computer elements: "physical processor" ( claims 1, 10 and 22) and "storage
medium" (claims 10 and 22). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
52. We note McRo, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. (837 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), guides: "[t]he abstract idea exception prevents
patenting a result where 'it matters not by what process or machinery the
result is accomplished.'" 83 7 F .3 d at 1312 ( quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 5 6
U.S. 62, 113 (1854)) (emphasis added).
We conclude claim 1 's recited steps of:
generating, by the system, a proposed sentiment result
associated with the document based on the ruleset, the proposed
sentiment result generated using a triggered first rule of the
ruleset;
causing, by the system, display of the proposed sentiment
result and the triggered first rule of the ruleset;
receiving, by the system, feedback about the proposed
sentiment result based on the displayed proposed sentiment
result and the displayed triggered first rule, the feedback
including an actual sentiment associated with the document and
a feature of the document that is indicative of the actual
sentiment, the feature included in the feedback being from a
first section of a plurality of sections of the document;
generating, by the system, a sentiment result for a further
document using the modified ruleset, and updating metadata of
the further document to indicate the sentiment result for the
further document;
are insignificant extra-solution activity. ( emphasis added). Courts have
found data gathering steps to be insignificant extra-solution activity. See,
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e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane), ajfd sub nom
Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
We also note remaining independent claims 10 and 22 recite similar
language of commensurate scope that we conclude also falls into the abstract
idea category of mental processes.
Because we conclude all claims on appeal recite an abstract idea, as
identified above, under Step 2A, Prong One, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong
Two.
2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance, we consider whether there
are additional elements set forth in the claims that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54--55. We have identified supra the additional non-abstract
elements recited in independent claim 1 as the generic "physical processor."
Under MPEP § 2106.05(a) ("Improvements to the Functioning of a
Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field"), Appellants
contend the claims amount to significantly more than an abstract idea:
"[T]he present application is directed to improving the relevant technology
of generating a sentiment result for a document and updating metadata of the
document to indicate the sentiment result, and thus includes significantly
more." App. Br. 16.
Appellants contend "[t]he claim at issue in McRO is analogous to
claim 1 of the present application." App. Br. 8. Appellants argue, "In both
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McRO and claim 1 of the present application, specific rules are applied to
produce a useful result that improves the relevant technology." App. Br. 9.
Appellants' argument based on McRO is unpersuasive because
Appellants' claim 1 is unlike the subject claim considered by the court in
McRO. The patent at issue in McRO describes that, prior to the claimed
invention, character animation and lip synchronization were accomplished
by human animators, with the assistance of a computer, and involved the use
of a so-called "keyframe" approach in which animators set appropriate
parameters, i.e., morph weights, at certain important times, i.e., in order to
produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions.
McRO, 837 F.3d. at 1305. Animators knew what phoneme a character
pronounced at a given time from a time-aligned phonetic transcription ( a
"timed transcript"). Id. In accordance with the prior technique, animators,
using a computer, thus, manually determined the appropriate morph weight
sets for each keyframe based on the phoneme timings in the timed transcript.
Id.
See also SAP Am. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir.
2018) ( distinguishing McRO):
The claims in McRO were directed to the creation of something
physical-namely, the display of "lip synchronization and
facial expressions" of animated characters on screens for
viewing by human eyes. Id. at 1313. The claimed improvement
was to how the physical display operated (to produce better
quality images), unlike ( what is present here) a claimed
improvement in a mathematical technique with no improved
display mechanism. The claims in McRO thus were not abstract
in the sense that is dispositive here. And those claims also
avoided being "abstract" in another sense reflected repeatedly
in our cases (based on a contrast not with "physical" but with
"concrete"): they had the specificity required to transform a
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claim from one claiming only a result to one claiming a way of
achieving it.
SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis added).
In contrast to the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely uses generic computing components to perform the
recited functions. Appellants' claims do not improve a physical display as
was the case in McRO. See SAP, 898 F .3d at 1167. Moreover, Appellants'
generic computer implementation performs steps that can be performed
alternatively as mental processes, as discussed above.
Appellants' claim 1 broadly recites generating sentiment results
associated with a document based on a ruleset and modifying the ruleset
based on feedback on sentiments associated with the document. We,
therefore, are not persuaded that Appellants' claim 1 is similar to the subject
claim in A1cRO, in which computers were used to make certain subjective
determinations, i.e., regarding morph weight and phoneme timings, that
could only be made prior to the J\1cRO invention by human animators.
In addition, because a particular computer is not required, the claim
also does not define or rely on a "particular machine." See MPEP § 2106.05
(b ). Further, the method does not transform physical subject matter; at best
it transforms information. See MPEP § 2106.05 ( c ); see Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding that a computer based
algorithm that merely transforms data from one form to another is not
patent-eligible).
Appellants' claims simply manipulate and output data. As such, the
claim has no other meaningful limitations (see MPEP § 2106.05 (e)), and
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merely recites instructions to execute the abstract idea on a computer
processor (see MPEP § 2106.05([)).
Nor do the claims present any other issues as set forth in the 2019
Revised Guidance regarding a determination of whether the additional
generic elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, we conclude the claims
on appeal merely use instructions to implement an abstract idea on a
computer, or merely use a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea. Id.
Thus, under Step 2A, Prong Two (MPEP §§ 2106.05(a}-(c) and (e}-
(h)), we conclude claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16-18, and 21-25 do not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Therefore,
we proceed to Step 2B, The Inventive Concept.
The Inventive Concept - Step 2B
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance, only if a claim: ( 1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine,
conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
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Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
We note Berkheimer was decided by the Federal Circuit on
February 8, 2018. On April 19, 2018, the PTO issued the Memorandum
titled: "Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)" (hereinafter "Berkheimer Memorandum"). 7 The Examiner's Answer
was mailed on June 29, 2018, and Appellants filed a Reply Brief on
August 22, 2018, more than six months after Berkheimer was decided.
The Berkheimer Memorandum provided specific requirements for an
Examiner to support with evidence any finding that claim elements ( or a
combination of elements) are well-understood, routine, or conventional. In
reviewing the Reply Brief, we note Appellants advance no arguments based
upon the change in the law effected by Berkheimer. Arguments not made
are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Further, regarding the use of the generic (known, conventional)
recited "physical processor" ( claim 1 ), the Supreme Court has held "the
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Alice, 573 U.S. 208, 223.
Our reviewing court provides additional guidance, including in
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir.
2016) ("the use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user
interface do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-
eligible subject matter"), and OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
7 Available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-
berkheimer-20180419 .PDF.
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1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (claims reciting, inter alia, sending messages
over a network, gathering statistics, using a computerized system to
automatically determine an estimated outcome, and presenting offers to
potential customers found to merely recite "'well-understood, routine
conventional acti vit[ ies]"' by either requiring conventional computer
activities or routine data-gathering steps (alteration in original, internal
citation omitted)).
This guidance is applicable here. Therefore, we agree with the
Examiner that, without more, "These additional elements are generic
computer components performing generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities amount to no more than
implementing the abstract idea with a computerized system." Final Act. 9.
Accordingly, on the record before us, we are not persuaded that any of
Appellants' claims on appeal add a specific limitation, beyond the judicial
exception, that is more than what was "well-understood, routine, and
conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the 2019 Revised
Guidance, that each of Appellants' claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16-18, and
21-25, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract
idea that is not integrated into a practical application and does not include
an inventive concept. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we
sustain the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of all claims 1-5, 7,
9, 10, 12-14, 16-18, and 21-25 on appeal. 8
8 To the extent that Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive
arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-5, 7, 9, 10,
12-14, 16-18, and 21-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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