Ex Parte Biundo

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 18, 2009

10341512 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 18, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
_____________

Ex parte MARC C. BIUNDO
_____________

Appeal 2009-0034871
Application 10/341,512
Technology Center 2600
______________

Decided: August 18, 2009
_______________

Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, JOHN C. MARTIN, and
JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, Administrative Patent Judges.

MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The real party in interest is Hewlett-Packard Development Company.
Br. 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-6, 8-12, 14, 15, and 17-29 in the March 29, 2007,
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Office action (“Office Action”). Claims 7 and 16 stand objected to for
depending on rejected claims.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

A. Appellant’s invention
Appellant’s invention relates to “cellular phone printing, and more
particularly, configuring cellular phones to print electronic mail (e-mail)
messages and e-mail attachments.” Specification 1:5-7.
Appellant’s Figure 1 is reproduced below.

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Figure 1 shows an exemplary environment 100 for cellular phones to
receive e-mail messages and attachments, and to send e-mail messages. Id.
at 3:12-13.
The Specification explains:
In an example operating scenario, cellular phone 105
receives an indication from WAP gateway computer 120 that e-
mail messages and attachments have been sent to SMTP server
135. Cellular phone 105 does not receive the actual e-mail
messages and attachments, but keeps the e-mail messages and
attachments stored in SMTP server 135, until cellular phone
105 instructs SMTP server to perform an action such as
printing, forwarding, and/or deleting the e-mail messages and
attachments.
Id. at 5:19-25.

B. The claims
The independent claims before us are claims 1, 9, 12, 20, 23, 24, and
29, of which claim 1 reads:
1. A cellular phone comprising:
a transceiver to receive an indication that an e-mail
message is available, wherein the indication does not include
the e-mail message;
a memory storing printer configuration information of a
printer capable of printing the e-mail message and e-mail
configuration settings; and
a processor coupled to the memory to configure the
cellular phone to direct printing of the e-mail message to the
printer without the e-mail message being sent to the cellular
phone.
Claims App., Br. 45.

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C. The references and rejections
The Examiner relies on the following references:
Quinn US 5,944,786 Aug. 31, 1999
Winbladh US 6,205,330 B1 Mar. 20, 2001
Richards et al. (Richards) US 2001/0016823 A1 Aug. 23, 2001
Asthana et al. (Asthana) US 2004/0185877 A1 Sep. 23, 2004

Claims 1-3, 5, 8, and 20-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
for obviousness over Asthana in view of Quinn.
Claims 4, 6, 9-12, 14, 15, 17-19, and 23-29 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Asthana in view of Quinn and
Winbladh.
In discussing the rejection of some claims, the Examiner relies on
Official Notice and additionally relies on Richards, cited by the Examiner in
response to Appellant’s request for documentary evidence supporting the
taking of Official Notice.

THE ISSUES
Appellants have the burden on appeal to show reversible error by the
Examiner in maintaining the rejection. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-
86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a
rejection by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness or by
rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of
nonobviousness.”) (citation omitted).
The issues before us are whether Appellant has shown that the
Examiner erred in:
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(1) Reading the recited “e-mail message” on Asthana’s attachment
200B and the recited “indication” on datagram 200A;
(2) Finding that Asthana discloses or suggests one or more
“dedicated” memories for storing printer and e-mail configurations; and
(3) Finding that Asthana discloses or suggests (in view of Officially
Noticed subject matter) a cellular phone that uses a “short message service”
to receive printer and e-mail configuration settings.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
1. Claim interpretation
Application claims are interpreted as broadly as is reasonable and
consistent with the specification, In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2002), while “taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant's specification,” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and without reading limitations from examples given
in the specification into the claims, In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
As explained in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (en banc), “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as
to the meaning of particular claim terms.”

2. Obviousness
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“[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or
on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In
re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (quoting KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U. S. 398, 416 (2007)).
Discussing the obviousness of claimed combinations of elements of prior art,
KSR explains:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida [v. AG
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)] and Anderson's-Black Rock[,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)] are
illustrative—a court must ask whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
KSR, 50 U.S. at 417. If the claimed subject matter “involve[s] more than the
simple substitution of one known element for another or the mere
application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the
improvement,” id.,
it will be necessary . . . to look to interrelated teachings of
multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the
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art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed
by the patent at issue.
Id. at 418. “To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit.” Id.
That is, “there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. (quoting
Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988).
“[T]he [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Furthermore, in
judging obviousness
it will be necessary . . . to look to interrelated teachings of
multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the
art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent
reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed
by the patent at issue.
Id. at 418 (emphasis added).

THE REJECTION BASED ON ASTHANA IN VIEW OF QUINN
Claims 1-3, 5, and 8
Asthana discloses a system and method of pushing user-selected data
items from a host system to a user’s mobile data communication device upon
detecting the occurrence of one or more user-defined event triggers.
Asthana at ¶ 0013.
Figure 6 of Asthana, on which the rejection is based, is reproduced
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below.

Figure 6 sets forth a system for redirecting messages having
attachments between a host system and a mobile device. Id. at ¶ 0029.
This system preferably includes a desktop system 214A, which is
associated with a mobile data communication device 214B, a host system
402, a relay system 410, and a plurality of attachment displayers 416. Id. at
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¶ 0092. A datagram2 with an attached file (collectively designated 200) is
sent to the host system 202. Id. at ¶ 0095. The datagram component 202A
of the host system recognizes the recipient address in the datagram 200 and
subsequently forwards the datagram 200 on to the desktop system 214A. Id.
The redirector component 202B of the host system 202 sends the datagram
200A, stripped of the attachment 200B, through the host firewall 206 to the
relay 210 and then on to the mobile device 214B via the Internet 208 and the
wireless network 212. Id. The datagram 200A contains the original message
and also contains information about the attachment 200B, such as the file
name, size, and file type. Id.
After the datagram 200A (minus the attachment 200B) is received at
the mobile device 214B, the mobile device 214B will receive a command
either from the host system 202 or from the user of the mobile device to find
an attachment displayer 216 (such as a printer3) within its vicinity to process
the attachment 200B. Id. at ¶ 0096. Alternatively, the mobile device 214B
or user may automatically attempt to find an attachment displayer when the
datagram 200A is received. Id.
The Examiner reads the recited “e-mail message” on attachment 200B
and the recited “indication” on datagram 200A. Office Action 4. The
Examiner’s reason for reading the claim term “e-mail message” on
attachment 200B is that the attachment “can be fairly characterized as the e-

2 Asthana explains that “the terms ‘information,’ ‘data items, ‘messages,’
and ‘datagrams’ are used interchangeably to mean an information object that
is received at or sent from the host system or the mobile device.” Id. at
¶ 0014.
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mail message or is an obvious expedient thereof since e-mail messages may
include only attachments.” Office Action 4. Appellant (Br. 12-13)
responded by arguing that “e-mail attachments” are “clearly distinct” from
“e-mail messages,” quoting the following discussion of e-mail messages and
e-mail attachments in the Specification:
E-mail messages can range from short one or two
sentence text messages to long and sometimes complicated
document-like messages. In certain cases, graphics may be
included in an e-mail message. A cellular phone receiving an
e-mail message is usually able to only process the text of the e-
mail message. The relatively small display screen size limits
the ability of a user to read relatively long e-mail messages.
E-mail attachments are files that are included with e-mail
messages. E-mail attachment files can only be opened by
specific application programs that are resident on the receiving
device. Typically, receiving devices of e-mail attachments are
personal computers (PC) in the form of desktops and laptops,
and computer workstations. PCs and workstations have the
requisite storage resources to host application programs, the
requisite processing capability to open and manipulate e-mail
attachments, and sufficient power or battery capacity to
effectively run the application programs.
Specification 1:18 to 2:4. In addition, Appellant (Br. 13) notes the repeated
references throughout the Specification to both “e-mail messages” and “e-
mail attachments.” We assume Appellant is referring, for example, to the
repeated use of the phrase “e-mail messages and attachments” in the above-
quoted (supra, p. 3) paragraph from page 5, lines 19-25.4

3 Asthana at ¶ 0095.
4 Appellant’s reliance (Br. 14-15) on the distinction that Asthana allegedly
makes between e-mail messages and e-mail attachment is misplaced because
the terms employed in Appellants’ claims are to be construed in light of
(Continued on next page.)
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However, as correctly noted by the Examiner (Answer 20), the
relevant portions of the Specification also include claim 8, which recites,
“[t]he cellular phone of claim 1 wherein the e-mail message comprises an e-
mail attachment, the e-mail attachment being sent to the printer for printing”
(emphasis added). Similar language appears in claims 14 and 19. We
understand the Examiner’s position to be that this claim language
demonstrates that the term “e-mail message,” as used in the claims, can be
read on an e-mail attachment. This position finds support in Phillips, which
explains that “the claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the
meaning of particular claim terms.” 415 F.3d at 1314, Appellant, who did
not file a reply brief, has not addressed the Examiner’s position that claim 8
supports the Examiner’s conclusion that the claim term “e-mail message” is
broad enough to read on Asthana’s e-mail attachment 200B.
Turning now to the recited “indication” received by the transceiver,
which indication the Examiner reads on Asthana’s datagram 200A, claim 1
specifies that the “indication does not include the e-mail message” and that
the “email message” is sent to the printer “without the e-mail message being
sent to the cellular phone.” The Examiner has taken two different positions
regarding these limitations. Initially, the Examiner found that “Asthana fails
to specifically disclose wherein the indication does not include the e-mail
message; and without the e-mail message being sent to the cellular phone”
(Final Action 5) and relied on Quinn for such teachings. Id. In the Answer,
however, the Examiner changed positions and found that Asthana’s

Appellant’s application disclosure.
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datagram 200A does satisfy these limitations when the recited “e-mail
message” is read on attachment 200B. See Answer 21 (“Since the
attachment 200B of Asthana can be fairly characterized as the claimed e-
mail message or is, at the least, an obvious expedient thereof, and since
datagram 200A is fairly characterized as the indication, such indication does
not include the e-mail message as claimed.”). Appellant has not addressed
this changed position of the Examiner, let alone demonstrated that it is
erroneous. Nor for the reasons given above, has Appellant demonstrated
error in its underlying premise that attachment 200B is an “e-mail message.”
Because Appellant has failed to show that the Examiner erred in
reading the recited “indication [that] does not include the e-mail message”
on datagram 200A, it is not necessary to address Appellant’s arguments
against the Examiner’s alternative reliance on Quinn for such a teaching.
For the foregoing reasons, the rejection of claim 1 is affirmed, as is
the rejection of dependent claims 2, 3, 5, and 8, which are not separately
argued.
Claims 20 and 21
Claim 20, in addition to including limitations like those recited in
claim 1, recites “means for configuring dedicated memory on the cellular
phone to print to a printer” and “means for configuring dedicated memory on
the cellular phone for e-mail” (emphasis added):
20. A processor in a cellular phone comprising:
means for receiving an indication of an e-mail message,
wherein the indication does not include the e-mail message,
wherein the e-mail message is stored on a server without being
sent to the cellular phone;
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means for configuring dedicated memory on the cellular
phone to print to a printer;
means for configuring dedicated memory on the cellular
phone for e-mail; and
means for directing the e-mail message to be printed on
the printer without the e-mail message being sent to the cellular
phone.
Claims App., Br. 48 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s arguments regarding the limitations that are common to
claim 1 are unpersuasive for the reasons given above.
The Examiner appears to agree with Appellant that “dedicated” as used
in the claims should be interpreted to mean “given over to a particular
purpose.”5 However, the Examiner, after concluding that “‘[given] over to a
particular purpose’ does not make any structural difference to the memory”
(Answer 37), reads each recited “dedicated memory” on the “internal data
store” described in paragraph 0173 of Asthana, which Asthana describes as
“stor[ing] the routing address and any other information required to use a
particular printer or service.” Specifically, the Examiner found that
the internal data store (memory) is given the particular purpose
(dedicated) to store the routing address and any other information
required to use a particular printer (printer and e-mail
configurations), such as information pertaining to their location
(printer configuration), electronic address (e-mail configuration),
and the type of attachments they can handle (printer
configuration) (all of which are routing address and any other
information required to use the particular printer).
Id. at 38. Appellant, on the other hand, interprets “dedicated” as requiring “a

5 Appellants (Br. 25) cite “http://www.m- w.com/dictionary/dedicate,” which
is the web site for the Merriam-Webster on-line Dictionary.
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particular memory location . . . for storing parameters describing a particular
printer” and “a particular memory location . . . for storing parameters
describing a particular mail server from which e-mail messages are received”
(Br. 26) and argues that
although Asthana et al. offers an example at paragraph [0173] that
involves “stor[ing] the routing address and any other information
required to use a particular printer or service in an internal data
store,” Asthana et al. provides no teaching or suggestion that such
an internal data store or the aforementioned flash memory and
RAM are dedicated memory for storing “the routing address and
any other information required to use a particular printer or
service.[”]
Id. at 26.
Although we agree with Appellant that the term “dedicated memory”
means a memory or memory area that is set aside for storing a specific type of
information, we do not agree that claim 20 requires two separate dedicated
memories for storing printer parameters and e-mail parameters, respectively.
That claim is broad enough to read on single dedicated memory for storing
both types of parameters.6 Furthermore, although Appellant is correct to argue
that Asthana does not indicate that the internal data store is a dedicated
memory, we conclude it would have been obvious to implement the entire
internal data store, or one or more regions thereof, as a dedicated memory or
memories because the use of dedicated memories and memory regions for
storing respective types of information was well known in the art as of
Appellant’s filing date. As explained in KSR, a judgment on the issue of
obviousness must take into account “the background knowledge possessed by

6 However, dependent claim 22, addressed infra, recites plural “dedicated
memories.”
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a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 550 U.S. at 418. We note that
Appellant does not argue that the task of configuring Asthana’s internal data
store so as to include one or more dedicated storage areas for e-mail and printer
data would have been uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary
skill in the art. See Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162 (“Leapfrog presents
no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in this type of device was uniquely
challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.”) (citation
omitted)).
The rejection of claim 20 and its dependent claim 21, which is not
separately argued, is affirmed.

Claim 22
Claim 22 depends on claim 20 and specifies that “the means for
configuring dedicated memories comprises receipt of printer and e-mail
configuration settings through a short message service.” Appellant’s
Specification, for example, explains that “[m]essaging center 320 [Fig. 3]
receives and stores messages (e.g., text) that are made available on the cellular
phone network 300” and that “[t]he messages that are sent are particularly
referred to as short message service (SMS) messages.” Specification 8:13-16.
The Examiner reads the recited “receipt of printer and e-mail
configuration settings” on paragraphs 0096, 0111-24, 0173, and 0179 of
Asthana. Office Action 8. Appellant fails to address, let alone point out any
error in, the Examiner’s reliance on these paragraphs for such a teaching.
Regarding the recited “short message service,” the Examiner, citing
paragraph 0009 of Richards, takes Official Notice that “it was notoriously well-
known in the art at the time of invention by applicant that short message
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service is widely available and widely used messaging system service, which is
well known to mobile phone users.” Office Action 3. The cited paragraph in
Richards reads as follows:
[0009] It will also be readily appreciated that the SMS (Short
Message Service) is a widely used service, which is well known
to mobile phone users and which accordingly needs no detailed
description herein.
Appellant’s argument that the above paragraph in Richards constitutes
inadmissible hearsay (Br. 30) is unpersuasive because hearsay evidence is
admissible in ex parte proceedings in the USPTO. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d
1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Regarding the requirement of claim 22 for receiving the printer and e-
mail configuration settings “through a short message service,” the Examiner
found that “Asthana does disclose that, in data communication mode, the
cellular phone receives text messages (page 5, paragraph [0056]), suggesting
short messages, and processing the information.” Office Action 8 (brackets in
original). The cited paragraph reads in pertinent part:
In a data communication mode, a received signal such as a
text message or web page download will be processed by the
communication subsystem 911 and input to the microprocessor
938, which will preferably further process the received signal for
output to the display 922, or alternatively to an auxiliary I/O
device 928.
Asthana at ¶ 0056 (emphasis added). The Examiner further concluded that it
would have been obvious to use a short message service to receive printer and
e-mail configuration settings in Asthana “for the advantages that short message
service is a widely available and widely used messaging system service, which
is well known to mobile phone users.” Office Action 8.
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To the extent Appellant is arguing (Br. 28) that the phrase “text
message” in paragraph 0056 does not refer to a “short message service”
message, we agree, because a short message service is not mentioned anywhere
in Asthana. Nevertheless, and for the following reasons, we are not persuaded
that the Examiner erred in concluding that it would have been obvious to
employ such messages in Asthana. Asthana, in discussing Figure 1, explains
that the mobile communication device 24 can take the form of, for example, “a
cellular telephone with data messaging capabilities.” Asthana at ¶ 0048.
Furthermore, in describing Figure 6, Asthana explains that the wireless
network 212, over which mobile device 214B communicates, “could be any
type of digital or analog wireless communication network, such as a packet
data network, a cellular network, a digital cellular network . . . etc.” Id. at
¶ 0093. When viewed in light of the above passages, we understand the
Examiner’s position to be that it would have been obvious that Asthana’s
mobile communications device, when implemented as “a cellular telephone
with data messaging capabilities” (id. at ¶ 0048), can use a known data
messaging service, such as the short message service, for the purpose of
sending and receiving messages. That position is consistent with basing an
obviousness determination on “the background knowledge possessed by a
person having ordinary skill in the art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Appellant
has not asserted that, let alone explained why, the implementation of Asthana
in that manner would have been uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art. Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162.
We are therefore affirming the rejection of claim 22.

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THE REJECTION BASED ON ASTHANA
IN VIEW OF QUINN AND WINBLADH
Dependent claims 4 and 6
Claim 4 depends on claim 3 and specifies that “the e-mail
configuration settings are sent by a short message service.” Claim 6
depends on claim 5 and specifies that “the printer configuration information is
sent by a short message service.”
For the reasons given above in the discussion of claim 22, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in concluding that these claim limitations
are suggested by Asthana in view of the known short message service. As a
result, it is not necessary to reach the merits of the Examiner’s additional
reliance on Winbladh for a teaching of a short message service in rejecting
claims 4 and 6. However, we note in passing that Appellant’s assertion that
“Winbladh is not properly combinable with Asthana et al. and Quinn” (Br. 36)
lacks a supporting analysis, as does their assertion that “even if they could be
properly combined, no combination of Asthana et al., Quinn and Winbladh
discloses, teaches or suggests each and every element of claims 4 and 6.” Id. at
34.
The rejection of claims 4 and 6 is affirmed.

Claims 9-11
Claim 9 reads as follows:
9. A system comprising:
a cellular phone configurable to receive an indication of an
e-mail message, wherein the indication does not include the e-
mail message;
a server that receives the e-mail message; and
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a network configured to locate the cellular phone and a
printer, wherein the server sends the e-mail message to the printer
for printing as directed by the cellular phone without the e-mail
message being sent to the cellular phone, and wherein the cellular
phone is configured through a short message service to direct the
server to send the e-mail message to the printer for printing.
Appellant’s assertion that “Winbladh does not disclose, teach or suggest
‘receiv[ing] an indication of an e-mail message, wherein the indication does not
include the e-mail message,’ or ‘send[ing] the e-mail message to the printer for
printing as directed by the cellular phone without the e-mail message being
sent to the cellular phone’” (Br. 36) is not responsive to the rejection, which as
noted above and as pointed out by the Examiner does not rely on Winbladh for
these limitations. See Answer 63 (“Winbladh was solely used for the teaching
of a cellular phone configured through a short message service.”).
The Examiner reads the “server” limitations on paragraphs 0096 and
0099 of Asthana (Office Action 10) and also on paragraphs 0191 and 0194
thereof. Answer 62. Appellant’s argument that the server in Winbladh fails
to satisfy the recited “server” limitations is unpersuasive because the Examiner
does not rely on Winbladh for the server limitations. See Answer 63
(“Winbladh was solely used for the teaching of a cellular phone configured
through a short message service.”).
Appellant’s above-quoted assertion that “Winbladh is not properly
combinable with Asthana et al. and Quinn” (Br. 36) and the assertion that
“even if they could be properly combined, no combination of Asthana et al.,
Quinn and Winbladh discloses, teaches or suggests each and every element of
claims 9-11” (id. at 37) are unconvincing because they lack supporting
analyses.
The rejection of claim 9 and its dependent claims 10 and 11, which are
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not separately argued, is affirmed.

Claims 12, 14, 15, 17-19, and 25-28
Claim 12 reads as follows:
12. A method comprising:
storing an e-mail message at a server without sending the
e-mail message to a cellular phone;
receiving an indication of the e-mail message at the
cellular phone, wherein the indication does not include the e-
mail message;
configuring the cellular phone through a short message
service to send print jobs to a printer; and
directing the server through the cellular phone to send the
e-mail message to the printer for printing without the e-mail
message being sent to the cellular phone.
The Examiner reads the “server” limitations on paragraphs 0070 and
0096 of Asthana (Office Action 12) and also on paragraphs 0191 and 0194
thereof. Answer 67. Consequently, Appellant’s argument that Winbladh’s
server does not function as claimed (Br. 38) is not responsive to the rationale
of the rejection. The remaining arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons
given above in the discussions of the other claims.
The rejection of claim 12 is therefore affirmed, as is the rejection of
dependent claims 14, 15, 17-19, and 25-28, which are not separately argued.

Claims 23, 24, and 29
Appellant repeats the above-discussed, unpersuasive arguments with
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respect to independent claims 23, 24, and 29. Br. 39-44.
The rejection of those claims is therefore affirmed.

DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-3, 5, 8, and 20-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
for obviousness over Asthana in view of Quinn is affirmed, as is the
rejection of claims 4, 6, 9-12, 14, 15, 17-19, and 23-29 under § 103(a) for
obviousness over Asthana in view of Quinn and Winbladh.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

gvw

HEWLETT PACKARD COMPANY
P O BOX 272400, 3404 E. HARMONY ROAD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION
FORT COLLINS, CO 80527-2400