Ex Parte Berg et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 8, 201814448863 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 8, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/448,863 07/31/2014 125366 7590 08/10/2018 Google Technology Holdings LLC (32367) 233 South Wacker Drive 6300 Willis Tower Chicago, IL 60606-6357 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Daniel T Berg UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 32331/102390-00 7786 EXAMINER SEYEDVOSOGHI, FARID ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2646 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/10/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mgbdocket@marshallip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Exparte DANIEL T. BERG, CHRISTOPHER A. ARNHOLT, CARL A. CEPRESS, and MAX K. YOSHIMOTO Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 1 Technology Center 2600 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges. MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Google Technology Holdings. (App. Br. 3). Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Exemplary Claim Exemplary claim 1 under appeal reads as follows ( emphasis added): 1. A device, comprising: an electronic device comprising one or more processors, one or more memory devices, a display, a first electrical connector, and one or more coupling mechanisms disposed about the periphery of the electronic device; an electronic accessory module, operable with the one or more processors of the electronic device, the electronic accessory module comprising a second electrical connector; and a housing, the electronic accessory module being received and positioned at a first end of the housing and coupled to the housing, wherein the electronic device is received and positioned at a second end of the housing and coupled to the housing via the one or more coupling mechanisms cooperating with one or more complementary coupling mechanisms on the housing, the first electrical connector of the electronic device and the second electrical connector of the electronic accessory module being biased together via the housing to communicatively engage with one another and to secure the electronic device and the electronic accessory module within the housing. App. Br. 14 (Claims Appendix). 2 Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 Rejections on Appeal 1. The Examiner rejected claims 1-3, 5, 6, 13, 17, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nambord et al. (US 2016/0269079 Al; published Sept. 15, 2016) ("Nambord"), Cho (US 2004/0242264 Al; published Dec. 2, 2004) ("Cho"), and Thome et al. (US 2007/0099592 Al; published May 3, 2007) ("Thome"). 2 2. The Examiner rejected claims 4, 7-12, 14--16, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Nambord, Cho, and Thome, in various combinations with other references. Issue on Appeal Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious? PRINCIPLES OF LAW Claim Interpretation A claim under examination is given its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the underlying specification. See In re American Acad. of Science Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the absence of an express definition of a claim term in the specification or a clear disclaimer of scope, the claim term is interpreted as broadly as the ordinary usage of the term by one of ordinary skill in the art would permit. See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to 2 The patentability of claims 2-20 is not separately argued from that of claim I. See App. Br. 11-12. Thus, with respect to this rejection, except for our ultimate decision, claims 2-20 are not discussed further herein. 3 Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim." See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Obviousness The mere existence of differences between the prior art and the claim does not establish non-obviousness. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 (1976). Instead, the relevant question is "whether the difference between the prior art and the subject matter in question is a [difference] sufficient to render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in the applicable art." Dann, 425 U.S. at 228 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear that when considering obviousness, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007). Further, one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is based on a combination of references. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,425 (CCPA 1981). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants' contention that the Examiner erred. Instead, we concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own the findings and reasoning set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and Examiner's Answer. 4 Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 The Examiner found Nambord teaches an electronic user equipment (UE) 300 that includes a housing 302, and an accessory 100 that includes a housing 102 that has raised edge surfaces along at least two sides that form a central recessed surface that extends to a recessed end of the housing 102 to receive the UE 300. See Final Act. 3 (citing Nambord i-fi-f28, 35; Figs. 1, 3); see also Nambord ,r 27. The Examiner further found Cho teaches a portable terminal 50 including an attachment recess 100, where guide grooves 101 are formed along the side surfaces of the attachment recess 100, and where the guide grooves 101 provide for the insertion of guide portions 209 of a wireless headset 200. See Final Act. 4 (citing Cho ,r 25). Thus, the Examiner found the combination of N ambord and Cho teaches or suggests, one or more coupling mechanisms disposed about the periphery of [a] electronic device ... wherein the electronic device is received and positioned at a second end of [a] housing and coupled to the housing via the one or more coupling mechanisms cooperating with one or more complementary coupling mechanisms on the housing, as recited in claim 1 ("the coupling mechanism limitations"). See Final Act. 3--4; see also Ans. 2-3. Appellants contend the combination ofNambord, Cho, and Thome fails to teach or suggest the coupling mechanism limitations because: The guide grooves 101 of Cho do not serve to secure a housing to an electronic accessory. As Cho describes, the guide grooves 101 serve to slidingly receive guide protrusions 209 to facilitate connection of the male connector 207 and female connector 102 of the wireless headset with one another. When a user wants to use the wireless headset 200, the user separates the wireless headset 200 from the attachment recess 100 of the portable terminal 50 by sliding the protrusions 209 along the grooves 101. Next, the male connector 207 is separated from the female connector 102. Cho does not disclose a "housing" coupling 5 Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 mechanisms with engages or otherwise cooperates with complementary mechanisms on an electronic device. App. Br. 9 (Appellants' emphasis and citations omitted; panel's emphasis added). We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred as the argument fails to address the rationale of the Examiner's rejection. More specifically, the Examiner did not rely solely upon Cho to teach the coupling mechanism limitations. Rather, the Examiner relied upon Nambord for teaching a housing of an accessory that receives a UE, and further relied upon Cho for teaching a portable terminal that includes guide grooves dispersed across a periphery of the portable terminal that provide for an insertion of guide portions of a wireless headset. See Final Act. 3--4; see also Ans. 2-3. Appellants' argument attacks the references individually and fails to address the combination of references. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination ofNambord, Cho, and Thome teaches or suggests the coupling mechanism limitations. The Examiner further found N ambord teaches the accessory 100 includes an accessory NFC circuit 110 located on housing 102, and the UE 300 includes a UE NFC circuit 310, where a loop antenna 316 connected to the UE NFC circuit 310 and a loop antenna 108 of the accessory NFC circuit 110 are in close proximity to each other. See Final Act. 3 (citing Nambord i-fi-f37, 45; Figs. 3-5). The Examiner also found Thome teaches an attachment mechanism configured to secure an accessory module 102 to a portable device assembly 104 to form a portable communication device 100 including a plastic housing 106, where battery contacts 306 form electrical connections to battery terminals 406 when the accessory module 102 is secured to the portable device assembly 104. See Final Act. 4--5 (citing 6 Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 Thome ,r,r 19, 27; Fig. 3). Thus, the Examiner found the combination of Nambord, Cho, and Thome teaches or suggests "[a] first electrical connector of [a] electronic device and [a] second electrical connector of [a] electronic accessory module being biased together via [a] housing to communicatively engage with one another and to secure the electronic device and the electronic accessory module within the housing," as recited in claim 1 ("the connectors limitations"). See Final Act. 3-5; see also Ans. 3-5. Appellants further contend the combination ofNambord, Cho, and Thome fails to teach or suggest the connectors limitations because: Thome teaches that forming electrical connections to battery terminals when an accessory module is secured to a portable device assembly, is performed using connection pads and spring loaded pins. Thome, however, does not teach, suggest, or render obvious that a "first electrical connector" of an electronic device and a "second electrical connector of an electronic accessory module" are "biased together" "via a housing" to "communicatively engage with one another" and "to secure the electronic device and the electronic accessory module within the housing," as recited in independent claim 1. App. Br. 11 (Appellants' emphasis omitted; panel's emphasis added); see also Reply Br. 3. We are not persuaded of Examiner error. Appellants argue for narrow definitions of the claimed "via" and "within," but neither claim 1, nor Appellants' Specification, defines or limits the claimed "via" and "within," in a manner that distinguishes the connectors limitations from Thome' s disclosed electrical connection of battery contacts and battery terminals formed when an accessory module is secured to a portable device assembly within a housing. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Nambord, Cho, and Thome teaches or suggests the connectors limitations. See Final Act. 3-5; see also Ans. 3-5. 7 Appeal2018-005067 Application 14/448,863 Accordingly, Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. CONCLUSIONS (1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1-20 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. (2) Claims 1-20 are not patentable. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-20 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation