Ex Parte Bentley et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 28, 2019

12978739 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 28, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/978,739 12/27/2010
48500 7590 05/30/2019
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jon L. Bentley
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
4366-908 1760
EXAMINER
TORRICO-LOPEZ, ALAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JON L. BENTLEY, ANJUR S. KRISHNAKUMAR,
P ARAMESHW ARAN KRISHNAN,
NA VJOT SINGH, and SHALINI Y AJNIK
Appeal2018-001686
Application 12/978,739
Technology Center 3600
Before CATHERINE SHIANG, CARLL. SILVERMAN, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1-3, 6-13, and 15-23, i.e., all pending claims. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Avaya Inc. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2018-001686
Application 12/978,739
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention "relates to e-conferences
and more specifically to scheduling an e-conference for participants with
partial availability." Spec. ,r 1. 2 The Specification explains that a system
"receives a declaration of availability for the e-conference" from one or
more participants, and each "declaration contains the partial availability of
[each] participant based on time restrictions and topics of interest to the
participant." Id. ,r 30, Abstract. Then, the system "determines a schedule
for the e-conference based on the declarations of availability received" and
"displays the declarations through [a] user interface to all of the participants
in thee-conference." Id. ,r 30; see id. ,r 8.
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as
follows:
1. A method comprising:
generating, by at least one processor, a graphical user
interface for an electronic conference, the graphical user
interface comprising an indication of which participants are
currently connected to the electronic conference and a schedule
associated with the electronic conference, the schedule
including agenda items to be addressed during the electronic
conference in a specific order, wherein ones of the agenda items
are mapped to one or more of the participants;
2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the
Specification, filed December 27, 2010; "Final Act." for the Final Office
Action, mailed January 12, 2017; "App. Br." for the Appeal Brief, filed
June 2, 2017; "Ans." for the Examiner's Answer, mailed October 3, 2017;
and "Reply Br." for the Reply Brief, filed December 4, 2017.
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Application 12/978,739
during the electronic conference, receiving, by the at
least one processor, a first declaration indicating partial
availability for the electronic conference from a partially
available participant of the participants, the first declaration
comprising a topic of interest of the partially available
participant and a portion of time the partially available
participant is available during the electronic conference;
during the electronic conference, scheduling, by the at
least one processor, the partially available participant for an
agenda item from the agenda items based on a second
declaration, from a yielding participant of the participants
different from the partially available participant, to yield to a
scheduling change, wherein the scheduling change causes an
agenda item of the agenda items associated with the topic of
interest to be scheduled for presentation within at least part of
the portion of time the partially available participant is
available;
generating, by the at least one processor and during the
electronic conference, an updated schedule for the electronic
conference based on the scheduling change;
generating, by the at least one processor, an updated
graphical user interface for the electronic conference
comprising a presentation of the scheduling change comprising
a listing of remaining agenda items from the agenda items and
associated participants; and
upon determining, by the at least one processor, that the
partially available participant has departed the electronic
conference and the topic of interest is coming up for discussion,
automatically sending a notification message, by the at least
one processor utilizing a network interface, to a communication
device associated with the partially available participant.
App. Br. 18-19 (Claims App.).
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Application 12/978,739
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence ofunpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a), the
Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Cragun et al. ("Cragun") US 2003/0149606 Al
Muller et al. ("Muller") US 2005/0125246 Al
Bagley et al. ("Bagley") US 2007/0100939 Al
Hesse US 2007/0285504 Al
Chen et al. ("Chen") US 2009/0006161 Al
Shuf et al. ("Shuf') US 2010/0042649 Al
Denner et al. ("Denner") US 2011/0072362 Al
The Re} ections on Appeal
Aug. 7, 2003
June 9, 2005
May 3, 2007
Dec. 13, 2007
Jan. 1,2009
Feb. 18,2010
Mar. 24, 2011
(filed Sept. 22, 2009)
Claims 1-3, 6-13, and 15-23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4---6.
Claims 1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15-18, and 21-23 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over Chen, Hesse, and Muller. Final
Act. 7-18.
Claims 2 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Chen, Hesse, Muller, and Cragun. Final Act. 18-20.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over
Chen, Hesse, Muller, and Denner. Final Act. 20-23.
Claims 9 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Chen, Hesse, Muller, and Bagley. Final Act. 23-24.
Claims 10 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Chen, Hesse, Muller, and Shuf. Final Act. 24--25.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellants' arguments
that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the
Examiner's conclusion concerning unpatentability under§ 103(a) but
disagree with the Examiner's conclusion concerning ineligibility under
§ 101. Except as noted below, we adopt the Examiner's findings and
reasoning regarding the§ 103(a) rejection in the Final Office Action and
Answer. See Final Act. 7-25; Ans. 5-8. We provide the following to
address and emphasize specific findings and arguments.
The§ 1 OJ Rejection of Claims 1-3, 6--13, and 15-23
INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter broadly:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Mayo and Alice, the
Supreme Court explained that § 101 "contains an important implicit
exception" for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012);
Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014); see Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In Mayo and Alice, the Court set forth a
two-step analytical framework for evaluating patent-eligible subject matter.
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77-80; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18.
Under Mayo/Alice step one, we "determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to" a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of
nature, or a natural phenomenon. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Step one involves
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looking at the "focus" of the claims at issue and their "character as a whole."
SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
In January 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance for determining
whether claims are directed to a judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019
Guidance"). The 2019 Guidance applies to the Board. Id. at 50-51, 57 n.42;
see 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (investing the Director with responsibility "for
providing policy direction" for the PTO). Neither the Examiner nor
Appellants had the benefit of the 2019 Guidance when advocating their
respective positions concerning subject-matter eligibility.
The 2019 Guidance specifies two prongs for the analysis under
Mayo/Alice step one (PTO step 2A). 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55. The first prong
requires evaluating "whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon." Id. at 54. "If the
claim does not recite a judicial exception, it is not directed to a judicial
exception," and it satisfies § 101. Id. "If the claim does recite a judicial
exception, then it requires further analysis" under prong two. Id. Prong two
requires evaluating "whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited
judicial exception into a practical application of the exception." Id. "When
the exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial
exception," and it satisfies § 101. Id. "If the additional elements do not
integrate the exception into a practical application, then the claim is directed
to the judicial exception," and it "requires further analysis" under
Mayo/Alice step two (PTO step 2B). Id.
Under Mayo/Alice step two, we "consider the elements of each claim
both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the
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additional elements" add enough to transform the "nature of the claim" into
"significantly more" than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18,
221-22 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). Step two involves the search for
an "inventive concept." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221; Univ. of Fla.
Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2019). "[A]n inventive concept must be evident in the claims."
RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG ONE
For Mayo/Alice step one, the Federal Circuit has noted that "[a]n
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction."
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here,
the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of
"instructing how to schedule events ( agenda items) during a conference
based on availability." Ans. 2, 4 (emphasis omitted); see Final Act. 5,
26-27. The Examiner identifies the abstract idea as "a method of organizing
human activities since it relates to interpersonal/intrapersonal activities" or
"an idea of itself since it relates to a concept/plan that can be performed in
the human mind or by a human using pen and paper" or both. Final Act. 5.
Appellants dispute that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. See
App. Br. 9-11; Reply Br. 2-5. Specifically, Appellants assert that the July
2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility ("2015 Guidance") identifies "four
judicially-created categories that qualify as an 'abstract idea.'" App. Br. 9;
see Reply Br. 2. Appellants contend that "[n]otably absent from the four
categories is, 'instructing how to schedule events (agenda items) during a
conference based on availability."' Reply Br. 2. Further, Appellants argue
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that the Examiner makes a "piecemeal rejection" and fails to consider the
claims as a whole. App. Br. 1 O; see Reply Br. 4.
We disagree. In determining that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea, the Examiner accurately assesses the "focus" of the claims and their
"character as a whole." See Final Act. 5; Ans. 2-5; see also SAP Am.,
898 F.3d at 1167. For instance, in making that determination, the Examiner
considers the limitations reciting "generating," "receiving," and
"scheduling." Final Act. 5.
In addition, we determine that the claims recite abstract ideas falling
within the three groupings of abstract ideas specified in the 2019 Guidance:
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and
mental processes. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52. As relevant here, the
Guidance identifies the following as mental processes: "concepts performed
in the human mind," such as "an observation, evaluation, judgment, [or]
opinion." Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
This appeal involves three independent claims, i.e., claims 1, 11,
and 16. Each independent claim recites a mental process in its scheduling-a-
change limitation and its generating-an-updated-schedule limitation.
The independent claims include similar scheduling-a-change
limitations. See App. Br. 18, 20, 22 (Claims App.). For example, claim 1 's
scheduling-a-change limitation requires:
during the electronic conference, scheduling ... the partially
available participant for an agenda item from the agenda items
based on a second declaration, from a yielding participant of the
participants different from the partially available participant, to
yield to a scheduling change, wherein the scheduling change
causes an agenda item of the agenda items associated with the
topic of interest to be scheduled for presentation within at least
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part of the portion of time the partially available participant is
available.
Id. at 18.
The claimed scheduling encompasses an observation or evaluation the
human mind may perform. For example, a human meeting coordinator may
mentally note a scheduling conflict, obtain information from conference
participants to resolve the conflict, and then resolve the conflict by
rearranging the agenda. Similarly, the Specification explains that a human
moderator may "manually schedule the agenda to meet all of the
participant's [sic] needs" and "manually schedule the agenda to meet all of
the participant's [sic] availability." Spec. ,r 34; see id. ,r 33. The 2019
Guidance identifies an observation or evaluation the human mind may
perform as a mental process, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
The independent claims include similar generating-an-updated-
schedule limitations. See App. Br. 18, 20, 22 (Claims App.). For example,
claim 1 's generating-an-updated-schedule limitation requires "generating ...
during the electronic conference, an updated schedule for the electronic
conference based on the scheduling change." Id. at 18. The claimed
generating encompasses a concept performed by a human mentally or with
pen and paper. For example, a human meeting coordinator may generate a
revised agenda reflecting rescheduling that occurs during a meeting, e.g., by
switching the order of two agenda items. The 2019 Guidance identifies a
concept performed by a human mentally or with pen and paper as a mental
process, and thus an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14--15; see also
Intellectual Ventures I LLCv. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
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MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG Two
Because we determine that each independent claim recites abstract
ideas, we consider whether each claim as a whole integrates the recited
abstract ideas into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55. "Only
when a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception
into a practical application, is the claim 'directed to' a judicial exception
.... " Id. at 51.
Appellants argue that claims 1, 11, and 16 provide an "improvement
to a technical field or technology." App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 4. Specifically,
Appellants assert that the claims recite "a particular solution to a problem
( e.g., a specific message sent with specific timing and under other specific
circumstances) as opposed to merely claiming the idea of a solution .... "
App. Br. 11. Appellants also assert that the Specification "states a problem
of the prior art":
What is missing from a calendaring system such as this one is
the ability for participants to indicate their partial availability.
When participants are not available for the full duration of
the e-conference, tracking their availability is difficult,
cumbersome and time consuming. When a participant is
available only for part of an e-conference, there is no efficient
way to schedule the e-conference such that the participant is
present for the part of the conference that is pertinent to that
participant.
Reply Br. 4 ( quoting Spec. ,r,r 5---6).
Appellants contend that the claims address this problem by
"notify[ing] a departed participant of an upcoming event and thereby
avoid[ing] the overhead that would be required to schedule and/or remedy a
missed agenda event." Id. at 6. Appellants also contend that the Examiner
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"omits consideration of' the automatically-sending-notification limitations
in claims 1, 11, and 16. App. Br. 9.
We determine that each claim as a whole integrates the recited
abstract ideas into a practical application. Each claim does so because the
generating-GUI, receiving-declaration, updating-GUI, and automatically-
sending-notification limitations in each claim use the recited abstract ideas
in a meaningful way beyond generally linking their use to a particular
technological environment to provide an improvement to technology. See
84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Due to these features and others, the invention permits
"more efficient use of participant[] time" and "allow[ s] participants to more
effectively manage their time" since "it may not be necessary for each
participant to be present for the entire duration of thee-conference," thus
providing an improvement to technology. Spec. ,r,r 34, 37.
Claims 1, 11, and 16 are directed to a particular manner of conducting
an electronic conference, scheduling changes in agenda items, and sending
notifications. Hence, we conclude that each claim is not directed to a
judicial exception and, therefore, satisfies § 101 under Mayol Alice step one.
See Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356,
1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (deciding that claims "directed to a particular
manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices"
satisfied§ 101 under Mayo/Alice step one).
SUMMARY
For the reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the§ 101 rejection
of claims 1, 11, and 16. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the § 101
rejection of dependent claims 2, 3, 6-10, 12, 13, 15, and 17-23.
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The§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims
1, 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 15-18, and 21-23
INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1, 11, AND 16
As noted above, the§ 103(a) rejection of claims 1, 11, and 16 rests on
Chen, Hesse, and Muller. See Final Act. 7-14. Appellants argue that the
Examiner erred in rejecting each claim because Hesse does not teach or
suggest the following limitation in claim 1 and similar limitations in
claims 11 and 16:
upon determining, by the at least one processor, that the
partially available participant has departed the electronic
conference and the topic of interest is coming up for discussion,
automatically sending a notification message, by the at least
one processor utilizing a network interface, to a communication
device associated with the partially available participant.
See App. Br. 15-16; Reply Br. 6-7.
Specifically, Appellants assert that (1) "Hesse may have a 'test
period' prior to a conference and a station may malfunction"; (2) "Hesse is
aware of the station" malfunctioning; (3) a malfunctioning station cannot
"receive messages of any kind"; and therefore (4) sending a notification
message to a malfunctioning station "would be nonsensical." App. Br.
15-16. Appellants also assert that in Hesse "monitoring is absent" and
"Hesse remains silent to a 'departed' participant." Reply Br. 6-7; see App.
Br. 15. According to Appellants, "Hesse does not provide a notification of
an upcoming agenda item associated with the departed participant, but
instead initiates a rescheduling." Reply Br. 7 ( emphasis omitted).
Appellants' arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error because
they rest on an erroneous claim interpretation and disregard Hesse's
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disclosures regarding monitoring human participants during a conference
and notifying human participants during a conference about changes.
The Examiner properly explains that the claims do not require sending
a notification message to the device with the graphical user interface that a
participant uses for an electronic conference. See Ans. 5; see also App. Br.
18-22 (Claims App.). Instead, the claims specify "sending a notification
message ... to a communication device associated with the partially
available participant." See App. Br. 18-22. As the Examiner reasons, the
claims cover "the sending of a notification to any type of communication
device associated with a partially available user when it is determined that a
user has departed a conference and that the topic of interest is coming up for
discussion." Ans. 5.
Hesse discloses that aspect of the disputed limitations as well as the
other aspects of the disputed limitations. In particular, Hesse describes
video conference systems that provide "audio and video programming ...
for some or all participants" and monitor "changes in the availability of
participants (e.g., human participant or equipment participant)." Hesse
,r,r 30, 33, 53, 85, 140, 181, 206, [57]; see id. Figs. 2, 12, 15, 17; Final
Act. 11-12, 28; Ans. 5---6. Hesse explains that a conference-system
architecture corresponds to a "plan by which system functions are made the
responsibility of particular processes." Hesse ,r,r 42, 170. Hesse describes
conference-system architectures with (I) monitor-participant-availability
processes, (2) reschedule-or-cancel-conference processes, and (3) notify
processes. Id. ,r,r 43, 53-54, 73, 140, 143, 171, 181-182, 193,206,209;
see id. Fig. 2 items 216,220,222; Fig. 12 items 1222, 1226, 1234; Fig. 15
items 1516, 1520, 1522; Fig. 17 items 1520, 1722, 1726.
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A monitor-participant-availability process determines whether a
participant ( either a human participant or an equipment participant) "becomes
unavailable" during a conference and then "posts status." Hesse ,r,r 53, 140,
181,206; see id. ,r,r 51, 85, 179; Final Act. 11-12, 28; Ans. 5-6.
A reschedule-or-cancel-conference process "responds to status posted by"
a monitor-participant-availability process and may reschedule "during a
conference." Hesse ,r,r 54, 140, 182,206; see id. ,r,r 66, 85; Final Act. 11-12,
28; Ans. 5---6. A notify process notifies a human participant about
rescheduling "by e-mail, automated telephone system and/or text paging"
during "the scheduled conference time." Hesse ,r,r 140, 143, 206, 209; see
id. ,r 85; Final Act. 11-12; Ans. 6-7. Moreover, a monitor-participant-
availability process and a reschedule-or-cancel-conference process "may
cooperate to reestablish availability" of a partially available human participant
"into an ongoing conference," i.e., cooperate to reconnect a departed human
participant. Hesse ,r 88 (Table 3 "Status: Reconnecting"); see id. ,r 43, Fig. 2
items 220, 222; Ans. 7-8.
Thus, Hesse discloses (1) monitoring a human participant during a
conference, (2) determining whether a human participant has left a
conference, (3) reconnecting a human participant who has left a conference,
( 4) rescheduling during a conference based on ability to participate, and
( 5) notifying a human participant during a conference about rescheduling
that occurs during the conference. Hesse ,r,r 30, 33, 43, 51, 53-54, 66, 73,
85,88, 136,140,143,171,179, 181-182, 193,202,206,209, [57]. Hence,
Hesse teaches or suggests notifying a partially available human participant
about a topic of interest "coming up for discussion," as recited in claims 1,
11, and 16. See Ans. 5-8.
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Further, to receive notifications "by e-mail, automated telephone
system and/or text paging," a human participant provides contact
information, e.g., "phone number," "email address, cellular phone number,
[and/or] pager number." Hesse ,r,r 136, 143, 202, 209; see id. ,r,r 49, 84
(Table 2 "contact information for use to notify participant"), 88 (Table 3
"Contact information"), 177; Final Act. 12; Ans. 6-7. Hence, Hesse teaches
or suggests "sending a notification message ... to a communication device
associated with the partially available participant," e.g., to the partially
available human participant's cellular phone, as recited in claims 1, 11,
and 16. See Ans. 6-7.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellants' arguments have not
persuaded us that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 11, and 16 for
obviousness based on Chen, Hesse, and Muller. Thus, we sustain the
§ 103(a) rejection of claims 1, 11, and 16.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS 3, 6, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, AND 21-23
Claims 3, 6, 8, and 21 depend from claim 1; claims 13, 15, and 22
depend from claim 11; and claims 17, 18, and 23 depend from claim 16.
Appellants do not argue patentability separately for these dependent claims.
See App. Br. 15-16; Reply Br. 6-7. Thus, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejection
of these dependent claims for the same reasons as claims 1, 11, and 16. See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
The§ 103(a) Rejections of Claims 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, and 20
Claims 2, 7, 9, and 10 depend from claim 1; claim 12 depends from
claim 11; and claims 19 and 20 depend from claim 16. Appellants do not
argue patentability separately for these dependent claims. See App. Br.
15-16; Reply Br. 6-7. Thus, we sustain the§ 103(a) rejections of these
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dependent claims for the same reasons as claims 1, 11, and 16. See
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
We reverse the rejection of claims 1-3, 6-13, and 15-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the rejections of claims 1-3, 6-13, and 15-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject all of the claims on
appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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