Ex Parte Bendig

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 17, 2014

12267264 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/267,264 11/07/2008 Oliver Bendig 6741P154 5766
45062 7590 12/18/2014
SAP/BSTZ
BLAKELY SOKOLOFF TAYLOR & ZAFMAN
1279 Oakmead Parkway
Sunnyvale, CA 94085-4040
EXAMINER
OWYANG, MICHELLE N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2168
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/18/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte OLIVER BENDIG
____________

Appeal 2012-008905
Application 12/267,264
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1 and 3–19, which are all the claims pending in the
application. Claim 2 was cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
Invention
The claimed invention on appeal “relate[s] to data handling on a
computer system. More specifically, embodiments of the invention relate to
persistence layer between application logic and an underlying database
access layer.” (Spec. 1, ¶1).
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Representative Claim
Independent claim 1 is representative of the invention:
1. An apparatus comprising:
a database;
a memory;
a persistence layer to control access to the database by an application,
the persistence layer having an update table residing in the memory to retain
transaction data from the application before the transaction data is
committed to the database; and
a session context applied to the persistence layer the session context
to define a condition for writeback to the database.

(Emphasis added regarding contested limitation).

Rejection
Claims 1 and 3–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combined teachings and suggestions of Weedon
(US 2003/0046298 A1; published Mar. 6, 2003) and Wiser (US 7,356,532
B2; issued Apr. 8, 2008).

Grouping of Claims
Based on Appellant’s arguments, we decide the appeal of:
The rejection of claims: on the basis of representative claim:
Claims 1 Individually
Claim 3 Individually
Claim 4 individually
Claim 5 (reversed)
Claims 6 and 13 Claim 6
Claims 7 and 14 (reversed)
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Claims 8 and 15 (reversed)
Claims 9 and 16 Claim 9
Claims 10 and 17 Claim 10
Claims 11 and 18 Claim 11
Claims 12 and 19 Claim 12

See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004). 1

ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims
1, 3, 4, 6, 9–13, and 16–19, and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Answer in response to
Appellant’s arguments. However, for the reasons discussed below, we
reverse the rejection of dependent claims 5, 7, 8, 14, and 15. We highlight
and address specific findings and arguments regarding for emphasis in our
analysis below.

1 Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on November 1, 2011. The date of
filing the Notice of Appeal determines which set of rules applies to an ex
parte appeal. If a Notice of Appeal is filed prior to January 23, 2012, then
the 2004 version of the Board rules published in the 2011 edition of
Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R. § 41.1 et seq.)
applies to the appeal. See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP) 8th ed., Rev. 8, July 2010.
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Claim 1
Appellant contends, inter alia:
In any event, even if one were to presume that the conditions
for writeback are defined, this fails to teach or suggest that a
session context is applied to a persistence layer or that the
session context defines the conditions for writeback. By way of
example, there is no indication in either reference the conditions
for writeback may be different from one session to the next.
Rather, whatever conditions for writeback exist, exist
uniformly. Thus, there is no basis for asserting that the session
context defines those conditions.

(App. Br. 8).
Appellant’s contention “there is no indication in either reference the
conditions for writeback may be different from one session to the next” (id.)
is not commensurate with the scope of the claim, which is silent regarding
the argued features.2 In the Reply Brief (5), Appellant further refers to “a
session context (which presumably can change between sessions) . . . .”

2 Our reviewing court guides: “[A]lthough the specification often describes
very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned
against confining the claims to those embodiments. . . . [C]laims may
embrace ‘different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific
2embodiments in the specification.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations omitted). Because “applicants
may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during
prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee.” In re ICON
Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted).
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We decline to read limitations into the claim from the Specification.3
The Examiner broadly but reasonably construes “session context . . . as a
statement or information describing the session.” (Ans. 14). Appellant has
not pointed to a limiting definition in the Specification for the claim term
“session context” that would preclude the Examiner’s broader
interpretation.4
Regarding the contested persistent layer, the Examiner explains:
[s]ince, the claimed persistent layer is between an application
and a database controlling transaction, the application server of
Weedon can be reasonably interpreted as the persistent layer
since the application server is between the client machine and
the database servers for process[ing] all application operations
the user application and the databases.

(Ans. 15).
In the Reply Brief (4), Appellant further urges: “While the
application server [of Weedon] may include a persistence layer (it clearly
includes a persistence manager see figure [4]), that does not make the
application server a persistence layer. Following this type of interpretation
to its logical conclusion, one would conclude that a ham and cheese
sandwich could be interpreted as just ham.”

3 “In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretations . . . limitations are not to be read into the claims
from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (citations omitted).
4 Any special meaning assigned to a term “must be sufficiently clear in the
specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood
by a person of experience in the field of the invention.” Multiform
Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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However, Appellant fails to point to a limiting definition in the
Specification that would preclude the Examiner’s broader construction of the
term “persistence layer.” Given the lack of limiting definitions in the
Specification for the aforementioned contested claim terms (session context
and persistence layer), on this record, Appellant has not persuaded us the
Examiner’s broader interpretations are overly broad or unreasonable.
Moreover, we observe Wiser (col. 2, ll. 20–26) provides teachings
similar or cumulative to Weedon’s persistence manager:
Persistence is maintained in such systems by using a “shadow”
copy of an object. Any changes to be made to an object during
a transaction is first done to this shadow copy. If all the
changes are processed successfully, the changes are applied to
the original copy of the object. If such a system crashes during
processing, or if the processing is otherwise unable to complete,
the original copy remains unmodified.

Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the rejection of representative independent claim 1.
Claim 3
Appellant contends, inter alia:
Claim 3 requires “a persistence manager to write a content of
the update table to the database after all business logic in the
application has completed processing of the transaction data”
. . . Appellant does not claim writeback on completion of a
transaction or that logic for application of a transaction is
completed. Rather, Appellant explicitly claims that all logic
within an application has completed processing of the
transaction data. Thus, if the same transaction data is processed
by multiple parts of the application which would traditionally
have constituted multiple database transactions, writeback is
forestalled until all of that processing has been completed.
Neither reference teaches or suggests that which Appellant
claims.
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(App. Br. 9, emphasis added).
As pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 16), Wiser expressly discloses
“Modifications to an object can be written to a database when a transaction
completes successfully.” (Wiser, col. 2, ll. 59–60). Appellant does not
specifically rebut the Examiner’s findings in the Reply Brief (5–6).
Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the
Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of
obviousness regarding dependent claim 3 over the combined teachings and
suggestions of Weedon and Wiser.
Claim 4
Appellant contends, inter alia:
Claim 4 requires “a plurality of data specific persistence
managers instantiated by the persistence layer” and “a buffer in
the memory associated with each data specific persistence
manager” . . . Appellant further notes that the broadest
reasonable interpretation is limited by what one of ordinary
skill in the art would interpret the language in light of the
specification. Appellant submits that paragraph 11 of the
specification as filed provides guidance to such ordinary
practitioner. In particular, a data specific persistence manager
is subordinate to the persistence manager and handles a
particular type of data. The buffers associated therewith are
selected based on the optimal buffering characteristics and thus
are likely to vary depending on the type of data that the data
specific persistent manager is intended to handle. It is submitted
that even absent the interpretation necessitated by the
specification, the Examiner’s interpretation and application of
the references is necessarily erroneous.

(App. Br. 9–10, emphasis added).
Regarding claim 4, we decline to read limitations into the claim from
the Specification. See n.2 supra. Appellant additionally submits, “that even
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absent the interpretation necessitated by the specification, the Examiner’s
interpretation and application of the references is necessarily erroneous.”
(App. Br. 10). However, mere attorney arguments or conclusory statements
are not evidence and are insufficient to rebut a prima facie case. See In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also: “EVIDENCE
APPENDIX No evidence is submitted with this Appeal Brief.” (App. Br.
19). Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the
Examiner’s underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of
obviousness regarding dependent claim 4 over the combined teachings and
suggestions of Weedon and Wiser.
Claims 5, 7, 8, 14, and 15
Appellant contends, inter alia:
Claim 5 includes the limitation “wherein the persistence layer
has a simulation mode and wherein transaction data is persisted
to a buffer responsive to an update command rather than the
database when the persistence layer is in the simulation mode”
. . . Neither Weedon nor Wiser remotely disclose a simulation
mode where the persistence of data to a buffer in response to an
update command rather than the database when the persistence
layer is in the simulation mode as claimed. As an initial matter
the utter absence of any disclosure of a “simulation mode” in
either reference precludes the propriety of this rejection. It is
noted that the term “simulation” does not appear in Weedon at
all and occurs only in the title of cited references in Wiser. The
Examiner cites the processing in temporary space rather than
the database of Fig. 5A of Weedon and in memory transaction
processing in column 4, lines 54-55 of Wiser. The Examiner
then conjures up the notion that this constitutes a simulation
mode. Appellants [sic] take exception to this assertion. In any
event, there is no indication in the references that data from
such transactions are persisted to a buffer rather than a database
in response to an update command. The entire rejection is
based on fantasy and should be reversed.
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(App. Br. 10–11).
The Examiner disagrees, and broadly construes the claim term
“simulation”:
[S]imulation [means] commonly known as the act of imitating
the behavior of some situation or some process by means of
something suitably analog[ous]. Also, Weedon discloses
processing transaction in temporary space so that the
transaction work is done in temporary space and no permanent
changes are written to the database ([0065], Fig 5A-5B); Wiser
discloses in-memory transaction processing (Col. 4, lines 54-
55). It appears that the transaction work performed in the
temporary space is an imitating process which is considered as
simulation of transaction processing, and the application server
managing the transaction is in simulation mode when
transaction work is done in temporary space.

(Ans. 18, emphasis added).
In reviewing the cited portions of Weedon and Wiser (id.), we find no
specific mention of simulation, as pointed out by Appellant. (App. Br. 10).
Although a literal teaching of “simulation” is not required, we are persuaded
the Examiner’s reading of the contested “simulation” features as transaction
work done in temporary space is overly broad and unreasonable. (See
Ans. 18). For this reason, we reverse the rejection of dependent claim 5, and
we also reverse the rejection of dependent claims 7, 8, 14, and 15, which
recite commensurate “simulation” features.
Claims 6 and 13
Appellant contends:
Claims 6 and 13 each include a formative of “delaying a
writeback to the database based on a session state of the
persistence layer”. The Examiner maintains basically the same
mantra as set forth in rejection claim 1. In particular that
Wiser’s transactional changes are written to the database if no
error occurs and Weedon discloses a system using a two phase
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write of the transaction by performing 3 steps when the
transaction is committed. It is respectfully submitted that none
of the Examiner’s analysis is actually directed to the language
of the claims and in particular, nothing reflects that the session
state of the persistence layer forms the basis for the delay of
write back of the database. Reversal of this rejection is also
requested.

(App. Br. 11).
The Examiner disagrees:
the recited [limitation] is similar to the feature of “apply session
context to define a condition for writeback” recited in
independent claim 1 because writeback is commonly known as
postponing writing data to a data storage device by
temporar[ily] saving the data in the cache. Also, based on
broadest reasonable interpretation, it appears that session
context state can be interpreted as [the] situation of a session.

(Ans. 18).

The Examiner further explains the basis for the rejection:
Since, the claimed persistent layer is between an application
and a database controlling transaction, the application server of
Weedon can be reasonably interpreted as the persisten[ce]
layer since the application server is between the client machine
and the database servers for process all application operations
the user application and the databases. Also, since, session
context involves information describing session, and the
claimed session context defines the condition for writeback, the
disclosure of Weedon describes that data will not be written to
the database until (1) completion of the first half called the read
half that involves performing transaction in temporary space,
and (2) receive respond indicating that database is prepared for
changes involves the transaction, it appear[s] that write data
back to database would be postponed or delayed when the first
transaction half called the read half is not complete or when the
respon[se] [is] received indicating that database is not prepared
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because the application server is not in state or situation for
writing data to database.

(Ans. 19–20).

Regarding representative independent claim 6, Appellant fails to
further rebut the Examiner’s specific findings and responsive arguments in
the Reply Brief. Given the lack of limiting definitions in the Specification
for the claim terms “session state” and “persistence layer”, on this record,
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner’s broader interpretations are
overly broad or unreasonable. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
representative claim 6 and claim 13, which falls therewith. See Claim
Grouping supra.
Claims 9 and 16
Appellant contends:
Claims 9 and 16 require the write back of the persistence
objects from the update table “after all business logic in the
application has completed processing corresponding transaction
data.” While these claims are patentable as dependent on
patentable independent claims, they are further patentable for
the same reasons as discussed above in connection with claim
3. Reversal of this rejection is respectfully requested.

(App. Br. 12).
The Examiner disagrees and finds:
Weedon discloses writing transaction data to database after
completing the first half of transaction which involves perform
[sic] work of transaction in a temporary space and receiving
respond from the database indicating that the database is
prepare for writing ([0065], [0071-0072]); and Wiser discloses
writing database to database when transaction is transitionally
completed (Col. 2, lines 53-62, Fig 3). It appears that the
combined teachings of Weedon and Wiser reasonably disclose
writing back is performed after completion of transaction.
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(Ans. 22).

Appellant fails to further rebut the Examiner’s specific findings and
responsive arguments in the Reply Brief for representative claim 9. Given
the lack of limiting definitions in the Specification for the claim terms
“session state”, “persistence layer”, “simulation session” and “persistence
objects” (as recited in the claims from which claim 9 depends), on this
record, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner’s broader construction
is overly broad or unreasonable. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
representative claim 9 for the same reasons articulated by the Examiner.
(Ans. 21–22). Claim 16 falls therewith. See Claim Grouping supra.
Claims 10 and 17
Appellant contends, inter alia:
[C]laims 10 and 17 each require a formative of “prefilling a
buffer with data from the database expected to be needed by the
application”. Neither reference teaches or suggests prefilling
. . . . The Examiner asserts that Weedon discloses allocating
data before any update [paragraph 0088] and the updates occur
in temporary space [Fig. 5]. The Examiner also asserts that
Wiser discloses processing transaction in temporary space such
as memory. The Examiner is utterly silent on how this would
constitute prefilling. Appellant particularly notes that the
allocation in paragraph [0088] of Weedon is allocation of
connections in the context of the two-phase commit and has
nothing to do with prefilling buffers with data expected to be
needed by an application.

(App. Br. 12).
The Examiner disagrees:
[P]refill data is directed to obtaining data before the process,
and sourcing is synonymous with obtaining from or providing.
Also, Weedon discloses allocating data before any update
occurs, and the temporary space such as memory is where
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transaction is done which means the temporary is prepared to
perform transaction work for database, and transaction involves
application and database with the memory as the middle-man
for transaction processing ([0065-0069], [0086], [0088]), and
Wiser disclose processing transaction in temporary space such
as in memory (Col. 4, lines 54-55). It appears that the
temporary space such as memory or buffer would contain data
from the database for communication before transaction
processing, and the application would have data of the database
from the memory in order to imitate transaction processing and
in order to perform transaction work successfully, otherwise the
application and the temporary space would not know how to
start and process transaction that involves updating database.
Hence, it appears that the combined teachings of Weedon and
Wiser properly disclose claimed feature involving prefilling a
buffer and sourcing the data.

(Ans. 23, emphasis added).
Appellant further responds in the Reply Brief (8):
The Examiner appears to be taking the position that “prefilling”
means bringing in data before the data is processed. Appellant
submits that anyone of ordinary skill in the art, and particularly
with reference to the specification, that prefilling a buffer or
prefilling a cache implies that data is retrieved before it is asked
for. Once the data is asked for, it is no longer prefilling but
rather is fetching. Because the Examiner has elected to
interpret the claim language in a manner inconsistent with what
anyone of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the language
even without reference to the specification, and even more so
because it is erroneous with reference to the specification, the
Board should reverse this rejection.

We decline to read exemplary embodiments described in the
Specification into the claims. See n.2 supra. Appellant has not submitted
rebuttal evidence during prosecution showing “that anyone of ordinary skill
in the art [would have known] that prefilling a buffer or prefilling a cache
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implies that data is retrieved before it is asked for.” (Reply Br. 8). Given
that Appellant has not pointed to a limiting definition in the Specification for
the claim term “prefilling a buffer,” we are not persuaded the Examiner’s
broader interpretation is overly broad or unreasonable. Therefore, we
sustain the rejection of representative claim 10 for the same reasons
articulated by the Examiner. (Ans. 23). Claim 17 falls therewith. See
Claim Grouping supra.
Claims 11 and 18
Appellant contends, inter alia:
[C]laims 11 and 18 include a formative of “preventing database
updates after a first execution of the application until a
successive execution of the application on the data completes.”
This feature is neither taught nor suggested by either reference
or the references in combination. Weedon teaches the
avoidance of a two-phase commit unless multiple databases are
involved. Thus, Weedon teaches the commit of data on the
completion of a transaction. It includes no notion of delaying
an update until successive execution of the application on the
same data completes. Similarly, Wiser has no such teaching or
suggestion. How the Examiner believes this feature to be
disclosed is mysterious. The Examiner asserts that the
references disclose “a read process and a write process
associated with different application execution” [sic].
Inasmuch as read access to a database does not involve write
back in any context difficult to discern how the Examiner
thinks this is relevant to the claims at issue. In any event, the
cited sections have been closely reviewed and Appellant
submits that none of them appear to teach or suggest delaying
the writeback for a subsequent execution of the application on
the data as expressly claimed.

(App. Br. 12–13, emphasis added).
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The Examiner disagrees:
Weedon discloses writing transaction data to database after
completing the first half of transaction which involves perform
work of transaction in a temporary space and receiving respond
from the database indicating that the database is prepare[d] for
writing ([0065], [0071-0072]); and Wiser discloses writing
database to database when transaction is transitionally
completed (Col. 2, lines 53-62, Fig 3). Based on the combined
teachings of Weedon and Wiser, it appears that database will
not be updated with transaction data until the completion of
first half of transaction which involves perform work of
transaction in a temporary space and receiving respond from the
database indicating that the database is prepare for writing as
taught by Weedon, or until when transaction is transitionally
completed, which means database update is prevented until
execution of first half of transaction and receiving respond from
database indicating that database is prepared for updates.

(Ans. 24).
Appellant further responds in the Reply Brief (8):
There is not a shred of evidence that either reference allows
successive executions of an application on data prior to it being
written back and committed to the database. Rather, it is
abundantly clear that both references merely disclose the
writeback as the completion of the second half of a transaction.
Contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, there is simply no notion
whatsoever of preventing writeback until successive executions
have occurred. Reversal is respectfully requested.

We observe the portion of Wiser pointed to by the Examiner (Ans. 24)
expressly teaches plural modifications to a data object before the
modifications are written (i.e., updated) to the database: “A transaction
manager can store modifications to an object in-memory until those
modifications are written to a database or personal data store.” (Wiser, col.
2, ll. 56–59). Therefore, we find the preponderance of evidence supports the
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Examiner’s legal conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of representative claim 11 for the same reasons articulated by the
Examiner. (Ans. 23). Claim 18 falls therewith. See Claim Grouping supra.
Claims 12 and 19
Appellant contends, inter alia:
[C]laims 12 and 19 include the limitation “aggregating database
updates from execution of a second application with the
database updates of the application to avoid writing back
temporary data to the database.” Thus, two applications must
act on the data prior to the data being written back to the
database to satisfy the limitations of these claims. This notion
of multiple applications acting on data before database update
occurs is neither taught nor suggested by the references of
record. In fact Weedon expresses a preference for immediate
commit over a two phase commit unless multiple data bases are
involved. This teaching is inconsistent with the teaching the
Examiner purports to get from this reference. Moreover, the
Examiner merely [groups] these claims in with the articulation
of the rejection of claims 11 and 18. However, here there are
two separate applications required to act on the data whereas in
claims 11 and 18 it is merely necessary that one application be
completely finished with its manipulation of the data. Thus, the
Examiner has chosen to, once again, ignore the explicit
language of the claims and has not set forth a prima facie case
of obviousness as to the limitations present.

(App. Br. 13, emphasis added).
The Examiner disagrees:
Weedon discloses writing transaction data to database after
completing the first half of transaction which involves perform
work of transaction in a temporary space and no permanent
changes have been written to the database and receiving
respond from the database indicating that the database is
prepare for writing ([0062], [0065], [0071-0072]); and Wiser
discloses aggregate persistent resources and write to database
when there are not errors (Col. 9,lines 12-15, Fig 3). Based on
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the combined teachings of Weedon and Wiser, it appears that
database will not be updated with transaction data until the
completion of first half of transaction which involves perform
work of transaction in a temporary space, and the transaction
work is performed in the temporary space, and only permanent
changes are made to the database when database is prepared as
taught by Weedon, which also means that temporary data will
not be written to the database thus writing temporary data to
database is avoided because the temporary data remains in the
temporary space.

(Ans. 24–25).

Appellant further responds in the Reply Brief (9):
The Examiner continues to ignore the claim language and
makes no reference to any teaching or suggestion within the
references of the second application acting on the data and
those changes being aggregated before commitment to the
database. The continued focus on two halves of the transaction
is of no moment and is unrelated to processing by plural
applications. As there is absolutely no notion in the references
of that which Appellant claims, reversal is respectfully
requested.

(Emphasis added).

Regarding the contested “second application” of claim 12, we find
“aggregating database updates from execution of a second application”
would have been a “predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007). Thus, claiming a mere plurality of prior art elements is not an
unobvious distinction over the prior art of record, because using plural
elements would have produced a predictable result under § 103. Cf. with In
re Harza, 274 F.2d 669, 671 (CCPA 1960)(“It is well settled that the mere
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duplication of parts has no patentable significance unless a new and
unexpected result is produced.”). Moreover, we are not persuaded that
processing by plural applications would have been “uniquely challenging or
difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v.
Fisher–Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550
U.S. at 418).
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of representative claim 12 for the
same reasons articulated by the Examiner. (Ans. 24–25). Claim 19 falls
therewith. See Claim Grouping supra.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 9–13,
and 16–19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 5, 7, 8, 14, and
15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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