Ex Parte Behrend et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 28, 201411334210 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/334,210 01/18/2006 George G. Behrend POU920050146US1 (19224) 7769 23389 7590 10/29/2014 SCULLY SCOTT MURPHY & PRESSER, PC 400 GARDEN CITY PLAZA SUITE 300 GARDEN CITY, NY 11530 EXAMINER LINDSEY, MATTHEW S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2453 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/29/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte GEORGE G. BEHREND and CHRISTOPHER V. DEROBERTIS1 ____________________ Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, THU A. DANG, and LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final Rejection of claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 19–24. Appellants have previously canceled claims 4 and 7–18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is International Business Machines Corp. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The Invention Appellants' "invention relates to computer clusters, and more specifically, to user account validity definitions in computer clusters." Spec. ¶ 1 ("Field of the Invention"). Exemplary Claims Claims 1, 22, and 23, reproduced below, are representative of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added): 1. A method of defining user account validity in a cluster of computer systems including a multitude of computer systems, each of the multitude of computer systems having a respective one identifier, the method comprising the steps of: providing a centralized management system for said cluster wherein a cluster administrator manages user account validity on the multitude of computer systems of said cluster and wherein a path manager routes data between the multitude of computer systems of said cluster; and using said centralized management system to maintain a record, for each user of the cluster, defining said each user as valid on a first group of one or more of said multitude of computer systems, and defining said each user as invalid on a second group of one or more of said multitude of computer systems; and wherein the record for each user identifies, by means of the respective identifiers for the computer systems, the one or 2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed May 23, 2011); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Oct. 4, 2011); Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Aug. 4, 2011); Final Office Action ("Final Act.," mailed Dec. 20, 2010); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed Jan. 18, 2006). Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 3 more of the computer systems on which said each user is valid, and the one or more of the computer systems on which said each user is invalid, therein providing each of the users with selective validity on the computer systems of the cluster. 22. The method according to Claim 1, wherein the identifiers of the computer systems, on which each of the users is valid, are included in an account definition for said each user in the centralized management system. 23. The method according to Claim 1, wherein each of the computer systems includes an operating system, and when each user is invalid on one of the computer systems, the operating system of said one of the computer systems will not allow the creation of files or processes for said each user. Prior Art The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Brown et al. ("Brown") US 5,941,947 Aug. 24, 1999 Ball et al. ("Ball") US 2003/0046390 A1 Mar. 6, 2003 Gai et al. ("Gai") US 6,651,096 B1 Nov. 18, 2003 Rejections on Appeal R1. Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 19, and 21–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Brown and Gai. Ans. 5. R2. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Brown, Gai, and Ball. Ans. 13. Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 4 GROUPING OF CLAIMS Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 19–26), we decide the appeal of Rejection R1 of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 19, and 21 on the basis of representative claim 1. Rejection R1 of claim 22 stands alone, while Rejection R1 of claims 23 and 24 stands or falls with claim 23. We address remaining claim 20 in rejection R2, not argued separately, infra. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS We only consider those arguments actually made by Appellants in reaching this decision, and we do not consider arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs so that any such arguments are deemed to be waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants' contentions with respect to claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 19–24, and we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' arguments. However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims 1, 22, and 23 for emphasis as follows. 1. § 103 Rejection R1 of Claims 1–3, 5, 6, 19, 21 and 24 Issue 1 Appellants argue (App. Br. 21–24; Reply Br. 2–11) the Examiner's rejection of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 5 unpatentable over the combination of Brown and Gai is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests a "method of defining user account validity in a cluster of computer systems including a multitude of computer systems" in which "each of the multitude of computer systems ha[s] a respective one identifier," wherein the method includes, inter alia, the steps of: using said centralized management system to maintain a record, for each user of the cluster, defining said each user as valid on a first group of one or more of said multitude of computer systems, and defining said each user as invalid on a second group of one or more of said multitude of computer systems; and wherein the record for each user identifies, by means of the respective identifiers for the computer systems, the one or more of the computer systems on which said each user is valid, and the one or more of the computer systems on which said each user is invalid, therein providing each of the users with selective validity on the computer systems of the cluster, as recited in claim 1? Analysis Appellants contend their invention provides selective validity and invalidity on individual computers of a cluster, and does not simply act to provide computer access. App. Br. 19. Appellants further contend Brown simply provides or denies access to services, and not individual computers, such that Brown has no need for identifiers to identify individual computers on which a user is valid and other computers on which a user is invalid. App. Br. 23. Appellants further emphasize: "[t]here is a critical difference Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 6 between, on the one hand, having or not having access to a computer, and on the other hand, being defined as valid or invalid on the computer" because "when a user is invalid in a computer system, the computer operating system will not allow the creation of files, processes, or other system resources for or associated with the user [ID]" such that the user ID effectively does not exist on that computer. Id. (citing Spec. ¶ 38). Appellants further allege the Gai reference identifies "which messages can or cannot be sent," while contending Appellants' invention purportedly distinguishes by "identifying the computer systems on which a user is valid and those on which the user is invalid." App. Br. 23. Appellants conclude their arguments by asserting the Examiner has engaged in improper hindsight by finding "it would have been obvious to modify the procedure disclosed in Brown . . . as the Examiner has done, and then to use this modified procedure to provide each user with selective validity and invalidity on the computer systems." App. Br. 24. We first observe, to the extent Appellants have defined what is meant by a "valid" user account, the Specification states "[a] user account that is valid on a system provides the ability for login access, and file and process creation, deletion, and ownership." Spec. ¶ 5. In connection with this conventional definition, the Specification further states, "[a] mechanism presently exists to restrict the systems where a user may login," and "'selective validity' is not available or configurable: Either the user is valid Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 7 on all nodes in the cluster or it is not, irrespective of whether or not a user may login to one or more nodes." Id.3 In response to Appellants' arguments, the Examiner finds Brown teaches defining whether a user is valid or invalid on each computer in a computer cluster (Ans. 15 (citing Brown col. 4, ll. 15–39)), and Gai teaches using computer system identifiers to define user access to services run on computer systems, and therefore "defines user validity or invalidity on the computer systems running those services." Ans. 15 (citing Gai col. 7, ll. 24–39). We find Brown discusses a relational access rights database having three tables in which: The first table is a group-member table which specifies the user groups and the members (i.e., user accounts) of each user group. Each user of the network is a member of at least one user group, and may be a member of multiple groups. The second table is a group-token table which contains, for each user group, a group-based access rights list (in the form of a list of tokens and corresponding access rights values). Each group-based access rights list specifies the group-based rights which are provided to all members of the respective group. The third table is an account-token table, which specifies, on a single-user basis (for certain users), additional rights that are to be added to the group-based rights of the user. Each user-specific entry in the account-token table is preferably in the form of a single token plus a corresponding access rights value. In addition to (or in place of) the account-token table, an exclusion table may optionally be implemented to specify access rights that are to be taken away from the accounts of specific users. As with the account-token table, each user- 3 Appellants contend their invention's novelty lies, at least in part, on their claimed feature of "selective validity." App. Br. 21. Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 8 specific entry in the exclusion table is preferably in the form of a single token plus a corresponding access rights value. The exclusion table is useful, for example, for taking away certain privileges of users who misuse certain services. Brown col. 4, ll. 15–39 (emphasis added). We find this passage of Brown teaches, or at least would have suggested, defining whether a user is valid (by granting a token) or invalid (by use of the exclusion table) on each computer of a cluster. In further support of the Examiner's position, with which we agree, we note Brown also teaches "[a]n access rights cache on each application server caches the access rights lists of the users that are connected to the respective application server, so that user access rights to specific data entities can rapidly be determined." Brown, Abstract. In addition, we note Brown Figures 3A4 and 3B5 provide a scheme to allow or deny a user's access to a particular node of the network of Figure 2. We find these teachings further supports the Examiner's findings discussed above with respect to valid or invalid user access. In particular, with respect to Appellants' argument cited, supra, that there is a "critical difference" between having or not having access to a computer, and a user being defined as valid or invalid on the computer, the Examiner finds defining user access rights to services is the same as defining user account validity or invalidity, "because the services are executed by computers." Ans. 16. We agree. 4 "FIG. 3A illustrates an access control matrix which specifies, for each user and for each node of the directory structure of FIG. 2, whether the user can access the node, and if so, what the level of access is. The notation 'XXXX' in FIG. 3A represents a 16-bit access rights value." Brown col. 5, ll. 32–36. 5 "FIG. 3B illustrates a preferred basic set of privilege levels, and illustrates one possible assignment of access rights bits to the privilege levels." Brown col. 5, 37–39. Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 9 During examination, a claim must be given its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. Because the applicant has the opportunity to amend claims during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow."). We agree with the Examiner because we find Brown's denying of access by a particular user to a particular node in Brown is equivalent to the user being "invalid" on that node because, if a user cannot access a node, then the user is denied the ability for login access, file and process creation, deletion, and ownership, the characteristics cited by Appellants as defining a "valid" user account, the absence of which reasonably suggests an "invalid" user account on the node. See Spec. ¶ 5. The U.S. Supreme Court has held "[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents." KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth "some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 10 Further, "if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In the present case, we find that the Examiner's proposed combination for claim 1 applies the teachings of Brown in a manner that would produce predictable results when used in the method of Gai. See Ans. 7. Appellants allege the Examiner has engaged in impermissible hindsight. App. Br. 24. Here, we see the hindsight question before us as a balancing test, i.e., whether the Examiner's proffered combination of references is merely: (1) "the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions" (KSR, 550 U.S. at 417), consistent with common sense; or, (2) would an artisan reasonably have combined the cited references in the manner proffered by the Examiner but for having the benefit of the claim to use as a guide (i.e., impermissible hindsight)? After reviewing the respective teachings and suggestions of the cited references, we find the evidence more strongly supports the first prong of the balancing test. It is our view that it would have been obvious to an artisan having general knowledge of computer access control as in Brown and access control lists and computer identifiers as in Gai for the reasons articulated by the Examiner. Ans. 7. We find the Examiner provided sufficient articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. "Motivation to combine these references comes from allowing administrators fine grained access control to allow or deny specific clients connecting to specific servers. Therefore, by combining the references, administrators have better access control of the Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 11 servers." Ans. 7. On this record, we are not persuaded the Examiner's proffered combination of references would have been "uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art." See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). Nor have Appellants provided objective evidence of secondary considerations which our reviewing court guides "operates as a beneficial check on hindsight." Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese and Powder Systems, 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). See also App. Br. 29 ("IX. Evidence Appendix . . . Appellants are not relying on any affidavits, extrinsic documents or extrinsic evidence."). Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner's reading of the contested limitations on the cited prior art, or in the legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection under § 103(a) of independent claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 19, 21, and 24, which fall with claim 1. 2. § 103 Rejection R1 of Claim 22 Issue 2 Appellants argue (App. Br. 25; Reply Br. 8) the Examiner's rejection of claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Brown and Gai is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests the method of claim 1, "wherein the identifiers of the computer systems, on which each of the users is valid, are included in an account Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 12 definition for said each user in the centralized management system," as recited in claim 22? Analysis Appellants contend, in the portions of the cited prior art combination relied upon by the Examiner (Final Act. 9 (citing Gai, Fig. 5A, col. 7, ll. 24– 38; and Brown, col. 4, ll. 26–35)), "[t]here is no discussion in Gai . . . and Brown . . . of 'identifiers of the computer systems, ' as described in claim 22." App. Br. 25. Instead, Appellants argue Gai's teaching relates to an access control list of network messages. Because the Examiner rejects the claims as obvious over the references, the test for obviousness is not what each reference individually discloses, as Appellants argue, but rather what the combination of references would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). That is, Appellants cannot show nonobviousness by attacking Brown and Gai for what they individually teach. We find the portion of Brown cited above teaches use of an account definition (i.e., "account-token table") for each user in a centralized management system for the computer systems in which the user is "valid." In addition, while we find the portions of Gai cited above teach the use of IP source addresses relating to network messages, we broadly but reasonably construe such addresses to be identifiers of the computers from which network messages are received. Therefore, given the Examiner's stated basis for motivation to combine Brown and Gai in the manner suggested above with respect to claim 1, which we find to be equally applicable to claim 22. Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 13 Accordingly, Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us of any reversible error in the Examiner's reading of the contested limitations on the cited prior art, or in the Examiner's legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of dependent claim 22. 3. § 103 Rejection R1 of Claims 23 and 24 Issue 3 Appellants argue (App. Br. 25) the Examiner's rejection of claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Brown and Gai is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches or suggests the method of claim 1, "wherein each of the computer systems includes an operating system, and when each user is invalid on one of the computer systems, the operating system of said one of the computer systems will not allow the creation of files or processes for said each user," as recited in claim 23? Analysis Appellants contend Brown's access control matrix 300 and access rights database 152, cited by the Examiner as teaching or at least suggesting the disputed limitation of claim 23 (Final Act. 9 (citing Brown col. 7, ll. 11– 15, 18–21; col. 16, ll. 40–45)), only describes "access rights of users to content objects through the access control matrix." App. Br. 25. Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 14 The focus of Appellants' contention is, as with independent claim 1, that there is a critical difference between providing a user with access to a computer and defining the user as invalid or valid on the computers. Because of these differences it would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the procedure of Brown et al. to define user validity and user invalidity on the computers of a computer cluster. App. Br. 26. For the reasons discussed with respect to Issue 1, claim 1, supra, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding claim 23 is obvious over the combination of Brown and Gai, and we sustain the rejection, along with the rejection of claim 24, which depends therefrom. 4. § 103 Rejection R2 of Claim 20 Appellants do not address rejection R2 in any way in either the Appeal Brief or the Reply Brief. In view of the lack of any argument directed to the unpatentability rejection of claim 20 under § 103, we pro forma sustain the Examiner's unpatentability rejection of this claim. When Appellants do not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Further, arguments not made are considered waived. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir 2008) ("When the appellant fails to contest a ground of rejection to the Board, section 1.192(c)(7) [(now section 41.37(c)(1)(vii))] imposes no burden on the Board to consider the merits of that ground of rejection . . . [T]he Board may treat any argument with Appeal 2012-000547 Application 11/334,210 15 respect to that ground of rejection as waived."). Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 20. REPLY BRIEF We have considered Appellants' arguments presented in the Reply Brief, but do not find these arguments to be persuasive for the reasons discussed with respect to Issues 1–3. Reply Br. 2–11. To the extent Appellants advance new arguments in the Reply Brief (id.) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in the Answer, we note that "[a]ny bases for asserting error, whether factual or legal, that are not raised in the principal brief are waived." Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative). Cf. with Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl'ns. S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived."). CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err with respect to the unpatentability rejections of claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 19–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the prior art combinations of record, and we sustain the rejections. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 19–24. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation