Ex Parte Bedell et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 25, 2010

09883301 - (D) (B.P.A.I. May. 25, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte JEFFREY A. BEDELL,
BENJAMIN Z. LI,
LUIS V. OROZCO,
and STEPHEN S. TRUNDLE
____________
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,3011
Technology Center 2400
____________
Decided: May 25, 2010
____________
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, LEE E. BARRETT, and JEAN R. HOMERE,
Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by BARRETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
Dissenting Opinion filed by HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.

BARRETT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Filed June 19, 2001, titled "Method and System for Implementing
Database Connection Mapping for Reporting Systems."
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

2
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final
rejection of claims 1-18. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention
The invention relates generally to implementing security features for
reporting systems, such as decision support, Business Intelligence, on-line
analytical processing and other systems. In particular, the invention relates
to a method and system for implementing database connection mapping for
mapping a user to an appropriate database via a database connection where
the database connection comprises information for locating and logging into
the appropriate database. Spec. 1, ll. 5-10.

Illustrative claim
Claim 1 is reproduced below for illustration:

1. A method for implementing database connection mapping
for connecting a user to at least one database in a reporting system,
comprising the steps of:

enabling a user to submit a user identification input and a user
request to a reporting system;

identifying the user based on user identification input; and

controlling access to at least one database through a centralized
server wherein the centralized server maps the user to at least one
appropriate database based on the user request and at least one
database connection definition.
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

3
The references

Freeman US 2001/0049717 A1 Dec. 6, 2001
(filed Jan. 23, 2001)
Lewis US 7,062,563 B1 Jun. 13, 2006
(filed Feb. 27, 2002)

The rejections
Claims 1-5, 7-11, and 13-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
as being anticipated by Lewis.
Claims 6, 12, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Lewis and Freeman.

ANTICIPATION
Issues
The issues, as argued, are:
Issue 1: Does Lewis teach "enabling a user to submit a user
identification input and a user request to a reporting system"?
Issue 2: Does Lewis teach "controlling access to at least one database
through a centralized server wherein the centralized server maps the user to
at least one appropriate database based on the user request and at least one
database connection definition"?

Principles of law
"Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of
all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim." Connell v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

4

Findings of fact
Lewis describes, as an overview:

[T]he present invention provides an improved method and system for
managing access information for users and other entities in a
distributed computing system. In an embodiment of the present
invention, information relating to user access (e.g., name,
authentication information, and user roles) is stored in a centralized
directory. When the user connects to the database, the database looks
up the necessary information about the user in the directory. In an
embodiment, the present invention addresses the user, administrative,
and security challenges described above by centralizing storage and
management of user-related information in an LDAP-compliant
directory service. When an employee changes jobs in such an
environment, the administrator need only modify information in one
location--the directory--to make effective changes in multiple
databases and systems. This centralization lowers administrative
costs and improves enterprise security.

Col. 1, l. 53 to col. 2, l. 2.
The specifics of Lewis are best described in the analysis to prevent
undue redundancy.

Analysis
Issue 1
The Examiner finds that the limitation of "enabling a user to submit a
user identification input and a user request to a reporting system" is taught at
column 5, lines 49-60 and column 7, line 47 to column 8, line 5. Final
Office Action (FOA) 3.
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

5
Appellants argue that column 5 of Lewis describes that databases refer
to entries in a directory information system, but at this time, a user is already
connected to a database and, so, Lewis does not disclose "enabling a user to
submit a user identification input and a user request to a reporting system."
Br. 6. It is argued that columns 7-8 discloses mapping objects and how a
mapping object may be used to map an enterprise user to a schema, which is
said to be a subset of a database, not a reporting system. Br. 7. It is argued
that Lewis clearly discloses at column 1, lines 53-60, that a user connects to
the "database" and not to a "reporting system" and Lewis cannot disclose
mapping a user to a database because a database obtains a user's global
rights when the user signs in. Br. 7-8. Appellants argue that the difference
between connecting to a "database" as opposed to a "reporting system" is
that a user who submits a user identification input and a request to a
reporting system "need not have a known account to a database." Br. 9.
The Examiner reads the claimed "reporting system" on the "directory
information system" in Lewis because the Examiner does not find an explicit
definition of a "reporting system." Ans. 6. The Examiner recognizes that
the Specification describes that examples of "reporting systems" include
"decision support, Business Intelligence, on-line analytical processing and
other systems" (Spec. 1, ll. 5-7), and states that "[t]he examiner has read the
claims in light of the specification as clearly shown above." Ans. 6-7.
Appellants argue that a directory information system is not a reporting
system per the examples in the specification. Reply Br. 4. It is argued that
Lewis discloses that the directory information system may comprise a
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

6
"Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory" but this is not a
reporting system. Id. It is argued that "Appellants were unable to find a
disclosure of a reporting system or of reports in Lewis." Reply Br. 5.
The Specification states that examples of "reporting systems" include
"decision support, Business Intelligence, on-line analytical processing
[OLAP] and other systems" (Spec. 1, ll. 5-7). The "other systems" is very
broad. We interpret "reporting system" broadly to include any system that
returns an answer to a query. We do not agree with or understand the
Examiner's reading of "reporting system" onto a directory information
system because we fail to see how it "reports" anything.
Nevertheless, Lewis has databases and one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that the databases must have some sort of front end
reporting system, not explicitly shown, to respond to queries from users for
information from the databases. For example, Lewis describes that the user
at the first database may execute a database query at column 9, lines 55-58.
The whole purpose of databases is for use in a database query system. Thus,
the databases in Lewis are considered part of a reporting system, so sending
authentication information and requests to the databases in Lewis is
considered to meet the limitation "enabling a user to submit a user
identification input and a user request to a reporting system." It is not
determinative that Lewis does not expressly mention "reports" or a
"reporting system." We note that "enabling a user to submit a user
identification input and a user request to a reporting system" does not
specify any order or time sequence of submitting the "user identification
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

7
input" and the "user request." Thus, a user can submit a user identification
input to log on to a database (reporting system) and once authenticated and
authorized, can later submit a request.
Therefore, we find that Lewis teaches "enabling a user to submit a
user identification input and a user request to a reporting system."

Issue 2
The Examiner finds that the limitation of "controlling access to at
least one database through a centralized server wherein the centralized
server maps the user to at least one appropriate database based on the user
request and at least one database connection definition" (emphasis added) is
taught at column 7, line 47 to column 8, line 5 of Lewis. FOA 3; Ans. 4.
Appellants argue that columns 7-8 of "Lewis, at best, discloses
mapping objects and how a mapping object may be used to map an
enterprise user to a schema, which is a subset of the database." Br. 10. It is
argued:
Mapping objects are created for a particular database therefore a
mapping object cannot map a user to an appropriate database because
it belongs to one database in particular. A mapping object, at best,
maps a user to a schema within a database (which the user is already
connected to), not to the database.

Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 5-6. Thus, it is argued, Lewis does not describe a
centralized server that maps a user to a database. Br. 10; Reply Br. 6.
The Examiner also finds that Lewis discloses mapping a user to a
database at column 10, lines 37-52. FOA 3; Ans. 4. In the Examiner's
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

8
Answer, the Examiner cites for the first time to the "current user links"
described at column 10, line 53 to column 11, line 3. Ans. 8.
Appellants argue that column 10 of Lewis describes that "named links
allow a user on a first database to execute a procedure at a second database
using the security context of another user" (col. 10, ll. 42-44), which only
discloses connecting a first user who is already mapped to a database, from
one database to another, not mapping a user to a database. Br. 11; Reply
Br. 7. It is argued that the "named link" contains the user name and
password of the other user to execute the stored procedure, which is not
"controlling access to at least one database through a centralized server."
Br. 11; Reply Br. 7. It is argued that Lewis teaches away from using a
named link for controlling access to a database because "Lewis teaches that
named links are a potential security problem, not a method of 'controlling
access.'" Br. 11. Appellants argue connecting from a first database to a
second database using a stored procedure does not meet the limitation of
"controlling access to at least one database through a centralized server" and
does not "map the user to at least one appropriate database based on the
user request and at least one database connection definition." Reply Br. 7.
It is argued that the named link will always connect to the same database
utilizing a connect string and the appropriate user credentials. Id.
Appellants argue that the Examiner continues to confuse a centralized
server mapping the user to a database, as claimed, and a user mapping to a
database directly. Br. 12; Reply Br. 5. It is argued that Lewis describes that
a user is already mapped to the database and is seeking authorization to the
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

9
database. Br. 12. It is argued that Lewis, at best, is directed towards
centralizing the scope of privileges and does not provide a disclosure of
mapping a user to an appropriate database. Id.
Initially, as a matter of claim interpretation, the verb "map" is defined
as "[t]o establish a correspondence between the elements of one set and the
elements of another set." The New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical
and Electronics Terms (5th ed. IEEE 1993). We interpret "the centralized
server maps the user to at least one appropriate database" to require an
explicit function of establishing a correspondence between the user and a
database, even if there is only one database. That is, merely logging onto a
server which is associated with only a single database is not sufficient to
meet the claim limitation because there is no explicit mapping function.
Lewis describes "information related to user access (e.g., name,
authentication information, and user roles) is stored in a centralized
directory. When the user connects to the database, the database looks up the
necessary information about the user in the directory." (Emphasis added.)
Col. 1, ll. 56-60. Clearly, the centralized directory in Lewis does not map a
user to a database because the user is already connected to the database
before the database asks for user information from the centralized directory.
Thus, if the claim limitation is to be met, we must rely on some other
reading of Lewis.
One possibility relied upon by the Examiner is the description of
"mapping objects" at columns 7-8. Manifestly, not all mapping is mapping
of a user to an appropriate database, so we must examine the mapping in
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

10
more detail. Lewis describes that a "[m]apping object contains mapping
information between a full or partial distinguished name ('DN') in the
directory information system and a user/schema name" (col. 5, ll. 55-57) and
the "mapping object contains the mapping of an enterprise DN and a native
database username" (col. 7, ll. 50-52). A "DN" is a unique name which
identifies an entry in a directory, and may be defined as a collection of one
or more entry attributes. Col. 5, l. 34 to col. 6, l. 18. A "schema" is defines
a "set of statements, expressed in a data definition language, that completely
describe the structure of a database." IBM Dictionary of Computing (10th
ed. 1994). Thus, we disagree with Appellants' statement that a "schema" is
"a subset of a database" (Br. 7); i.e., a schema is the organization of the
database, not the database itself. In any case, we do not see how mapping
between a full or partial DN (distinguished name) and a user/schema name
can be considered to be mapping a user to a database. Moreover, Lewis
describes that "[m]apping objects also reside under server objects, and are
created for a particular database" (emphasis added) (col. 5, ll. 59-60), so we
agree with Appellants that the mapping objects only map within a database,
not to the database.
Other possibilities for mapping are the descriptions of "connected-
user links," "fixed user" or "named" links, and the "current user links" of the
invention described at columns 9-13. The Examiner relies on the "fixed
user" or "named" links described at column 10, lines 37-52, and in the
Examiner's Answer cites for the first time the "current user links" described
at column 10, line 53 to column 11, line 3 Lewis describes that users at a
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

11
first database may perform operations that require access to a second
database. A "named" links contains both the connect string and the
appropriate user credentials. Col. 10, ll. 38-41. We agree with Appellants
that this is not access controlled through a centralized server, as claimed, and
does not "map" to a database because the link will always connect to the
same database utilizing a connect string and user credentials. That is, we do
not see how merely connecting to a database over a link is "mapping."
Using the "current user links" of the invention, the link to a remote
database is embedded stored into a stored object that is executed and when
any user runs a stored object, the privilege domain of the object owner is
used, for example, by passing the DN of the current user from the first
database to the second database. "The transmitted DN is used to map the
connected user to the appropriate schema at the second database and for
authorizing privileges." Col. 10, l. 66 to col. 11, l. 2. Again, we fail to see
that there is any "mapping" done by a centralized server. The establishment
of a link between two databases does not imply that there is mapping.
The rejection does not clearly identify the elements and relationships
in the limitation, i.e., what is the "centralized server"?, what is the
"database"?, where is the "mapping" between the user and the database?,
how is any mapping "based on the user request and at least one database
connection definition"?, and how does Lewis teach that all this "controls
access"? The Examiner has not persuaded us that Lewis teaches "controlling
access to at least one database through a centralized server wherein the
centralized server maps the user to at least one appropriate database based
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

12
on the user request and at least one database connection definition."
Although Appellants' Specification describes many of the same elements
found in Lewis, such as access control lists (ACLs), Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP), etc., the Examiner has not shown that the elements
are connected and function as described and claimed.

Conclusion
Issue 1: Lewis teaches "enabling a user to submit a user identification
input and a user request to a reporting system."
Issue 2: Lewis does not teach "controlling access to at least one
database through a centralized server wherein the centralized server maps
the user to at least one appropriate database based on the user request and at
least one database connection definition."
Because Lewis does not teach at least "controlling access" in claim 1,
and because independent claims 7 and 13 contain corresponding limitations,
the anticipation rejection of claims 1-5, 7-11, and 13-17 is reversed.

OBVIOUSNESS
Because the Examiner does not rely on Freeman to cure the
deficiencies of Lewis, the obviousness rejection of dependent claims 6, 12,
and 18 is reversed.

NEW GROUND OF REJECTION
Claims 13-18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
nonstatutory subject matter.
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

13
"If a claim covers material not found in any of the four statutory
categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope of § 101 even
if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful." In re Nuijten,
500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). "A transitory, propagating signal . . .
is not a 'process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter' [under
35 U.S.C. § 101]" and therefore does not constitute patentable subject matter
under § 101. Id. at 1357. Claims that are so broad that they read on
nonstatutory as well as statutory subject matter are unpatentable. Cf.
In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1015 (CCPA 1972) ("Claims which are broad
enough to read on obvious subject matter are unpatentable even though they
also read on nonobvious subject matter."). This is now USPTO policy. See
Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat.
Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010).
Claims 13-18 recite a "processor-readable medium comprising code"
which is broad enough to read on a transitory, propagating signal containing
information and are not limited to a tangible medium within one of the
statutory classes of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

14
CONCLUSION
The rejections of claims 1-18 are reversed.
A new ground of rejection is entered as to claims 13-18.
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides that "[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review."
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of
the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so
rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in
which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . .

(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard
under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .

Requests for extensions of time are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(b).
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

REVERSED -- 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

llw

Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

15
HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting-in-part.
I agree with the majority opinion (“Op.” hereinafter) in all respects
save one. I write separately to voice my disagreement with the majority’s
holding that Lewis does not teach "controlling access to at least one
database through a centralized server wherein the centralized server maps
the user to at least one appropriate database based on the user request and
at least one database connection definition,” (emphasis added,) as recited in
independent claim 1. (Op. 13.) In particular, the majority finds that “the
centralized directory in Lewis does not map a user to a database because the
user is already connected to the database before the database asks for user
information from the centralized directory.” (Op. 9.) Because of this
finding, the majority reverses the Examiner’s prior art rejection of claim 1.
From that decision, I respectfully dissent.

In my view, the majority misapprehended the claimed invention by
narrowly construing the claim limitation in question. Such a narrow
interpretation of the claim language is not consistent with In re Bigio, which
requires that the claim be given the broadest reasonable interpretation.
In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The cited recitation
merely requires controlling access to a single (at least) database through the
centralized server that maps a user to another single (at least) database based
on the user’s request and the database connection definition.
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

16

Applying the above claim construction to the definition2 set forth by
the majority in the Opinion, I find that where, as in this case, each of the sets
only includes a single database element, the correspondence between the two
sets necessarily occurs once the databases are communicating with each
other. In other words, because of the one-to-one correspondence between
the central server and the database, the mapping always occurs. In this
particular case, as in Lewis’s, Appellants’ central server can only serve as a
gate keeper by determining whether or not the user is authorized to access
the single database. Put differently, where each of two sets only contains a
single element, no actual mapping occurs since there is always a one-to-one
correspondence between the two elements. In fact, the majority opinion
supports this position by finding the following:
“merely logging onto a server which is associated with only a
single database is not sufficient to meet the claim limitation because
there is no explicit mapping function.” (Op. 9.) … does not "map" to a
database because the link will always connect to the same database
utilizing a connect string and user credentials. That is, we do not see
how merely connecting to a database over a link is "mapping."
(Op. 11.)

I am therefore satisfied that Lewis’s disclosure of the communication
between the two databases teaches the disputed claim limitation. Thus, I
cannot agree with the majority’s reversal of the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1. Accordingly, I would affirm the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1 as being anticipated by Lewis.

2 Mapping is defined as "establishing a correspondence between the
elements of one set and the elements of another set." (Op. 9.)
Appeal 2009-004977
Application 09/883,301

17

HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
1900 K STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON, DC 20006-1109