Ex Parte Baumann et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 10, 201412044188 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 10, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/044,188 03/07/2008 Warren J. Baumann AUS920070988US1 6737 86713 7590 04/11/2014 Mitch Harris (END) c/o Mitch Harris, Atty at Law P.O. Box 7998 Athens, GA 30604-7998 EXAMINER CONYERS, DAWAUNE A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2159 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/11/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte WARREN J. BAUMANN, FIRAS BOUZ, DOUGLAS S. BROWN, and WESLEY STEVENS ____________________ Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2 1 The real Party of Interest is International Business Machines Corp. 2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed March 16, 2011 (“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed August 4, 2011 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ Invention Appellants’ invention relates to file selection techniques for use during backup, migration, synchronization, deployment, and other forms of file transfer between systems, for example, work station and remote storage based on application-associated templates. Spec. ¶ [0005]. Claims on Appeal Claims 1, 7, 13, and 21 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is representative of Appellants’ invention, and is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A computer-performed method for selecting files and/or configuration entries for backup, migration, restoration or synchronization comprising: during a backup, migration or synchronization session, reading a template specifying one or more applications, wherein a collection of files is specified for transfer between a workstation and a storage location for each of the one or more applications; during the backup, migration or synchronization session, accepting multiple user inputs from a single user that modify the template read by the reading to produce a local template specifying a modified collection of files; storing the local template specifying the modified collection of files; storing a record of the multiple user inputs including storing an order of entry of the multiple user inputs in the record; Answer mailed June 9, 2011 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed December 20, 2010 (“Final Rej.”); and the original Specification filed March 7, 2008 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 3 transferring the files between the workstation and the storage location in conformity with the stored local template; and modifying another template specifying files for transfer using the stored record of the multiple user inputs by applying them to the another template according to their stored order of entry. Evidence Considered Bhansali US 6,006,239 Dec. 21, 1999 Ballard US 2005/0223277 A1 Oct. 6, 2005 Singhal US 2006/0117309 A1 Jun. 1, 2006 Examiner’s Rejections (1) Claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-15, 17-19, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ballard and Bhansali. Ans. 5- 19. (2) Claims 5, 11, 16, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ballard, Bhansali, and Singhal. Ans. 20-22. Issue on Appeal Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-15, 17-19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ballard and Bhansali. In particular, the appeal turns on whether the Examiner’s combination of Ballard and Bhansali teaches or suggests limitations of Appellants’ independent claims 1, 7, 13, and 21 as well as dependent claims 5, 6, 11, 12, 16-18, and 20. App. Br. 12-18; Reply Br. 2-11. Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 4 ANALYSIS With respect to independent claims 1, 7, and 13, the Examiner finds Ballard discloses a method for selecting files and/or configuration entries for backup, migration, restoration or synchronization over the Internet including reading a template specifying one or more applications and files for transfer between a workstation and a storage location, and generating a local template with updated files for subsequent file transfer. The Examiner finds Ballard does not disclose “storing a record of the multiple user inputs including storing an order of entry of the multiple user inputs in the record” and “[m]odifying another template specifying files for transfer using the stored record of the multiple user inputs by applying them to the another template according to their stored order of entry.” Ans. 8, 17-18 (citing Ballard, ¶¶ [0031], [0045], [0051]-[0052]; and FIGS. 1-16). The Examiner then relies upon Bhansali for disclosing the missing features, i.e., “storing a record . . . including an order of entry of the multiple user inputs” and “modifying another template specifying files for transfer . . . ” Id. at 8-9 (citing Bhansali, col. 3, ll. 5-10; col. 7, ll. 35-67; col. 8, ll. 1-67; col. 9, ll. 25-67; and FIG. 2) . Based on these factual findings, the Examiner concludes that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to have modified the teachings of Ballard with the teachings of Bhansali for storing user changes in a change log which would result in the claimed invention.” Id. at 10. Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s specific findings regarding Ballard and Bhansali. Rather, Appellants contend the Examiner’s Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 5 combination of Ballard and Bhansali does not disclose what Appellants characterize as: “storing a record of multiple user inputs accepted from a single user during a backup, migration or synchronization session to modify a template specifying a collection of files for transfer, including storing their order of entry and modifying another template specifying files for transfer using the stored record of the multiple user inputs and their stored order of entry.” App. Br. 12 (emphasis added). In particular, Appellants characterize that: (1) Ballard does not disclose storing a record of user inputs at all, and (2) Bhansali discloses only a method and system for allowing multiple users to edit a spreadsheet. Id. (citing Bhansali, col. 3, ll. 5-7l; Abstract). Appellants then assert Bhansali does not disclose selecting files for backup, migration, or synchronization. For example: “First and foremost, Bhansali does not disclose recording changes made to a template that specifies a collection of files. Bhansali only discloses multi-user spreadsheet editing sessions . . . Second, the changes recorded by Bhansali are from multiple users, not a single user as recited in the Claims. Finally, the changes recorded by Bhansali are from multiple spreadsheet editing sessions and not the changes made by that single user during a backup, migration or synchronization session.” App. Br. 13 (citing Bhansali, col. 7, ll. 35-67; col. 8, ll. 1-67; and col. 9, ll. 25-67); Reply Br. 3-4. We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive to justify a reversal of the Examiner’s rejection. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining that even if the examiner had failed to make a prima facie Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 6 case, the Board would not have erred in framing the issue as one of reversible error because it has long been the Board’s practice to require an appellant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections). At the outset, we note the claim term “accepting multiple user inputs from a single user” as recited in Appellants’ claims 1, 7, and 13 is an inherent contradiction, and is neither supported nor described in Appellants’ Specification, including step 42 of FIG. 5 and ¶ [0023] as asserted by Appellants. App. Br. 4. A single user would be able to enter data representing multiple user inputs, but not “multiple user inputs.” Nevertheless, acceptability of that claim term depends on whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is claimed in light of the Specification. Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004): The requirement to “distinctly” claim [under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph] means that the claim must have a meaning discernible to one of ordinary skill in the art when construed according to correct principles . . . . Only when a claim remains insolubly ambiguous without a discernible meaning after all reasonable attempts at construction must a court declare it indefinite. (Citations omitted). In view of Appellants’ own Specification, we find one skilled in the art would consider the claim term “accepting multiple user inputs from a single user” to mean a user input such that “a record of the multiple user inputs” could be stored and files could be subsequently transferred between a workstation and a storage location in the manner recited in Appellants’ claims 1, 7, and 13. Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 7 Second, we note Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope of claims 1, 7, and 13. For example, claim 1 simply recites “storing a record of the multiple user inputs including storing an order of entry of the multiple user inputs in the record” and not “a record of multiple user inputs accepted from a single user during a backup, migration or synchronization session,” as incorrectly characterized by Appellants. Third, Appellants’ attacks on Bhansali are misplaced. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). The test of obviousness is what the combined teachings would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 425. Contrary to Appellants’ characterization, Bhansali is simply cited for disclosing storage of a record of multiple user inputs including an order of entry of those user inputs, and modification of a template using the stored record of multiple user inputs in the form of multiple users’ access to a spreadsheet (i.e., template) for editing and updating, i.e., making additions, deletions, or other desired changes among multiple users. Ans. 8-10. Thus, the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response, supported by sufficient evidence, to each of Appellants’ contentions. As such, we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings and the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer. Ans. 22-29. Moreover, Ballard also teaches similar features disclosed by Bhansali. For example, Ballard teaches the use of an operation log 72 to store an entry for each operation (e.g., backup) and a file log 74 to store an entry for each Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 8 file to be backed up, shown in FIG. 6 and FIG. 7 as reproduced below with additional markings for illustration. FIG. 6 FIG. 7 FIG. 6 of Ballard shows an operation log 72 to store an entry for each operation (e.g., backup), while FIG. 7 shows a file log 74 to store an entry for each file to be backed up. As shown in FIG. 6, an entry for each backup operation is formed by fields 81 including: a client computer address field (or other client identifier), an indication field of the type of operation (e.g., system back-up, programmed back-up, incremental back-up), and a time stamp field. See Ballard, ¶ [0038]. Similarly, as shown in FIG. 7, an entry 82 includes fields 83 for identifying information for the file (e.g., filename, file type, file size and/or file creation date), a field for a time stamp, and a field for a client computer identifier (e.g., client computer address). Id. at ¶ [0039]. According to Ballard, different entries may correspond to different client computers, i.e., multiple user inputs as recited in Appellants’ claims 1, 7, and 13. Id. at ¶¶ [0038]-[0039]. Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 9 In addition, Ballard further teaches the use of a pre-existing template for user selection of files for the system back-up operation, shown in FIG. 10 as reproduced below with additional markings for illustration. FIG. 10 of Ballard shows a client computer user interface 90 including commands for different types of backup operations, including a programmed back-up in which a template is used to permit a user to select files and update those files for backup operations. Thus, based on Ballard’s disclosures, the Examiner need not rely on Bhansali for the obviousness conclusion. Nevertheless, we agree with the Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 10 Examiner that Ballard and Bhansali teach the disputed limitations of Appellants’ claims 1, 7, and 13. For the reasons set forth above, Appellants’ contentions have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s position. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 7, and 13 based on Ballard and Bhansali. With respect to independent claim 18, Appellants argue the Examiner’s combination of Ballard and Bhansali does not disclose: “receive a transfer of files from a workstation computer system for storage in a storage location managed by a server computer system, wherein the transfer of files is specified in part by one or more templates and in part by a record of modifications made by a single user during a backup, migration or synchronization session at the workstation computer system and according to a stored record of their entry.” App. Br. 15. We disagree. At the outset, we note Appellants’ independent claim 18 is significantly broader than independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and does not require the features disclosed by Bhansali, i.e., storage of a record of multiple user inputs including an order of entry of those user inputs, and modification of a template using the stored record of multiple user inputs. Consequently, we find Ballard discloses all Appellants’ claimed elements, including the transfer of files between a workstation and a storage location using one or more templates and in part a record of modifications (i.e., update of the template) by the user during a backup section according to a record of files, as shown in FIG. 6, FIG. 7, and FIG. 10. Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 11 Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude independent claim 18 is rendered unpatentable over Ballard. As such, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 18. With respect to independent claim 21, Appellants further argue the Examiner’s combination of Ballard and Bhansali does not disclose: “receiving an object specifying an administrative override whereby at least one file specified by the program instructions that accept multiple user inputs is excluded from or included in the modified collection of files.” App. Br. 15. The claim term “administrative override” is described in Appellants’ Specification as a process to force the inclusion or exclusion of specific files, directories and/or file names. See Spec. ¶ [0016]. In response, the Examiner has broadly interpreted the claim term “administrative override” as encompassing user saving changes in the template, as disclosed by Ballard and also by Bhansali in the context of multiple users’ access to a spreadsheet for editing purposes. Ans. 32-33 (citing Bhansali, col. 3, ll. 5-10; col. 7, ll. 35-67; col. 8, ll. 1-67; col. 9, ll. 25-67; and FIG. 2). We find the Examiner’s interpretation is reasonable and consistent with Appellants’ own Specification. Consequently, we conclude the Examiner’s combination of Ballard and Bhansali discloses or suggests the disputed limitation of independent claim 21. For the reasons set forth above, Appellants’ contentions have not persuaded us of any error in the Examiner’s position. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 21. Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 12 With respect to dependent claims 6, 12, and 17, Appellants further argue the Examiner’s combination of Ballard and Bhansali does not disclose: “detecting a media type or location of the storage location, and selectively including files or excluding files from the modified collection of files used by the transferring in conformity with the detected media type or location of the storage location.” App. Br. 16. We again disagree, and adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. Ans. 34-35. With respect to dependent claims 2-4, 8-10, 14-15, and 18-19, Appellants present no separate patentability arguments. For the same reasons discussed, we also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2-4, 8-10, 14-15, and 18-19. Lastly, with respect to dependent claims 5, 11, 16, and 20, Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding regarding Singhal. Instead, Appellants argue the Examiner’s combination of Ballard, Bhansali and Singhal does not disclose the same feature recited in claim 21, that is, “receiving an object specifying an administrative override at the workstation, whereby at least one file specified by the accepting multiple user inputs is excluded from or included in the modified collection of files . . .” App. Br. 18. For the same reasons discussed in connection with claim 21, and the Examiner’s findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (Ans. 35-36), we also Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 13 sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claims 5, 11, 16, and 20 based on Ballard, Bhansali, and Singhal. CONCLUSION On the record before us, we conclude the Examiner has not erred in rejecting: (1) claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-15, 17-19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ballard and Bhansali; and (2) claims 5, 11, 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ballard, Bhansali, and Singhal. DECISION As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejections of claims 1-21.3 3 In the event of further prosecution, we suggest the Examiner consider if claims 13-21 include forms of non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals. If so, the Examiner may reject claims 13-21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as covering non-statutory subject matter. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007); and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Interim Examination Instructions for Evaluating Subject Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, at 2 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/2009-08- 25_interim_101_instructions.pdf (emphases omitted); see also David J. Kappos, Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media, 1351 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 212 (Feb. 23, 2010) (citation omitted). Appeal 2011-012578 Application 12/044,188 14 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED cam Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation