Ex Parte Basu et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 11, 201613173643 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/173,643 06/30/2011 Sujoy Basu 56436 7590 05/13/2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise 3404 E. Harmony Road Mail Stop 79 Fort Collins, CO 80528 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 82613061 9482 EXAMINER HERSHLEY, MARKE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2155 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/13/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): hpe.ip.mail@hpe.com mkraft@hpe.com chris.mania@hpe.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUJOY BASU and SHARAD SINGHAL Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN P. PINKERTON, CARLL. SILVERMAN, and NORMAN H. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judges. BEAMER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-20. 1 We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 In the Appeal Brief, Appellants identify Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP as the real party in interest. (App. Br. 2.) Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 THE INVENTION Appellants' disclosed and claimed invention is directed to extracting concepts and relationships from a text. (Abstract.) Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system for extracting concepts and relationships from a text, comprising: a processor that is adapted to execute stored instructions; and a memory device that stores instructions, the memory device comprising processor-executable code, that when executed by the processor, is adapted to: generate concepts from the text using singular value decomposition; rank the concepts based on a term weight and a distance metric; extract the concepts iteratively that are ranked above a particular threshold; merge the concepts to form larger concepts until concept generation has stabilized; generate relationships based on the concepts using singular value decomposition; rank the relationships based on various metrics; and extract the relationships that are ranked above a particular threshold. REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 1, 4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15, and 18-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hagar et al. (US 2007/0011151 Al, pub. Jan. 11, 2007) (hereinafter "Hagar") and Cucerzan 2 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 et al. (2012/0203772 Al, pub. Aug. 9, 2012) (hereinafter "Cucerzan"). (Final Act. 11-14.) The Examiner rejected claims 2-3, 9-10, and 16-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hagar, Cucerzan, and Hagar (US 2010/0114890 Al, pub. May 6, 2010) (hereinafter "Hagar II"). (Final Act. 15-17.) The Examiner rejected claims 5 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hagar, Cucerzan, and Bartz et al. (US 2008/0243826 Al, pub. Oct. 2, 2008) (hereinafter "Bartz"). (Final Act. 17- 18.)2 ISSUES ON APPEAL Appellants' arguments in the Appeal Brief present the following issues: 3 Whether the combination of Hagar and Cucerzan teaches or suggests the claim 1 limitations, "rank the concepts based on a term weight and a distance metric; ... merge the concepts to form larger concepts until concept generation has stabilized; generate relationships based on the concepts using singular value decomposition; rank the relationships based on various metrics; and extract the relationships that are ranked above a particular 2 Claim 14 is indicated as rejected in the Final Action, but the Examiner does not provide the basis or rationale for the rejection. (See Final Act. 1.) 3 Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellants and positions of the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Jan. 13, 2014) ("App. Br."), Reply Brief (filed July 14, 2014) ("Reply Br."), Final Office Action (mailed Sept. 11, 2013) ("Final Act."), and the Examiner's Answer (mailed May 12, 2014) ("Ans.") for the respective details. 3 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 threshold," and similar limitations recited in independent claims 8, and 15. (App. Br. 7-13.) ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants' arguments, and we adopt as our own: ( 1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 11-18); and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' Appeal Brief (Ans. 9-13). We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and emphasize the following. For the limitation, "rank the concepts based on a term weight and a distance metric," the Examiner relies on the disclosure in Hagar of a "concept bridge" which "extract[ s] significant terms from search text and infer[ s] relevant terms therefrom," and which involves a filter that measures "line length," and the use of "concept terms [that] may be applied using different weights." (Final Act. 12; Hagar Abstract, i-fi-137, 39.) Appellants argue that the "line length" described in Hagar does not satisfy the definition of "distance metric," which, according to Appellants, is defined in the Specification as "the inner product of two term vectors." (App. Br. 9; Spec. i135.) The Examiner finds: The specification is non-limiting in its disclosure of distance metrics, and the paragraph cited by the Applicant is not directed to the ranking of concepts. Therefore, broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language in light of the specification does not limit the distance metric of the claim language to the "inner product of two term vectors that may be 4 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 used to describe how strongly the two terms are correlated across the documents." (Ans. 9.) We are not persuaded that the Examiner errs in finding Hagar teaches or at least suggests the claim limitation at issue. For the limitation, "merge the concepts to form larger concepts until concept generation has stabilized," the Examiner relies on the disclosure in Hagar of a "ranking process" wherein "the list of ranked unknown terms can be merged with the list of significant terms for the concept terms that are used in building a concept bridge query." (Final Act. 12; Hagar i-f 39.) Appellants argue Hagar "recites unknown terms that are not concepts," and therefore Hagar "does not disclose 'merging the concepts' as recited in the present claims." (App. Br. 10.) Appellants further argue Hagar does not disclose merging the concepts to form larger concepts, but rather "merely applies concept terms to a query." (Id.) The Examiner finds Hagar discloses that "significant terms of the concept matrix are clustered into synonym groups based on the similarity established in the concept matrix," and "application of the weights to the concept terms .... is used to determine the similarity groups of concept terms." (Ans. 10.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner errs in finding Hagar teaches or suggests this limitation. For the limitation, "generate relationships based on the concepts using singular value decomposition," the Examiner relies on the disclosure in Hagar that "patterns of document word usage and document similarity scores are determined using singular value decompression." (Final Act. 12; Hagar i-f 55.) Appellants argue: 5 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 [A] relationship ... is expressed by language. . . . A relationship is not a similarity score. Moreover, the similarity score in [Hagar] is not based on concepts, as is the relationship recited by the present claims. Rather, the similarity scores of terms or documents in [Hagar] are generated from a document concept vector. (App. Br. 11.) The Examiner responds that Appellants' interpretation is unreasonably narrow: A similarity between two concepts is, using broadest reasonable interpretation, a relationship between two concepts. Further, a similarity score must be expressed by a language in order to be understood and utilized by a human, machine or computer. Therefore, a similarity score is a representation of a relationship between concepts. (Ans. 11.) We conclude the Examiner's interpretation of the claims is reasonable, and we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Hagar teaches of suggests this limitation. For the limitations, "rank the relationships based on various metrics; and extract the relationships that are ranked above a particular threshold," the Examiner relies on the disclosure in Cucerzan of the ranking of relationships and extraction of concept relationships having a level of importance that is higher than a prescribed threshold. (Final Act. 13; Cucerzan i-fi-157-58.) Appellants argue "giving a 'level of importance' to concepts in a relationship graph is not the same as ranking relationships." (App. Br. 12.) For the reasons stated, we agree with the Examiner's finding: Since Applicant's claim language does not give a clear definition of a relationship, nor has Applicant presented a citation of the specification defining what a relationship of concepts is, broadest reasonable interpretation must be used. Therefore, Cucerzan's determining a level of importance for the relation between 6 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 concepts (one concept relative to another concept) is determining a rank for the relationships. [Hagar's] similarity score 1s a measure of once concept relative to another concept, and therefore, is analogous to the relationships of Cucerzan. (Ans. 12.) CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 over Hagar and Cucerzan. We also sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 4, 6, 7, 11, 13, and 18-20 over Hagar and Cucerzan, which claims are dependent from claims 1, 8, or 15, and are not argued separately with particularity. (App. Br. 13.) With respect to the Examiner's obviousness rejection of dependent claims 2-3, 9-10, and 16-17 over Hagar, Cucerzan, and Hagar II, Appellants incorporate the arguments discussed above, and also argue Hagar II does not disclose the above-discussed limitations of independent claims 1, 8, and 15. (App. Br. 13-14.) Because, as discussed above, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding Hagar and Cucerzan teach or suggest the limitations at issue, we sustain the rejection of these dependent claims. With respect to the Examiner's obviousness rejection of dependent claims 5 and 12 over Hagar, Cucerzan, and Bartz, Appellants incorporate the arguments discussed above, and also argue Bartz does not disclose the above-discussed limitations of independent claims 1, 8, and 15. (App. Br. 14--15.) Again, as discussed, these arguments are unpersuasive, and accordingly we also sustain the rejection of these dependent claims. 7 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 As stated above, dependent claim 14 is indicated as rejected in the Final Office Action, but the Examiner does not provide the basis or rationale for the rejection. However, Appellants make no argument as to this claim, and therefore have waived their Appeal directed to this claim. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 14. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-20. 4 4 In the event of further prosecution of this application, we direct the Examiner's attention to the question of whether the claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of the preliminary examination instructions on patent eligible subject matter. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, USPTO (Dec. 16, 2014). Abstract ideas identified by the courts as patent ineligible subject matter include, by way of example, fundamental economic practices, certain methods of organizing human activities, an idea 'of itself,' and mathematical relationships/formulae. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355-56 (2014). Although claim 1, for example, recites a "processor" and "a memory device," a question arises as to whether a person would also be capable of perfonning the acts of the claimed subject matter as mental steps, or with the aid of pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson"). Our reviewing court further guides that "a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under§ 101." CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373. We leave further consideration of this § 101 issue to the Examiner. While the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02 (9th Ed., Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 8 Appeal2014-008055 Application 13/173,643 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation