Ex Parte Barthel

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 16, 2016

13070646 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/070,646 03/24/2011
24131 7590 06/20/2016
LERNER GREENBERG STEMER LLP
PO BOX 2480
HOLLYWOOD, FL 33022-2480
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Roland Barthel
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2010P05482 2494
EXAMINER
VILLENA, MARK
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2658
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/20/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
boxoa@patentusa.com
docket@patentusa.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROLAND BARTHEL
Appeal2014-009718
Application 13/070,646
Technology Center 2600
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
DENISE M. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judges.
BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
STATEivIENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
rejection of claims 1-13, which stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Barthel (US 2005/0259838 Al; published Nov. 24, 2005)
and Perez-Mendez (US 5,754,978; issued May 19, 1998). Final Act. 2-7. 1
We have jurisdiction under 3 5 U.S. C. § 6(b ). We review the appealed
rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in
light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye,
94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
We affirm.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
Appellant's invention improves the voice control of hearing devices.
Spec. ,-r 6. In particular, the invention uses a binaural configuration of two
hearing devices. Id. ,-r 8. The first hearing device's voice-recognition
method uses information data sent from the second device; s voice-
recognition method. Id. For example, the information data can contain a
recognized voice command. Id. Through this configuration, the invention
reduces incorrect recognition of voice commands. Id.
1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Office Action mailed
Sept. 24, 2013 ("Final Act."); (2) the Appeal Brief filed February 19, 2014
("Br."); and (3) the Examiner's Answer mailed July 8, 2014 ("Ans.").
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
1---6:
CLAHvIS 1---6
Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative2 of claims
1. A method for v01ce control of hearing aids, which
comprises the steps of:
transmitting voice commands to a hearing aid being a
binaural apparatus with hearing devices including a first hearing
device and a second hearing device, the voice commands
providing voice control of the hearing aid;
transferring information data from a second voice
recognition method of the second hearing device method3 to a
first voice recognition method of the first hearing device; and
using, in the first voice recognition method of the first
hearing device, the information data from the second voice
recognition method of the second hearing device for recognition
of the voice commands.
Contentions
Under § 103, the Examiner combines two embodiments from Barthel
with Perez-Mendez to conclude that the claimed invention would have been
obvious. Final Act. 2-5. In particular, the Examiner finds that Barthel's
first embodiment provides voice control for a hearing aid. Id. at 2-3 (citing
Barthel Fig. 2, i-f 29). But the Examiner finds that Barthel's first
embodiment lacks a binaural configuration. Final Act. 3. The Examiner
2 Appellant argues claims 1---6 together as a group. See Br. 4--8.
Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative of claims 1---6.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
3 We understand claim 1 's recitation of "method" in the phrase "the second
hearing device method'' (emphasis added) to be a clerical drafting error.
Because the antecedent basis for this limitation is "a second hearing device,"
we understand "device method" to mean "device." We leave to the
Examiner and Appellant to address this issue.
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
turns to a second embodiment in Barthel in concluding that this binaural
configuration would have been obvious. Id. (citing Barthel Fig. 3, i-f 30).
The Examiner further finds that the combined teachings of Barthel's
two embodiments lack a second voice-recognition method, the associated
information data, and the recited "using step." Final Act. 3--4. The
Examiner then cites Perez-Mendez in concluding that these features would
have been obvious. Id. at 4--5. In particular, the Examiner finds that Perez-
Mendez shows (1) two voice recognition methods and (2) using the second
method's data in the first, as recited. Id. at 4 (citing Perez-Mendez Fig. 2,
items 34, 36, and Abstract).
Appellant presents four main arguments against the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1. Br. 6-7.
First, Appellant argues that Perez-Mendez's engine 32 converts the
speech into electrical signal 33 for both speech recognition engines 34 and
36. Id. at 6. According to Appellant, in the application, each hearing aid
forms and interprets its own electrical signal from speech---e.g., two
electrical signals from the speech are formed and interpreted, in contrast to
Perez-Mendez's one signal 33. Id.
Second, Appellant argues that Perez-Mendez's speech-recognition
engine 32 provides only speech data, not "information data." Id. Appellant
argues the recited "information data" in the application can be the result of
voice recognition, but does not have to be. Id. at 6-7 (citing Spec. i-f 31 ).
Appellant then contends that, unlike the broader "information data," Perez-
Mendez's speech data must be the result of a more specific voice
recognition. Br. 7.
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
Third, Appellant argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have combined the references in the manner that the Examiner has proposed.
Id. According to Appellant, one could not put Perez-Mendez's speech-
recognition engines 32 and 34 in one hearing aid and engine 36 in another.
Id. Rather, Appellant argues that engine 36 must be connected to engine 32.
Id. And according to Appellant, Perez-Mendez's data transfer happens in
the same device. Id.
Fourth, Appellant argues that Perez-Mendez requires text comparator
42 and the application uses two radio modules 16 and 26. Id.
Analysis
The Examiner's rejection relies on Perez-Mendez's Figure 2
embodiment (Final Act. 4), which is reproduced below.
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Perez-Mendez's Figure 2 showing a block diagram of the speech
recognition system.
In the system shown above, speech-recognition engine 32 converts
sound waves to electrical signal 33. Perez-Mendez col. 6, 11. 22-24, quoted
in Ans. 4. Electrical signal 33 is supplied to speech-recognition engines 34
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
and 36. Perez-iviendez col. 6, 11. 24--26, quoted in Ans. 4. The speech-
recognition engines may either be identical or not identical. Id. Abstract,
cited in Final Act. 4.
The underlying premise of Perez-Mendez's design is that recognizing
no text is preferable to recognizing text incorrectly. Perez-Mendez col. 8,
11. 18-21. To this end, text comparator 42 compares the recognized-text-
output signals (38, 40) and accepts or rejects the text based on degree of
agreement between the signals. Id. Abstract, cited in Final Act. 4.
The Examiner proposes adding Perez-Mendez's speech-recognition
engines 34, 36 and text comparator 42 to Barthel's binaural device
configuration. Final Act. 4--5. In particular, Barthel transfers data between
the left and right hearing aids. Barthel i-f 30 (describing Fig. 3), cited in
Final Act. 3. And the Examiner states that Barthel and Perez-Mendez are
combined "to transmit data between the two hearing aids" and "to recognize
voice commands" by comparing speech-recognition results. Final Act. 4--5.
We therefore understand the Examiner's proposed combination to be
(1) placing Perez-Mendez's engine 34 in one of Barthel's hearing aids and
(2) placing engine 36 and comparator 42 in the other. See id.
Like Perez-Mendez's engine 32, Barthel's hearing aids have a
component to convert speech to electrical signals-namely, the microphone.
See Barthel i-f 29, cited in Final Act. 3. The signal 1' of the microphone is
fed to unit 7' that detects words. Barthel i-f 29 (describing Fig. 2).
Based upon this understanding of the rejection's basis, we tum to
Appellant's first argument-that Perez-Mendez, as used in the proposed
combination, only forms one electrical signal. Br. 6. This argument does
not squarely address, let alone persuasively rebut, the Examiner's rejection.
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Application 13/070,646
That is, we find no evidence that the Examiner proposes removing the
existing microphones from one of the hearing aids. See Final Act. 3.
Rather, the Examiner's reliance on Barthel's first embodiment indicates that
the Perez-Mendez's engines 34 and 36 receive electrical signals from both of
Barthel's microphones. See id.
For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by Appellant's third
argument that recognition engine 32 is required for the system to function
properly (Br. 7). Appellant does not explain why another component, like
Barthel's microphone (Barthel i-f 29), could not also send the electrical signal
to Perez-Mendez's engines 34 and 36. Nor has Appellant shown that doing
so would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of
ordinarily skilled artisans. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
On the contrary, as discussed above, Perez-Mendez's engines operate
on the same input-speech converted to electrical signals-when used alone
(see Perez-Mendez col. 6, 11. 24--26) and in combination with Barthel (see
Final Act. 4--5). Accordingly, the Examiner's proposal here is nothing more
than an obvious combination of prior art elements according to known
methods to yield predictable results. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant's argument that Perez-Mendez
does not disclose putting speech engines 34 and 36 in different devices
(Br. 7) because "[a] suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the
relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior
art .... " In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Here, the
Examiner's obviousness conclusion (Final Act. 4--5) is supported by an
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning. Namely, that the
proposed addition of Perez-Mendez would increase recognition rates.
Id. at 5. To this reasoning, Appellant has not provided a persuasive rebuttal.
Furthermore, Appellant's first, second, and fourth arguments are
based on limitations not found in the claims. Br. 6-7. Notably, Appellant
refers to the "instant application," rather than the claim limitation. See id.
Indeed, we find no limitations in claim 1 that require the "same voice
signal," "other data related to the voice command" or "radio modules." Nor
does Appellant point to any paragraphs that express a clear intent to deviate
from plain meaning of the claim terms so as to require these features. See
Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
Nevertheless, even assuming that paragraph 3 1 in the disclosure
defines "information data" as "the result of voice recognition" or "other data
related to the voice command," as Appellant argues (Br. 6-7), this definition
only supports the Examiner's finding that Perez-Mendez's data reads on
"information data" (Final Act. 4). That is, Appellant acknowledges that
Perez-Mendez's data "must be the result of the voice recognition." Br. 7.
Accordingly, Appellant's definition for information data encompasses
Perez-Mendez's specific type of information data. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner's obviousness rejection of representative claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of that claim, as well as
dependent claims 2---6, which fall with claim 1.
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
CLAHvIS 7-13
We also sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections of claims
7-13, which recite a hearing aid with structural features similar to claim 1.
Appellant incorporates the arguments for claim 1 in the arguments presented
for claim 7. Br. 8. For example, Appellant reiterates the argument that there
are no teachings to place the speech recognition components in separate
hearing devices and they would not function if they were. Id. at 8-9.
Appellant further argues that the Examiner has not explained where text
comparator 42 of Perez-Mendez is placed in the proposed combination.
Id. at 9.
We are unpersuaded by these arguments for the reasons stated above.
Specifically, we understand the Examiner's proposed combination as placing
Perez-Mendez's engine 34 in one hearing aid and placing engine 36 and
comparator 42 in the other. See Final Act. 4--5. This proposed combination
can be inferred from the Examiner's statement in the rejection, as discussed
above. See id. To these findings, Appellant presents no evidence that the
electrical signal from Barthel's microphone, for example, could not be fed to
Perez-Mendez's engine 34 and 36. See Br. 9.
Instead, Appellant assumes Perez-Mendez's system must be
incorporated in its entirety into Barthel. See id. But we see no evidence that
the rejection is based upon combining the references in such a manner.
We also are unconvinced by Appellant's arguments (id. at 6-9) that
this is the only way to combine the references. Rather, the Examiner
proposes an alternative combination supported by an articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning, as discussed above. See Final Act. 4--5;
see also id. at 7 (applying the reasoning of claim 1 to claim 7).
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Appeal2014-09718
Application 13/070,646
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments for claim
7 and dependent claims 8-13, not separately argued (see Br. 8-9).
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-13 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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