Ex Parte Barrie et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 28, 2016

13088424 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 28, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/088,424 04/18/2011 Robert Matthew Barrie TGN0005T J/PREEP1011JS 8412
23623 7590 12/30/2016
AMIN, TUROCY & WATSON, LLP
127 Public Square
57 th Floor, Key Tower
CLEVELAND, OH 44114
EXAMINER
PRESTON, JOHN O
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/30/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketl @thepatentattorneys.com
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT MATTHEW BARRIE,
DARREN NICHOLAS JOHN WILLIAMS,
DAVID HARRISON, and PETER PHILIPS
Appeal 2014-003621
Application 13/0884241
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.
FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Appellants identify Freelancer Technology Pty Limited as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1.
1
Appeal 2014-003621
Application 1/088,424
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
THE INVENTION
Appellants’ claims “relate[] to distributed computing, and in particular
to distributed computing that involves engaging one or more associate
computers to assist in completing a task.” Spec. 3,11. 3—5.
Claim 1 reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method for a service computing device to engage, on
behalf of a client computing device, one or more remote
computing devices to perform at least one client directed task
for a fee, comprising the steps of:
(a) receiving, by a system comprising a processor, from a
client computing device associated with a client, data indicative
of at least one task to be performed;
(b) reviewing, by the system, capabilities of one or more
remote computing devices;
(c) selecting, by the system, at least one of the one or
more remote computing devices for performing at least a first
subtask;
(d) receiving, by the system, an indication of receipt of a
payment from the client;
(e) dispatching, by the system, the first subtask to at least
one of the one or more selected remote computing devices;
(f) receiving, by the system, a first result indicative of
performance of the first subtask, from the one or more remote
computing device to which the first subtask was dispatched;
and
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Application 1/088,424
(g) providing, by the system, an indication permitting
payment to a remote provider associated with the one or more
remote computing device to which the first subtask was
dispatched.
THE REJECTION
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Vega US 2002/0120554 A1
Martin US 2008/0028405 A1
Berkovitz US 2008/0221964 A1
Aug. 29, 2002
Jan. 31, 2008
Sept. 11,2008
The following rejections are before us for review.
Claims 1—6 and 10—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Berkovitz and in view of Martin.
Claims 7—9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Berkovitz and Martin, and in view of Vega.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2—14 of the
Final Action and on pages 4-8 of the Answer.
Appeal 2014-003621
Application 1/088,424
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION
The Appellants argued independent claims 1,17 and 19 as a group.
(Appeal Br. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for
this group, and the remaining independent claims stand or fall with claim 1.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
Appellants argue, “Martin does not teach reviewing capabilities or
selecting based on capabilities. Rather, Martin teaches checking whether a
computing [sic] working is busy or idle. Martin || 0048-0050.” (Appeal Br.
5).
The Examiner however found, “Martin teaches selecting a first remote
computing device that has the required capabilities for performance of the
first subtask (Martin: pgh 67-68).” (Ans. 4). The Examiner also found that
“Berkovitz teaches providing a marketplace for performance of tasks,
payment for performance, or negotiation of terms for performance
(Berkovitz: pgh 29-32).” (Final Act. 3).
We disagree with Appellants. Appellants’ Specification does not
specifically define the term “capability,” nor does it utilize the term contrary
to its customary meaning. The ordinary and customary definition of the
term “capability” is: “the ability to do something”.2 We thus find
unpersuasive Appellants’ argument that because Martin only discloses
checking whether a computer is “busy or idle”, it cannot check based on
capability. This is because the definition of capability encompasses whether
2 Capability Definition, Meriam-Webster.com, https ://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/capability (last visited 12/19/2016)
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Application 1/088,424
something or someone is “busy or idle”. That is, when a device is idle it is
capable of taking on a task, and when it is busy, it is not so capable.
Appellants next argue that Berkovitz discloses:
a process that does not involve an automated system reviewing
capabilities of remote computing devices or selecting remote
computing devices that have required capabilities. Instead,
Berkovitz describes a largely manual process, “Consumers and
service providers register with the database to post tasks and
search for tasks to be completed.” Berkovitz | 0006. This
manual searching for tasks by service providers is quite
different from an automated system that reviews the capabilities
of remote computing devices. It is also quite different from an
automated selection of a remote computing device that has
required capabilities.
(Appeal Br. 6).
We disagree with Appellants because we find that the results of
automation, such as argued by Appellants, are “the commonly understood
benefits of such adaptation, such as decreased size, increased reliability,
simplified operation, and reduced cost” which is an obvious modification
under controlling case law. See Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007). It thus follows that Berkovitz
does not teach away (Appeal Br. 7, 9), merely because it discloses using
people, rather than a computer to accomplish a determining step.
Appellants next argue that:
Berkovitz does not disclose the association of remote providers
and remote computing devices. Berkovitz discloses only
“service providers” (see, e.g., Berkovitz | 0019; 1 0025), not
remote computing devices. Second, Berkovitz clearly teaches
that the escrow service relied upon by the Examiner (see Office
Action of June 7, 2013 at p. 2 | 3) is a third party service and
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Application 1/088,424
accessible “only” by a third party. Berkovitz Abstract and
10007.
(Appeal Br. 8).
We disagree with Appellants because, as to the first argument,
Appellants attack the Berkovitz reference individually when the rejection is
based on a combination of Martin and Berkovitz, and the Examiner relies on
Martin for disclosing the feature of assessing the capability of a client
computing device. (Final Act. 7—8). We also disagree with Appellants’
second argument that the limitation of “receiving, by the system, an
indication of receipt of a payment from the client” is not met by Berkovitz.
The Examiner found that the third party escrow service provides such
indication of receipt of a payment from the client. (Ans. 4-5). The
Examiner cites to paragraph 29 of Berkovitz to show this feature. (Id.). Our
review of Berkovitz at paragraph 29 reveals that Berkovitz discloses
“[rjeleased funds are directly deposited into an electronic account held by
the service provider.” We thus find that one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that payments made to an account by a client, and hence
recorded as such, constitutes an indication of receipt by the system.
Appellants also argue: “Berkovitz 10031 is directed to limiting the
types, locations, ratings, etc. of service providers that may bid on a task.
However, this disclosure does not suggest any offer or acceptance of terms
for performance.” (Appeal Br. 9).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments here because claim 1
does not require “any offer or acceptance of terms for performance” as
argued by Appellants above.
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Application 1/088,424
Appellants next argue that:
Specifically, the Examiner does not show or suggest that one of
ordinary skill could have combined (a) Martin’s computing
devices having the same software capabilities with Berkovitz's
service provider (i.e., a person or business), (b) Martin's
automated cooperative scheduler with Berkovitz’s consumer
(i.e., a person), or (c) Martin's cooperative system with
Berkovitz’s competitive marketplace. Nor does the Examiner
show any rationale for combining an automated cooperative
system with a manual competitive marketplace.
(Appeal Br. 10).
We disagree with Appellants. First, Appellants’ argument seeks an
explanation of how the computer system of Martin would be bodily
incorporated into the system of Berkovitz, which is not the test for
obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). We further
disagree with the Appellants’ argument that no rationale is provided by the
Examiner for combining Martin with Berkovitz because the Examiner found
task management to be common between the two references, and thus based
the combination on that common feature. (Final Act. 3).
Concerning Appellants’ argument to dependent claims 2—123, 14, 18,
and 20 (Appeal Br. 11-14), we adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings as
set forth on pages 6-8 of the Answer, and find Appellants’ arguments
unpersuasive for the same reasons found by the Examiner as set forth
3 Concerning Appellants’ arguments to claim 8, our review of the rejection
made in the Final Action shows that the Examiner applied Vega in rejecting
claim 7, and that because claims 7-9 were rejected together as a group under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Final Act. 13), the features of Vega were incorporated
into the combination applied in the rejection of claim 8.
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Application 1/088,424
therein.
We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 13, 15, 16, and 18
because Appellants have not challenged these claims with any reasonable
specificity. See In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
DECISION
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED