Ex Parte Baratz et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 14, 201712836793 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/836,793 07/15/2010 Alan Edward Baratz 648.0002 2953 93379 7590 11/16/2017 Setter Rnehe T T P EXAMINER 14694 Orchard Parkway WANG, LIANG CHE A Building A, Suite 200 Westminster, CO 80023 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2447 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/16/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): s arah @ setterroche. com pair_avaya@ firsttofile.com u spto @ setterroche .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALAN EDWARD BARATZ, ANTHONY FRANK BARTOLO, JAYESH GOVINDARAJAN, ANWAR A. SIDDIQUI, JOHN F. BUFORD, and VYANKATESH BALAJI DESHPANDE Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 Technology Center 2400 Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JON M. JURGOVAN, and KEVIN C. TROCK, Administrative Patent Judges. MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 STATEMENT OF CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Exemplary Claims Exemplary claims 1 and 7 under appeal read as follows (emphasis added): 1. A method of operating a communication system, the method comprising: registering a first communication device operated by a first session participant with a peer-to-peer network as a first node on the peer-to-peer network associated with the first session participant and a first entity; registering a second communication device operated by a second session participant with the peer-to-peer network as a second node on the peer-to-peer network associated with the second session participant; registering a third communication device operated by a third session participant with the peer-to-peer network as a third node on the peer-to-peer network associated with the third session participant; initiating a communication session to establish communications with an agent within a contact center environment; selecting the first session participant from between at least the first session participant and the third session participant as the agent with which the communications should be established; in response to selecting the first session participant, establishing the communication session between the first node and the second node; transferring for display by the second communication device first persona information identifying the first session participant and the first entity; and 2 Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 exchanging user communications for the communication session between the first communication device and the second communication device. 7. The method of claim 1 wherein the first persona information comprises a service handle that identifies the first participant and a graphic that identifies the first entity. Rejections The Examiner rejected claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ludwig et al. (US 2006/0064461 Al, published Mar. 23, 2006).1 Issues on Appeal Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being anticipated? ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments (Appeal and Reply Briefs) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following points. 1 We select claim 1 as representative. Appellants do not separately argue claims 2—20. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv)(“ Under each heading identifying the ground of rejection being contested, any claim(s) argued separately or as a subgroup shall be argued under a separate subheading that identifies the claim(s) by number.”). Except for our ultimate decision, this rejection of these claims is not discussed further herein. 3 Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 A Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because: Ludwig fails to disclose that devices operated by session participants are registered as nodes on a peer-to-peer network. Instead, the only elements that could be considered nodes on a peer-to-peer network are ML AN Servers 60, which Ludwig does not teach are operated by session participants. Specifically, the only peer type communications mentioned in the entirety of Ludwig are those between MLAN Servers 60, which Ludwig teaches communicate on a “peer-to- peer basis” (see Ludwig, 10038).2 App. Br. 7 (Appellants’ emphasis omitted; Panel emphasis added). As to Appellants’ contention, we disagree. Appellants state “the only peer type communications mentioned in the entirety of Ludwig are those between MLAN Servers 60.” Ludwig 1 68. Appellants are mistaken. At paragraph 61, Ludwig also states that as to the individual collaborative multimedia workstations (CMWs) 12: While lines 13a and 13b may be implemented in various ways, it is currently preferred to use commonly installed 4-pair UTP telephone wires . . . These UTP wires are used in a hierarchy or peer arrangements of star topologies to create MLAN 10. Ludwig 1 61. Ludwig explicitly contradicts Appellants’ attempt to limit Ludwig’s peer-to-peer connections to only servers 60. Rather, Ludwig teaches the CMW nodes may also be connected in a peer arrangement. 2 We treat 0038” as a typographical error, and read it as —f 0068—. Paragraph 38 is directed to figure 3 ID, and does not recite the “peer-to- peer” subject matter referenced by Appellants. 4 Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 B Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because: Additionally, the only registration process disclosed by Ludwig teaches that all client programs must register the services they provide with the Service Server 69, which is a component of each ML AN Server 60 (see Ludwig, 1 0136). Even if a device on which such a client program ran was considered a communication device operated by a participant in accordance with claim 1, the registration merely allows Service Server 69 to track the location of the client program and the types of sessions in which the client program can participate (see id.). The registration does not register the client program, or any device on which the client program is running, as a node on a peer-to-peer network, as claim 1 requires of the first, second, and third communication devices. Thus, Ludwig does not disclose the registration of participant operated communication devices as nodes on a peer-to-peer network. App. Br. 7 (Appellants’ emphasis omitted; Panel emphasis added). [T]he fact that user devices can communicate with one another and perform some sort of registration with a server does not disclose those devices registering as nodes on a peer-to-peer network. Reply Br. 2. As to Appellants’ contention, we disagree. Beyond asserting that registration of services does not show the claimed registering as a node, Appellants fail to explain what they deem the limitation “registering as a node” to preclude Ludwig’s registering of services. We find Appellants’ assertion to be conclusory. Such unsupported attorney argument, is entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 L.3d 1465, 1470 (Led. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 L.2d 699, 705 (Led. Cir. 1984). 5 Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 Further, our review concludes paragraph 24 of Appellants’ Specification provides a broad description of a registered node as: Referring to Figure 1, communication devices 111, 121, and 131, once registered as nodes with P2P network 110, include nodes 113, 123, and 133 respectively. Nodes 113, 123, and 133 respectively, may be software elements running on communication devices 111, 121, and 131 that allow participants 115, 125, and 135 to participate in P2P network 110. For example, nodes 113, 123, and 133 may be communication software that provides chat, voice calling, or video calling capability, including variations or combinations thereof. Specification 124 (emphasis added). We compare this to Ludwig. The central component of the Collaborative Multimedia Workstation software is the Collaboration Initiator 161. All collaborative functions can be accessed through this module[.] When the Collaboration Initiator is started, it exchanges initial configuration information with the Audio Video Network Manager (AVNM) 60 (shown in FIG. 3) through Data Network 902. Information is also sent from the Collaboration Initiator to the AVNM indicating the location of the user, the types of services available on that workstation (e.g., videoconferencing, data conferencing, telephony, etc.) and other relevant initialization information. Ludwig 1125 (emphasis added). Contrary to Appellants’ argument, we conclude the registering of services in Ludwig is directly on point to the claimed registering of nodes. 6 Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 C Further, Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because:3 Ludwig merely discloses that a caller’s handle can be used to change the caller to a hold state (see Ludwig, 10152). In contrast, the first persona information of claim 7 is persona information of an agent within a contact center environment, not a caller to the contact center environment. App. Br. 8. As to Appellants’ contention, we disagree. Appellants are arguing a difference where that difference is the label (“agent”) applied to a participant. The argued point is merely a label as to the skill set or authority possessed by the participant. As the label does not change the function or structure of the communication system, the label Appellants have applied to the participant does not serve to distinguish over the prior art communication system. CONCLUSIONS (1) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—20 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). (2) Claims 1—20 are not patentable. 3 Although Appellants style this argument as being directed to claim 7, the “agent” is claimed in its parent claim 1. Therefore, we treat this argument as being directed to claim 1. 7 Appeal 2017-007490 Application 12/836,793 DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20 as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation