Ex Parte BangorDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 9, 201410267068 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 9, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/267,068 10/07/2002 Aaron W. Bangor T00437 (00064) 8549 82744 7590 06/10/2014 AT&T Legal Department - JW Attn: Patent Docketing Room 2A-207 One AT&T Way Bedminster, NJ 07921 EXAMINER TRAN, QUOC A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2177 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/10/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte AARON W. BANGOR ____________________ Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and ROBERT J. WEINSCHENK, Administrative Patent Judges. MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Introduction Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Exemplary Claims Exemplary claims 5, 2, 14, and 1 under appeal read as follows (emphasis added): 5. A method for providing a computerized provisioning environment for a service agent performing provisioning of intelligence network services, comprising: grouping identity information, indicative of an identity of the service agent, into an identity information section; grouping a plurality of navigation links into a navigation section, each of the plurality of navigation links directed to a particular information page comprising information concerning the provisioning of the intelligence network services; grouping a plurality of task links into a task section, each of the plurality of task links directed to a particular page for performing a task associated with the provisioning of the intelligence network services; and displaying the identity information section, the navigation section, and the task section on a same single layout. 2. The method of Claim 1, wherein displaying the identity information section, the customer information section, the navigation section, and the task section in a same single layout comprises displaying a particular corresponding color background for each of the identity information section, the customer information section, the navigation section, and the task section. Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 3 14. The system of Claim 13, wherein the program is operable to continually display the identity information group in a same position in the same single layout when the particular page comprising the information or the particular page for performing the task is displayed[.]1 1. (In-part) A method for providing a computerized provisioning environment for a service agent performing provisioning of advanced intelligent network services, comprising: . . . wherein the identity information group remains displayed in a same position in the same single layout when the particular page comprising the information or the particular page for performing the task is displayed, . . . positioning the task section under the customer information section and next to the navigation section. 2 Rejections on Appeal The Examiner rejected claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Strickland (US 5,956,024), Elliott (US 7,145,898 B1), and Goss (US 2004/0039846 A1). 3 1 As filed, claim 14 lacked a period. 2 The reproduced “wherein” clause of claim 1 is confusing, we suggest replacing with the following or similar language (changes emphasized): “wherein the identity information section remains displayed in a same position in the same single layout when a first desired particular page comprising the information or a second desired particular page for performing the task is displayed,”. 3 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 1, 4, 6-8, 12, 13, and 15-20. Except for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein. Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 4 Appellant’s Contentions 1. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 5 under § 103(a) because the information in Goss is not indicative of a service agent performing provisioning as required by claim 5. App. Br. 6-8. Further, Appellant argues that: Appellant notes that the Answer emphasizes the inclusion of an agent’s name (Gwenna Williamson) in Goss FIG. 6. See, Answer at pp. 35-36. Appellant further notes that FIG. 6 of Goss depicts “Case History” and “Case Details” information and Gwenna Williamson is the name of an agent that handled a matter contained in the case history. In other words, the name “Gwenna Williamson” does not identify the agent who is performing the provisioning services as recited in claim 5. Reply Br. 1-2. 2. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2 under § 103(a) because: Although both the reference and the claim 2 are concerned with the use of color, the use of color to distinguish the state of different connections in a conference call application does not teach or suggest the use of different color backgrounds for different sections of a provisioning application as claimed. App. Br. 9 (emphasis added). 3. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 3 under § 103(a) because: Although both the reference and the claim 3 are concerned with the use of color, the use of color to distinguish the state of different connections in a conference call application does not teach or suggest the use of differently color links in a provisioning application as claimed. App. Br. 9 (emphasis added). Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 5 4. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 9 under § 103(a) because: [A]lthough the user interfaces of FIG. 1 and FIG. 3 of Strickland include reference numerals individually identifying each of the sections, the rejection does not indicate which reference numerals allegedly correspond to which of the claimed sections. App. Br. 10. 5. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 10 under § 103(a) because the stated rejection “is a facially incorrect statement” for the reasons set forth by Appellant at page 10 of the Appeal Brief. 6. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11 under § 103(a) because the stated rejection “is improper” for the reasons set forth by Appellant at pages 10-11 of the Appeal Brief. 7. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 14 under § 103(a) because the stated rejection is “confusing” for the reasons set forth by Appellant at page 11 of the Appeal Brief and page 3 of the Reply Brief. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. As to Appellant’s above contentions 5-7 covering claims 10, 11, and 14, we agree with Appellant’s arguments. However, we leave it to the Examiner to prepare new rejections of these claims for reasons noted in this decision. For example, as to claim 14, it is conventional in the art to have a Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 6 program that is operable to continually display information in a same position in a layout. See Strickland at Figure 3, Field 2, (col. 3, ll. 10-12) which shows the conventional Apple ™ menu which is well known to continually display information in a same position in a layout. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions as to contentions 1-4 covering claims 1-9, 12, 13, and 15-20. As to the rejection of these claims, we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for emphasis. As to Appellant’s above contention 1, we disagree. Appellant is mistaken that “the name ‘Gwenna Williamson’ does not identify the agent who is performing the provisioning services” (Reply Br. 2) because the trouble ticket “Case ID” (Goss, Fig. 6, white text on black background) and the Case Details “Case ID” are the same. Separately as to contentions 1-4, 4 Appellant’s argument is directed to the information content of the displayed non-functional descriptive material (e.g., “information, indicative of an identity of the service agent,” (claim 5); particular type of information being colored differently (claims 2 and 3); and particular groupings of information being placed at selected locations in a data structure, i.e., particular display format (claim 9)). It appears to us that in numerous instances the argued subject matter presented in the claims on appeal relates to features that differ from the prior art solely on the basis of 4 This analysis is equally applicable to claims 10 and 11. We leave it to the Examiner to prepare new rejections of these claims. Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 7 “non-functional descriptive material” (e.g., the data structure of Appellant’s claim 9 is identical to the data structure for displaying groupings of information in figure 1 of Strickland, they differ only in their non-functional information to be displayed in each grouping), which is generally not given patentable weight when determining patentability of an invention over the prior art. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The PTO may not disregard claim limitations comprised of printed matter. See Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1384; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981). However, the Examiner need not give patentable weight to descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material and the substrate. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed Cir. 1994); In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“[N]onfunctional descriptive material cannot lend patentability to an invention that would have otherwise been anticipated by the prior art.”), aff'd, 191 Fed.Appx. 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rule 36); Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“Nonfunctional descriptive material cannot render nonobvious an invention that would have otherwise been obvious.”), aff'd, No. 06-1003 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 12, 2006) (Rule 36). We conclude that if the prior art describes all the claimed structural and functional relationships between the descriptive material and the substrate, but the prior art describes a different descriptive material than the claim; then the descriptive material is non-functional and will not be given any patentable weight. That is, we conclude that such a scenario presents no new and unobvious functional relationship between the descriptive material Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 8 and the substrate. In the instant case on appeal, we find that the subject matter argued by Appellant in contentions 1-4 recites non-functional descriptive material which does not provide a patentable distinction to the data or to the process of the claimed methods. In other words, we find that the meaning to a human of the content of a human viewable image or of human-readable instructions cannot be used to distinguish the claimed invention from other human-readable or viewable information whose processing is otherwise identical. CONCLUSIONS (1) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 10, 11, and 14. (2) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-9, 12, 13, and 15-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). (3) Claims 1-9, 12, 13, and 15-20 are not patentable. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 10, 11, and 14 is reversed. 5 The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-9, 12, 13, and 15-20 is affirmed. 5 We leave it to the Examiner to prepare new rejections of these claims as discussed in this decision. Appeal 2011-002899 Application 10/267,068 9 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation