Ex Parte Banavar et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Dec 13, 2011

10434815 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 13, 2011)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10/434,815 05/09/2003 Guruduth Somasekhara Banavar YOR920030011US1 7372
7590 12/13/2011
Ryan, Mason & Lewis, LLP
Suite 205
1300 Post Road
Fairfield, CT 06430
EXAMINER
VU, THONG H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2159
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/13/2011 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte GURUDUTH SOMASEKHARA BANAVAR,
JOHN SIDNEY DAVIS II, and DABY MOUSSE SOW
____________

Appeal 2009-014618
Application 10/434,815
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
ANDREW J. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judges

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-20, which are all the claims pending in the application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

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Invention
Appellants’ invention relates generally to the field of data mining.
More particularly, the invention on appeal is directed to mining data about
users. (Spec. 1).
Representative Claim 1
1. A method of invoking at least one service associated with
one or more patterns in context of one or more users, the
method comprising the steps of:

receiving filtered context from one or more sources,
wherein said filtered context has been filtered based on privacy
requirements;

determining one or more patterns in said context.
corresponding to the one or more users, wherein said context
comprises said filtered context;

correlating the one or more patterns in the context with
one or more of a plurality, of services; and

invoking the one or more services correlated to the one or
more patterns in the context based on current context of the one
or more users.

(Emphasis added regarding disputed limitations).

Rejections
1. Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being
anticipated by Salmenkaita (US Pat. Pub. 2004/0176958 A1).

2. Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being
anticipated by Engberg (US Pat. Pub. 2003/0158960 A1).
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ANALYSIS
First-stated § 102 rejection
Claims 1-5, 12-14, and 16-20
Regarding this first-stated rejection over Salmenkaita, Appellants
argue claims 1-5, 12-14, and 16-20 as a group. (App. Br. 4-6). We select
representative claim 1 to decide the appeal for this group. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Appellants contend that Salmenkaita does not disclose “determining
one or more patterns in context that has been filtered based on privacy
requirements.” (App. Br. 4, italics and underline in original).
Salmenkaita is teaching that the privacy control grants or
revokes access bv application programs and web servers
connected to the context inference server. While Sahnenkaita
teaches that the privacy control grants or revokes access by
application programs and web servers and teaches that privacy
filter settings 229 are applied to the data in the Past
Recornmendation XML File 227 (see, FIG. 4C and
paragraph [0167]), Salmenkaita does not disclose or suggest
that the current context (retrieved in step 230 of FIG. 4C) is
filtered based on privacy requirements prior to being used to
determine the patterns.
(App. Br. 5).

ISSUE
Based upon our review of the administrative record, we have
determined that the following issue is dispositive regarding representative
claim 1 that stands rejected under §102 over Salmenkaita:

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Under §102, did the Examiner err by finding that Salmenkaita
discloses:
receiving filtered context from one or more sources,
wherein said filtered context has been filtered based on privacy
requirements; [and]

determining one or more patterns in said context
corresponding to the one or more users, wherein said context
comprises said filtered context,

within the meaning of representative claim 1?

We begin our analysis by observing that the Examiner points to
paragraphs 107, 144, and 223 for teaching the filtering based on user privacy
requirements. (Ans. 3, 12-13).
In particular, Appellants refer to paragraph 0144 of Salmenkaita.
(App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 3). For convenience, we reproduce paragraph 0144
below, and the several examples of privacy filter settings which follow:

[0144] The user can initialize the device 100 by entering
privacy filter settings, as shown in the browser 102 of FIG. 3E.
Privacy filter settings are used to remove the user's private
information from the messages sent by the device 100 to the
network server 140. Examples of privacy filter settings that can
be stored in the device 100 are:

[0145] FOR CURRENT REQUESTS:

[0146] [a] REMOVE USER NAME

[0147] [b] ENTER OTHER DATA TO REMOVE

[0148] FOR PAST RECOMMENDATIONS:
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[0149] [a] REMOVE USER NAME

[0150] [b] REMOVE LOCATION OF PAST
RECOMMENDATION

[0151] [c] REMOVE DATE OF PAST RECOMMENDATION

[0152] [d] REMOVE NAME OF PAST SERVICE PROVIDER

[0153] [e] ENTER OTHER DATA TO REMOVE

Salmenkaita’s paragraph 0144 refers to (wireless) device 100
which is shown in Fig. 5. Salmenkaita’s paragraph 0144 also refers to
server 140 which is shown in Fig. 6. From Fig. 5, we observe that the
user’s privacy profile 152 is applied to privacy control 150 which is
further applied to the current context and requests for context.
Salmenkaita’s paragraph 0223 discloses:
The same privacy control and privacy profile is extended to the
context inference server, thereby enabling the extension of the
user’s privacy control to any web server connected to the
context inference server. The feature thus enables building an
infrastructure for context sensitive applications and services
within the wireless device and the server, while providing to the
mobile user control over the privacy user's context information.

Because wireless device 100 (Fig. 5) communicates with server 140
(Fig. 6), we find server 140 receives context information from wireless
device 100 which is filtered according to the user’s privacy filter settings
and privacy profile 152. We also agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Salmenkaita’s paragraph 0048 discloses the claim determining step which is
met when Salmenkaita’s network server responds to a request for a service
recommendation from the wireless device 100. (Ans. 3, 13).
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For at least these reasons, on this record, we find Appellants’
arguments unpersuasive of Examiner error. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection over Salmenkaita of representative claim
1, and claims 2-5, 12-14, and 16-20 which fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Anticipation rejection of independent claim 20 over Engberg
Regarding the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent claim
20 over Engberg, Appellants merely (1) restate the portion of the reference
relied on by the Examiner, and (2) recite the language of claim 20, and (3)
assert that Engberg does not disclose or suggests the recited limitations.
(App. Br. 6-8).
However, merely reciting the language of the claim is insufficient to
persuade us of Examiner error. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(vii) (“A statement
which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an
argument for separate patentability of the claim.”).
Merely stating that Appellants “could find no disclosure or suggestion
by Engberg” regarding the disputed limitations is insufficient to persuade us
of Examiner error. (App. Br. 5). See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the Board has reasonably interpreted
Rule 41.37 to require applicants to articulate more substantive arguments if
they wish for individual claims to be treated separately.”).
The Examiner has pointed to specific disclosures in Engberg. (Ans.
11). Appellants have not traversed the Examiner’s rejection with any
substantive argument or evidence. Conclusory statements that are
unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re
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Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe,
736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693,
slip op. at 7-8 (BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd09004693.pdf.
This reasoning is applicable here. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s second-stated anticipation rejection of independent claim 20
over Engberg.

Anticipation rejection of dependent claims 6 and 15
over each of Salmenkaita and Engberg
Regarding the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of dependent claims 6
and 15 over Salmenkaita and the overlapping anticipation rejection of
dependent claims 6 and 15 over Engberg, Appellants merely (1) restate the
portion of the reference relied on by the Examiner, and (2) recite the claim
language, and (3) assert that neither Salmenkaita nor Engberg discloses or
suggests the recited limitations. (App. Br. 6-8).
As discussed above, merely reciting the language of the claim is
insufficient to persuade us of Examiner error. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(vii).
See also Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1356. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
first-stated anticipation rejection of claim 6 (and claims 7-11 not argued
separately),1 and claim 15 over Salmenkaita. For the same reason (no
substantive argument), we also sustain the Examiner’s second-stated
anticipation rejection of claim 6 (and claims 7-11 not argued separately), and
claim 15 over Engberg.

1 We select representative claim 6 to decide the appeal for the group of
claims 7-11 that depend thereon and are not argued separately. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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Anticipation rejection of claims 1-5, 12-14, and 16-19 over Engberg
Appellants do not provide any arguments traversing the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of claims 1-5, 12-14, and 16-19 over Engberg.
Therefore, we consider these arguments waived. See Hyatt v. Dudas, 551
F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir 2008) (“When the appellant fails to contest a
ground of rejection to the Board, section 1.192(c)(7) [(now section
41.37(c)(1)(vii))] imposes no burden on the Board to consider the merits of
that ground of rejection. . . . [T]he Board may treat any argument with
respect to that ground of rejection as waived.”).
On this record, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of claims 1-5, 12-14, and 16-19 over Engberg.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner §102(e) rejection of claims 1-20 over
Salmenkaita.
We affirm the Examiner §102(e) rejection of claims 1-20 over
Engberg.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

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