Ex Parte Babich et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 20, 2018

13655004 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 20, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/655,004 10/18/2012
75532 7590 06/22/2018
LEE LAW, PLLC
IBM SVLIP
P.O. BOX 189
PITTSBORO, NC 27312
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Alan F. Babich
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
S VL920 l 20069US 1 7343
EXAMINER
MCATEE,PATRICK
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/22/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@leelawpllc.com
docketing_archive@leelawpllc.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALAN F. BABICH, MIKE A. MARIN, and MIMI P. VO
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004 1
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13-18, and 21-24. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellants' invention relates "to use of proxy objects for integration
between a content management system and a case management system."
(Spec. ,r 1.)
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is International Business
Machines Corporation. (Appeal Br. 3.)
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
Claims 1, 9, and 1 7 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative. It recites:
1. A method comprising:
designating, by a processor of a computer, a first content
management system to store proxy objects for root case instance
folders, real objects for documents, and real objects for other
folders in a first folder sub-hierarchy;
designating, by the processor of the computer, a second
content management system to store real objects for the root case
instance folders, proxy objects for the documents, and proxy
objects for the other folders in a second folder sub-hierarchy;
in response to receiving a first operation to modify one of
1) a real object for a document among the real objects for the
documents and 2) a real object for a folder among the real objects
for the other folders, having the first content management system
to process the first operation; and
in response to receiving a second operation to modify a
real object for a root case instance folder among the real objects
for the root case instance folders, having the second content
management system to process the second operation.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, and 23 are provisionally
rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being
unpatentable over claims 1-24 of copending Application No. 14/060,091
(hereinafter "the '091 application").
Claims 8, 16, and 24 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-24 of the
'091 application, and Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of
Cloud Computing (Draft), NIST Special Pub. 800-145 (Draft) (Jan. 2011)
(hereinafter "Mell").
2
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
Claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13-18, and 21-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(b) as
anticipated by Cramer (US 5,946,685, iss. Aug. 31, 1999).
Claims 2, 6, 7, 10, 14, 15, 18, 22, and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as unpatentable in view of Cramer and Johnson
(US 2006/0085412 Al, pub. Apr. 20, 2006).
Claims 8, 16, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable in view of Cramer and Mell.
ANALYSIS
The provisional double patenting rejections
o(claims l, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, and 23
Claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, and 23 are provisionally
rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting in view of the '091
application. (Final Action 4.) In particular, independent claims 1, 9, and 17
of the present application are rejected in view of claims 1, 17, and 9 of the
'091 application.
Although the '091 Application refers to a case
management system and external content repository rather than
a first content management system and second content
management system, the Examiner asserts that each of the above
elements is merely a computer system programmed to perform
and respond to remote procedure calls to add, modify, update,
link, and delete content. As such, it would have been obvious to
a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention to refer to the programmed computers by any
designated title as this would not have affected or impacted the
functionality performed by the computer ....
3
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
(Id. at 6.)
Appellants argue that "the claims of the present application recite ...
designating a first content management system ... and recite designating a
second content management system .... In contrast, the claims of the ['091
application] recite ... detecting a case creation event ... to cause creation of
a case within the case management system." (Appeal Br. 19.) Specifically,
Appellants argue:
(Id.)
The rejection further alleges that a "case management
system" is equivalent to a "content management system." (Final
Office Action dated August 25, 2015, page 5). However,
Appellant teaches that these two types of systems are distinct and
different systems that perform distinct and different functions
( e.g., one manages cases, and the other manages "content" that
may be associated with the cases).
The Examiner answers that "[t]here is no explanation in Appellant's
[sic] brief regarding why the difference between 'cases' and 'content'
amounts to a technical, patentable distinction, rather than a purely semantic
one." (Answer 65.)
Appellants' Specification discloses that "[ c ]ontent management
systems manage objects (such as documents, folders, or other types of
objects)" (Spec. ,r 2), that "[p]rocess management systems manage workflow
processes and may use a content management system to store and retrieve
objects, as well as, to maintain workflow queues" (id. ,r 3), and that "[a] case
management system uses both a process management system and a content
management system in order to facilitate the processing of cases ... by
human case workers" (id. ,I4). Thus, Appellants' argument relates to the
4
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
type of information, e.g., documents or workflow, being managed by the
system.
"Obviousness-type double patenting ... requires rejection of an
application claim when the claimed subject matter is not patentably distinct
from the subject matter claimed in a commonly owned patent." In re Berg,
140 F.3d 1428, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "Generally, a 'one-way' test has been
applied to determine obviousness-type double patenting. Under that test, the
examiner asks whether the application claims are obvious over the patent
claims." Id. at 1432. Here, we agree with the Examiner. Appellants have
not persuasively argued why the Examiner erred in determining that the
claims of the present application would have been obvious over the claims
of the '091 application. Specifically, Appellants have not persuasively
argued that the asserted difference in the type of information at issue in a
"content management system" and in a "case management system" shows
that the subject matter of claim 1 of the present application is patentably
distinct from the subject matter of claim 1 of the '091 application.
Therefore, Appellants have not persuasively shown that the Examiner
erred in provisionally rejecting claim 1 on the ground of double patenting.
Because Appellants do not separately argue claims 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17,
18, 22, and 23, these claims fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
The provisional double patenting re;ection of claims 8, 16, and 24
Claims 8, 16, and 24 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting in view of the '091 application and Mell.
(Final Action 9.) Appellants do not present any arguments in response.
5
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
Therefore, we summarily affirm the provisional rejection of claims 8, 16,
and 24 on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting.
The§ 1 OJ reiection
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101, however,
"'contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.'" Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if "the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept." Id. If the claims
are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the second
step of the framework is applied to determine if "the elements of the
claim ... contain[] an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." Id. at 2357 (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 79).
6
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
As an initial matter, we note that all claims are argued together.
Therefore, the claims will stand or fall together. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We select claim 1 as representative.
With regard to step one of the Alice framework, the Examiner
determines that the claims are directed to "the abstract idea of managing data
by executing predefined tasks according to rules, with the intended use or
purpose of data redundancy or synchronization between multiple
computers." (Final Action 12; see also id. at 14.)
Appellants disagree and argue that the claims are "directed to real-
time processing and partitioning of responsibility between different devices,
where specifically as claimed each content management system processes
different operations to modify the respective different real objects stored at
the respective devices." (Appeal Br. 23-24.)
Under step one of the Alice framework, we "look at the 'focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's 'character as a
whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Moreover, because the focus of the analysis is on the claim as a whole, a
claim may incorporate multiple abstract ideas, but that "does not render the
claim non-abstract." RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that the claimed
invention relates "to use of proxy objects for integration between a content
management system and a case management system." (Spec. ,r 1.) Claim 1
7
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
recites "[a] method comprising: designating ... a first content management
system to store proxy objects ... and real objects," "designating ... a
second content management system to store real objects ... and proxy
objects," "in response to receiving a first operation to modify one of' the
real objects stored in the first management system, "having the first ...
management system to process the first operation," "and in response to
receiving a second operation to modify one of' the real objects stored in the
second management system, "having the second ... management system to
process the second operation."
Although we and the Examiner describe, at different levels of
abstraction, to what the claims are directed, it is recognized that "[a]n
abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction."
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this
case, that does not "impact the patentability analysis." See id. at 1241.
Moreover, in this case, as in Alice, we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the "abstract ideas" category. It is enough to recognize that
there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction between the
concept of using proxy objects to integrate between two systems, and
creating shadow records held independently by separate institutions,
adjusting shadow records as transactions are made, and issuing related
instructions, which the Court determined amount[ s] to nothing more than
"electronic record keeping----one of the most basic functions of a computer."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359; see also id. at 2352 n.2. Therefore, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that the claims are directed
to an abstract idea, i.e., "the abstract idea of managing data by executing
predefined tasks according to rules, with the intended use or purpose of data
8
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
redundancy or synchronization between multiple computers." (See Final
Action 12; see also id. at 14.)
Nonetheless, Appellants argue that "Appellant's [sic] claimed subject
matter is not directed to an abstract idea to the exclusion of others." (Appeal
Br. 22.) We understand this to be an argument rooted in a concern for
preemption, i.e., that the claims are patent-eligible because they do not
preempt every application of the abstract idea. We do not find this argument
persuasive of error. Preemption is not a separate test.
To be clear, the proper focus is not preemption per se, for some
measure of preemption is intrinsic in the statutory right granted
with every patent to exclude competitors, for a limited time, from
practicing the claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154. Rather,
the animating concern is that claims should not be coextensive
with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; a
patent-eligible claim must include one or more substantive
limitations that, in the words of the Supreme Court, add
"significantly more" to the basic principle, with the result that
the claim covers significantly less. See Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1294
[566 U.S. at 72-73].
CLS Bankint'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (Lourie, J., concurring), aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Moreover,
"[ w ]here a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot." Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In other words, "preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
[but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility." Id.
9
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
We now look to step two of the Alice framework which has been
described "as a search for an ' "inventive concept" '-i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
The Examiner determines that "none of the claim limitations recite
any improvement to another technology or technical field [or] an
improvement to the functioning of the computer itself." (Final Action 14.)
Appellants disagree and argue that "Appellant [sic] improves
computing technology itself by improving partitioning of responsibility
between two content management systems, as claimed." (Appeal Br. 22.)
Specifically, Appellants argue that the claims "amount to significantly more
than the alleged exception, by specifically reciting that the claimed
programmed processor/process performs real-time processing by having
operations to modify the respective real objects managed by the different
content repositories processed by the respective different content
repositories." (Id. at 23.)
As an initial matter, we note that claim 1 does not recite performing
"real-time processing." Claim 1 is silent on the temporal relation between,
e.g., "receiving a first operation" and "process[ing] the first operation."
Therefore, we do not find the argument persuasive of error.
With regard to Appellants' more general argument that the claimed
invention "improves computing technology itself by improving partitioning
of responsibility between two content management systems" (id. at 22), we
are not persuaded of error. Appellants do not point to anything in the
Specification or elsewhere to support the attorney argument that the claimed
10
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
method "improves computer technology." Instead, Appellants' argument
appears to be based on the assertion that "[t]here has not been shown a
previous or conventional approach to solving this technological real-time
problem of partitioned responsibility." (Id. at 21.)
However, even if the claimed techniques are "[g]roundbreaking,
innovative, or even brilliant," that is not enough for patent eligibility. Ass 'n
for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591. "The 'novelty' of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 under§ 101. Claims 2, 5-10, 13-18, and 21-24 fall with claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
The§ 102(b) re;ection o(claims l, 5, 9, 13, 17, and 21
Cramer discloses a "global mount mechanism [that] mounts a new file
system resource into the global name space in a coherent manner such that
the new file system resource is mounted at the same mount point
concurrently in each node." (Cramer, Abstract.) Figure 8D of Cramer is
shown below:
11
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
Figure 8D illustrates an example of the steps used by a global mount
mechanism to mount a new file system resource into a global name space.
(Id. at col. 3, 11. 3--4 and col. 2, 11. 65---67.)
Cramer also discloses that
[i]n the case where the client and server computer are the same
node, the client node 102a will have a file system object (FSobj)
116 and a file object (Fobj) 114 for a file system resource when
the client node 102a is acting as the sever [sic] for the file system
resource and will have proxy data structures when the client node
102a is acting as a client for the resource. The proxy file object
122 contains an object reference to the associated file object 114
and the proxy file system object 122 contains an object reference
to the associated file system object 116.
(Id. at col. 4, 11. 1-10.)
The Examiner finds:
Because Cramer ( as cited above) discloses that each node
can act as either a client or server depending on the file system
12
,....
, ...
1':
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
resource, and that a node can be a client (with respect to proxy
objects) and server (with respect to real objects) simultaneously,
a person having ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the
system shown in Figure 8D may have an alternate configuration.
In the alternate configuration, proxy VFS 151 in node 102a (i.e.,
"Client Node1") could be swapped with VFS 150 in node 102b
(i.e., "Server Node") making node 102a the server node for VFS
150 and node 102b the client node for corresponding proxy VFS
151.
(Final Action 20.) In view of the above, "[t]he Examiner ... create[s] for
reference a simplified alternate of Figure 8D below to represent this alternate
state of the system ... : "
FSobj -122a---., ..
~-
proxy
~ \lnode for
/' /rnnt
\ pm>,:y
\IFS
VFS
102a .... /
13
124a----
PxVFS
proxy
VFS
402b .... >'
vnooe for
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
(Id. at 21.)2 In the Examiner-created Figure 8D Alternate, node 102a stores
"proxy 'vnode for /mnt' to access proxy VFS 121 and proxy file object
'PxFobj' 122a (i.e., proxy objects for the documents and proxy objects for
the other folders) in the cluster/local hierarchy of node 102a." (Id.)
Appellants disagree and argue that "the principle elements ( e.g.,
vnode, VFS, and FSobj) are always correlated on the same node, and that
node is always the server node that serves the respective principle file
system elements within the global namespace." (Appeal Br. 34.)
Additionally, Appellants argue that the cited portion of Cramer, i.e.,
column 4, lines 1-10,
confirms ... that when a node is acting as both a client node and
a server node, the node "will have" (required in the citation
twice) each of the respective sets of "data structures," and that
these data structures must be present and must be used to operate
as the respective node type (server or client) within the global
name space.
(Id. at 35.) Thus, Appellants further argue,
as disclosed within the Cramer reference, to function as a client
node, the respective node must have the "proxy data structures"
(all of them - the "proxy" VFS element, the "proxy" FSobj, and
the "proxy" vnode) working in conjunction with one another for
a given "resource" to support client-based access to that
particular resource. Further, to function as a server node, the
respective node must have the principle data structures ( all of
them - the VFS, the FSobj, and the vnode - not proxy elements)
working in conjunction with one another for a given "resource"
to support server-based access to the particular resources.
2 "VFS" refers to a virtual file system mechanism and "vnode" refers to a
virtual file system node. (See Cramer, col. 2, 11. 16-22.)
14
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
(Reply Br. 9.) "No commingling of the principle nodes and principle file
system elements/resources with proxy nodes or proxy file system
elements/resources is factually disclosed in the Cramer reference as cited."
(Id.) In other words, Appellants argue, because claims 1, 9, and 1 7 recite
such comingling, i.e., "designating ... a first content management system to
store proxy objects for root case instance folders, real objects for documents,
and real objects for other folders in a first folder sub-hierarchy" and
"designating ... a second content management system to store real objects
for the root case instance folders, proxy objects for the documents, and
proxy objects for the other folders in a second folder sub-hierarchy," Cramer
does not anticipate claims 1, 9, and 1 7. 3
3 Appellants also argue:
As a threshold, this formal introduction of an alleged
alternative configuration based upon speculation of the Examiner
constitutes manufacturing of evidence. Further, based upon the
technical facts regarding operation of the respective data
structure stacks of the Cramer reference that are required to be
interconnected within the global name space as cited, this formal
introduction of an alternative configuration constitutes
manufacturing of false evidence. Manufacture of false evidence
by an administrative agent is a violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). Use of false manufactured evidence to
deprive Appellant of justified patent rights violates Due Process.
(Appeal Br. 37-38; see also id. at 32.) We do not find the Examiner's
determination that "a person having ordinary skill in the art would recognize
that the system shown in Figure 8D may have an alternate configuration"
(Final Action 20) or the revised Figure 8D ( clearly labeled "Figure 8D
Alternate") illustrating such an alternate configuration, to be in any way
"false evidence." Nor do we find Appellants' accusations of such to be
helpful to us in understanding Appellants' arguments. We remind
Appellants and Appellants' counsel that "Applicants and their attorneys or
15
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
"[ A ]n invention is anticipated if the same device, including all the
claim limitations, is shown in a single prior art reference. Every element of
the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim."
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
If the prior art reference does not expressly set forth a
particular element of the claim, that reference may still anticipate
if that element is "inherent" in its disclosure. To establish
inherency, the extrinsic evidence "must make clear that the
missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing
described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by
persons of ordinary skill." Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto
Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1746, 1749
(Fed.Cir.1991 ). "Inherency, however, may not be established by
probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing
may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient."
Id. at 1269, 948 F.2d 1264, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1749 (quoting In re
Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581, 212 U.S.P.Q. 323, 326
(C.C.P.A.1981)).
In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Here, the Examiner acknowledges that all of the claim limitations are
not literally present and arranged as shown in the claim, i.e., "a person
having ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the system shown in
Figure 8D may have an alternate configuration." (See Final Action 20.)
With regard to inherency, the Examiner finds that in the alternate
configuration, "proxy VFS 151 in node 102a ... could be swapped with
VFS 150 in node 102b ... making node 102a the server node for VFS 150
and node 102b the client node for corresponding proxy VFS 151." (Id.,
emphasis added.) Particularly in view of the disclosure in Cramer that
agents are required to conduct their business with the United States Patent
and Trademark Office with decorum and courtesy." 37 C.F.R. § 1.3.
16
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
"where the client and server computer are the same node, the client node
102a will have a file system object ... and a file object ... for a file system
resource when the client node 102a is acting as the sever [sic] for the file
system resource and will have proxy data structures when the client node
102a is acting as a client for the resource," we find that the Examiner has not
established that the proposed alternate configuration "is necessarily present
in the thing described." See Continental Can Co., 948 F.2d at 128.
In view of the above, we will reverse the rejection of claim 1.
Independent claims 9 and 1 7 contain similar language and for similar
reasons we will reverse the rejection of claims 9 and 1 7, and dependent
claims 5, 13, and 21.
The§ 103(a) re;ections o(claims 2, ~8. 10, 1~16, 18, and 22-24
In rejecting dependent claims 2, 6-8, 10, 14--16, 18, and 22-24 under
§ 103(a), the Examiner does not rely on the additional references to cure the
deficiency noted above. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we will
reverse the rejections of claims 2, 6-8, 10, 14--16, 18, and 22-24 under
§ 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner's provisional rejections of claims 1, 2, 6-10, 14--18,
and 22-24 on the grounds of nonstatutory double patenting are affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 5-10, 13-18, and 21-24
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 5, 9, 13, 1 7, and 21 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is reversed.
17
Appeal2017-000669
Application 13/655,004
The Examiner's rejections of claims 2, 6-8, 10, 14--16, 18, and 22-24
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
18