Ex parte Ayache

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 25, 1999

08151938 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 25, 1999)

Application for patent filed November 15, 1993. 1
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered
today (1) was not written for publication in a law
journal and (2) is not binding precedent of the
Board.
Paper No. 21
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte ELIE AYACHE
____________
Appeal No. 95-3920
Application No. 08/151,9381
____________
ON BRIEF
____________
Before URYNOWICZ, KRASS and CARMICHAEL, Administrative Patent
Judges.
KRASS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal from the final rejection of
claims 1 through 11, all of the claims pending.
Appeal No. 95-3920
Application No. 08/151,938
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The invention is directed to a variable frequency clock
for an electronic system. More particularly, the frequency of
a system clock is reduced when a microprocessor has been idle
for a predetermined time in order to decrease power
dissipation.
Representative independent method claim 8 is reproduced
as follows:
8. A method of reducing power dissipated by an
electronic system, comprising the steps of:
monitoring a component of said system for a change in an
output thereof from a logic “1" to logic “0" or vice versa;
and
reducing the frequency of a clock of said system when
said output is constant for a predetermined interval of time.
The examiner relies on the following references:
Carter et al. (Carter) 4,980,836 Dec. 25,
1990
Watts, Jr. et al. (Watts) 5,218,704 Jun. 8,
1993
Claims 1, 3 and 8 through 10 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. 102(e) as anticipated by Watts. Additionally, claims 1
through 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as unpatentable
Appeal No. 95-3920
Application No. 08/151,938
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over Watts. In a new ground of rejection entered in the
principal answer, the examiner further rejects claims 1
through 11 under 35 U.S.C. 103 as unpatentable over Watts in
view of Carter while claims 8 through 11 stand further
rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as unpatentable over Carter in
view of Watts.
Reference is made to the briefs and answers for the
respective details of the positions of appellant and the
examiner.
OPINION
We will sustain all of the stated rejections on appeal.
With regard to the rejection of claims 1, 3 and 8 through
10, the examiner has set forth a prima facie case of
anticipation in showing that Watts discloses the provision of
a timer reset pulse, the generation of a timeout pulse and the
reduction of a system clock frequency.
With regard to claims 1 through 11, the examiner has set
forth a prima facie case of obviousness by showing that while
one might argue that Watts does not appear to show the claimed
physical pulses, it was notorious to skilled artisans in the
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Application No. 08/151,938
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data processing arts that a high level description as set
forth by Watts “would be physically implemented using the
physical pulses of the claimed invention.” [principal answer -
page 3].
With regard to the new grounds of rejection under 35
U.S.C. 103, the examiner sets forth a prima facie case of
obviousness by pointing out that while Watts may not show a
specific hardware realization of a timer reset or timeout
pulse, when viewed in light of Carter, in the environment of
stopping a system clock when peripherals have been inactive
for a predetermined time, which discloses hardware
implementations of the indicated claim limitations, the
skilled artisan would have been led to the claimed invention.
While, in our view, the examiner has set forth reasonable
cases of anticipation and obviousness, appellant’s response is
merely to attack the Watts reference as an improper reference
against the instant claims because Watts is directed to
software for changing the frequency of the clock rather than
the hardware of the instant claimed invention. Appellant
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Application No. 08/151,938
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calls the difference between Watts and the instant claimed
invention “apples and oranges.”
We disagree. We find no hardware in the instant claims
described with such specificity that a software embodiment, as
shown in Watts, would not be sufficient to describe the same
functions set forth in the claims. For example, we find very
little difference between mere rectangular boxes labeled
“activity sensor” and “delay timer” in Figure 1 of the instant
disclosure and flow diagram boxes in Watts labeled “determine
activity level” and “Decrease T (OFF) Interval” (Figure 1).
The software, or flow diagrams, in Watts provides the
artisan with everything he/she needs to implement the
invention described in the instant claims. While appellant
vociferously argues that the “abstractions” of Watts’ software
can not possibly provide for the hardware of the instant
claims, we note that other than labeled rectangular boxes,
appellant has shown no specific hardware. Boxes labeled
“timer,” “activity sensor,” etc. describe merely the function
which is to be obtained. They do not describe any specific
hardware being used to implement any particular function. It
is our view that from such a disclosure, appellant is in a
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Application No. 08/151,938
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poor position to argue that the software implementation of
Watts, which describes the functions and result to be obtained
by the instant invention, does not anticipate, and/or make
obvious, the instant claimed subject matter. We would further
note that, in fact, Watts shows more specific hardware than
does appellant. See Figure 3 of Watts. We also note, with
some curiosity, that while appellant argues so strongly that
the difference between Watts and the instant claimed invention
is the use of “hardware” by the latter, instant claims 8
through 11 are directed to a method, containing no “hardware”
at all.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, at page 6 of the
principal brief, that “referring to a ‘hardware implementation
... of Watts’ is confusingly illogical,” we find it very
logical that the artisan implementing the process set forth by
Watts in flow diagram form would clearly implement it with
some type of hardware.
With regard to appellant’s argument, at page 4 of the
reply brief, that Carter is not combinable with Watts because
Carter is directed to stopping the clock, we disagree. Watts
teaches the reduction of clock frequency as in the instant
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claimed invention. Carter was employed by the examiner merely
to suggest to artisans that there are hardware implementations
for operating on a system clock when peripherals have been
inactive for a predetermined time. We believe that a hardware
implementation of what is shown in Watts would have been
obvious, by itself, to artisans, Carter being merely
cumulative to what is already shown by Watts with regard to
the instant claimed invention.
We find no convincing arguments by appellant in this
record as to why Watts would not be applicable to the instant
claimed subject matter in the manner applied by the examiner.
Accordingly, the examiner’s decision is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
Appeal No. 95-3920
Application No. 08/151,938
8
STANLEY M. URYNOWICZ, JR. )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
ERROL A. KRASS ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
JAMES T. CARMICHAEL )
Administrative Patent Judge )
bae
Appeal No. 95-3920
Application No. 08/151,938
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