Ex Parte Asfour

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 7, 2018

14576445 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 7, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/576,445 12/19/2014 Logain Asfour 1301-053U 2857
112025 7590
CRGO LAW
7900 Glades Road
Suite 520
Boca Raton, EL 33434
02/09/2018 EXAMINER
POPHAM, JEFFREY D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/09/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LOGAIN ASFOUR
Appeal 2017-005960
Application 14/576,4451
Technology Center 2400
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Technology
The application relates to “pattern driven data privacy management.”
Spec. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below:
1. A method for pattern driven data privacy management, the
method comprising:
monitoring different attempts by one or more end users to
access data in a database and a context in which each of the
different attempts occur;
computing different patterns of access to the data according
to different contexts in which the different attempts occur;
1 Appellant states the real party in interest is SugarCRM Inc. App. Br. 2.
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Application 14/576,445
mapping the computed different patterns to a respective
portion of the data for which a mapped one of the patterns is
computed; and,
responsive to a contemporaneous attempt to access a
particular portion of the data, determining a contemporaneous
context for the contemporaneous attempt, locating in the mapping
a computed pattern for the particular portion of the data,
comparing the contemporaneous context to the computed pattern
of access for the particular portion of the data, and if the
contemporaneous context deviates from a computed pattern of
access for the particular portion of the data, enforcing a data
privacy rule in respect to the particular portion of the data.
Rejection
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
the combination of Wong (US 2014/0181290 Al; June 26, 2014) and
Janakiraman et al. (US 2007/0083915 Al; Apr. 12, 2007). Final Act. 7-18.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner’s rejection meet the notice requirement under
35 U.S.C. § 132?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Wong and
Janakiraman teaches or suggests “mapping the computed different patterns
to a respective portion of the data for which a mapped one of the patterns is
computed” and “if the contemporaneous context deviates from a computed
pattern of access for the particular portion of the data, enforcing a data
privacy rule in respect to the particular portion of the data,” as recited in
claim 1?
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ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Notice Requirement
In Appellant’s own words, Appellant “attack[s] the suitability of
Wong as a reference without regard to the combination of Wong with
Janakiraman.” App. Br. 7-8. Thus, “Appellant does not provide any
argument with respect to the Janakiraman reference, . . . nor does Appellant
provide any argument against the combination of Wong in view of
Janakiraman.” Ans. 2. Yet “[t]he rejection cites both Wong and
Janakiraman as disclosing the majority of the claim.” Id. at 14. In
particular, “Janakirman is cited as disclosing all of claim 1 except for the
preamble.” Id.\ Final Act. 9-11. We therefore agree with the Examiner that
Appellant fails to adequately address the rejection. “Non-obviousness
cannot be established by attacking references individually where the
rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Even if Appellant’s arguments with respect to Wong alone are
considered, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Appellant argues the
Examiner has not specifically identified a teaching in Wong that discloses
the claimed limitation because the Examiner cites the same 26 paragraphs in
Wong for each limitation “without any correlation between the specific
claimed elements and the cited portions, and contributed only a few words of
analysis.” App. Br. 10-12. However,
all that is required of the office to meet its prima facie burden of
production is to set forth the statutory basis of the rejection and
the reference or references relied upon in a sufficiently articulate
and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of
[35 U.S.C.] § 132. As the statute itself instructs, the examiner
must “notify the applicant,” “stating the reasons for such
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rejection,” “together with such information and references as
may be useful in judging the propriety of continuing prosecution
of his application.” 35 U.S.C. § 132.
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Section 132 merely ensures that an applicant at least be informed
of the broad statutory basis for the rejection of his claims, so that
he may determine what the issues are on which he can or should
produce evidence. Section 132 is violated when a rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and
seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.
Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted).
In Jung, “the examiner’s discussion of the theory of invalidity
(anticipation), the prior art basis for the rejection (Kalnitsky), and the
identification of where each limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the
prior art reference by specific column and line number was more than
sufficient to meet this burden.” Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363 (emphasis added).
Here, the Examiner provided the theory of invalidity (obviousness),
the prior art basis for the rejection (Wong and Janakiraman), where each
limitation of the rejected claims is shown in the prior art references by
specific paragraphs, and a discussion of the relevant teachings in the cited
paragraphs. Final Act. 7-11; Ans. 24. Indeed, we determine the Examiner
has set forth a detailed explanation of a reasoned conclusion of obviousness
with respect to each of the claims and therefore has established a prima facie
case of obviousness. For example, for the limitation “mapping the computed
different patterns to a respective portion of the data for which a mapped one
of the patterns is computed,” the Examiner cites paragraphs 10, 12, 20-31,
34, and 36^46 and explains these paragraphs teach “allowing for providing
varying access rights based on where the user is located, for example, such
as providing access to other applications, while denying access to trading
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Application 14/576,445
application, and/or providing access to trading application if the user is
authenticated, authorized, and present at the appropriate device, as
examples.” Final Act. 8. Looking at the cited paragraphs of Wong, we find
Wong discusses examples of a user having different active network sessions
at the same time (e.g., on a computer at home, a computer at work, a laptop
at a coffee shop between home and office, and a mobile phone or tablet at
every location) despite physically only being in one location at a time
flfll 20-21, 36-37), the dangers of allowing access depending on where the
user is located (e.g., an “unattended” computer) 10, 12, 22), and
techniques for allowing or disallowing access (e.g., to a stock-trading
application) based on “contextual data” such as where the user is located
(e.g., a “security tag of ‘TraderAtConsole’”) (]fl| 22-31, 34, 38^46).
Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner’s rejection here is
“so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and
seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester, 906 F.2d at 1578.
We note, for example, that Appellant has not identified any specific claim
limitation where the Examiner’s explanation is unclear. See Reply Br. 5
(“The clarity in Examiner’s remarks speaks for itself.”). Similarly, we agree
with the Examiner that “only those terms need be construed that are in
controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”
Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
1999). Again, Appellant has not identified any specific claim term it
believes is in controversy and needs to be construed.
Accordingly, we determine the Examiner has set forth “the reasons for
[the] rejection . . . together with such information and references as may be
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Application 14/576,445
useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the]
application,” as required by 35 U.S.C. § 132.
Issue 2: Claim 1
Claim 1 recites “mapping the computed different patterns to a
respective portion of the data for which a mapped one of the patterns is
computed” and “if the contemporaneous context deviates from a computed
pattern of access for the particular portion of the data, enforcing a data
privacy rule in respect to the particular portion of the data.”
According to Appellant, “there is no suggestion in Wong that any
mapping occurs between any data for which an attempt at access occurs and
patterns of access for past attempts to access the same data. But, so much is
required by Applicants’claim language.” App. Br. 15. In particular,
Appellant argues that Wong teaches enforcing policies, not mapping patterns
and comparing a contemporaneous context for a pattern match. See App. Br.
15; Reply Br. 6-8.
The Examiner identifies numerous examples from Wong, such as
permitting access to a stock trading app “when the trader is at the console”
but denying access “once the trader leaves his/her console” (e.g., if an
unauthorized user attempts to use a computer that the trader left on when
leaving the room). Ans. 33-34 (citing Wong ]fl[ 39 40); Final Act. 7-9.
Appellant characterizes these as “policies,” yet Appellant fails to explain
how such policies are any different than the claimed “enforcing a data
privacy rule” “if the contemporaneous context deviates from a computed
pattern of access” (emphasis added). For example, Wong explains that it “is
common for users to leave an active network session unattended for a period
of time which may allow access to sensitive network resources and/or
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Application 14/576,445
provide an opportunity for a hacker or other malicious entity to access the
network.” Wong 22; Final Act. 8 (citing Wong 22); see also Wong
10, 12. Thus, network administrators have recognized two patterns of
access according to different contexts: (A) the trader is at his or her console
and (B) the trader is not at his or her console. Ans. 33-36; Final Act. 7-9
(e.g., “deciding whether to allow access (if user is present) or deny access (if
user is away)”). Access to data (e.g., a stock trading app) is then mapped to
one of these patterns (i.e., the trader being at his or her console). Ans. 33-34
(discussing Wong 39), 35 (same), 36; Final Act. 8. A rule is then enforced
if a contemporaneous context deviates from that pattern (i.e., if the trader is
not at his or her console). Ans. 34-35; Final Act. 8-9. Thus, Appellant has
not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding Wong teaches or suggests
the “mapping” and “enforcing” limitations.
Indeed, upon review of all of Appellant’s assertions, we are not
persuaded the combination of Wong and Janakiraman fails to teach or
suggest any of the limitations of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and
claims 2-20, which Appellant does not argue separately. See App. Br. 5.
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1-20. No time for taking subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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