Ex Parte Aschick et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesDec 30, 200910163038 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 30, 2009) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte PETER ASHICK, THOMAS FLECK, MICHAEL KALTENBACH, UDO KLEEMANN and NORBERT LIEBISCH ____________ Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Decided: December 30, 2009 ____________ Before, MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and BIBHU R. MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judges. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2002). SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM. THE INVENTION Appellants claim a system and method for supply chain process management, and more specifically for managing logistics of a supply chain of digitally networked supply chain participants. (Specification 1:18-22) Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A processor-implemented decentralized method of managing a supply chain of digitally networked supply chain participants, comprising: identifying at least two supply chain suppliers in the supply chain being linked directly within the supply chain; grouping the at least two supply chain suppliers; determining, on the side of each of the at least two grouped supply chain suppliers, logistic fulfillment requirements for providing local supply activities to the at least other supply chain participant of the grouped supply chain suppliers; exchanging logistic fulfillment information between the at least two supply chain suppliers for controlling the local supply activities; Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 3 controlling the supply chain, on the side of each of the at least two supply chain suppliers, dependent on the content of the exchanged logistic fulfillment information. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Adler US 2002/0169658 A1 Nov. 14, 2002 Crabtree US 2002/0128944 A1 Sep. 12, 2002 Cline US 6,944,598 B1 Sep. 13, 2005 The following rejections are before us for review. The Examiner rejected claim Claims 1-12 and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler. The Examiner rejected claims 3, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler and Cline. The Examiner rejected claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as being indefinite. ISSUES Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting Claims 1- 12 and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler on the grounds that a person with ordinary skill in the art would understand that although Crabtree discloses a trusted agent in the system customer/supplier systems, suppliers are still able to communicate at the server to server level? Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 4 Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting Claims 1- 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph as being indefinite because the claims recite each side of the supply chain? PRINCIPLES OF LAW The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). “Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also KSR, 550 U.S. at 407 (“While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.”) Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 5 FINDINGS OF FACT We find the following facts by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. The Examiner found that Crabtree discloses all the elements of independent claims 1, 12 and 17 except “…logistic fulfillment to the other supply chain but Adler discloses determining, on the side of each of the at least two grouped supply chain suppliers, logistic fulfillment requirements for providing local supply activities to the at least other supply chain participant of the grouped supply chain participants (page 3, [0022]).” (Answer 4) 2. The Examiner thus found that: It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to utilize the logistic fulfillment information as taught by Alder into the system of Crabtree because it would allow more suppliers to join and participation a supply chain, which may help to increase the efficiency of the fulfillment process. (Answer 4) 3. The Specification Summary states: The idea underlying the invention is to provide a certain level of supplier collaboration and replenishment, i.e. control of goods movement, by way of logistic information exchange between suppliers directly interlinked within the entire supply chain network and thus to defer responsibility for fulfillment of local logistic supply chain requirements from the supplied company to the supply chain participants, thus to decentralize those local management efforts but to keep control of the entire supply chain process at the supplied company. (Specification 5:17-27) Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 6 4. Crabtree discloses that while the trusted agent 300 is associated with a public hub 302, both of which cooperate to facilitate the exchange of commodities over, for instance, a network, such as an Internet, Intranet, Extranet or other type of network, the trusted agent functions nevertheless can be provided by an independent entity from that of the public hub. (¶ [0026]) 5. Crabtree discloses, “[a]lternatively, the customer/supplier computer system can perform server-to-server level communication to interchange data. Information 450 can be passed between customer/supplier systems 408, 410 and systems 402, 404, 406 via public hub 412.” (¶ [0040]) 6. Alder discloses a highly adaptive, modular framework allowing attributes and decision rules to be modified quickly and selectively. (¶ [0052]) ANALYSIS We affirm the rejections of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); and reverse the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as being indefinite. The 35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph Rejection. Appellants traverse the rejection of 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph rejection. Appellants “submit that the statement ‘on the side’ is descriptive of a location, as clearly described throughout the patent application, for example, at page 5, first paragraph; page 7, first paragraph; page 10, line 12: page 12, first and second paragraphs, etc. As a result, the statement "on the side" is clearly defined in the instant application.” (Appeal Br. 22) We agree with Appellants. Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 7 Claim 1 recites “on the side” in the context of “on the side of each of the at least two grouped supply chain suppliers….” Page 10, line 12 of the Specification describes “side” in terms of the supplied company. We thus interpret “side” to mean the side being supplied or supplying which is consistent with how the term is used in the claims. We therefore will not sustain the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Claims 1-12 and 15-17 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler. The Examiner found that Crabtree discloses all the elements of independent claims 1, 12 and 17 except logistic fulfillment to the other supply chain. (FF1) This fact has not been contested by Appellants. (Appeal Br. 16) What Appellants do contest is that Crabtree “teaches away from the present invention, which aims at decentralizing the local management efforts. Contrary to the present invention, Crabtree aims at centralizing the management efforts by introducing the trusted agent.” (Appeal Br. 17) We disagree with Appellants because Crabtree does not actually teach away from every aspect of all local management efforts. See In re Gurley, 27 F.3d at 553. The Examiner maintains that: “Crabtree does not disclose centralizing the management efforts as Appellant argues (sic), but the trusted agent is used to making (sic make) sure that the exchange of commodities are (sic is) done smoothly. It is not used for management to get control of other local management by centralizing the commodities in one location.” (Answer 7) The Examiner’s position here is supported by Appellants’ Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 8 Specification in that it limits the decentralization issue to “supplier collaboration and replenishment, i.e. control of goods movement, by way of logistic information exchange between suppliers directly interlinked within the entire supply chain network….” (FF 3). Moreover, Crabtree discloses that while the trusted agent is associated with a public hub, the functions of the trusted agent nevertheless can be provided by an entity independent of the public hub. (FF 4) Still further, Crabtree discloses, “[a]lternatively, the customer/supplier computer system can perform server-to-server level communication to interchange data. Information 450 can be passed between customer/supplier systems 408, 410 and systems 402, 404, 406 via public hub 412.” (FF 5) According to Crabtree, even with a trusted agent in the system, customer/supplier systems are able to communicate at the server to server level. Thus, as long as the combination is not directed to the discouraged aspects of the particular customer supplier system, there is no teaching away. Appellants next argue that “…the present invention … allows supply chain suppliers to be and linked ‘directly’, which understandably means: without passing through a trusted agent.” (Appeal Br. 19) We disagree with Appellants for two reasons. First, the claims only require two supply chain suppliers in the supply chain being linked directly within the supply chain. This language leaves open the possibility of the two supply chain suppliers being linked directly through the intermediary of a connecting application, e.g., a trusted agent. Second, as found supra (FF 5), Crabtree discloses server-to-server level communication to interchange data which we interpret as causing the users of the supply chain to be linked directly within the supply chain. Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 9 Appellants also argue “Adler does not provide any teaching or suggestion to support modifying the Crabtree design to manage a supply chain of digitally networked supply chain participants….” (Appeal Br. 20) To the extent Appellants’ seek an explicit suggestion or motivation in the reference itself, this is no longer the law in view of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). Since the Examiner has provided some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning for why a person with ordinary skill in the art would modify Crabtree to use the logistic fulfillment information as taught by Alder in the system of Crabtree (FF 2), Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection. We find it reasonable to understand that logistic fulfillment information would “allow more suppliers to join and participation a supply chain, which may help to increase the efficiency of the fulfillment process.” (FF 2) This is because Alder discloses a highly adaptive modular framework allowing attributes and decision rules to be modified quickly and selectively. (FF 6) Thus, for the above reasons we sustain the rejection of claims. Claims 3, 14, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler and Cline. With regard to remaining rejected claims 3, 14, and 19, because Appellants’ argument to the rejection made against these claims relies upon the underlying argument to the independent claims, we also affirm the examiner’s rejection of these claims. Appeal 2009-002684 Application 10/163,038 10 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW We conclude the Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim Claims 1-12 and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler. We conclude the Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim claims 3, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Crabtree in view of Adler and Cline. We conclude the Appellants have shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph as being indefinite. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-20 is AFFRIMED. MP SAMUEL A. 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