Ex Parte Arjomand

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 3, 2014

11474530 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 3, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/474,530 06/26/2006 Ray Arjomand 1934
23590 7590 11/03/2014
RICHARD L HUFF
19304 OLNEY MILL ROAD
OLNEY, MD 20832
EXAMINER
ABDUR RAHIM, AZIM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3744
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/03/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte RAY ARJOMAND
________________

Appeal 2012-008435
Application 11/474,530
Technology Center 3700
________________

Before NEAL E. ABRAMS, MICHAEL L. HOELTER,
and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges.

STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ray Arjomand (Appellant) seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 53–61. We have jurisdiction
over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART

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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed invention is directed to a refrigeration system. Claims 53
and 59 are illustrative of the claims on appeal and are reproduced below:
53. A combination of an opening between indoors and
outdoors in a building having an inside and an outside and a
refrigerator device, in which the refrigerator device has a
cooling compartment, a door, an evaporator coil, an outdoor
temperature-sensitive device, and a condenser coil wherein the
condenser coil is outdoors and there is a gated conduit between
the cooling compartment and the outdoors such that when the
gate is closed the conduit is insulated and the air on one side of
the gate is prevented from exchanging with the air on the other
side of the gate and wherein the outdoor temperature-sensitive
device opens the gate whenever the temperature inside the
refrigerator cooling compartment gets above outdoor ambient
temperature and above a predetermined temperature and the
outdoor temperature-sensitive device closes the gate whenever
the outdoor temperature gets warmer than the inside of the
refrigerator cooling compartment.

59. A combination of an opening between indoors and
outdoors in a building having an inside and an outside and a
refrigerator having a cooling compartment, a door, an
evaporator coil, a time-sensitive device, and a condenser coil
wherein the condenser coil is outdoors, wherein the evaporator
coil is adjacent to a reservoir and contains heat-conductive
phase-change material inside the reservoir, and wherein the
time-sensitive device controls the operation of the evaporator
coil so that the evaporator coil produces a solidified phase
change in the phase-changing material in the reservoir at night
when ambient temperature outdoors is colder than during day
and the solidified phase-change material will later be used to
cool the cooling compartment during day when ambient
outdoor temperature is warmer than during night.

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REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER

Wertheimer US 2,984,086 May 16, 1961
Metcalfe US 3,030,873 April 24, 1962
Shavit US 3,979,922 Sept. 14, 1976
Kuwaki US 4,448,346 May 15, 1984
Kanda US 5,036,904 Aug. 6, 1991
Seon US 5,577,822 Nov. 26, 1996

Maekawa JP 03263576 Nov. 25, 1991

THE REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
Claims 53–55 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, and Shavit.
Claim 56 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Metcalfe.
Claim 57 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Seon.
Claim 58 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Kanda.
Claims 59–61 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Kanda, and Kuwaki.
ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 53–55 as obvious over Wertheimer, Maekawa, and
Shavit.
(I)
Claim 53 recites, in part:
a gated conduit between the cooling compartment and the
outdoors such that when the gate is closed the conduit is
insulated and the air on one side of the gate is prevented from
exchanging with the air on the other side of the gate.
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(II)
The Examiner rejects claim 53 as obvious over Wertheimer,
Maekawa, and Shavit, and cites Maekawa for the gated conduit.
Office Action dated July 15, 2011, (herein “Office Action”) 3–4.
Maekawa teaches a refrigerator that includes a discharge duct
(19) and a damper (21), wherein when a temperature of the
discharge air detected by a temperature sensor (23) is reduced
to below a set temperature, the damper is modulated [see
constitution]. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to
have modified the device of Werteimer to include the duct and
damper as taught by Maekawa in order to cool food items
disposed inside the device using air exterior of the refrigerator
without consuming electricity. Also, one of ordinary skill in
the art would have been motivated to utilize outdoor air to cool
the interior of the device since, depending on the climate, the
outdoor air would normally be cooler than air inside of a
building.
Office Action 4 (emphasis added).
(III)
Appellant traverses the Examiner’s obviousness rejection, stating that
the Examiner has not set forth the level of a person of ordinary skill in the
art and therefore, “the third Graham factual inquiry has not been resolved
and the APA has not been complied with.” Appeal Br. 13–14. Appellant
states “[w]ithout knowing the skill level of one of ordinary skill in the art, it
is impossible to determine whether a given change would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. at 14 (referring to the “Graham
factors” enumerated in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S.
1 (1966)).
Appellant further asserts “[t]he examiner relied upon his own
inventiveness to use outside air instead of room air.” Appeal Br. 14.
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Appellant explains “[t]o prepare a permanent refrigerator/freezer/air
conditioner wherein the refrigerator/freezer portion contained a third
compartment for cooling hot food, one would not and could not permanently
use outdoor air to cool the food on the basis of the outdoor air being cooler
than the indoor air.” Id. at 14–15. Appellant states “[a]lso, the air intake for
the examiner’s ‘cool’ air borders on the outdoor portion of the air
conditioner and would be warmed by the exiting air.” Id. at 15.
Appellant also points out discrepancies in the headings in the
Examiner’s Answer and asserts “[a]pparently, not one of [A]ppellant’s
arguments directed to independent claim 53 is alleged to have been
addressed by the [E]xaminer.” Reply Br. 8. Appellant further asserts that
the Examiner has failed to address each material issue presented in
Appellant’s brief as required by 5 U.S.C. § 557(c). Id.
(IV)
Regarding whether the Examiner did not properly set forth the level of
a person of ordinary skill in the art, although the Examiner did not articulate
a specific finding regarding the level of skill in the art, Appellant has not
made any specific proposal regarding what the level of ordinary skill in the
art is or argued that the proposed modification was beyond the level of skill
in the art. We consider the applied prior art to be reflective of the level of
skill in the art. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is
presumed to know the relevant prior art.” (citing Custom Accessories, Inc.
v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). See also
Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence
of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to
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reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a
need for testimony is not shown.” Emphasis omitted. Against this
background, the Examiner determined the obviousness of claim 53.
Accordingly, we see no error in the Examiner’s application of the factual
inquires set forth in Graham in the rejection of claim 53. Although
Appellant repeats this argument regarding an absence of a determination of
the level of skill in the art for other claims on appeal, we are not persuaded
of Examiner error on this issue with respect to any of the remaining claims,
for the same reasons.
Regarding Appellant’s assertion that the Examiner relied on his own
inventiveness in rejecting claim 53, we are not persuaded the Examiner did
so. As noted above, the Examiner states that a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have been motivated to use outdoor air rather than indoor air
because “depending on the climate, outdoor air would normally be cooler
than air inside of a building” and it would save electricity. Office Action 4
(See also Ans. 6). It may be true that, as Appellant asserts, “one would not
and could not permanently use outdoor air to cool the food on the basis of
the outdoor air being cooler than the indoor air.” Appeal Br. 15. However,
claim 53 does not require that one permanently use outdoor air for cooling.
The Examiner’s rationale for using outdoor air to cool (that outdoor air may
be cooler than indoor air) is reasonable. Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner on this issue.
Regarding Appellant’s assertion that, in the Examiner’s proposed
combination of references, the location of the air intake relative to the
outdoor (heated) portion of the air conditioner would heat incoming air, we
are not persuaded of Examiner error on this point. “The test for obviousness
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is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily
incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test
is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981) (citation omitted). See also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (citation omitted) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the
references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under
review.”); and In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining
the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their
specific structures.”). Rather, “if a technique has been used to improve one
device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would
improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious
unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007) (citation omitted). In the present
case, Appellant has not shown that the Examiner’s proposed combination is
constrained to place the cold air intake near the warm part of an air
conditioner, nor that if these components were in close proximity, the air
entering the intake would be too warm to use. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of Examiner error on this point.
Regarding Appellant’s statement on page 8 of the Reply Brief,
“[a]pparently, not one of appellant's arguments directed to independent
claim 53 is alleged to have been addressed by the examiner,” the Examiner
has made a prima facie case of obviousness against claim 53, and Appellant
has not demonstrated Examiner error in this regard. The fact that the
Examiner has not specifically identified claim 53 (which appears to have
been caused merely by an error in headings) in the Response to Arguments
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section does not negate the rejections of independent claim 53 and
dependent claim 55 on the merits.1 Additionally, the context of the
discussion in the Response to Arguments section makes clear that the
Examiner addressed Appellant’s arguments for claim 53.
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments for claims 53 and
55, but we do not agree with Appellant’s position that the decision of the
Examiner is in error. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 53 and 55.
Claim 54
With respect to claim 54, Appellant reiterates that the Examiner has
failed to address all the Graham factors. For the reasons discussed above in
the rejection of claim 53, we do not agree with Appellant on this issue.
Appellant also asserts that, rather than include an outdoor
temperature-sensitive device as required by claim 54, the Examiner’s
proposed combination of Wertheimer and Maekawa would include a
temperature-sensitive device that senses only indoor temperature. Appeal
Br. 15. Appellant further argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Shavit to
remedy this deficiency is improper because, before beginning examination
on the merits, the Examiner issued an Election of Species Requirement
dividing the Application into three species, and one of the non-elected
species relates to air conditioners, as does Shavit.2 Appellant states:
By maintaining the requirement the examiner confirmed that
window refrigerators are considered to be patentable over
window refrigerators associated with freezers and air
conditioners. This being the case, it is quite clear that window

1 A similar clerical error occurred for claim 54.
2 The Election of Species Requirement issued on January 26, 2009, listed
three separate species represented by figures 1, 4, and 9.
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refrigerators are patentable over central air conditioners. It is
appellant’s position that the use of a reference drawn to a
central air conditioning system is improper and contrary to the
examiner’s position that window refrigerators are patentable
over window refrigerators associated with freezers and air
conditioners.
Appeal Br. 17.
We do not agree with Appellant’s position on this point. The Election
of Species Requirement was issued based on the content of the Application,
and any preclusive effect of the Election of Species Requirement with
respect to rejections of the elected claims extends only to divisional
applications directed to the non-elected species, not to other references. See
35 U.S.C. § 121.
Appellant further argues that “none of the cited references shows . . . a
gated conduit between the freezer compartment and the outdoors such that
when the gate is closed the conduit is insulated and the air on one side of the
gate is prevented from exchanging with the air on the other side of the gate.”
Appeal Br. 17–18. Appellant argues there is nothing in Maekawa to suggest
modifying a freezer compartment, and “[i]t is not seen how a feature in a
central air conditioning system [as shown in Shavit] which transfers heat
from a room to the outdoors can serve as a valid teaching of a freezer system
which transfers heat from a freezer to the outdoors.” Id. at 18.
The Examiner’s response is that Maekawa is cited “for the teaching of
a refrigerator that includes a suction duct 18 that is disposed between a
refrigerator chamber 13 and an exterior of the refrigerator, wherein air
outside of the refrigerator is used to cool food items in chamber 13 via
operation of a fan 22 and a damper 20 based on a detected temperature from
temperature sensor 23.” Ans. 13. The Examiner further states, “Shavit was
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further introduced for the teaching of closing a damper to prevent flow of
outdoor air through a duct into an enclosed space when the outdoor air
temperature exceeds a preset temperature as disclosed in column 3, lines
23[–]26.” Id.
We are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 54.
The Examiner cited references for all the features of claim 54, and Appellant
has not shown that the Examiner’s rationale for combining these features,
found in the discussion of claim 53, is improper. The Examiner does not
rely on Maekawa for a freezer compartment per se, but rather modifies a
freezer compartment from Wertheimer in light of a technique used in
Maekawa to reduce electricity consumption in refrigerators (or as said by the
Examiner, “to cool food items…without consuming electricity”). Ans. 6.
As discussed above with respect to claim 53, the test for obviousness is what
the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art, and Appellant has not shown the Examiner’s
reliance on the cited references or the Examiner’s rationale in combining the
features of Wertheimer and Maekawa is incorrect. With respect to further
modifying the asserted combination of Wertheimer and Maekawa with the
damper and outdoor air duct connection from Shavit, we agree with the
Examiner’s rationale, set forth in the rejection of claim 53.
The rejection of claim 56 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Metcalfe.
Appellant does not make specific arguments on the merits for any
recited feature of this claim and instead states, “Appellant relies on the
doctrine set forth in Section 2143.03 of the M.P.E.P., and the decision of In
re Fine, supra to establish the patentability of claim 56.” Appeal Br. 18.
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MPEP § 2143.03 cites In re Fine, 837 F. 2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and states
“[i]f an independent claim is non-obvious under 25 U.S.C. 103, then any
claim depending therefrom is nonobvious.” Accordingly, we understand
Appellant’s argument for claim 56 to be that claim 56 stands or falls together
with claim 53, from which claim 56 depends via intervening claim 55.3
Appellant asserts, in the Reply Brief, that the Examiner’s Answer
does not address Appellant’s arguments for claim 56 and therefore the
Examiner has not complied with Section 557 of the Administrative
Procedures Act. Reply Br. 8. However, the Examiner has addressed claim
53, and as noted above, claim 56 stands or falls with claim 53. Thus, the
Examiner addressed any argument made for claim 56 when the Examiner
addressed the arguments for claim 53.
The rejection of claim 57 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Seon.
Claim 57 recites:
The combination of claim 53, wherein the cooling compartment
has a removable insulating barrier which divides the
compartment into a portion which is cooled and a portion which
is not cooled, thereby decreasing the volume which is cooled
during warmer summer season and saving electricity.
Claims Appendix 26–27 (emphasis added).
The Examiner cites intermediate partition wall (30) of Seon for the
removable shelf. Office Action 6.
Appellant asserts that Seon fails to remedy the deficiencies in
Wertheimer, Maekawa, and Shavit because a change in position of the
intermediate partition wall in Seon does not change the volume which is

3 Appellant argues claim 53 and 55 together, beginning on page 11 of the
Appeal Brief.
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cooled, in contrast to the requirement in claim 57. Figures 3 and 6 of Seon
are reproduced below.

Figure 3 of Seon is a perspective view of a refrigerator showing the
intermediate partition wall 30 in an uninstalled state. Figure 6 is a cross-
section showing the intermediate partition wall 30 installed in a refrigerator.
As is clear from figure 6 above, a passage 34 connects the cooling
chamber 12 to the freezing chamber 11 via the cooling apparatus
compartment 20. Accordingly, both compartments 11 and 12 are cooled,
regardless of the position of the intermediate partition wall 30. An
alternative embodiment disclosed in Seon provides the same result. The
Examiner has not identified an embodiment in Seon that decreases the
volume to be cooled as recited in claim 57. Rather, the entire interior of the
refrigerator is cooled at all times.
The Examiner asserts that although both compartments in Seon are
cooled, they are cooled at different temperatures, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would “have arrived at the claimed invention of dividing a
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refrigerator compartment into a portion that is cooled and a portion that is
not cooled.” Ans. 15. However, the Examiner has not provided any
rationale for this conclusion. Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above,
we agree with Appellant that Seon fails to remedy the deficiencies present in
the combined teachings of Wertheimer, Maekawa, and Shavit with respect to
claim 57. Therefore, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claim 57.
The rejection of claim 58 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Kanda.
Claim 58 recites:
The combination of claim 53 wherein the evaporator coil
is adjacent to a reservoir and there is a heat-conductive phase-
change material inside the reservoir, whereby the evaporator
coil produces a solidified phase change in the phase-changing
material in the reservoir at night when an ambient temperature
outdoors is colder than during day and the solidified phase-
change material will later be used to cool the cooling
compartment during day when an ambient outdoor temperature
is warmer than during night.
Claims Appendix 27.
The Examiner asserts:
it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the
art at the time the invention was made to have modified the unit
of Werteimer as modified by Maekawa and Shavit to include
the latent heat storage system as taught by Kanda in order to
utilize inexpensive night time cooling, thus reducing energy
costs.
Ans. 9.
Appellant asserts “[t]here is no indication in the reference that the
latent heat system is actually inside a refrigerator.” Appeal Br. 21.
Appellant further asserts “Kanda uses a container having antifreeze.
Appellant does not.” Id.
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The Examiner asserts that claim 58 does not recite that the latent heat
system itself is inside a refrigerator.” We agree with the Examiner on this
issue. Regarding the Appellant’s assertion that Kanda uses a container
having antifreeze, and Appellant does not, this argument is not
commensurate in scope with the claimed subject matter. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claim 58.
The rejection of claims 59–61 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Wertheimer, Kanda, and Kuwaki.
Claim 59
Claim 59 recites:
A combination of an opening between indoors and
outdoors in a building having an inside and an outside and a
refrigerator having a cooling compartment, a door, an
evaporator coil, a time-sensitive device, and a condenser coil
wherein the condenser coil is outdoors, wherein the evaporator
coil is adjacent to a reservoir and contains heat-conductive
phase-change material inside the reservoir, and wherein the
time-sensitive device controls the operation of the evaporator
coil so that the evaporator coil produces a solidified phase
change in the phase-changing material in the reservoir at night
when ambient temperature outdoors is colder than during day
and the solidified phase-change material will later be used to
cool the cooling compartment during day when ambient
outdoor temperature is warmer than during night.
The Examiner cites Kanda for the reservoir and cites Kuwaki for the
time-sensitive device. Office Action 8.
Appellant notes a discrepancy in the citation of references applied to
claim 59 by the Examiner inasmuch as the Office Action includes one
reference to “Lukas,” (Office Action 8) and this reference was not listed in
the heading for the rejection of claim 59. Appeal Br. 24. However,
Appellant has not asserted this discrepancy renders the rejection of claim 59
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too vague for a response, and we address the substantive arguments for
claim 59 below.
Appellant asserts:
Note that the reservoir of the claim is inside the refrigerator.
The reservoir of the prior art is outside the refrigerator. The
phase-change material in the claim is cooled by ambient air.
The phase-change material of the prior art is cooled by the
refrigerator. Thus, the prior art does not teach the subject
matter of the claim.
Appeal Br. 24 (emphasis added).
Appellant further asserts, regarding claim interpretation,
The claims require that the refrigerator has a cooling
compartment and an evaporator coil. Figure 8 (discussed on
page 14 of the specification) corresponds to the device of
claims 58 and 59. Figure 8 shows an evaporator (56) inside the
refrigerator cooling compartment. It is appellant's position that
the claim language would be understood to mean that the
refrigerator cooling compartment has the evaporator coil within
it. Additionally, where a claim sets forth an element which is
not it the usual location, the location is clearly set forth.”
Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added).
Regarding Appellant’s arguments as to the location of the reservoir
inside the refrigerator and the phase-change material being cooled by
ambient air, the Examiner replies:
First, claim 59 does not explicitly state that the reservoir
nor the evaporator is disposed inside of the refrigerator.
The claim merely states that the refrigerator has an evaporator
coil, a reservoir, etc. As stated in column 1, lines 6[–]15 of
Kanda, the latent heat storage tank is cooled by the refrigerator.
Second, the claim does not state that the phase change
material is cooled by the ambient air. The claim states that
the phase change material inside the reservoir is cooled by the
evaporator at night.
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Ans. 17–18 (emphasis added).
We agree with the Examiner’s statement. Care must be taken not to
read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the
claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See Superguide
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted) (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided
by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to
import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim. For example,
a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be
read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the
embodiment.”). We decline to import the limitations of figure 8 and page 14
of the Specification into claim 59 as is suggested by Appellant, and we agree
with the Examiner that the subject matter recited in claim 59 would have
been obvious over the cited references, at the time the claimed invention was
made. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 59.
Claim 60
Claim 60 recites “[t]he combination of claim 59 in which the reservoir
is adjacent to a heat-conducting grate for air passage.”
The Examiner asserts:
Regarding claim 60, Werteimer as modified by Kanda teach all
of the limitations of the claimed invention, and Kanda further
teaches that the containers would be disposed adjacent to a heat
-conducting grate [for] air passage [see column 1, lines 7[–]14:
there would be some type of passageway for cooling via the
containers].
Ans. 10-11.
Appellant asserts “[c]ontrary to the examiner’s positive statement, the
prior art fails to teach a grate as is required by the claims and it is seen that
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the examiner has failed to resolve the first and second Graham factual
inquiries.” Appeal Br. 25.
The section of Kanda cited by the Examiner states:
The present invention relates to a latent heat storage tank of a
latent heat system wherein a refrigerator is operated using
inexpensive night time electric power whereby heat is stored as
latent heat in the state of ice or icy liquid by refrigerating the
water or liquid enclosed in latent heat containers surrounded
with an antifreeze solution cooled by said refrigerator and then
using the latent heat for air-conditioning during the day when
said ice or icy liquid melts.
Kanda, col. 1, ll. 6–15.
We agree with Appellant on this issue, in that nothing in the cited
section of Kanda correlates to a heat-conducting grate as recited in claim 60.
Accordingly, we reverse the rejection of claim 60 and of claim 61 depending
therefrom.
DECISION
Although we have carefully considered all of Appellant’s arguments,
including various assertions of non-compliance with the APA and failure to
determine the Graham factors, etc., both in the Reply Brief and in the
Appeal Brief, we are not persuaded that the positions taken by the Examiner
with respect to the obviousness of claims 53–56, 58, and 59 are in error.
This being the case:
The rejection of claims 53–55 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Wertheimer, Maekawa, and Shavit is affirmed;
The rejection of claim 56 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Metcalfe is affirmed;
The rejection of claim Claim 57 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Seon is reversed;
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The rejection of claim Claim 58 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Wertheimer, Maekawa, Shavit, and Kanda is affirmed;
The rejection of claim 59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Wertheimer, Kanda, and Kuwaki is affirmed; and
The rejection of claims 60 and 61 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Wertheimer, Kanda, and Kuwaki is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

rvb