Ex Parte Arimilli et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 6, 2016

12425210 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 6, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/425,210 04/16/2009 RAVI K. ARIMILLI AUS920070384US1 2079
124677 7590 12/08/2016
Russell No- PT T C iTRM ATTSrt EXAMINER
8729 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 100
Austin, TX 78757
RUBY, TRAVIS C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3744
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/08/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
stephanie@russellnglaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RAVI K. ARIMILLI,
MICHAEL J. ELLSWORTH JR., and
EDWARD J. SEMINARO
Appeal 2014-003513
Application 12/425,210
Technology Center 3700
Before: LYNNE H. BROWNE, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
BRENT M. DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judges.
DOUGAL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of
claims 8—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Belady
(US 2007/0213881 Al, pub. Sept. 13, 2007), Shaw (US 6,269,650 Bl, iss.
Aug. 7, 2001), and Manole (US 2006/0090494 Al, pub. May 4, 2006). We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal 2014-003513
Application 12/425,210
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to control of liquid cooled electronics. Claim
8, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
8. A system for controlling liquid-cooled electronics, said
system comprising:
an electronics rack including at least one heat-generating
electronics subsystem;
at least one Modular Cooling Unit (MCU) associated with
said electronics rack and configured to provide system coolant to
said at least one heat-generating electronics subsystem for
facilitating cooling thereof, wherein each MCU includes a heat
exchanger, a first coolant loop and a second coolant loop;
a system controller coupled to at least one control valve
that controls a flow of liquid that passes through said heat
exchanger, wherein said system controller is configured to:
measure a first set point temperature, Ta, wherein
said Ta is based on a dew point temperature, TdP of a
computer room;
measure a second set point temperature, Tb, wherein
said Tb is based on a facility chilled liquid inlet
temperature, Tei, and a rack power, Prack, of an electronics
rack;
select a Modular Cooling Unit (MCU) set point
temperature, Tsp, wherein said Tsp is the higher value of
said Ta and said Tb; and
regulate said control valve responsive to said
selected Tsp.
OPINION
Claims 8 and 15
Claims 8 and 15 are independent and are argued together. Br. 4. We
select claim 8 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellants argue that “the combination of Belady, Shaw, and Manole
would essentially disclose three unrelated actions to increase cooling of a
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Appeal 2014-003513
Application 12/425,210
computer system, i.e., increase a cooling fluid flow, increase a speed of a
condenser fan, and increase a speed of a compressor motor.” Br. 10. This is
“[i]n contrast to . . . Appellants' claimed subject matter [] directed to
regulating a control valve that controls a flow of liquid that passes through a
heat exchanger based on a set point that is a higher value of a first set point
temperature that is based on a dew point temperature of a computer room
and a second set point temperature that is based on a facility chilled liquid
inlet temperature and a rack power of an electronics rack.” Id.
The Examiner replies that the rejection is not based on the bodily
incorporation of the secondary references into the primary reference, but
“what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.” Answer 14 (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413 (CCPA 1981)). The Examiner then proceeds to further explain the prior
findings from the Final Action of “what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art” and the
reasoning behind the combination of references. Id. at 14—15.
Appellants provide no argument or explanation as to why the
Examiner’s position or reasoning is incorrect. Thus, Appellants’ broad
assertion as to what the prior art suggests, without addressing the reasoning
as set forth by the Examiner is not enough to inform us of error in the
rejection of independent claims 8 and 15.
Claims 12—14, 19, and 20 depend from the independent claims and are
not separately argued and therefore fall with claims 8 and 15 for the same
reason.
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Appeal 2014-003513
Application 12/425,210
Claims 9—11 and 16—18
Appellants argue that Belady does not teach or suggest features of
claims 9-11 and 16—18. Br. 10-11. In support of this argument, Appellants
recite the language of each of these claims. Id. Merely reciting the language
of a claim and asserting that the cited prior art references do not disclose that
limitation is insufficient. See In reLovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to
require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation
of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements
were not found in the prior art.”).
For these reasons, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 9—11 and 16—18.
§101 Rejection
Claims 15—20 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellants
filed an Amendment on June 20, 2013 to address the rejection, however, the
Amendment was not entered by the Examiner. In the Appeal Brief,
Appellants do not present arguments pertaining to the § 101 rejection.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the rejection under § 101.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 8—20 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
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Appeal 2014-003513
Application 12/425,210
AFFIRMED
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