Ex Parte Arcot et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 5, 2017

11455442 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 5, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/455,442 06/19/2006 Praveen Arcot 10171-12002A 1487
(NC58170US)
101535 7590
Lempia Summerfield Katz LLC/HERE
20 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Chicago, IL 60603
EXAMINER
MUSTAFA, IMRAN K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3663
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/07/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket-us @ lsk-iplaw.com
pair_lsk @ firsttofile.com
hereipr @ here, com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte PRAVEEN ARCOT and BISHNU PHUYAL
Appeal 2016-004782
Application 11/455,4421
Technology Center 3600
Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1—11, 15—18, 21—23, and 25—29,2 which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 12—14, 19, 20, and 24 are cancelled. See Br. (Claims App’x) 20, 22.
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is HERE GLOBAL B.V.
Br. 2.
2 The Examiner identifies claim 14 as rejected (Final Act. 1 (item 6));
however, claim 14 is cancelled (Br. (Claims App’x) 20).
Appeal 2016-004782
Application 11/455,442
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ disclosed “invention relates to collecting traffic data using
probe vehicles.” Spec. 1:4. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows:
1. A method of collecting traffic information comprising:
in each one of a plurality of vehicles being driven along
roads in a geographic area:
determining, by a navigation system associated with a
vehicle of the plurality of vehicles, a location reference code of
a plurality of location reference codes which represents that
portion of the road network upon which the vehicle is located;
obtaining, by the navigation system, a first vehicle speed
representative of the speed of the vehicle; and
determining, by the navigation system, that a position of
the vehicle has changed and subsequently determining whether
the location reference code which represents that portion of the
road network upon which the vehicle is located has changed;
when the location reference code has not changed,
obtaining a second vehicle speed representative of the speed of
the vehicle, and
when the location reference code has changed,
determining, by the navigation system, an average vehicle
speed of the vehicle on the portion of the road network
represented by the previous location reference code by
averaging the first and second vehicle speeds of that vehicle,
and transmitting, by the navigation system, data that indicates
the previous location reference code and the average vehicle
speed from the vehicle to a central traffic facility.
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims:
Rosenquist
Drury et al.
Cook
Oshitani
US 5,864,305 Jan. 26, 1999
US 2004/0104842 Al June 3, 2004
US 6,810,321 B1 Oct. 26,2004
JP 2006146695 A June 8, 2006
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Application 11/455,442
Claims 1, 3—11, 15, 17, 18, 21—23, and 25—28 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Drury et al, (hereinafter
“Drury”) and Cook. See Final Act. 2—12.
Claim 2 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Drury, Cook,3 and Rosenquist. See Final Act. 12—13.
Claims 16 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Drury, Cook, and Oshitani. See Final Act 13—17.
Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief
(“Br.” filed Aug. 4, 2015) and the Specification (“Spec.” filed June 19,
2006) for the positions of Appellants and the Final Office Action (“Final
Act.” mailed Feb. 6, 2015) and Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” mailed Jan. 21,
2016) for the reasoning, findings, and conclusions of the Examiner. Only
those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this
Decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Appeal Brief have
not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
ISSUE
The issue presented by Appellants’ arguments is whether the
combination of Drury and Cook teaches or suggests
when the location reference code has changed, determining, by
the navigation system, an average vehicle speed of the vehicle on
the portion of the road network represented by the previous
3 The Examiner refers to Sampedro et al. (US 2004/0034467 Al; Feb. 19,
2004), and not Cook, in the statement of rejection for claim 2. Final Act. 12.
However, the detailed rejection of claim 1, from which claim 2 depends,
relies on Cook, not Sampedro. Final Act. 2—5. Sampedro is not relied on in
the detailed rejection of claim 1 or claim 2. See Final Act. 2—5, 12—13.
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Application 11/455,442
location reference code by averaging the first and second vehicle
speeds of that vehicle, and transmitting, by the navigation
system, data that indicates the previous location reference code
and the average vehicle speed from the vehicle to a central traffic
facility
(hereinafter the “argued limitation”), as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
Interpretation of Claim 1
We note as an initial matter that claim 1 is directed to a “method of
collecting traffic data” (Br. (Claims App’x) 18) (a “process” (35 U.S.C.
§ 101)) and that the argued limitation is a conditional step that is only
performed “when the location reference code has changed,” which need not
happen. According to our precedent, as a matter of claim construction, the
broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1 encompasses a method in
which the argued limitation is not performed. See Ex parte Schulhauser,
Appeal No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792, at *3-5 (PTAB Apr. 28,
2016) (precedential).
Independent claims 16 and 17 recite limitations similar to the argued
limitation of claim 1 and are argued similarly to claim 1. Compare Br. 9—18,
with Br. 6—9. Unlike claim 1, however, claims 16 and 17 are directed to a
“navigation system used in a vehicle” (Br. (Claims App’x) 20) and a “probe
vehicle for collecting traffic data” (id. at 21) respectively, placing them in a
different statutory class from claim 1, i.e., a “machine” or system rather than
a “process” or method under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The broadest reasonable
interpretation of such machine claims requires that structure and logic be
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Application 11/455,442
provided to perform all recited functions, even those that are conditional.
See Schulhauser, 2016 WL 6277792, at *6—7.
In the interests of administrative and judicial efficiency, although we
conclude that as to claim 1 (and its dependent claims) the argued limitation
need not be performed, rendering Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive, we
do not rely solely on that conclusion in sustaining the rejection of claim 1,
and instead further rely on the following analysis of the arguments presented
by Appellants for all independent claims.
The Argued Limitation
The Examiner relies on Drury to teach determining location reference
codes at the beginning and the end of a portion of a road network,
calculating an average speed of a vehicle over the portion of a road network
defined by the location reference codes, and transmitting the average vehicle
speed to a central traffic facility. Final Act. 2-4 (citing Drury || 300-04).
The Examiner relies on Cook to teach calculating average speeds from a
plurality of instantaneous speeds. Final Act. 4 (citing Cook, Abstract).
Appellants contend neither “Drury [n]or Cook collects] or
calculate^] velocities in response to a location reference code change.” Br.
6. We disagree because the rejection is based on the combination of Drury
and Cook, not either one alone.
It is well settled that “one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking
references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on
combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA
1981). Drury discloses that
[t]he in-vehicle system records the time the vehicle takes to travel
from one end [(i.e., an initial location reference code)] to the
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Application 11/455,442
other of the link [(i.e., a location reference code change)] and
stores a reference to the link, the time of day, and the speed
traveled along the link in the link speed log.
Drury | 301. One of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the
speed along the link (portion of road) can only be calculated when the end of
the link is reached, i.e., when the location reference code changes. See Ans.
5. Cook teaches that average speeds may be calculated by averaging
instantaneous speeds together. Cook, Abstract. Although not necessary to
our opinion, we also note for emphasis that, although the average speed
determined by Drury may be calculated using the time travelled between the
ends of the link and the distance between the ends of the link (see Ans. 5),
Drury discloses the vehicle also senses instantaneous speeds (see Drury
195).
Appellants contend “neither Drury nor Cook disclose[s] transmitting
data after being triggered by a location reference code change.” Br. 9. We
disagree because, as pointed out by the Examiner, the argued limitation does
not require that the data be transmitted immediately after the location
reference code changes. See Ans. 3.
As discussed above, Drury discloses calculating the average speed
traveled by a vehicle along a portion of roadway when the end of the portion
of roadway is reached, i.e., when the location reference code changes, and
storing that data in a link speed log. See Drury 1301. It is axiomatic that
for data to be transmitted, the data must exist. Thus, a necessary condition
for transmitting the average speed data to the central traffic facility is a
location code change, and any transmission of that data is necessarily in
response to, or “triggered by” the location code change, even if the
transmission occurs some period of time after the changing of the location
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Application 11/455,442
reference code, and even if some other condition (e.g., passage of a
predetermined period of time (see Drury || 302, 306)) must also be met to
transmit the data.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not persuaded us of error
in the rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections of
(1) claim 1; (2) independent claims 16 and 17, which recite limitations
substantially similar to the argued limitation and were argued on
substantially the same bases (compare Br. 9-18, with Br. 6—9); and
(3) claims 2—11, 15, 18, 21—23, and 25—29, which variously depend, directly
or indirectly, from clams 1 and 17, and were not separately argued with
particularity.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—11, 15—18, 21—23,
and 25—294 is affirmed.
4 We note that claims 27—29 each recite “[t]he method of claim 17” (Br.
(Claims App’x) 23) whereas claim 17 is directed to “[a] probe vehicle” (id.
at 21). In the event of further prosecution, including any review for
allowance, the Examiner may wish to consider whether claims 27—29 are
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, by virtue of reciting
process steps in a claim ostensibly directed to a machine. See IPXL
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citing Ex parte Lyell, 17 USPQ2d 1548 (BPAI 1990)); see also Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure § 2173.05(p)(II) (9th ed. 2014, rev. 2015).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b).
AFFIRMED
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