Ex Parte Archer et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 13, 201311564508 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 13, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte STEVEN T. ARCHER, FRANCISCO A. DIAS, and KRISTOPHER A. PATE ____________________ Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 9-13, 15-17, and 19-21. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Appellants’ Invention Appellants’ invention relates to a method for mapping a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag to a network routable address. Abstract. Illustrative Claim Independent claim 1 further illustrates the invention as follows: 1. A method comprising: obtaining a tag identifier of a radio frequency identification (RFID) transponder that is unique to the RFID transponder; generating a network routable address by using the tag identifier as part of the network routable address; and mapping the network routable address to the RFID transponder, wherein the network routable address is used to communicate with the RFID transponder over a data network, and wherein the communication with the RFID transponder includes historical data related to control criterion of an asset coupled to the RFID transponder that is received and stored by the RFID transponder. Rejections on Appeal The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 5-7, 9, 11-13, 15, 17, 19, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hattig Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 3 (US 2006/0034282 A1, Feb. 16, 2006) and Shafer (US 2005/0199716 A1, Sep. 15, 2005). Ans. 4. The Examiner rejected claims 4, 10, 16, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hattig, Shafer, and Chang (US 2005/0219120 A1, Oct. 6, 2005). Ans. 10. ANALYSIS We consider Appellants’ arguments seriatim as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 5-10, and the Reply Brief, pages 2-5. Dispositive Issue: Have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Hattig and Shafer teaches “wherein the communication with the RFID transponder includes historical data related to control criterion of an asset coupled to the RFID transponder that is received and stored by the RFID transponder,” as recited claim 1? Appellants did not challenge the Examiner’s factual findings about Hattig and Chang on pages 4-15 of the Answer. We will take those findings as conceded by Appellants. Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Hattig and Shafer describes the disputed limitations emphasized above. App. Br. 5-9; Reply Br. 2-5. Appellants admit that the “management system of Shafer et al., at best, allows an entity (the asset manager) to identify and track an asset,” but argue that Shafer does not teach a control criterion, as “it relates to physical attributes, Shafer et al. merely discloses that the asset manager may identify an asset according a physical Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 4 characteristic of the asset, and may obtain information describing the asset’s environment.” App. Br. 8. We begin our analysis by first considering the scope and meaning of the claim limitation “control criterion” which must be given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellants’ disclosure, as explained in In re Morris: [T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that “claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow”). Our reviewing court further states, “the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In particular, Appellants’ Specification states the following: The assets 103 are monitored and tracked, as in step 401, by the tracking system 115. In step 403, data about an asset (e.g., asset 103a) is captured, and the data is analyzed by the tracking system 115 using, in an exemplary embodiment, a control criteria (step 405). For example, the control criteria can specify environmental conditions that are to be monitored about the asset 103a; the asset 103a can be a perishable good that requires strict environmental controls. Under this scenario, the RFID tag 101a corresponding to the asset 103a can include a thermal sensor to register the temperature of the storage area. Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 5 This information can be transmitted to the RFID reader 105 and provided to the tracking system 115. Spec. ¶ [0020] (emphasis ours). Appellants’ Specification also states the following: The tracking system 115 can then apply the control criterion, for instance, that the temperature should not exceed a certain temperature otherwise the good can be compromised (e.g., spoiled, stale, melted, etc.). Spec. ¶ [0021]. We note that the relevant portions of Appellants’ Specification cited above do not provide an express definition of a “control criterion.” Thus, according to Appellants’ Specification, control criteria includes properties that can be monitored about the asset. Although this disclosure is not limiting of the claimed invention, it provides context for which the phrase “control criterion” is interpreted. The Examiner found (Ans. 5) that Shafer discloses: The asset type identifier 22 may indicate a general property of the asset which is common to multiple assets, for example, the type of asset, e.g., a 12 amp vacuum cleaner; the size or weight of the asset, e.g., container carrying 25 tons of cargo; a product model or version, e.g., Windows® version 1.0; a personnel pass for access to particular areas; the color and/or size of a type of apparel, e.g., a large red shirt; a logistics unit of at least one asset, e.g. a container, pallet, or case of asset(s); geographic location for distribution or manufacture, e.g., Windows® for Japanese users; personal information and/or credit charge data for product purchase; entry and exit time for vehicle toll payment; and/or any other property or descriptor of an asset under asset management. Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 6 Shafer, ¶ [0033] (emphasis ours). We observe that Shafer also discloses: These tags, when read and translated, identify some property of the asset which may be used to track, collate, manage or convey the assets in the asset management system. Shafer, ¶ [0002] (emphasis ours). Based on our review of Shafer (¶¶ [0002] and [0033]) and consistent with the Examiner’s stated position (Ans. 5), we interpret the claim language “control criterion” using the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellants’ disclosure – to include Shafer’s asset type identifier 22 that identify some property of the asset which may be used to track. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054. Finally, Appellants contend, in the Reply Brief, but not the Appeal Brief, that claim 1 is distinguishable from the cited art because: The “standard” network protocol address for storing/communicating asset identification data of Shafer et al., per se, does not describe or suggest a “standard” against which other things can be compared and evaluated for controlling the asset. In other words, the network address or identifier merely the address or name of a single asset or entity, which is not used as a basis, a standard, or a reference point against which other things can be compared and evaluated for controlling the asset. Reply Br. 5. These arguments are untimely as they are presented for the first time in the Reply Brief. See In re Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473 (BPAI 2010) Appeal 2011-004368 Application 11/564,508 7 (informative). Even if they were timely, they are unpersuasive because they are not commensurate with the scope of claim 1, which does not recite “compared and evaluated.” Consequently, we are satisfied that the combination of Hattig and Shafer describes the disputed limitations. It follows that Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Claims 3-7, 9-13, 15-17, and 19-21, not separately argued fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3-7, 9-13, 15-17, and 19-21 as set forth above. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED msc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation