Ex Parte Archer

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 31, 2016

12548845 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/548,845 08/27/2009
25537 7590 09/02/2016
VERIZON
PA TENT MANAGEMENT GROUP
1320 North Court House Road
9th Floor
ARLINGTON, VA 22201-2909
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Donald Gene Archer
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
20090232 7852
EXAMINER
CHOKSHI, PINKAL R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2425
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/02/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
patents@verizon.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DONALD GENE ARCHER
Appeal2015-004966
Application 12/548,845
Technology Center 2400
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from rejections
of claims 1-13 and 15-20, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention concerns identifying a
virtual market associated with requested content, such as a video-on-demand
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Verizon
Communications Inc. and its subsidiary companies. App. Br. 3.
Appeal2015-004966
Application 12/548,845
movie, and creating or emulating the virtual market for the viewer who
requested the content so the viewer may purchase products displayed in the
virtual market. Spec. i-fi-138--44; Abstract. 2
Representative Claim
Claim 1 exemplifies the subject matter of the claims under
consideration and reads as follows, with italics identifying the limitations
at issue:
1. A method comprising:
receiving a request for content from a device;
identifying a virtual market that is associated with the
content by looking up a table entry associating the content with
the virtual market; and
transmitting, to the device, the content and data for
initiating emulation of a 3-dimensional model of the virtual
market, within an advertisement timeslot during a presentation
of the content via the device, and terminating the emulation by
requiring a virtual user, corresponding to a user of the device,
to traverse through to an end of the 3-dimensional model of the
virtual market.
App. Br. 19 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Re} ections on Appeal
As evidence ofunpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following
prior art:
Kenney us 6,026,376 Feb. 15,2000
2 This decision employs the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the
Specification, filed August 27, 2009; "Non-Final Act." for the Non-Final
Office Action, mailed July 21, 2014; "App. Br." for the Appeal Brief, filed
December 12, 2014; "Ans." for the Examiner's Answer, mailed February 5,
2015; and "Reply Br." for the Reply Brief, filed March 31, 2015.
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Appeal2015-004966
Application 12/548,845
Fukushima et al.
("Fukushima")
Howcroft
Corvin
US 2009/0150944 Al June 11, 2009
US 2010/0125884 Al May 20, 2010
(filed Nov. 18, 2008)
US 2011/0126227 Al May 26, 2011
(filed Feb. 1, 2001)
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1---6, 8-13, and 15-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Howcroft, Kenney, and Corvin. Non-Final Act. 3-15;
App. Br. 7.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Howcroft, Kenney, Corvin, and Fukushima. Non-Final Act. 15; App. Br. 7.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1-13 and 15-20 in light of
Appellant's arguments that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained
below, we disagree with Appellant's assertions regarding error by the
Examiner.
The Rejection of Claims 1-6, 8-13,
and 15-20 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Independent Claims 1, 3, and 12
Claim 1 recites "terminating the [virtual market's] emulation by
requiring a virtual user, corresponding to a user of the device, to traverse
through to an end of the 3-dimensional model of the virtual market." App.
Br. 19 (Claims App.). Claims 3 and 12 include similar limitations. Id.
at 19, 22.
The Examiner finds that Kenney discloses a "virtual three-
dimensional shopping facility" that a user travels through to select products
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Application 12/548,845
for purchase and after "travelling through the store and making purchase[s],
[the] user is returned back to the home-page (by terminating [the] virtual 3-d
shopping facility) .... " Non-Final Act. 3--4, 6, 11. The Examiner also
finds that Corvin discloses a forced advertisement presented so that a
television viewer cannot avoid watching the forced advertisement by
switching channels or turning off the television. Id. at 4, 7, 12.
Appellant argues that the combination of Kenney and Corvin does not
disclose or suggest terminating a virtual market's emulation by requiring a
virtual user to traverse or walk through to an end of the virtual market. App.
Br. 11-14, 16-17. In particular, Appellant contends that "modifying
KENNEY's virtual store shopping system by CORVIN's forced
advertisement system would merely disclose a user KENNEY' s system not
being able to 'escape' from viewing the virtual store by changing channels
or turning off the viewing device." Id. at 11, 14, 16.
Appellant also argues that a forced advertisement according to Corvin
occurs during a scheduled advertising time slot and that a virtual market's
emulation according to the Corvin-Kenney combination would last exactly
as long as the advertising time slot. App. Br. 12, 14, 16. As a result,
Appellant asserts, the virtual market's emulation would not terminate if a
virtual shopper reached the virtual market's end before the advertising time
slot ended, and the virtual shopper could not linger in the virtual market after
the advertising time slot ended. Id. at 12, 14, 16.
In response, the Examiner notes that Corvin teaches or suggests the
general concept of requiring a user to view an advertisement in its entirety
and that "combining this concept with the 3-d virtual shops system of
Kenney would render" claims 1, 3, and 12 obvious. Ans. 3; see id. at 4.
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Application 12/548,845
In reply, Appellant points out that claims 1, 3, and 12 do not recite
anything regarding an advertising time slot and that Corvin's time slot
"cannot be reasonably construed to correspond to the claimed" virtual
market. Reply Br. 2--4.
We agree with the Examiner that Corvin teaches or suggests the
general concept of requiring a user to view an advertisement in its entirety
and when combined with Kenny suggests the user view (traverse) the entire
virtual market. Corvin Abstract, i-fi-121-22, 24. An obviousness analysis
"can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Viewing an advertisement's entire content
corresponds to traveling through a virtual market and viewing the products
offered from start to finish.
Appellant focusses on Corvin' s disclosure that a forced advertisement
may appear during a scheduled advertising time slot. App. Br. 12, 14, 16;
Reply Br. 2--4; see Corvin claim 12. But Corvin also discloses that the
forced advertisement may appear at any point in a television program or
even in a separate window. See Corvin i-fi-125-26, claim 1.
Accordingly, Appellant's arguments have not persuaded us that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3, and 12 for obviousness based on
Howcroft, Kenney, and Corvin. Hence, we sustain the obviousness
rejection.
Dependent Claims 2, 4--6, 8-11, 13, and 15-20
Claims 2, 4--6, 8-11, 13, and 15-20 depend directly or indirectly from
an associated independent claim. App. Br. 19-24 (Claims App.). Appellant
presents the same patentability arguments for these dependent claims as for
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Appeal2015-004966
Application 12/548,845
the associated independent claim. App. Br. 8-17. Because Appellant does
not argue the claims separately, they stand or fall together. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Hence, we sustain the obviousness rejection.
The Rejection of Claim 7 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Claim 7 depends from claim 3. App. Br. 20-21 (Claims App.). For
claim 7, "Appellant submits that FUKUSHIMA does not cure the
deficiencies in the combination ofHOWCROFT, KENNEY, and CORVIN
with respect to claim 3." App. Br. 17. But Appellant does not articulate any
patentability arguments for claim 7 beyond the arguments regarding claim 3.
Id. Because Appellant does not argue claim 7 separately, it stands or falls
with claim 3. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Hence, we sustain the
obviousness rejection of claim 7.
DECISION
We affirm the rejections of claims 1-13 and 15-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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